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Folder Title:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 19, 1995. Record ID: 9520653. (1 page)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy. (2 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
003. agenda	Duplicate of 001. (1 page)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memcon	Meeting with President Franjo Tudjman. Record ID: 9507894. (9 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: SYG Foreshadows Options for UNPROFOR. (4 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	Sarajevo Fighting Fires. (2 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
007. paper	NATO Withdrawal of UNPROFOR. (2 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
008. paper	Contact Group: Consensus on Recognition. (1 page)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F

vz2706

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20653

May 18, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget


MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 19, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. An NSC Discussion Paper is at Tab B. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Va. [Signature] NARA, Date 6/2/2014

2013-087-f

~~SECRET~~

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COLLECTION:

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BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICESNSC DISCUSSION PAPERIntroduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. Whither UNPROFOR: U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ◆ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ◆ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ◆ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ◆ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ◆ Muddle through with the status quo: French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ◆ "Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate: UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ◆ "Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates: could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ◆ "Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement: the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate." Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. Whither OPLAN 40104, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal? What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations? Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104? If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ◆ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation. We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ◆ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ◆ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.


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20653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK^h/NELSON DREW *ND*
SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 19, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *AV* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By *La Thind* NARA, Date *6/2/14*
2013-0687-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 18 MAY 95

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MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX+1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. LEON E. PANETTA WHITE HOUSE 1ST FLOOR, WEST WING WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

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Initials: RZ Date: 6/2/14

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DATE

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SIGNATURE

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: VIA FAX

COL. T. R. PATRICK
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ROOM 2E865
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-0001

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PAGES

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS**

Initials: VZ Date: 6/2/14

2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. paper	Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy. (2 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2706

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20602

May 10, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN


DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, May 9, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Va Thinh NARA, Date 6/2/14
2013-0687-F

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 9, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:15 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

OVP:

William Wise

State:

Peter Tarnoff

Robert Frasure

Chris Hill

DOD:

Walter Slocombe

James Pardew

OMB:

Gordon Adams

John Burnim

USUN:

Madeleine Albright

Rick Inderfurth

David Scheffer

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Norm Schindler

JCS:

ADM William Owens

LTG Wesley Clark

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

BG Don Kerrick

Steven Simon

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss next steps in dealing with the Contact Group on what degree of sanctions relief to offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia. Following Ambassador Frasure's report on his two meetings with Milosevic, Deputies discussed a State proposal for a new, two-pronged approach that incorporates sanctions relief and new OSCE involvement. Deputies directed that a paper outlining the new proposal be circulated to the Deputies by May 10 for subsequent Principals consideration. (Action: State) Deputies reemphasized the need to work in close coordination with the Bosnian Government on any proposal regarding its goal of gaining

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genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders in return for limited sanctions relief and a closure of the border with Bosnian Serb territory. ~~(S)~~

2. Deputies reviewed the situation in Croatia and progress on preventing escalation following the Vice President's meeting with President Tudjman in London over the weekend. Deputies agreed that the situation remained very volatile and that the U.S. should continue to press President Tudjman to exercise restraint. They agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should follow-up with Tudjman on his agreement with the Vice President to accept some UNCRO presence in Sector West and to refrain from military action in other areas of conflict. Deputies further directed that Ambassador Albright and Ambassador Galbraith continue efforts with appropriate Croatian authorities to develop positions that will further defuse the situation. (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies discussed options for dealing with the situation in Sarajevo where increased violations of the exclusion zone and the Bosnian Serb closure of the Sarajevo airport continue to erode UN authority and NATO credibility. Deputies agreed that the untenable situation, and lack of UN will to fully execute its mandate, places the continuation of UNPROFOR in Bosnia at serious risk. Noting that with the change in Government, the French will undertake a review of their participation in UNPROFOR, Deputies directed that a strategy be developed for gaining French support for tougher UN action in Sarajevo. (Action: State) Deputies further directed that the JCS Sarajevo military options paper be circulated to Principals. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

5. Deputies briefly discussed the IWG efforts in developing a post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy and in drafting answers to the unanswered policy questions regarding OPLAN 40104. Noting that more time was needed to review the work, Deputies asked that Agency comments be promptly provided (NLT COB May 11) directly to State (EUR). State will incorporate comments and circulate another version for Deputies final review on Friday, May 12. (Action: State) A subsequent version which incorporates any additional Deputies' comments will be circulated to Principals. ~~(S)~~

