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Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [6]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: May 16 Principals Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520633. (6 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 16, 1995. Record ID: 9520611. (1 page)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. report	Presentation Slides: OPLAN 40104, Activation Request, Execution Order. (3 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	SACEUR Request for Activation Request Authority. (2 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	Implications of Activation Request. (1 page)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. draft	OPLAN 40104 Approval Process. (2 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
001g. draft	Bosnia: Formulating a Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy. (3 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
001h. paper	State Background Paper for Principals Committee Meeting. (6 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Update on Contact Group Efforts to Gain Milosevic's Recognition. Record ID: 9520617. (2 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: OPLAN 40104 Unanswered Policy Questions. Record ID: 9520625. (1 page)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	Duplicate of 001h. (6 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)

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2013-0687-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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004. letter	Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Granic to Warren Christopher. (3 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
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TAB A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 16, 1995. Record ID: 9520611. (1 page)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
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TAB B



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

May 12, 1995

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~SECRET NO DIS~~
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TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: Acting Secretary Tarnoff

FROM: EUR - Robert C. Frasure *RCF*

SUBJECT: Contact Group Consensus in Frankfurt -
Next Stop is Belgrade

The Contact Group reached a full consensus in Frankfurt on May 12 on a Bosnia recognition/border/sanctions suspension package that should be fielded with Milosevic in Belgrade next week and with the Bosnians.

On sanctions suspension, the following points were agreed:

- There would be a six-month suspension of designated sanctions with a positive UNSC renewal mechanism.
- There will be no actual lift until Pale accepts the CG package. At that point, Phase One sanctions -- airport, sports, and culture which are now suspended -- would be lifted. Other than that agreed point, it was felt that additional lift must be calibrated to implementation of the plan. This framework can be developed later.
- Financial transactions will be freed up, as the Europeans wanted. However, assets will remain frozen and the UNSC resolution will specifically state that credits cannot be provided against frozen assets. (The Bundesbank believes no banks will do so, in that event.)
- The difference was split between the UN and EU lists on strategic trade definitions. To the EU list were added equipment for energy production and petrochemicals. The EU list plus these items will not be suspended. Oil is the key item that remains forbidden. (The traffic jams in Belgrade don't provide much confidence that this is effective.)

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There was considerable interest in the OSCE package that I had suggested to Milosevic. It was agreed that we should actively pursue it in the following manner:

- The FRY and FYROM (a new element, they are now only observers) should get OSCE seats. This would step over the FRY successor state issue and also do something for Gligorov. It will also help us on our small-package diplomacy with the FYROM.
- OSCE takes over the enhanced ICFY border monitoring mission. (The Germans have now matched our pledge for fifty monitors.) In the meantime -- until the OSCE elements are in place -- the ICFY role will continue with certification by the head of mission to be passed directly through Owen to the UN Secretary General.
- The OSCE Long Duration Mission will return to Kosovo, Sandzak, and the Vojvodina.

It should be noted that the Frankfurt meeting was functionally a Quad. Zotov couldn't get there from Moscow. The Germans are to brief the Russians in Bonn this afternoon. We think the Russians will be sufficiently on board with this approach that they will not cause trouble.

It was agreed that I should go to Belgrade early next week on behalf of the CG and explore the packages with Milosevic. My visit would not be publicly announced and the substance of the packages should be closely held.

On the Bosnian side, Sacirbey was in Frankfurt and will be in touch with Izetbegovic. Sacirbey was especially enthusiastic about the OSCE aspect. German CG rep Steiner will go to Mostar for a Federation meeting and will brief Ganic on the packages.

There was great concern about the rapidly deteriorating situation inside Bosnia, especially in Sarajevo. (We always need to be aware of the possibility that we are playing diplomatic word games with ourselves while the war spins out of control.) All sides agree that something must be done about the airport, and air strikes might be necessary. It was agreed that we should warn both the Bosnians and Mladic (via Milosevic) to pull back from the precipice.

We all recognize that this is all a long shot venture. But with the Frankfurt meeting, we seem to be off to a good start.

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TAB C

May 12 Contact Group AgreementIf the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Tightens closure of the inter-Serb border, allows transfer of border mission to OSCE and OSCE monitors to Kosovo

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (notes 1 and 2)
- Suspension of financial sanctions (notes 1 and 3)
- OSCE membership

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG package.

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of all Phase 1 sanctions

And if Pale then:

- Fully implements Contact Group plan

FRY and Pale get in return:

- "Lift of remaining sanctions (plus release of frozen assets) calibrated to implementation in a way to be developed later."

NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for a six-month period and can be renewed only by positive vote by the Security Council.

