

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

897

Row:

34

Section:

2

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1

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2

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V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	Memorandum for the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Use of U.S. Ground Forces. Draft of 9520780. (2 pages)	05/28/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	French Memorandum on Bosnia. [French] (1 page)	05/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Duplicate of 002. (2 pages)	05/27/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Inter-Serbian Sanctions: No Discernible Improvement in Serbian Enforcement. [CIA Act] [partial] (5 pages)	05/19/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
005. report	The Balkans: The Bosnian Serb Army. (6 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Official-Informal: Air Strikes. (2 pages)	05/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2704

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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STAFF
CC: LAKE
BERGER
20686

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

May 25, 1995

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

TO: Anthony Lake

FROM: Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright *MKA*

SUBJECT: The FRY and the Outer Wall of Sanctions

I wanted to follow up on our discussion at May 18's Principals' Meeting concerning conditions for the FRY to join the international community.

I remain concerned that any change from our announced policy will expose the President to considerable criticism and erode our credibility in negotiations for peace settlement. On March 13, the President told Representative Hoyer that the Serbs should not expect to join the international community -- exemplified by membership in international organizations, attendance at international conferences, and access to financing from the international financial institutions -- until they affirmatively comply with requests of the International Tribunal. (I have attached his letter.) Chris and I are also on record with strong statements of support for the Tribunal.

I continue to believe that keeping the Tribunal as a condition for the "outer wall" of sanctions is the right thing to do. The victims of atrocities deserve justice. Removing persons who would foment violence will reduce causes of future conflict. Finally, the Tribunal is one aspect of our Balkans policy that has received consistent public and congressional praise.

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

Interestingly, the Tribunal has become important to domestic politics in the former Yugoslavia. Over the last eighteen months, Milosevic has used accusations of atrocities to undermine his political rivals. The Government of Croatia has made clear that its cooperation with the Tribunal will demonstrate its commitment to western ideals. The Constitution of the Bosniac-Croat Federation forbids war crimes suspects from holding political office; this provision was included with the intention of marginalizing revanchist Bosnian Croats who are now impeding the Federation's development. And Haris Silajdzic has strongly urged sustained U.S. support for the Tribunal, with the possible intention of using it to support his domestic aspirations. After working to place the Tribunal and the law it supports on the combatants' agenda, we should not back away now.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hoyer:

Thank you for your letter on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. As you know, the United States is the War Crimes Tribunal's strongest advocate. I remain personally committed to it and firmly believe that successful completion of its mission is critical to long-term peace prospects in the former Yugoslavia. That is why, in the latest proposal put forward by the Contact Group, we emphasized that nothing should be done to affect our commitment to the Tribunal and that all parties should cooperate in its efforts. In particular, the Serbs should not interfere with its operations and should not expect to fully rejoin the international community until they affirmatively comply with the Tribunal's requests.

I agree that the United States must play a leading role with regard to the Tribunal's funding. We will continue to be active in urging the United Nations to provide adequate budgets for the Tribunal. U.S. experts have closely reviewed the proposed budget and have provided their assessment and advice to the UN. The results so far have been encouraging. In December 1994, the Tribunal received the full amount it had requested through March 1995 and reports on the ongoing UN budget review are promising. At the same time, we are continuing to press other states to support the Tribunal's budget.

To further demonstrate our commitment, the United States also contributed over twenty prosecutors, investigators and other experts at U.S. expense. As you note, the United States made a \$3 million cash contribution to the Tribunal last year and we are currently considering whether to make additional voluntary contributions in light of the UN budget.

Let me also assure you of our support for implementing legislation to enable us to comply with orders of the Tribunal. As you are aware, such legislation was transmitted at the end of the last congressional session, but there was insufficient time for the Congress to act upon it. Since then, we have had to make adjustments to encompass the Rwanda Tribunal. Legislation will be presented to the Congress shortly, and I look forward to your help in moving it along.

Once again, thank you for sharing your views on this important matter..

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

France strongly condemns the attitude of the Bosnian Serb leaders.

It considers that UNPROFOR's ultimatum should be applied and followed up.

It is indignant at the treatment accorded to UNPROFOR soldiers, among whom are a number of French soldiers. It cannot accept that peacekeepers to be attacked and deprived of their freedom of movement.

It demands their immediate release.

Given the deterioration of the situation, France calls for emergency meetings of the Security Council and the Atlantic Council. It hopes that the ministerial meeting of the Contact Group, scheduled for next week at its initiative, take place in the most timely fashion.

On that occasion, France will strongly insist on strengthening the means available to UNPROFOR in order for it to achieve its mission./.