6. Deputies discussed the SACEUR's request for authority to issue an ACTREQ for the enabling and main forces in OPLAN 40104 that may be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) next week. Deputies agreed that this request goes beyond existing Principals' authorization and directed that the following actions be taken to frame the issue for Principals' decision:

- o Present Principals with proposed answers to OPLAN 40104 unanswered policy questions NLT Monday, May 15. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- o Clarify the significance of the ACTREQ as it relates to the overall OPLAN 40104 approval process. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(S)~~
- o Gauge likely NATO response to the request and develop appropriate guidance to U.S. representatives at NATO. (Action: State/DoD) ~~(S)~~
- o Prepare ACTREQ options/decision paper for Principals' consideration NLT Monday, May 15. (Action: DoD with State input) ~~(S)~~
- o Defer Congressional briefings until questions concerning new authorities requested by the SACEUR are clarified. (Action: NSC/IWG) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995

20653

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK⁴²/NELSON DREW *D*
SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held May 19, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

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Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van O...* NARA, Date *6/2/12*

2013-0687-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
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DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~187~~

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Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

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Tab B NSC Discussion Paper

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Va Thanden NARA, Date 6/2/14

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

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May 17, 1995

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES
NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

Introduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. Whither UNPROFOR: U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ♦ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ♦ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ♦ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ♦ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ♦ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ♦ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ♦ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates:** could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ♦ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate". Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. Whither OPLAN 40104, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ♦ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ♦ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ♦ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memcon	Meeting with President Franjo Tudjman. Record ID: 9507894. (9 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2706

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	re: SYG Foreshadows Options for UNPROFOR. (4 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	Sarajevo Fighting Fires. (2 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F

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TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL
TO CAPITOL HILL

- I am calling to let you know what is going on in NATO with regard to contingency planning for possibly assisting in the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping force -- UNPROFOR -- in Bosnia if the UN asks NATO for such assistance.
- It remains our position that the best hope for containing the violence in Bosnia lies with the retention of the UN peace forces there.
- However, tomorrow [Friday, May 19] U.S. (NATO) Ambassador Robert Hunter will join the other NATO ambassadors in approving the Supreme Allied Commander's (SACEUR) Activation Request (ACTREQ) for a possible NATO withdrawal force.
- This is a request for contributing nations to identify and prepare specific forces that would be made available for the operation.
- The ACTREQ requests the time frame the forces would be available, whether they will be available for emergency measures, and whether they would be available for full implementation of the withdrawal plan.
- This request does not commit forces to actual deployment, nor will the U.S. response to that request do so.
- It does allow for the commanders involved to identify shortfalls and requests national authorities to commence with the proper administrative preparations and training for those forces identified.
- Any further decision regarding actual deployment of those forces will require another NATO decision.
- We will, of course, consult with you prior to such a decision. We have offered to brief you at your earliest convenience on the entire NATO withdrawal plan.

1 /

Attached is a proposed Dole amendment that will likely be offered to the SFRC consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act mark up beginning next Wed. on Serbian sanctions.

The first page is a copy of existing Levin language on Serbian sanctions.

State is preparing talking points on amendment for Committee mark up.

Bill Danvers
18 May

not later than March 1, 1994. In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Secretary of State.

(b) **LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.**—Section 401(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting before the period the following: ", except that funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance (other than funds appropriated pursuant to such paragraph) may be obligated for humanitarian and civic assistance under this section only for incidental costs of carrying out such assistance".

(c) **NOTIFICATIONS REGARDING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.**—Any notification provided to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to assistance activities under section 2551 of title 10, United States Code, shall include a detailed description of any items for which transportation is provided that are excess nonlethal supplies of the Department of Defense, including the quantity, acquisition value, and value at the time of the transportation of such items.

(d) **REPORT ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES.**—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities planned to be carried out by the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1995 under sections 401, 402, 2547, and 2551 of title 10, United States Code. The report shall include information, developed after consultation with the Secretary of State, on the distribution of excess nonlethal supplies transferred to the Secretary of State during fiscal year 1993 pursuant to section 2547 of that title.