2. The agreed definition of "strategic goods" includes oil, petroleum products, coal, iron, steel, and other metals *plus energy-related equipment and petro-chemicals*.

3. All financial sanctions are suspended, including credits. Frozen assets are not released. The resolution relaxing sanctions is to contain prohibitions against using frozen assets to secure or otherwise support loans and credits.

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001c. report	Presentation Slides: OPLAN 40104, Activation Request, Execution Order. (3 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

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TO BE PROVIDED

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1 May 1995

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options to reopen Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

2. (U) Background. Sarajevo air operations have been periodically interrupted by the Bosnian Serbs since the beginning of the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces control the area surrounding the airport and the major land routes into Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs have the capability to attack aircraft in flight and while unloading on the airfield. Aircraft are threatened by both antiaircraft weapons and conventional direct and indirect ground systems. The Bosnian Muslims also have the capability, though to a lesser extent, to interdict air operations. UNPROFOR has documented numerous occasions of BiH fire.

3. ~~(S)~~ Discussion. The following options are available for consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo:

Assumptions:

- New UNSCR(s) required to implement a military option will be adopted by the Security Council.
- A parallel diplomatic effort to secure the opening of Sarajevo will be undertaken.

OPTION 1: Secure Sarajevo Airport - forcibly secure and maintain a DMZ around Sarajevo. Create a demilitarized zone (8-10km) around Sarajevo airfield which denies the Bosnian Serbs from employing weapons against aircraft that are in flight or on the ground. This option could require up to a division sized force to secure the airfield and remove the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim presence from the immediate area.

UNPROFOR Action:

- UNPROFOR seize (if necessary) and establish administrative control over the Sarajevo airport
- Secure airfield perimeter and approaches using a combination of troops equipped with means of acquisition for various types of attack. May include night vision devices, GPS, artillery acquisition battery.
- Take direct action to secure high terrain and buildings from belligerents. Move civilians outside of airport safe zone (2-3km). Combatants excluded inside 8-10km zone.

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- Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport. Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to 10 km from the airport.
- NATO Airborne AC-130 and helicopter response capability to attack sniper/mortar/artillery positions. Consider use of a ground quick reaction force.

Belligerent Reaction:

- "Administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government in Pale, e.g., refusing to guarantee the safety of UN flights.
- Employ random sniping incidents due to the particular vulnerability of aircraft
- Small arms fire directed either at aircraft or ground personnel. Will be disruptive even if not directed at airport operations per se.
- Random or continuous mortar and artillery attacks designed to damage the airfield, aircraft or simply to disrupt operations.
- Employment of man portable IR surface to air missiles/AAA designed to directly attack aircraft.
- Employment of longer range systems (heavy artillery, SA-2s from ranges of 30-50kms).
- Horizontal escalation elsewhere in B-H; hostage taking, attacks on ground convoys, attacks on UN personnel, disruption of utilities into Sarajevo and other enclaves.
- BiH may target UNPROFOR attempting to blame the BSA in order to encourage a NATO response against the BSA.

Counteraction:

- Difficult if not impossible to counteract Bosnian Serb horizontal escalation/asymmetric responses.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- Counterbattery radar, NODs, GPS, and other long range acquisition devices linked to means of reaction.
- Up to a brigade dedicated to airport security with heavy quick reaction force, up to a brigade sized force to remove combatants from the Sarajevo airport area.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support
- Air assault capability (company sized)

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Pol-Mil Considerations:

- UNPROFOR/Allies unlikely to support "offensive" operation to open airport.
- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- Allies could call for large US troop and equipment contribution.
- Bosnian Serbs could advertise DMZ as form of ethnic cleansing.

Risk Assessment:

- Irrespective of any of the military measures taken, the absolute safety of transport/civilian aircraft cannot be guaranteed given the threat environment.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, transport, and AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- UNPROFOR would be required to redeploy forces to support this option which could create increased risk in other areas. Only French, UK, Dutch, Canadian forces capable of accomplishing tasks associated with this option.
- Without significant force enhancements, UNPROFOR forces outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Airport sits astride confrontation line; will be difficult to establish which party is responsible for firing.

OPTION 2: Use CAS and air strike packages to support delivery of humanitarian aid flights. Marshall significant NATO air package to suppress immediate threats around Sarajevo airport as aid is flown into and unloaded at the airfield. Package could include integration of target acquisition systems to assist in locating indirect firing systems. Given the nature of the threat surrounding the airfield, target acquisition (rifleman, AA gun, mortar) would be extremely difficult. As a consequence, the ability to deliver effective suppressive fire against these type targets would be extremely difficult.