T
A
B

A.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20676

May 22, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: NELSON DREW *D*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
 Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
 May 23, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held May 23, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *AS* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
 Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Van Zandt* NARA, Date *6/2/14*

2013-0087-f

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: May 23, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIA

John Deutch

State

Secretary Christopher

JCS

Admiral William Owens

DOD

Secretary Perry

White House

Sandy Berger

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OMB

Gordon Adams

OVP

Leon Fuerth

NSCAlexander Vershbow
Colonel Nelson DrewSummary of ConclusionsFrasure-Milosevic Negotiations:

1. Principals noted that several areas remain unresolved following Ambassador Frasure's talks in Belgrade. While the sanction reimposition mechanism is the key, others include: securing a clear recognition formula and commitment to cut off support for the Bosnian Serbs; demands for 500,000 MT oil/month; maintaining some linkage of sanctions-lifting to normalization of relations with Croatia; and deflecting the successor state issue. Principals noted the French and British pressure to "cut a deal," and conflicting reports as to whether the French were bluffing or serious about withdrawing their UNPROFOR troops if no agreement was forthcoming. They also noted the problem of uncoordinated

Russian diplomatic approaches to Milosevic. Principals agreed to let process simmer for now with Milosevic, and to approach the French, British and Russians to stiffen resolve and restore Contact Group solidarity. (Action: State.) ~~TS~~

Post-Withdrawal Strategy:

2. Principals agreed that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian forces, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals agreed that U.S. security assistance should largely be limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers, and that training should be by a third party if possible; they ruled out training by the U.S. on Bosnian territory. Principals agreed that this option also imposed a need to strengthen efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, and that we would maintain peacekeepers in Macedonia, reinforced if necessary. They further agreed that this approach should be put forward in a decision memorandum for the President. (Action: NSC.) ~~TS~~

3. Principals agreed on the need for an intelligence reappraisal of the relative capabilities of the warring factions -- current, and projected against the likely situation after withdrawal if the agreed U.S. policy option is carried out. (Action: CIA.) They tasked OSD/JCS to review Bosnian training requirements in light of the forthcoming CIA reappraisal. (Action: OSD/JCS.) They also tasked the Bosnia IWG to study several unanswered questions associated with the agreed option:

- If Russia (or others) won't support full multilateral lift in the UNSC, will the U.S. pursue limited multilateral lift and/or unilateral lift?
- What if the Russians make good on their threat to arm the Serbs if lift occurs?
- What current efforts would remain in place: the No-Fly-Zone? NATO air strike decisions? Any relief efforts? If so, how and why?
- What military posture should a NATO or an allied coalition of the willing adopt to contain the fighting if withdrawal occurs? ~~TS~~

Unanswered Questions for OPLAN 40104:

4. The Principals noted that several questions still remain unanswered regarding implementation of OPLAN 40104. They tasked

the Bosnia IWG to continue efforts to answer questions associated with:

- Possible civilian use of NATO forces for protection;
- Assisting movement of refugees from the enclaves;
- Possible breakdown of humanitarian efforts while NATO is in place;
- How NATO would react if Serbia enters the war while NATO is in place;
- What to do about prisoners or released POWs that fall into NATO hands; and
- How to determine to whom NATO would return disputed areas. ~~(S)~~

5. Principals agreed that the magnitude of the problems associated with both OPLAN 40104 implementation and post-withdrawal strategy made it imperative to keep UNPROFOR in place, and agreed to urgently approach the French to get them to reconsider their possible withdrawal from UNPROFOR. ~~(S)~~

Alternatives to NATO-led UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

6. Principals noted the OSD and JCS assessments that even a limited attempt at withdrawal from the enclaves ran the risk of provoking a level of opposition from the warring parties that could rapidly escalate beyond the ability of individual national units or UNPROFOR to handle. They expressed concerns about the ability of OPLAN 40104 to deal with very limited withdrawal or repositioning efforts without provoking an all-out withdrawal operation. They agreed that, politically, it would be extremely difficult to reject a call from a troop contributing state for NATO assistance in withdrawal. They agreed that SecDef would raise these concerns in discussions this week with SACEUR.

(Action: OSD.) ~~(S)~~

Remaining Decisions and "Firebreak Point" for OPLAN 40104:

7. Principals noted that the U.S. Execution Order (EXORD) responding to the force Activation Request (ACTREQ) issued by NATO would be released sometime during the second week in June, and agreed that it would not commit U.S. troops to deploy outside of the U.S. (Action: JCS.) They noted that the NAC would conduct a review of the OPLAN on May 31, and that it would be asked to approve the OPLAN on June 14. They agreed that the U.S. could join consensus to approve the OPLAN without crossing a firebreak making execution of the plan inevitable. They agreed that the firebreak that we were not prepared to cross would come when the NAC considered a decision authorizing deployment of

forces to Europe for assembly and training, probably no earlier than the third week in June. In this light, they agreed that the U.S. would not support a decision to deploy forces into Europe in support of the OPLAN until UNPROFOR withdrawal was clearly inevitable. (Note: JCS understands that SACEUR will not request any deployment of the force in Europe unless and until there is a UN decision authorizing UNPROFOR withdrawal.) ~~(S)~~

8. They agreed that SecDef would convey this position to SACEUR in discussions this week, and would ask SACEUR to clarify where and how he envisions training of the withdrawal force taking place. (Action: OSD.) ~~(S)~~

Legislative Strategy:

9. Principals noted that the next briefing on the OPLAN was scheduled to go to the SASC on Thursday, May 25, and tasked JCS and OSD to revise the briefing in light of the critique from Senator Dole's staff following the May 19 briefing to the SFRC. (Action: OSD/JCS.) They agreed that, lacking a time in which full committees could be briefed before the Memorial Day break, the OSD/JCS/State briefing team should continue efforts to provide the briefing to key Congressional leaders (e.g. Dellums, Smith) before week's end. (Action: OSD/JCS/State.) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20662