(2) The report shall be submitted at the same time that the President submits the budget for fiscal year 1995 to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

(e) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—The funds authorized to be appropriated by section 301(18) shall be available to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities under sections 401, 402, and 2551 of title 10, United States Code.

(f) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

Subtitle B—Policies Regarding Specific Countries

SEC. 1511. SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.

(a) **CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH SANCTIONS.**—The sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, that were imposed by or pursuant to the following directives of the executive branch shall (except as provided under subsections (d) and (e)) remain in effect until changed by law:

(1) Executive Order 12808 of May 30, 1992, as continued in effect on May 25, 1993.

(2) Executive Order 12810 of June 5, 1992.

(3) Executive Order 12831 of January 15, 1993.

(4) Executive Order 12846 of April 25, 1993.

(5) Department of State Public Notice 1427, effective July 11, 1991.

(6) Proclamation 6389 of December 5, 1991 (56 Fed. Register 64467).

(7) Department of Transportation Order 92-5-38 of May 20, 1992.

(8) Federal Aviation Administration action of June 19, 1992 (14 C.F.R. Part 91).

(b) **PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE.**—No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by law may be obligated or expended on behalf of the government of Serbia or the government of Montenegro.

(c) **INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any assistance from that institution to the government of Serbia or the government of Montenegro, except for basic human needs.

(d) **EXCEPTION.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized and encouraged to exempt from sanctions imposed against Serbia and Montenegro that are described in subsection (a) those United States-supported programs, projects, or activities that involve reform of the electoral process, the development of democratic institutions or democratic political parties, or humanitarian assistance (including refugee care and human rights observation).

(e) **WAIVER AUTHORITY.**—(1) The President may waive or modify the application, in whole or in part, of any sanction described in subsection (a), the prohibition in subsection (b), or the requirement in subsection (c).

(2) Such a waiver or modification may only be effective upon certification by the President to Congress that the President has determined that the waiver or modification is necessary (A) to meet emergency humanitarian needs, or (B) to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is acceptable to the parties.

SEC. 1512. INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED FORCES IN SOMALIA.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOMALIA.**—

(1) Since United States Armed Forces made significant contributions under Operation Restore Hope towards the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and restoration of peace in the region to end the humanitarian disaster that had claimed more than 300,000 lives.

(2) Since the mission of United States forces in support of the United Nations appears to be evolving from the establishment of "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations," as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992, to one of internal security and nation building.

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for foreign aid bill

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**PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN AS-
SISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL, FIS-
CAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997**

Viz:

1 At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the follow-
2 ing new section:

3 SEC. ____ RESTRICTIONS ON THE TERMINATION OF SANC-
4 TIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.

5 (a) RESTRICTIONS.—Section 1511 of the National
6 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public
7 Law 103-160) is amended by striking subsection (e) (re-
8 lating to waiver authority) and inserting the following new
9 subsection:

10 “(e) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in
11 this subsection is a certification that the Federal Republic
12 of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro)
13 has—

14 “(1) halted its aggression against the Republic
15 of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

16 “(2) terminated all forms of support for the
17 control and occupation by Serbian forces of any and
18 all regions within the sovereign territories of the re-
19 publics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia;

20 “(3) terminated all forms of support, including

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1 air, for Serbian separatist militants and their leaders
2 in the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cro-
3 atia;

4 "(4) terminated all ties and contact between its
5 political and military leadership and those of the
6 Serb separatist militants in the republics of Bosnia
7 and Herzegovina and Croatia;

8 "(5) extended full respect for the territorial in-
9 tegrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia, and the
11 former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

12 "(6) restored full human and civil rights to the
13 majority Albanian population in Kosova;

14 "(7) restored political autonomy to Kosova and
15 to Vojvodina;

16 "(8) restored full human and civil rights to eth-
17 nic non-Serbs in Serbia, including non-Serbs in the
18 Sandjak and Vojvodina;

19 "(9) allowed the monitor missions of the Orga-
20 nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to
21 return to Kosova to carry out their duties with the
22 full cooperation and support of Serbia and local au-
23 thorities; and

24 "(10) cooperated fully with the United Nations
25 War Crimes Tribunal, including by surrendering all

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1 available and requested evidence and those indicted
2 individuals who are residing the territory of Serbia
3 and Montenegro."

