

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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897

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2

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Sanctions Relief. (2 pages)	05/04/1995	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Status of Sarajevo and Bihac. (4 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
003. report	Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, #379. (4 pages)	05/09/1995	P1/b(1)
004. note	For Sandy Vershbow from Wilma Hall. [partial] (1 page)	05/10/1995	b(6)
005. draft	Memcon: Meeting Between Vice President Gore and President Tudjman of Croatia; May 7, 1995. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	The Defeat of Krajina Serb Forces. (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: OPLAN 40104: French Paper on May 4 Meeting. (6 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Talking Points for Use by Vice President Gore with Prime Minister Major. (2 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
009. memo	For Leon Fuerth, Rick Inderfurth, Kenneth Brill, et al. From Andrew Sens. Subject: Additional Principals Tasking. Record ID: 9520564. (1 page)	05/04/1995	P1/b(1)
010. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520596. (1 page)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
011. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: JCS Talking Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104 Briefing. Record ID: 9503499. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2699

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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012. paper	Croatia and Bosnia: Danger of Escalation. (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)
013. cable	re: Appraisal of Situation. (3 pages)	05/06/1995	P1/b(1)

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State's
latest version

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EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY
AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

"Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR.

UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:

"... member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of] its mandate ..."

That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and replying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770, the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require that actions by member states and regional organizations be taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN, respectively.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION

NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9, 1993, which read in part:

"...that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas ..., measures including air strikes ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation" of safe areas.

The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General." This has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

-2-

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO
EXCLUSION ZONE

NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9, 1994, which reads in part that NATO:

"... accepts ... the request of the UN Secretary General to launch air strikes, ... at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo ... which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilians, ... and ... in response to artillery or mortar attacks on Sarajevo, ... and ... in response to the identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone [and not under UNPROFOR control] ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

In addition to the UN/NATO authorities, collective self-defense would authorize states to use air power at the request of the Bosnian Government. Such use of air power could be restricted by UN Security Council resolutions -- e.g., by the establishment of the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above, does NOT apply to restrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by diplomats or official delegations.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20588

May 5, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(D)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee
Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 4, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held May 4, 1995.

Concurrence by: Rick Saunders *FR (C)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van Thinh* NARA, Date *6/2/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, May 4, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions w/Attachment

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Van [Signature] NARA, Date 6/2/14

2013-0687-E

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 4, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:30pm - 2:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

OMB:

John Burnim

OVP:Leon Fuerth
Rick SaundersUSUN:David Scheffer
James O'BrienState:Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert FrasureCIA:Douglas MacEachin
Norm SchindlerDOD:Walter Slocombe
Joseph KruzelJCS:LTG Wesley Clark
BG John WalshNSC:Alexander Vershbow
BG Don KerrickSummary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss a strategy for dealing with the Contact Group deadlock on what degree of sanctions relief to offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia, and the accompanying strategy for Ambassador Frasure to pursue in the next Contact Group meeting and in a follow-on private meeting with Milosevic. Deputies agreed that we should continue to pursue a strategy, in close coordination with the Bosnian Government, that supports the Bosnian Government's goal of gaining genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders in return for limited sanctions relief and a closure of the border with Bosnian Serb territory. ~~(S)~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

10/1/2013

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

2. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure should continue to stand on the existing USG position in upcoming Contact Group discussions. In the follow-on meeting with Milosevic, Ambassador Frasure should emphasize that the U.S. will not support any efforts to lift sanctions until the Contact Group plan is accepted by the Pale Serbs, and that while we might consider a longer sanctions suspension period (e.g. 180 days), any extension of suspended sanctions would require a positive UNSC vote. He should also inform Milosevic that the U.S. is not prepared to support release of frozen financial assets. Deputies agreed that, if it becomes clear in the meeting with Milosevic that an element of lift is necessary to complete an otherwise acceptable deal, the U.S. should consider (but not offer at that meeting) lifting sanctions against certain media and information-related activities. Deputies asked that Leon Fuerth and Ambassador Frasure confer on the appropriate financial sanctions language for presentation to the Contact Group. (Action: OVP/State) ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies discussed the renewed fighting in Croatia and a strategy to prevent escalation. They agreed that the U.S. should press President Tudjman and the Krajina Serbs to halt military operations and exercise restraint. They agreed to press the Croats at all levels to adopt an accommodating position that could include the demilitarization of the recaptured areas, the return of Serb civilians to their homes, and the reestablishment of UNCRO authority in Sector West and other areas of conflict. If Croatia is willing to take these steps, the U.S. would support the presence of Croatian civilian police in Sector West and the removal of all RSK military forces. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies discussed the steps to be taken to ensure the Croats are aware of the U.S. view of their military actions. They agreed to support a UNSC resolution condemning incursions by all sides in Sectors South and East and calling for the restoration of UNCRO authority in all areas. Deputies directed that the Croats be immediately informed of our deep concerns and endorsed a Vice Presidential meeting with President Tudjman in London as a useful forum for registering U.S. concerns about Tudjman's military actions. (Action: State/OVP) ~~(S)~~