May 22, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: NELSON DREW *D*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
May 19, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held May 19, 1995.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Va Zohler* NARA, Date *6/2/2004*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20662

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, May 19, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Va Zander NARA, Date 6/2/14

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: May 19, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OVP

Leon Fuerth

CIA

John Deutch

State

Warren Christopher

Richard Holbrooke

JCS

Admiral William Owens

DOD

Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Colonel Nelson Drew

OMB

Alice Rivlin

Summary of ConclusionsNegotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals discussed progress made to date in ongoing negotiations between Ambassador Frasure and Milosevic regarding the recognition/sanctions relief package. They agreed on the contents of an instruction cable to Frasure outlining key problem areas in Milosevic's counterproposal and authorizing further negotiations to close the gap (Action: State). The cable will provide goals but retain flexibility for Frasure in the negotiations. ~~(S)~~

2. Principals agreed on the following guidance on the most sensitive issues:

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- Successor State Status: Principals agreed to maintain our existing position that Serbia/Montenegro could be treated as "a" successor state but not "the" successor state to Yugoslavia. ~~(S)~~
- Timing of Serbian Admission to OSCE: Principals agreed that Serbia's admission to OSCE should be simultaneous with restoration of the long-duration missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. ~~(S)~~
- Sanctions Relief: Principals agreed on the need to avoid "front-end loading" of sanctions relief or lifting. Milosevic's proposed automatic mechanism for continuing extension of sanctions suspension without a UNSC vote was unacceptable. Principals agreed to counter his oil relief proposal of 500,000 MT per month with an offer of 125,000 MT, and to try to limit imports through a single point of entry. OVP provided an outline chart linking specific sanctions relief actions to specific progress toward a political settlement involving Pale (attached); Principals agreed that this should be provided to Frasure as a guide rather than as detailed negotiating instructions. They agreed that some lifting of sanctions should be tied to recognition of Croatia. They reaffirmed that any lifting of the "outer wall" of sanctions (access to IFIs, full participation in international organizations) should be tied to cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal and progress toward a broader regional settlement, including restoration of autonomy to Kosovo. ~~(S)~~

Future Options for UNPROFOR

3. Principals reaffirmed that retention of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was critical to U.S. interests, and agreed to support the conclusions of the CHODs meeting with UNPROFOR Commanders calling for enhancement of UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its existing mandate. The CHODs' proposal included agreement that the UNPROFOR Ground Commanders would develop an enhanced air supply plan for the eastern enclaves on an urgent basis, and that unhindered use of Sarajevo airport was imperative. (Other options considered but rejected by the CHODs included continuation of the existing situation, retrenchment and reduced UN presence, UNPROFOR withdrawal, and military intervention.) CJCS will be instructed to take this window of opportunity to press allies for as robust an enhancement of UNPROFOR as possible (**Action: JCS**) and USUN will work to ensure that options presented for agreement in New York reflect the CHODs' decisions (**Action: USUN**). ~~(S)~~

4. Principals agreed that there was little likelihood that the CHODs' proposals would lead to more robust use of force by UNPROFOR in pursuit of fulfilling its mandate, or increased willingness to employ NATO airpower under the dual key approach. If an opportunity arose to support rotation of the UNSYG Special Representative to someone more likely to support UN requests for the use of NATO airstrikes, the U.S. would be supportive, but not initiate such an effort. (Action: USUN). (S)

5. At the same time, Principals agreed that if the French found enhancing UNPROFOR in its existing areas and mandates acceptable, and the UK was willing to let this go forward, the U.S. should not press for UNPROFOR retrenchment at this time. Principals also noted that success in the Frasure-Milosevic negotiations could help satisfy French requirements for progress toward a political settlement. (S)

OPLAN 40104

6. Principals noted that briefings to the SFRC earlier in the day had flagged serious concerns regarding preparing the Congress and the public for U.S. participation in a possible withdrawal operation, lack of clarity about a post-withdrawal strategy, and funding. Principals agreed that a strong effort would be needed to secure Congressional approval. (S)

7. Principals agreed to meet again on Tuesday, May 23, to address (1) post-withdrawal strategy (Action: State); (2) remaining unanswered questions associated with OPLAN 40104 implementation (Action: State, OSD); (3) the remaining steps associated with OPLAN 40104 (Action: JCS, OSD); and (4) a legislative strategy (Action: All). (S)

Attachment

May 12 Contact Group Agreement
(The plan offered to Milosevic on May 18)

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Tightens closure of the inter-Serb border, allows transfer of border mission to OSCE and OSCE monitors to Kosovo

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (notes 1 and 2)
- Suspension of financial sanctions (notes 1 and 3)
- OSCE membership

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG package.

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of all Phase 1 sanctions

And if Pale then:

- Fully implements Contact Group plan

FRY and Pale get in return:

- "Lift of remaining sanctions (plus release of frozen assets) calibrated to implementation in a way to be developed later."

NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for a six-month period and can be renewed only by positive vote by the Security Council.
2. The agreed definition of "strategic goods" includes oil, petroleum products, coal, iron, steel, and other metals *plus energy-related equipment and petro-chemicals*.
3. All financial sanctions are suspended, including credits. Frozen assets are not released. The resolution relaxing sanctions is to contain prohibitions against using frozen assets to secure or otherwise support loans and credits.

Milosevic's May 18 Counter Offer

If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Allows reinforcement of the inter-Serb border-monitoring mission

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (UN definition)
- Import of 500,000 MT of oil a month
- Suspension of all financial sanctions
- Lift of sports sanctions
- Entry into OSCE

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG plan as a starting point for negotiations

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of phase 1 sanctions (air and ferry service).

Then:

- When a cessation of hostilities is in place, and
- The Bosnian parties have begun negotiations on implementation of the CG plan

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of non-strategic trade and financial sanctions
- Suspension of strategic trade sanctions (oil import quota remains in place)

When

- The CG plan is fully implemented on the ground
- Respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial limits

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of remaining sanctions (presumably including release of frozen assets)

NOTES:

1. All "suspensions" are for an indefinite time period. The Security Council would "review" the situation in the former Yugoslavia, to include the sanctions suspension arrangements.
2. UNSC Resolutions define strategic goods as including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

Countering Milosevic's Counter Offer**DRAFT**If the FRY:

- Recognizes Bosnia
- Allows reinforcement of the inter-Serb border-monitoring mission
- Ends support for Pale and Knin

FRY gets in return:

- Suspension of sanctions on non-strategic trade (UN definition)
- Import of up to 100,000 MT of oil a month
- Suspension of all financial sanctions
- Entry into OSCE

If Pale then:

- Accepts the CG plan as a starting point for negotiations and begins negotiations

FRY gets in return:

- Partial lift of phase 1 sanctions
- CG agreement to change terms of sanctions relief extension (eg: longer than six month periods, revise extension conditionality, etc.)

Then when:

- The Bosnian parties have reached agreement, and
- They have begun implementation of the CG plan (to include starting withdrawals)

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of non-strategic trade and financial sanctions
- Suspension of strategic trade sanctions (oil import quota remains in place)

And when

- The CG plan is fully implemented on the ground, and
- Respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial limits
- (And if the FRY has recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia)

FRY gets in return:

- Lift of remaining sanctions (presumably including release of frozen assets)
- End of oil quota system

NOTES:

1. Initial suspensions are for six months. The Security Council would have to vote to extend sanctions relief.
2. UNSC Resolutions define strategic goods as including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Inter-Serbian Sanctions: No Discernible Improvement in Serbian Enforcement. [CIA Act] [partial] (5 pages)	05/19/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2704

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

19 May 1995

Inter-Serbian Sanctions: No Discernible Improvement in Serbian Enforcement (b)(3)

Declassified

in Part

E.O. 13526

There has been no discernible improvement in Serbian and Montenegrin (FRY) enforcement of the inter-Serbian sanctions since the UN Security Council extended sanctions relief on 22 April. The apparent deterioration in FRY enforcement that occurred since early February 1995 has not been rectified, although Belgrade apparently has continued to hold overall shipments across the FRY-Bosnia border below pre-August 1994 levels. Widespread small-scale smuggling via the ant trade continues undiminished and occasional larger prohibited commercial shipments appear to cross the FRY-Bosnia border.

1.4 (b)

1.4 (c)

1.4 (d)

12
10/1/2013

(b)(1)

[004]

(b)(1)

the Yugoslav Army continues to covertly support the Bosnian Serb Army, and that Serbian President Milosevic is aware of this. A staffing decline has rendered the ICFY monitoring mission unable to verify Belgrade's compliance with the embargo against Pale.

(b)(3)

This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. The report was requested by Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to provide information on Serbia's sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force on

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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
(b)(3)

The Ant Trade: Undiminished


(b)(1) *the ant trade continues unabated since 22 April. Moreover, the decline in ICFY monitoring and improved springtime road conditions will probably allow an increase in violations.* Nearly 30,000 persons, most of whom appear to be smuggling, transit the border daily. In addition to the thousands of automobiles, several hundred buses, trucks, and tractors cross the border daily. FRY authorities confiscate some prohibited goods, but most non-humanitarian goods are allowed into Bosnia. (b)(3)

Daily Cross-Border Bus, Tractor, and Truck Crossings at Selected ICFY Checkpoints, 23 April - 12 May 1995

[004]



Some smuggling is occurring across the Drina River, *but it may be limited by high springtime river levels.* (b)(1)



(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

Large Commercial Shipments: Probable

(b)(1) some large commercial shipments into Bosnia may be occurring, particularly across Montenegrin crossings. (b)(1) vehicle tracks, apparently from trucks, around barricades and on bypass roads. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

[004]

ICFY-FRY Cooperation: Problems Persist

Although (b)(1) overall cooperation as good, (b)(1) (b)(1) the monitors continue to face inconsistencies and shortcomings in FRY cooperation and enforcement. FRY authorities have made a few arrests, confiscated some material, sometimes refused to allow vehicles to continue to their destination, and repaired damaged crossing barriers. As before 22 April, however, authorities fully inspect only a fraction of all buses and let most vehicles enter Bosnia unimpeded. ICFY head Tuano Niemenen recently expressed concern about the sincerity of FRY customs head Kertes, the ICFY mission's main interlocutor, according to US Embassy reporting. Separate from the occasional problems with FRY customs and the military, (b)(1) the monitors have had the most trouble with local police. On at least two occasions, for example, police refused (b)(1) to investigate suspicious activity several hundred yards from a border crossing by stating that it was outside their jurisdiction. On two occasions, (b)(1) the police had been cool toward the monitors (b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