4 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1511(a) of
5 such Act is amended by striking "subsections (d) and (e))
6 remain in effect until changed by law" and inserting "sub-
7 section (d)) remain in effect until the certification require-
8 ments of subsection (e) have been met".

*Embassy of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Washington, DC*

No.02-54/95

The Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents its compliments to the United States Department of State and has the honor to forward a note from the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The text is as follows:

"This morning at 8:40 a.m. paramilitary forces of the Pale Serbs commenced an intensive artillery attack against Sarajevo from several directions.

This attack is continuing.

Several hundred heavy artillery shells have hit Sarajevo. Dozens have landed in the very center of the city.

The attack is being carried out by heavy artillery on positions from within NATO's exclusion zone. The Pale Serbs are using weaponry that should have been under UNPROFOR control.

Several civilians, including children, have been killed and severely wounded.

UNPROFOR forces have also been targeted in the artillery attacks, but have not returned fire.

We understand that UNPROFOR has asked NATO planes to call off flights over Sarajevo.

This attack violates valid UN resolutions and NATO decisions designating Sarajevo as a "safe area" and "exclusion zone". The Pale Serbs, recognizing the passivity of the international community, are being encouraged to launch even stronger attacks against Sarajevo.

We are requesting that your Government take urgent steps in order to protect Sarajevo, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the NATO exclusion zone".

The Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina takes this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

Washington, DC, May 16, 1995

*Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, DC*





Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York

May 16, 1995

H.E. M. Jean Bernard Merimee
President Security Council
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

Upon the instructions of the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we direct the following facts and considerations to the Security Council.

At approximately 8:40 A.M. Sarajevo time, the besieging Serbian forces launched a multipronged and multifaceted assault upon both the defensive lines of Sarajevo and its population. As of the time of this letter, 6:00 PM Sarajevo time, the attack continues unabated.

The direct shelling and sniping of civilians has already accounted for a large number of casualties including murdered children. The number of heavy projectiles fired into Sarajevo by the Pale Serbs has eclipsed our capacity to keep exact numbers but certainly exceeds several hundred. At least some of the fired projectiles came from heavy weapons recently taken from the United Nations collection points. All of the heavy weapons used in this attack, by definition of course, violate the now largely fictionary "exclusion zone" around Sarajevo.

Simultaneously timed, the Serbian forces have also launched a two pronged artillery and infantry assault upon the defensive lines of the Government forces protecting the city. From the north of the city, the Serbians have opened a 4 to 5 kilometer front. From the south of the city, the attackers have opened up to a 6 kilometer front with even greater intensity.

This coordinated offensive operation by the Serbian forces could not have been initiated without substantial advance preparation. It appears to be part of a concerted plan of action employed by the besieging Serbian forces in increasing their strangulation of the city over the last several weeks.

We also have information that UNPROFOR has been targeted within the city environs, of course, without any response yet.

At least some United Nations' functionaries are implying in their wide ranging comments to the media that the Bosnians have provoked the Serbian assault, and, therefore, that this justifies a "no-response" attitude from UNPROFOR and NATO. Let us be clear on the following:

1. President Izetbegovic has personally informed me that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not engaged in offensive actions, consistent with our commitment made on April 30, 1995 that we would not undertake offensive military action;

2. The multipronged and coordinated attack upon the civilian population of, and defensive positions guarding Sarajevo could only have been initiated after substantial preparation, and is another escalation of the tightening noose around Sarajevo; For several weeks now, while emphasizing their rejection of the Contact Group plan, Karadzic, and other extremist Serbian leaders have been promising a new resolve in pursuing military solution for all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sarajevo, in particular.