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~~SECRET~~**UNPROFOR Action:**

- Deploy target acquisition system to Sarajevo airfield. Deploy TACPs to Sarajevo area.
- Package aid deliveries so that CAS/air strike packages support specified high density delivery periods.
- Clearly state intent to use NATO air support for protecting aid deliveries into Sarajevo.
- Specify target categories (high value, artillery pieces, headquarters in Sarajevo vicinity) that NATO may strike in response to Serb attack on humanitarian aid flights.

Belligerent Reaction:

- Continued "administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport. Blocking aid outside airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government refusing safety of flights.
- Hostage taking - placing hostages at weapons sites.
- Direct attack against humanitarian flights.
- BiH may manipulate NATO's intent to use air power to their advantage.

Counteraction:

- Direct attack against targets engaging aircraft.
- Direct attack against Bosnian Serb high value targets.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- AC-130 aircraft.
- EW CAP (EA-6B, EF-111s).

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Troop contributing nations unlikely to support air option due to concern for safety of deployed troops.
- "Dual key" arrangement remains key factor in control of air strikes.
- Could require significant US contribution in terms of air assets.
- Bosnian Serbs likely to use collateral damage as media weapon against US/NATO. Given this scenario, attempts to suppress sniper/mortar fires in an urban environment have a high potential for collateral damage.

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~~SECRET~~**Risk Assessment:**

- Air power alone insufficient to protect humanitarian aid flights and keep airfield open. Threat/target difficult to identify and acquire (snipers, mortars, urban environment, mountainous topography).
- Support aircraft (AC-130) at high risk in semi-integrated air defense network.
- Bosnian Serbs can react in ways (hostage taking, utility shut-down) which limit the effectiveness of air power options.
- High probability of collateral damage and fratricide.

OPTION 3: Open and maintain a road corridor from the Adriatic coast to Sarajevo (15km through Bosnian Serb held territory).

UNPROFOR Action:

- Enhance convoy ability to protect themselves by employing a graduated range of security responses from self protection through heavy force (armor/Infantry Fighting Vehicle) security escorts.
- UNPROFOR can create and employ a "Quick Reaction Force" consisting of heavy ground maneuver units, assault forces, and possibly helicopters.
- To counter interdiction efforts UNPROFOR can obtain and employ combat engineer units/assets moving with convoys or reacting to specific points.
- Provide each convoy with TACPs and continuous overhead air escort (helo/fixed wing).

Belligerent Reaction:

- Incidents of civil disobedience on the part of the population, e.g. crowds blocking roads.
- Halt and delay convoys with intent to delay aid delivery or steal ("tax") contents of the convoys.
- Sniping or other acts of random violence to intimidate and disrupt or stop convoys.
- Attacks on convoys to prevent delivery of aid or as a punitive measure in response to UNPROFOR (or opposing) belligerent actions.
- Belligerents may stop/delay aid by interdicting LOC.
 - Barricade roadway Mine road segments
 - Destroy bridges Block tunnels

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Counteraction:

- Difficult to counteract Bosnian Serb indirect responses - mining roads, destroying bridges (72 choke points on the Ploce - Sarajevo route).

Recommended Force Enhancements.

- Up to a brigade for route security (approx 15 km).
- Quick Reaction Force (mech and air assault).
- 1-2 engineer battalions.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support.
- MP units.

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- UNPROFOR/NATO allies could call for significant US contribution.
- UNPROFOR unlikely to accept full enforcement of mandate.

Risk Assessment:

- Bosnian Serb indirect/asymmetrical responses can halt aid delivery.
- Current UNPROFOR forces not capable of providing robust ground escort package. Without enhancements, UNPROFOR forces would be outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Routes parallel numerous hot spots near the active confrontation line. Convoys may encounter indirect fire from the fighting.

NOTE: These options were developed based on the assigned mission - reopen Sarajevo airport. The options are intentionally robust based on the threat capabilities and areas required to be secured. An air strike only package directed against high value targets throughout Bosnia was not considered. This approach could be perceived as purely offensive and unrelated to the

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direct opening of the airport at Sarajevo. The danger to relief operations and UNPROFOR troops could rise dramatically given this approach to reopening Sarajevo.

5. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation. The military options are high risk, high cost operations. Unless the US is willing to employ ground forces to support the securing of Sarajevo airfield and/or the coastal route to Sarajevo, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR or NATO will support a military option. At this time, the Joint Staff recommends against executing a military option.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV
X49435
(eur/eurcenea/bosnia/dosom/sarajevo)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. draft	Bosnia: Formulating a Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy. (3 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2707

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Proposed US Policy Principles
(During Withdrawal)

- Mission. NATO (and the US) will limit its mission to the withdrawal operation, and depart when that operation is finished.
- Neutrality. NATO will remain impartial and neutral during the withdrawal, and will not support Bosnian (or Croatian) military forces, or turn over territory or weapons to them.
- Use of force. NATO forces will be authorized to take the necessary measures (including lethal force) consistent with the laws of war against any threat (from any faction and including nominal civilians) to protect themselves and UN personnel (including hostage rescue) and to protect the accomplishment of the operation.
- Withdrawal priority. The withdrawal priority will be to remove UN personnel (civilian and military) first, then UN forces' weapons, and finally UN equipment. Weapons and equipment not withdrawn will be disabled or destroyed whenever possible.
- Command and control. [Once the UN asks for NATO help in a withdrawal anywhere in the theater, NATO will assume command of all current UNPROFOR units throughout FRY, subject to delegation of local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn. OSD/JCS] or [NATO will have flexibility to fully support a partial or complete withdrawal if it must, but also to remain in a supporting role if not asked and not needed by UNPROFOR.]
- No dual key. After TOA to NATO, no dual key arrangements will apply to any air operation judged by the NATO commander to be needed to support the withdrawal operation. Dual key arrangements will remain in place for areas and functions from which UN forces are not being withdrawn. The SRSg would continue to direct and be responsible for any remaining civil UN operations.
- Non defense/evacuation of civilians. NATO forces will not attempt to defend the Bosnian (or Serb, or Croatian) populations and will not undertake to evacuate civilians from the enclaves (or elsewhere).

• Authorized secondary, not-to-interfere activities.
However, to the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to

-- support humanitarian assistance (aid delivery, refugee relocation, etc.) efforts of UNHCR and NGOs;

[-- assist in the evacuation of civilians from enclaves and other exposed areas, but not take over responsibility for their shelter or safety after arrival]

-- respond to attacks on civilian populations in areas where NATO forces are operating;

-- continue to conduct current NATO-authorized operations, including SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, CAS, TEZ, protection of safe areas;

-- destroy warring faction weapons/equipment previously confiscated by UNPROFOR.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001h. paper	State Background Paper for Principals Committee Meeting. (6 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20623

May 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs

Office of Management and Budget


MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Report on Contact Group Meeting ~~(S)~~

Request you pass the attached close-hold, State Department report on the May 12 Contact Group meeting to your Deputy and Principal. The report will be discussed at the Principal's Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 16, 1995. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A State Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Va. Thorden NARA, Date 6/2/14
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 12, 1995

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

12 10/1/2013

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: Acting Secretary Tarnoff

FROM: EUR -- Robert C. Frasure *RCF*

SUBJECT: Contact Group Consensus in Frankfurt -
Next Stop is Belgrade

The Contact Group reached a full consensus in Frankfurt on May 12 on a Bosnia recognition/border/sanctions suspension package that should be fielded with Milosevic in Belgrade next week and with the Bosnians.

On sanctions suspension, the following points were agreed:

- There would be a six-month suspension of designated sanctions with a positive UNSC renewal mechanism.
- There will be no actual lift until Pale accepts the CG package. At that point, Phase One sanctions -- airport, sports, and culture which are now suspended -- would be lifted. Other than that agreed point, it was felt that additional lift must be calibrated to implementation of the plan. This framework can be developed later.
- Financial transactions will be freed up, as the Europeans wanted. However, assets will remain frozen and the UNSC resolution will specifically state that credits cannot be provided against frozen assets. (The Bundesbank believes no banks will do so, in that event.)
- The difference was split between the UN and EU lists on strategic trade definitions. To the EU list were added equipment for energy production and petrochemicals. The EU list plus these items will not be suspended. Oil is the key item that remains forbidden. (The traffic jams in Belgrade don't provide much confidence that this is effective.)

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There was considerable interest in the OSCE package that I had suggested to Milosevic. It was agreed that we should actively pursue it in the following manner:

- The FRY and FYROM (a new element, they are now only observers) should get OSCE seats. This would step over the FRY successor state issue and also do something for Gligorov. It will also help us on our small-package diplomacy with the FYROM.
- OSCE takes over the enhanced ICFY border monitoring mission. (The Germans have now matched our pledge for fifty monitors.) In the meantime -- until the OSCE elements are in place -- the ICFY role will continue with certification by the head of mission to be passed directly through Owen to the UN Secretary General.
- The OSCE Long Duration Mission will return to Kosovo, Sandzak, and the Vojvodina.

It should be noted that the Frankfurt meeting was functionally a Quad. Zotov couldn't get there from Moscow. The Germans are to brief the Russians in Bonn this afternoon. We think the Russians will be sufficiently on board with this approach that they will not cause trouble.