3

(b)(3)

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3

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

The ICFY Mission: Inadequate

The international monitoring mission, currently staffed at less than 150 monitors, because of funding problems, *is incapable of verifying that the FRY has closed its border with Bosnia*, and its border coverage has continued to decline. The mission ended 24-hour coverage at five crossings since 22 April, lowering to 14 the number of crossings monitored on a full-time basis. The mission also has severely curtailed its patrols. The VJ, *whose commitment to enforcement is questionable*, is in sole charge of numerous crossings. *The mission would need about 400 people to adequately monitor the 340-mile border, which has more than 100 major and minor crossings, and to perform tasks such as sealing humanitarian shipments. Even the quality of field monitors' reports to Belgrade has declined. The mission also has neither the equipment nor personnel to verify that Belgrade has ended airspace violations.*

(b)(3)

VJ-BSA Military Ties: Ongoing

(b)(1)

the VJ is covertly

providing limited support to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA).

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Milosevic's dispute with

Bosnian Serb President Karadzic reportedly has resulted in a recent decline in VJ support, but aid will be increased if the BSA begins to lose significant ground in the fighting.

(b)(1)

[004]

(b)(1)

Serbian President Milosevic may not wish to confront the VJ over their support for the Bosnian Serbs. According to US Embassy reporting, Milosevic is worried about controlling the VJ and has used surrogates to periodically threaten the VJ over opposition to his policies. Many VJ officers, feeling it is their duty to help their former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) colleagues in the BSA, maintain close ties to the BSA, and consider BSA commander Ratko Mladic to be one of their own. Milosevic may also believe that maintaining at least some aid to the BSA will help him coax Mladic to split with Karadzic.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

VJ-BSA contact, (b)(1)
 continued since 22 April. (b)(1)
 (b)(1) Mladic has participated in
 meetings in Belgrade, sometimes with Milosevic and FRY customs chief Kertes,
 (b)(1) BSA
 Deputy Commander Milan Gvero was in Belgrade (b)(1)
 (b)(1) VJ-BSA contacts are most frequent between mid- and low-level
 officers, according to US defense attache reporting. (b)(3)

(b)(1) the Bosnian Serbs also continue to purchase goods
 from and via the FRY *that may be funded in part by Greek officials.* (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

[004]

(b)(1)

Uniformed soldiers continue to transit the FRY-Bosnia border, although in smaller
 groups than whole busloads of soldiers, (b)(1)
 (b)(1) FRY border authorities allowed 266 uniformed personnel to transit
 the border in both directions despite being warned repeatedly that it was considered a
 violation, (b)(1) Separate from soldiers in cars, vans, and
 buses, between 23 April and 14 May, the monitors at Vrbanj on the Montenegro-
 Bosnia border recorded 67 military vehicles, *presumably trucks or jeeps*, crossing the
 border heading toward Bosnia, with a similar number of vehicles later returning to the
 FRY. *Because some Montenegrin villages and presumably VJ troops are between
 the checkpoint and the Bosnian border, the vehicles may be reinforcing VJ troops
 closer to the border. The frequency of the trips, however, seems excessive
 compared to the occasional military vehicle crossings reported before February.*

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

BOSNIA: AIR STRIKES

- The U.S. is and remains prepared to join NATO in whatever the UN requests.
- We support and welcome the action taken so far.
- We condemn the shelling of civilians and note that NATO actions are strictly against military targets.
- The situation is still unfolding. We will not be commenting on every development as it takes place.
- As the President said yesterday, we hope that the airstrikes of the past two days will convince the Bosnian Serb leadership to end their violations of the exclusion zones and comply with their other agreements with the UN.



Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Washington, DC

May 26, 1995


The Honorable William Clinton
President of the
United States of America
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to forward to you the attached letter dated May 26, 1995 from the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, addressed to your Excellency.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,


Sven Alkalaj
Ambassador



The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY
Sarajevo

26 May, 1995

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Excellency:

The international community no longer notices the wounds in the bleeding body of Bosnia, evidenced by the massacres of civilians, that would, if they happened anywhere else in the West, cause shock, and would be followed by resolute action against the perpetrators.

Last night, Karadzic's Serbs killed 71 and severely wounded more than hundred young men and women gathered at a youth meeting point in Tuzla. The eldest victim was only 28.

The aggressor wanted exactly this outcome.


A great power, such as Your country, has particular responsibility to protect the international order and norms it is based upon.

This international order is gravely challenged.

Bosnia and its people expect that You will not yield to blackmail and violence.

Please accept Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,


Alija Izetbegovic

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 25, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I welcome the decision of the UN and NATO to launch airstrikes today against a Bosnian-Serb ammunition site following the violence of the past several days in and around Sarajevo. This action was taken in response to Bosnian-Serb defiance of yesterday's UNPROFOR demand for the return of heavy weapons to designated weapons' collection points in accord with existing agreements.