5. Deputies also discussed the importance of warning the Krajina Serbs of the consequences of attacks on U.S. personnel in Zagreb. They agreed that we should be prepared to bypass the dual-key system if a NATO response were not approved by the UN. They directed military options be developed for retaliatory action, both unilateral and through NATO. (Action: JCS)

6. Deputies discussed briefing the Congress on OPLAN 40104 and directed that the talking points be cleared before the briefings are scheduled. (Action: JCS draft talking points; NSC/State schedule briefings) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

1 May 1995

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options to reopen Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
2. (U) Background. Sarajevo air operations have been periodically interrupted by the Bosnian Serbs since the beginning of the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces control the area surrounding the airport and the major land routes into Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs have the capability to attack aircraft in flight and while unloading on the airfield. Aircraft are threatened by both antiaircraft weapons and conventional direct and indirect ground systems. The Bosnian Muslims also have the capability, though to a lesser extent, to interdict air operations. UNPROFOR has documented numerous occasions of BiH fire.
3. ~~(S)~~ Discussion. The following options are available for consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo:

Assumptions:

- New UNSCR(s) required to implement a military option will be adopted by the Security Council.
- A parallel diplomatic effort to secure the opening of Sarajevo will be undertaken.

OPTION 1: Secure Sarajevo Airport - forcibly secure and maintain a DMZ around Sarajevo. Create a demilitarized zone (8-10km) around Sarajevo airfield which denies the Bosnian Serbs from employing weapons against aircraft that are in flight or on the ground. This option could require up to a division sized force to secure the airfield and remove the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim presence from the immediate area.

UNPROFOR Action:

- UNPROFOR seize (if necessary) and establish administrative control over the Sarajevo airport
- Secure airfield perimeter and approaches using a combination of troops equipped with means of acquisition for various types of attack. May include night vision devices, GPS, artillery acquisition battery.
- Take direct action to secure high terrain and buildings from belligerents. Move civilians outside of airport safe zone (2-3km). Combatants excluded inside 8-10km zone.

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PER E.O. 13526

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Declassify on OADR

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- Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport. Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to 10 km from the airport.
- NATO Airborne AC-130 and helicopter response capability to attack sniper/mortar/artillery positions. Consider use of a ground quick reaction force.

Belligerent Reaction:

- "Administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government in Pale, e.g., refusing to guarantee the safety of UN flights.
- Employ random sniping incidents due to the particular vulnerability of aircraft
- Small arms fire directed either at aircraft or ground personnel. Will be disruptive even if not directed at airport operations per se.
- Random or continuous mortar and artillery attacks designed to damage the airfield, aircraft or simply to disrupt operations.
- Employment of man portable IR surface to air missiles/AAA designed to directly attack aircraft.
- Employment of longer range systems (heavy artillery, SA-2s from ranges of 30-50kms).
- Horizontal escalation elsewhere in B-H; hostage taking, attacks on ground convoys, attacks on UN personnel, disruption of utilities into Sarajevo and other enclaves.
- BiH may target UNPROFOR attempting to blame the BSA in order to encourage a NATO response against the BSA.

Counteraction:

- Difficult if not impossible to counteract Bosnian Serb horizontal escalation/asymmetric responses.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- Counterbattery radar, NODs, GPS, and other long range acquisition devices linked to means of reaction.
- Up to a brigade dedicated to airport security with heavy quick reaction force, up to a brigade sized force to remove combatants from the Sarajevo airport area.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support
- Air assault capability (company sized)

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- UNPROFOR/Allies unlikely to support "offensive" operation to open airport.
- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- Allies could call for large US troop and equipment contribution.
- Bosnian Serbs could advertise DMZ as form of ethnic cleansing.

Risk Assessment:

- Irrespective of any of the military measures taken, the absolute safety of transport/civilian aircraft cannot be guaranteed given the threat environment.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, transport, and AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- UNPROFOR would be required to redeploy forces to support this option which could create increased risk in other areas. Only French, UK, Dutch, Canadian forces capable of accomplishing tasks associated with this option.
- Without significant force enhancements, UNPROFOR forces outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Airport sits astride confrontation line; will be difficult to establish which party is responsible for firing.