It was agreed that I should go to Belgrade early next week on behalf of the CG and explore the packages with Milosevic. My visit would not be publicly announced and the substance of the packages should be closely held.

On the Bosnian side, Sacirbey was in Frankfurt and will be in touch with Izetbegovic. Sacirbey was especially enthusiastic about the OSCE aspect. German CG rep Steiner will go to Mostar for a Federation meeting and will brief Ganic on the packages.

There was great concern about the rapidly deteriorating situation inside Bosnia, especially in Sarajevo. (We always need to be aware of the possibility that we are playing diplomatic word games with ourselves while the war spins out of control.) All sides agree that something must be done about the airport, and air strikes might be necessary. It was agreed that we should warn both the Bosnians and Mladic (via Milosevic) to pull back from the precipice.

We all recognize that this is all a long shot venture. But with the Frankfurt meeting, we seem to be off to a good start.

SEEURRCF 194

~~SECRET~~

20623

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *TC*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(10)*
SUBJECT: Bob Frasure's Contact Group Report

Bob Frasure's memo to the Secretary on the Contact Group meeting in Frankfurt is attached. Bob will attend the Tuesday PC before heading to Belgrade to see Milosevic.

While the outcome appears to be positive, Principals should review one last time before sending Bob off to see Milosevic. Bob agrees we should circulate the memo to Deputies and Principals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *nr* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A State Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Va Bond* NARA, Date *6/2/13*

2013-0607-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20617

May 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DON KERRICK (C)

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Contact Group

Attached is a memorandum to the President reviewing the new steps we are taking within the Contact Group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

cc: Rick Saunders

Sandy Toney

*Mem contains input
from OVP staff and
Sgt. Frazee. Mem has
NOT cleared & personally
[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Va. [Signature]* NARA, Date *6/2/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Update on Contact Group Efforts to Gain Milosevic's Recognition. Record ID: 9520617. (2 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2707

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: OPLAN 40104 Unanswered Policy Questions. Record ID: 9520625. (1 page)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [6]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	Duplicate of 001h. (6 pages)	05/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2707

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SV Copy
Inlet Vision
12 May 1995 (17)

PROPOSED US POLICY PRINCIPLES DURING NATO-LED UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

- **NATO Mission.** NATO's (and the US) mission is to conduct withdrawal operations and depart. There will be no follow-on missions. To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will continue to conduct NATO-authorized operations, including SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, CAS, TEZ, and protection of safe areas.
- **Neutrality.** NATO forces will remain completely neutral and impartial during the withdrawal, and will not support Bosnian government or Croatian military forces. NATO will not turn over weapons or hand off territory to any warring party.
- **Use of Force.** NATO will be authorized to take necessary self-defense measures, including lethal force if required, to protect themselves and UN personnel from any faction, including civilians, regardless of location. NATO will use all necessary measures required to accomplish their mission.
- **Withdrawal priority.** The withdrawal priority will be to remove UN personnel (civilian and military) first, then UN forces' weapons, and then UN equipment. UN weapons and equipment not withdrawn will be disabled or destroyed whenever possible. To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to destroy warring faction weapons/equipment previously confiscated by UNPROFOR.
- **Command and Control.** NATO will continue to support UNPROFOR operations under existing UN mandates. Once the UN asks for NATO help in withdrawal anywhere in the theater and, prior to the withdrawal actually commencing, NATO will assume command and control of all current UNPROFOR units throughout FRY to conduct emergency, partial, or total withdrawal operations. NATO will delegate local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn.
 - ⇒ * **Dual-key.** After TOA, NATO Theater Command is in effect and dual key arrangements will not apply to NATO forces in theater, nor to countries in which NATO-led withdrawal operations are authorized, nor to areas within the theater from which attacks on NATO-led withdrawal operations are launched or threatened. Except as provided above, dual-key arrangements will remain in

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PER E.O. 13526

12 10/1/7013

place for areas from which UNPF is not being withdrawn as delimited by the NATO Theater Commander.

- **Civilians.** NATO forces will not attempt to defend Bosnian Muslim, Croat, or Serb civilian populations and will not undertake to evacuate civilians from the enclaves (or elsewhere). However, to the extent it can, without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to:

- ⇒ Respond to attacks on civilian populations in area where NATO forces are operating.
- ⇒ Support humanitarian assistance (aid delivery, refugee relocation, etc.) efforts of UNHCR and NGOs.

Notes:

- * Dual-key statement should not be considered as the final USC policy position until agreed upon at the NAC.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. letter	Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Granic to Warren Christopher. (3 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

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