This action should help NATO and the UN sustain their ability to ease suffering in the region. I hope that today's airstrikes will convince the Bosnian-Serb leadership to end their violations of the exclusion zone and comply with their other agreements with the UN.

I appreciate the courage and dedication of the UN forces on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, and trust that this evidence of UN and NATO determination will serve to enhance the ability of these forces to remain and perform their missions.

-30-30-30-

**BACKGROUND PAPER:
VIOLENCE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

The tragic events of the past week vividly illustrate the level of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indiscriminate shelling of purely civilian targets, with over 70 killed in a single incident of what the UN has described as a "return to medieval barbarism," highlights the disintegration of much of what we commonly accept as the basis for society in the modern world.

Since the current war began in the former Yugoslavia in June 1991, more than 200,000 people reportedly have perished.

In addition to the death toll, the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is reflected in the total disruption of the lives of the inhabitants. At present, UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and other affected by the war in Bosnia. (There is no accurate breakout available of how many of these are children.)

As the President stated in Budapest in December, 1994, "After three years of conflict, the combatants remain locked in a terrible war no one can win. Now each faces the same choice: They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace."

U.S. policy is based on achieving a political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity. While we have not yet succeeded in achieving a settlement, we have undertaken a range of actions that have made a difference, reducing the violence and easing the humanitarian conditions for many beleaguered Bosnian citizens.

The U.S. is the largest single-country humanitarian aid donor to the region (\$780 million since 1991), and the largest food donor, and we have led the longest airlift and airdrop operation in history. We have also brought hundreds of patients to the U.S. for treatment and admitted over 5000 Bosnian refugees for resettlement.

Through U.S. leadership, the U.S., Russia, France, UK, and Germany established the Contact Group in April 1994 to coordinate international efforts to bring about a peace settlement.

The U.S. led the Contact Group's efforts to craft a territorial solution to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia as a single state and roll back the bulk of Serb gains.

The U.S. led efforts that achieved a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities agreement at the beginning of 1995. Now that the cease-fire has expired because of Bosnian Serb refusal to accept the Contact Group proposal, we and our Contact Group partners are working intensively to limit the fighting and reinvigorate the search for a political settlement.

At the same time, we are working to strengthen UNPROFOR so that it can remain in Bosnia and continue to perform its humanitarian mission.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	The Balkans: The Bosnian Serb Army. (6 pages)	05/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2704

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9504054
RECEIVED: 25 MAY 95 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: PANIC, MILAN

DOC DATE: 18 MAY 95
SOURCE REF: 112363

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
YUGOSLAVIA

SERBIA
MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATIONS TO PRES ON NEW PEACE PROPOSAL FOR BOSNIA

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE DATE: 29 MAY 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
KERRICK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CLARKE
DANVERS
SESTAK
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

#112363

4054

Republique Federale de Yougoslavie
le Premier Ministre (1992-93)
Milan Panic

May 18, 1995


Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my sincere congratulations on your new proposal to President Milosevic as reported by the New York Times, May 18.

In my letter of May 9, I said that the moment was perilous and the need for creative policy is great. Your new proposal strikes me as meeting this need. In my view, it gives Milosevic much of what he needs to blunt the opposition of his most militantly nationalist opponents.

I hope Milosevic will have the wisdom to accept this proposal. I will do everything I can, through my intermediaries who are in touch with him, to urge him to do so.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Milan Panic
Former Prime Minister of Yugoslavia

MP:bmd

William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

*Republique Federale de Yougoslavie
le Premier Ministre (1992-93)
Milan Panic*

TELECOPY

Milan Panic

**Chairman of the Board, President and
Chief Executive Officer**

Prime Minister 1992-1993

**ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Costa Mesa, California**

**Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia**

TO: President Bill Clinton

TELECOPY: (202) 456-2461

DATE: May 19, 1995

PAGES: 2 - Including cover page

Please see attached fax.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 24, 1995

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE MILAN PANIC

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN REGARDING PRESIDENT'S NEW
PROPOSAL TO PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ANTHONY LAKE		ORG	95/05/24		
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:F INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE *			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY *			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOP) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Official-Informal: Air Strikes. (2 pages)	05/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2704

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 25, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I welcome the decision of the UN and NATO to launch airstrikes today against a Bosnian-Serb ammunition site following the violence of the past several days in and around Sarajevo. This action was taken in response to Bosnian-Serb defiance of yesterday's UNPROFOR demand for the return of heavy weapons to designated weapons' collection points in accord with existing agreements.

This action should help NATO and the UN sustain their ability to ease suffering in the region. I hope that today's airstrikes will convince the Bosnian-Serb leadership to end their violations of the exclusion zone and comply with their other agreements with the UN.

I appreciate the courage and dedication of the UN forces on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, and trust that this evidence of UN and NATO determination will serve to enhance the ability of these forces to remain and perform their missions.

-30-30-30-

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1995

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter regarding the war in Bosnia. I share your concern about the possibility of the resumption of large-scale hostilities. I am also pleased that we agree that we should limit direct U.S. involvement in the conflict.