3. The failure of UNPROFOR and, by extension, NATO to respond to this noose that has been tightening daily in front all of us can only be deemed a contributing factor to the current dramatic situation;

4. Blaming the defenders for the current assault may serve the dubious purposes of some who want to escape responsibility for non-action and the ever worsening consequences;

5. The International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has recently officially indicted some and accused others, particularly Karadzic and Mladic, of war crimes including for the shelling and sniping of civilians in Sarajevo and other towns. Those, including UN officials, that somehow rationalize the targeting of civilians by referring to fictitious or real Bosnian "provocation" not only ignore the documented evidence of the ever tightening Serbian noose, but also seem to equate the targeting of civilians with military objectives. These rationalizations may serve the purpose of both soothing consciences and attempting to justify the failure to respond to the attacks upon the safe area/exclusion zone of Sarajevo as mandated. But one final caution: war crimes cannot be rationalized by fictitious or real provocations, and those that employ such rationalization are on the verge of a free fall into a moral and legal chasm which has already swallowed Karadzic and Mladic;


The people of Sarajevo find noxious the tired commentary of United Nations' spokesmen repeating the often abused line "both parties have resorted to a military solution." First, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has agreed to the Contact Group peace plan while the Pale Serbs have not. Second, the death of civilians that are specifically targeted in Sarajevo and other places cannot be thus rationalized. These civilians are the victims of war crimes and not military options. They were neither combatants nor bystanders, but the targets of terrorism, whether in Sarajevo, London or Oklahoma city.

Finally, Mr. President, once again emphasizing our commitment not to undertake military offensive action, we also must counter with the obvious position that we cannot, in the future, continue to stand-by while the besieging Serbian forces tighten the noose and those mandated to respond only scurry for excuses to justify inaction. Our responsibility to our population, sovereignty, and territorial integrity does not allow us to ignore the reality and to find comfort in fiction.

May I ask Excellency for Your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept Excellency the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,



Muhamed Sacirbey
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

BOSNIA: FORMULATING A POST-UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL STRATEGY

In carrying out planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, NATO has worked on the very narrow assumption that it will enter Bosnia, extract UNPROFOR, and leave. Even if this turns out to be the case, we cannot state with any degree of certainty what Bosnia will look like after UNPROFOR departs. Will the UN retain a residual presence, continuing to provide assistance to the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo? If not, who will? Will we push NATO to be ready to take a more assertive role in the conflict, particularly in and around a strangled Sarajevo? If multilateralism fails, will the U.S. be ready to provide air support, humanitarian supplies and arms? These are the questions that must be examined in formulating a post-withdrawal strategy.

Humanitarian Assistance

If UNPROFOR withdrawal is carried out in a relatively permissive environment, UNHCR and other NGO's may be able to stay on the ground, continuing to provide relief supplies to the five most vulnerable areas of the country: the three eastern enclaves, Bihac and Sarajevo. Many areas of the Federation, however, would have to begin the process of distributing relief on their own.

At the moment, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the UN's coordinating agency for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia. The World Food program (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) operate in conjunction with UNHCR in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and United Nations Volunteers operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNHCR's position -- and thus that of its implementing partners -- remains what it has always been: It will continue operations as long as the security situation permits.

One of the most important NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, has said it will remain in Bosnia as long as possible. In addition, there are over 100 NGOs in the former Yugoslavia, many of them implementing partners of the UN or of bilateral donors such as the U.S., or operating on their own. The EC has several projects, among them the EU Administration of Mostar project, as well as its monitors, and these functions would presumably continue after UNPROFOR withdrawal.

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VZ 10/1/2013

NATO's Role

OPLAN 40104 makes no provision for a NATO mission in Bosnia, such as support for humanitarian relief efforts, after UNPROFOR withdraws. Any determination of NATO's post-UNPROFOR role would therefore require a policy decision and would need to take into account several factors:

-- Conditions of withdrawal. Bosnian Serb opposition to withdrawal could lead to direct military confrontation with U.S. and NATO forces. Under such a scenario, international support might be more forthcoming for lifting the arms embargo and taking broader military actions. Such support would be less likely if the withdrawal is not contested.

-- Allied support of lift and strike. In the face of Russian opposition to lift, but possible support from key Allies, we could press for a unilateral NATO commitment to the Bosnian government to assist it obtain arms and to provide air power. If key Allies are not prepared to support us, we would have to consider building a coalition of the willing.

-- Continuation of legal mandates. Without new UN resolutions, the authorization for NATO close air support and the protection of safe areas and exclusion zones may lapse with UNPROFOR's withdrawal. The legal framework for enforcement of the No-fly zone and Sharp Guard, in contrast, would probably continue, although for the former, NATO would need new technical arrangements.

The U.S. Role

UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia will increase pressure on the U.S. to become more involved in Bosnia, diplomatically and militarily. If withdrawal is precipitated by passage in the U.S. Congress of a unilateral lift bill, the U.S. will be under great pressure to help arm and train Bosnian troops. While Congress wants to lift the arms embargo, it might try to tie our hands in using military force, seriously complicating our ability to help. If the withdrawal is the result of British and/or French exhaustion, we will still be under great pressure to support the Bosnian Government by lifting the arms embargo.

In the event of withdrawal, the U.S. will in short order be faced with the following decisions:

-- Whether to Lift the Embargo: The U.S. will be under great pressure after withdrawal to revisit the lift issue in the Security Council (assuming the withdrawal is not precipitated by unilateral lift). Since the Russians are

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unlikely to go along with multilateral lift, we might consider the alternative of "great power lift", i.e., lift by the U.S., France and Britain (while this option would be preferable to unilateral action, it is not clear that Allies would go along, even after withdrawal). Our remaining options would be unilateral lift or doing nothing.

-- Whether to Plan for and Provide Humanitarian Aid: If U.N. relief agencies retreat with UNPROFOR, we will have to make quick decisions on humanitarian issues, i.e., opening a relief corridor to Sarajevo or the enclaves, perhaps using air power to break the strangulation of the city.

-- Whether to Strike: Once the UN is removed, the U.S., as the strongest advocate of air action, will be under great pressure to retaliate for Serb violations, either through NATO or unilaterally.

-- Whether to Arm and Train: If the arms embargo is lifted, unilaterally or multilaterally, we will have to decide how to arm the Bosnians and train them in the use of weapons. This might include training in weapons left behind by departing UNPROFOR troops.

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20623

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW 
FROM: DON KERRICK 
SUBJECT: Bob Frasure's Contact Group Report

Bob Frasure's memo to the Secretary on the Contact Group meeting in Frankfurt is attached. Bob will attend the Tuesday PC before heading to Belgrade to see Milosevic.

While the outcome appears to be positive, Principals should review one last time before sending Bob off to see Milosevic. Bob agrees we should circulate the memo to Deputies and Principals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A State Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Va Zbhl NARA, Date 6/2/2014

703-0087-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Report on Contact Group Meeting ~~TS~~

Request you pass the attached close hold State Department report on the May 12 Contact Group meeting to your Deputy and Principal. The report will be discussed at the Principal's Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 16, 1995. ~~TS~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A State Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Ja. Bowl NARA, Date 6/2/14

2013-0687-F



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

May 12, 1995

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~SECRET NODIS~~
DECL:OADR

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: Acting Secretary Tarnoff

FROM: EUR - Robert C. Frasure *RCF*

SUBJECT: Contact Group Consensus in Frankfurt -
Next Stop is Belgrade

The Contact Group reached a full consensus in Frankfurt on May 12 on a Bosnia recognition/border/sanctions suspension package that should be fielded with Milosevic in Belgrade next week and with the Bosnians.

On sanctions suspension, the following points were agreed:

- There would be a six-month suspension of designated sanctions with a positive UNSC renewal mechanism.
- There will be no actual lift until Pale accepts the CG package. At that point, Phase One sanctions -- airport, sports, and culture which are now suspended -- would be lifted. Other than that agreed point, it was felt that additional lift must be calibrated to implementation of the plan. This framework can be developed later.
- Financial transactions will be freed up, as the Europeans wanted. However, assets will remain frozen and the UNSC resolution will specifically state that credits cannot be provided against frozen assets. (The Bundesbank believes no banks will do so, in that event.)
- The difference was split between the UN and EU lists on strategic trade definitions. To the EU list were added equipment for energy production and petrochemicals. The EU list plus these items will not be suspended. Oil is the key item that remains forbidden. (The traffic jams in Belgrade don't provide much confidence that this is effective.)

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VZ 10/1/2013

There was considerable interest in the OSCE package that I had suggested to Milosevic. It was agreed that we should actively pursue it in the following manner:

- The FRY and FYROM (a new element, they are now only observers) should get OSCE seats. This would step over the FRY successor state issue and also do something for Gligorov. It will also help us on our small-package diplomacy with the FYROM.
- OSCE takes over the enhanced ICFY border monitoring mission. (The Germans have now matched our pledge for fifty monitors.) In the meantime -- until the OSCE elements are in place -- the ICFY role will continue with certification by the head of mission to be passed directly through Owen to the UN Secretary General.
- The OSCE Long Duration Mission will return to Kosovo, Sandzak, and the Vojvodina.