As you note, renewed fighting could increase the pressure for UNPROFOR withdrawal. In that regard, we are continuing to work actively with our Contact Group partners and other allies to contain the conflict, prevent a larger war and promote a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. U.S. leadership was instrumental in bringing about the recent UN Security Council resolutions keeping UN forces in the region as a deterrent to full-scale war. Additionally, we are working with our Allies on measures to make UNPROFOR more capable and effective. These measures, together with efforts to increase the political and economic isolation of the Bosnian Serbs, should help to reduce the pressure for UNPROFOR withdrawal and an escalation of the conflict.

In your letter, you suggest that we train pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and on the use of some weapons. While I am opposed to providing combat-related training at the present time, we have taken steps to provide the Bosnians limited military training through the Bosnian Federation. We have presented a draft agreement to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the establishment of an International Military and Educational Training (IMET) program aimed at developing the armed forces of the Federation. We have also recently selected a new military adviser to the Secretaries of State and Defense on Bosnian Federation military affairs, retired Major General John Sewall, who will advise on ways to assist in the integration of Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croat forces within the framework of multi-ethnic democracy.

Your letter also notes that, in the event of significant Serb escalation or UNPROFOR withdrawal, you expect the Congress to vote unilaterally to end participation by the United States in the arms embargo. As I explained in a letter to you and some of your colleagues last month, we have told our Allies that we think

an agreement to lift the arms embargo multilaterally should follow an UNPROFOR departure from Bosnia. Combat-related training for the Federation would need to be considered at that time. But I remain strongly opposed to unilateral lifting of the arms embargo because of the potentially grave implications for our country. I also believe a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and UNPROFOR's subsequent withdrawal would put at risk the survival of the Federation, the preservation of which I believe we both agree is essential.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9503977
RECEIVED: 23 MAY 95 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: PANIC, MILAN

DOC DATE: 09 MAY 95
SOURCE REF: ID 111797

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM PANIC OF YUGOSLAVIA RE FINAL PEACE TREATY AMONG
ALLFORMER YUGOSLAV STATES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 26 MAY 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
KERRICK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BASS
CLARKE
DANVERS
GRAY
SENS
SESTAK
SODERBERG
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

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DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

3977

Republique Federale de Yougoslavie
le Premier Ministre (1992-93)
Milan Panic

May 9, 1995

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of April 26. Unfortunately, the situation in the former Yugoslavia has worsened sharply since then. President Tudzman has embarked on a dangerous course which has inflamed the most militant Croatian and Serbian nationalists and threatens to provoke the outbreak of a more serious conflict between Croations and Serbs than anything we have yet seen. If that happens, Russia, the United States and the Moslem world would come under great pressure to actively support different parties to the conflict and we would be faced with the specter of a global confrontation in the Balkans. Moreover, the United Nations' peacekeeping forces already there would be in great jeopardy, as the callous manner in which they were brushed aside this past weekend by Croation forces in the Pakrac/Okucani area suggests.


The situation is clearly desperate. My contacts in Belgrade tell me that militant passions there run deeper than ever before, to the extent that Milosevic now has curiously become a stong voice for calm and peaceful solutions. It took political courage for him to criticize Knin as well as Zagreb. As you know, I have long been sharply critical of Milosevic's policies, and as Prime Minister of Yugoslavia confronted him publicly. However, now that he is advocating peaceful solutions in the face of strong and mounting opposition from hundreds of thousands of supporters of the policies of Karadzic, and Martic, he needs some clear recognition and support.

I believe that what is needed at this juncture is a joint statement from you and President Yeltsin that you will not be drawn into the Yugoslav conflict in support of any side and that you will support a lifting of the sanctions and recognition of the Republic of Yugoslavia if Milosevic's government will declare its provisional recognition of its borders with Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia pending a final peace treaty among all of the former Yugoslav states.

Letter to President Clinton
May 9, 1995
Page Two

The moment is perilous and the need for creative policy is great. All of the best people I know in Serbia tell me that only a joint U.S.-Russian initiative can end this conflict.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Milan Panic". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Milan" written in a larger, more prominent script than the last name "Panic".

The Honorable Milan Panic
Former Prime Minister of Yugoslavia

MP:bmd

William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Republique Federale de Yougoslavie
le Premier Ministre (1992-93)
Milan Panic

TELECOPY

Milan Panic

**Chairman of the Board, President and
Chief Executive Officer**

**ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Costa Mesa, California**

Prime Minister 1992-1993

**Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia**

TO: President Bill Clinton

TELECOPY: (202) 456-2461

DATE: May 10, 1995

PAGES: 3 - including cover page

Please see attached fax

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 19, 1995

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE MILAN PANIC

SUBJECT: CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA
HAS WORSENERED, OFFERS SUGGESTIONS FOR A FINAL
PEACE TREATY AMONG ALL OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
STATES

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
ANTHONY LAKE		ORG	95/05/19			
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:F INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *      OF SIGNER   *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *      CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *      OUTGOING    *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

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FM: Reuters

TO:

FOR
CHRIS
HILL
(3 pages)

a0794

^BC-YUGOSLAVIA 1STLD (SCHEDULED)

^Karadzic signal on Bosnia breakthrough

By Kurt Schork

SARAJEVO, May 23 (Reuter) - Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has signalled a possible breakthrough in Bosnia by offering to discuss an international peace plan he rejected last summer, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said on Tuesday.