It should be noted that the Frankfurt meeting was functionally a Quad. Zotov couldn't get there from Moscow. The Germans are to brief the Russians in Bonn this afternoon. We think the Russians will be sufficiently on board with this approach that they will not cause trouble.

It was agreed that I should go to Belgrade early next week on behalf of the CG and explore the packages with Milosevic. My visit would not be publicly announced and the substance of the packages should be closely held.

On the Bosnian side, Sacirbey was in Frankfurt and will be in touch with Izetbegovic. Sacirbey was especially enthusiastic about the OSCE aspect. German CG rep Steiner will go to Mostar for a Federation meeting and will brief Ganic on the packages.

There was great concern about the rapidly deteriorating situation inside Bosnia, especially in Sarajevo. (We always need to be aware of the possibility that we are playing diplomatic word games with ourselves while the war spins out of control.) All sides agree that something must be done about the airport, and air strikes might be necessary. It was agreed that we should warn both the Bosnians and Mladic (via Milosevic) to pull back from the precipice.

We all recognize that this is all a long shot venture. But with the Frankfurt meeting, we seem to be off to a good start.

SEEURRCF 194



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (H)**LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT UNIT****FAX SHEET**DATE: 5/16TO: DON KERRICK / SANDY VERSHADOVFAX NUMBER: 456-9150FROM: Tom ROBERTSONPAGES (INCLUDING COVER SHEET): 3

URGENT _____ CLEARANCE _____

FYI ☒ PER YOUR REQUEST _____MESSAGE: I SEE PC HAS BEEN POSTPONED.

NEXT WEEK IS LAST WEEK BEFORE RECESS
TO DO "CONSULTATIONS." DO WE HAVE TO
WAIT UNTIL AFTER PC TO SCHEDULE?

FAX NUMBER OF SENDER: (202) 647-9667**TRANSMISSION PROBLEMS CALL: (202)**

JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
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JAMES W. NANCE, STAFF DIRECTOR
EDWIN K. HALL, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR & CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

May 15, 1995

The Honorable Warren Christopher
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write with regard to the U.S. commitment to participate in a NATO-led effort to extract U.N. troops from Bosnia.

When President Clinton indicated in December that he would commit U.S. troops to an extraction effort, I wrote to you that I do not favor the participation of U.S. ground troops in any mission whatsoever in Bosnia. In my December letter to you, I expressed my view that there may be ways -- short of using ground troops -- in which the U.S. can assist such a potential U.N. withdrawal. These might include airlift and other logistical support. I want you to know that I remain opposed to the use of U.S. ground troops in the former Yugoslavia.

In the months since President Clinton made the commitment to help extract U.N. troops from Bosnia, there has been insufficient explanation about what a U.S. commitment would entail. I have become increasingly concerned about this in the past weeks, as the situation in former Yugoslavia has deteriorated.

Frankly, there appear to be a number of scenarios -- including, but certainly not limited to a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo --- under which U.N. troops would either be forced to or would choose to withdraw. The need for a withdrawal could come quickly; yet, Congress has not been informed about plans for an extraction -- including command and control arrangements, cost, troop commitments, and exit strategy.

While the Congress has been informed about NATO plans to preposition communications equipment in Croatia as part of its contingency planning, Members of Congress have not been consulted about further details of NATO planning. In fact, the presence of U.S. troops as part of these communications teams increases the imperative that Congress be consulted about contingency plans.

05/16/95 11:21 202 647 9667
05-16-95 10:57AM FROM FOR REL CAPITOL

STATE LEG AFF.
TO 96479657

→→→ EUROPEAN DIR
FOUJ/UUJ

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Given the continued unravelling of the situation in both Croatia and Bosnia and the growing potential for either a partial or complete withdrawal of U.N. troops, I would hope that the Administration will expeditiously consult with the Congress.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,



Claiborne Pell

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	NATO Withdrawal of UNPROFOR. (2 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F

vz2706

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. paper	Contact Group: Consensus on Recognition. (1 page)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F

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