It reported him as saying on Monday on the eve of a critical session of the parliament of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb parliament in Banja Luka:

"We would like the (U.N.) Security Council to know that we are ready to treat the Contact Group's plan as the basis for the resumption of the peace process."

Karadzic's move took diplomats in Belgrade by surprise and one cautioned: "We have to look at the wording of this very carefully. He uses the word 'treat' and what he needs at least to do is 'accept' the plan as a basis."

Informed Serb sources said Karadzic told the parliament that the plan itself, drawn up by a Contact Group composed of the United States, Russia, France, Germany and Britain, remained unacceptable without radical changes.

The five proposed dividing Bosnia in half between the Serbs and a federation of Moslems and Croats. Their plan was rejected last July by the Serbs, who hold 70 per cent of the country after more than three years of war.

The military and political balance has swung against the Bosnian Serbs with a series of battlefield setbacks and signs that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic may isolate them further by recognising Bosnia.

Milosevic and U.S. envoy Robert Frasure have been haggling since last week over the terms of a deal under which Milosevic would be rewarded with the suspension of some U.N. sanctions.

Frasure returned to Washington on Tuesday apparently without clinching an agreement and a diplomatic source said there were no immediate plans to resume the talks.

Milosevic earlier demanded the lifting of all sanctions and Frasure's opening offer was reported not to include embargos on oil, military equipment and international credits.

The Contact Group believes recognition of Bosnia by

INTERNATIONAL

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Milosevic, who is already waging a military and economic blockade of the Serbs, would weaken Karadzic and shorten the war.

Karadzic has blamed the blockade by Belgrade for his army's losses in the field to the Moslem-led Bosnian government forces.

The government army pressed attacks on the Serb town of Bosanska Krupa bordering the Moslem Bihac enclave in northwest Bosnia on Tuesday after recapturing large swathes of territory.

``It was a nice victory," government 5th Corps commander General Atif Dudakovic told Bosnian state radio after his troops overran seven Serb villages around Bihac.

``The 5th corps of the (Bosnian government) army has liberated the villages of Radic, Grmusa, Pritoka, Golubic, Ripac, Lohovo and Racic, all on the right bank of the Una river and now that part of the Bihac pocket is completely safe," the radio said.

Serb military sources said the attack on Krupa was ``intensifying by the hour."

At the parliament session in Banja Luka, Karadzic was expected to renew clashes with his military commander General Ratko Mladic over the blame for the military setbacks.

^REUTE
RB-- 05/23/95 09:43:00

FROM:
SITREPRT

INTERNATIONAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: CLARKER, DREW, KERRICK, NODIST, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, VERSHBOW

PREC: RUSH CLASS: INTERNATIONAL DTG:

FM: Reuters

TO:

BC-YUGOSLAVIA-BOSNIA-SERBS

^Karadzic says he favours Bosnia peace plan

By Jovan Kovacic

BELGRADE, May 23 (Reuter) - Bosnian Serb leader Radovan

Karadzic has indicated he is ready to accept an international peace plan as the basis for resuming stalled peace talks following a series of military setbacks he blamed on Belgrade.

''We would like the U.N. Security Council to know that we are ready to accept the Contact Group's plan as the basis for the resumption of the peace process,'' the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted Karadzic as saying.

Karadzic was speaking on the eve of a parliamentary debate in the north Bosnian town of Banja Luka which was expected to see renewed clashes between political and military leaders over responsibility for a series of recent military setbacks in the centre and northwest of the country.

''The fact is that the plan contains several elements which are unimportant for the other side, but are absolutely crucial for us, and these elements could be changed, if the mediators show good will,'' Karadzic said.

Karadzic has frequently used ambiguous language to indicate support for the peace plan, but has always stopped short of unconditionally accepting it as demanded by the Contact Group.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic imposed a military and trade embargo against the Bosnian Serbs after Karadzic rejected the peace plan tabled by the major powers' group, which would divide Bosnia into two almost equal parts.

Bosnia's Moslem-led government and Croats grudgingly accepted it, but Karadzic ignored international pressure to follow suit while his armies had a clear upper hand.

Over the past 10 months, the embargo has slowed down the mobility of the superior Bosnian Serb war machine, which relies on heavy weaponry, prompting Karadzic to pin the blame on Belgrade for blocking supplies of arms, petrol and parts.

''Practically all the difficulties are created by the blockade on the Drina (the river bordering Serbia and Bosnia), which directly undermines our defence capabilities,'' he said.

While Bosnian Serb leaders argue among themselves, some military commanders are reported to be urging the politicians to find a way out of the three-year war.

In Belgrade, Milosevic was in the midst of tough negotiations with U.S. envoy Robert Frasure, representing the Contact group, on recognising Bosnia in return for the temporary suspension of some sanctions against Belgrade.

Western diplomats have said Milosevic is close to recognising Bosnia's international borders, a move that would further isolate the rebel Serbs.

^REUTE

FROM:
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NPZ

& air strike decisions

are not linked

+ UNPROFOR

presence,

only CAS