OPTION 2: Use CAS and air strike packages to support delivery of humanitarian aid flights. Marshall significant NATO air package to suppress immediate threats around Sarajevo airport as aid is flown into and unloaded at the airfield. Package could include integration of target acquisition systems to assist in locating indirect firing systems. Given the nature of the threat surrounding the airfield, target acquisition (rifleman, AA gun, mortar) would be extremely difficult. As a consequence, the ability to deliver effective suppressive fire against these type targets would be extremely difficult.

~~SECRET~~**UNPROFOR Action:**

- Deploy target acquisition system to Sarajevo airfield. Deploy TACPs to Sarajevo area.
- Package aid deliveries so that CAS/air strike packages support specified high density delivery periods.
- Clearly state intent to use NATO air support for protecting aid deliveries into Sarajevo.
- Specify target categories (high value, artillery pieces, headquarters in Sarajevo vicinity) that NATO may strike in response to Serb attack on humanitarian aid flights.

Belligerent Reaction:

- Continued "administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport. Blocking aid outside airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government refusing safety of flights.
- Hostage taking - placing hostages at weapons sites.
- Direct attack against humanitarian flights.
- BiH may manipulate NATO's intent to use air power to their advantage.

Counteraction:

- Direct attack against targets engaging aircraft.
- Direct attack against Bosnian Serb high value targets.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- AC-130 aircraft.
- EW CAP (EA-6B, EF-111s).

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Troop contributing nations unlikely to support air option due to concern for safety of deployed troops.
- "Dual key" arrangement remains key factor in control of air strikes.
- Could require significant US contribution in terms of air assets.
- Bosnian Serbs likely to use collateral damage as media weapon against US/NATO. Given this scenario, attempts to suppress sniper/mortar fires in an urban environment have a high potential for collateral damage.

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SECRET**Risk Assessment:**

- Air power alone insufficient to protect humanitarian aid flights and keep airfield open. Threat/target difficult to identify and acquire (snipers, mortars, urban environment, mountainous topography).
- Support aircraft (AC-130) at high risk in semi-integrated air defense network.
- Bosnian Serbs can react in ways (hostage taking, utility shut-down) which limit the effectiveness of air power options.
- High probability of collateral damage and fratricide.

OPTION 3: Open and maintain a road corridor from the Adriatic coast to Sarajevo (15km through Bosnian Serb held territory).

UNPROFOR Action:

- Enhance convoy ability to protect themselves by employing a graduated range of security responses from self protection through heavy force (armor/Infantry Fighting Vehicle) security escorts.
- UNPROFOR can create and employ a "Quick Reaction Force" consisting of heavy ground maneuver units, assault forces, and possibly helicopters.
- To counter interdiction efforts UNPROFOR can obtain and employ combat engineer units/assets moving with convoys or reacting to specific points.
- Provide each convoy with TACPs and continuous overhead air escort (helo/fixed wing).

Belligerent Reaction:

- Incidents of civil disobedience on the part of the population, e.g. crowds blocking roads.
- Halt and delay convoys with intent to delay aid delivery or steal ("tax") contents of the convoys.
- Sniping or other acts of random violence to intimidate and disrupt or stop convoys.
- Attacks on convoys to prevent delivery of aid or as a punitive measure in response to UNPROFOR (or opposing) belligerent actions.
- Belligerents may stop/delay aid by interdicting LOC.
 - Barricade roadway Mine road segments
 - Destroy bridges Block tunnels

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Counteraction:

- Difficult to counteract Bosnian Serb indirect responses - mining roads, destroying bridges (72 choke points on the Ploce - Sarajevo route).

Recommended Force Enhancements.

- Up to a brigade for route security (approx 15 km).
- Quick Reaction Force (mech and air assault).
- 1-2 engineer battalions.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support.
- MP units.

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- UNPROFOR/NATO allies could call for significant US contribution.
- UNPROFOR unlikely to accept full enforcement of mandate.

Risk Assessment:

- Bosnian Serb indirect/asymmetrical responses can halt aid delivery.
- Current UNPROFOR forces not capable of providing robust ground escort package. Without enhancements, UNPROFOR forces would be outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Routes parallel numerous hot spots near the active confrontation line. Convoys may encounter indirect fire from the fighting.

NOTE: These options were developed based on the assigned mission - reopen Sarajevo airport. The options are intentionally robust based on the threat capabilities and areas required to be secured. An air strike only package directed against high value targets throughout Bosnia was not considered. This approach could be perceived as purely offensive and unrelated to the

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direct opening of the airport at Sarajevo. The danger to relief operations and UNPROFOR troops could rise dramatically given this approach to reopening Sarajevo.

5. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation. The military options are high risk, high cost operations. Unless the US is willing to employ ground forces to support the securing of Sarajevo airfield and/or the coastal route to Sarajevo, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR or NATO will support a military option. At this time, the Joint Staff recommends against executing a military option.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV
X49435

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. note	For Sandy Vershbow from Wilma Hall. [partial] (1 page)	05/10/1995	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2699

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

May 10, 1995

NOTE FOR SANDY VERSHBOW

FROM: Wilma Hall *Wilma*
Anthony Lake's ofc

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Stephen Chesine

Mr. Chesin called today (from Canada) to say that through you Mr. Lake has requested preparation of some materials from him. He referenced a February 24 letter.

He is following up about coming to Washington to discuss it with Mr. Lake.

I told him that you and Mr. Lake were both travelling; that I would pass this message to your office to have upon your return.

Mr. Chesin can be reached at: 613/235-4597

(b)(6)

[004]

cc: Kathy Veit

Date: May 10, 1995

To: Anthony Lake, NSC


From: Stephen Chesine, Ottawa, Tel. Home (613) 235-5497 - evenings

Re: Your reference letter from Alexander Vershbow dated Feb. 24, 1995

- I have been developing the material
- There are changes in light of new developments
- Would like to meet in Washington
- Wish to add to the material in person
- Believe that a meeting in person would facilitate a more productive approach to the material
- Allows me to present material that I believe to be significant but must remain in verbal form

The Bottom Line: Federal District Properties

- A precedent for other disputes
- The basis of any civilized solution
- The basis of stability in the Region
- Upholds the life and liberty of the children, the elderly and the innocent



Stephen Chesine

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport

The Problem

After their successful challenge to the French at the illegal Sierra-4 checkpoint and their even more humiliating treatment of Contact Group representatives at Sarajevo airport, the Bosnian Serbs know they can keep bullying the United Nations and get whatever they want. The UN has no fall-back position for its talks with Karadzic; it long-ago ruled out the option of enforcing its control of the airport and the environs of Sarajevo. In his initial report on the situation, the Secretary General made it clear that the airport could be kept open only with the parties' agreement.

Referring to nonexistent precedents and claiming that the airport is Serb territory merely managed by the UN, Karadzic and his minions have threatened to fire on UN aircraft carrying anything but UNPROFOR military personnel. On April 27, the Serb commander overseeing the airport turned back a plane with civilians aboard and Karadzic announced that he will never allow foreign diplomats to land at Sarajevo, "especially diplomats from hostile nations, like Iran and the United States."

Prognosis: Humiliation and Strangulation

In the end, the UN may be able to maintain the airport as a logistical base for its own severely limited activities, but unless the UN can persuade the Bosnian Serbs otherwise, Sarajevo will lose its air link to the outside world. The GOBH will be isolated and the city will be strangled by closure of land routes.

And the Serbs may go further. In recent weeks, the Bosnian Serb Army has made obvious preparations for a massive attack on Sarajevo -- digging tank emplacements, replacing wooden and sandbag revetments encircling the city with reinforced concrete, etc. General Smith has said he expects the Serbs to "pick off the enclaves one-by-one" and then go for "the real prize enclave -- Sarajevo itself."

In response to these moves, the GOBH is certain to take into its own hands the future of its capital city. The B-H Army has already engaged in probing actions north and south of the city -- possibly setting the stage for an all-out offensive to punch one or two corridors into Sarajevo from nearby government-controlled territory. As Bosnian Vice President Ganic has stated, "We want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and do its job while the Serbs want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and not do its job." In the case of Sarajevo, the Bosnians will not long accept an UNPROFOR that is powerless to counter the Serbs.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

Our Limited Options

The key to keeping UNPROFOR on the ground and to avoiding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia is to take aggressive and decisive measures to keep Sarajevo Airport open for all traffic. The legal authority exists to do so and military options are being prepared.* But if we are truly serious, we must begin immediately to build a consensus among our allies and at the UN, threatening realistic consequences for inaction.

Among our options are the following:

- Using existing authority to permit NATO air activity of the following sorts:
- 1) Close air support in defense of UNPROFOR troops at the airport, who have in recent days been shelled by the Bosnian Serbs;
- 2) Air strikes based on the fact that Sarajevo is being strangled;
- 3) Air strikes based on the fact that the exclusion zone is being violated.

Diplomatically, we could begin with the following steps:

- Consulting immediately with allies bilaterally, at NATO and at the UN on Serb non-compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions, which call for unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance including "safe and secure access" to Sarajevo Airport, and provide for the use of force to protect the Sarajevo safe area. The UN Security Council is to act Wednesday to issue a Presidential Statement on the airport that will call for its re-opening in accordance with the 1992 Airport Agreement.
- Convening a meeting of the NAC to discuss military measures to ensure compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions.
- Arranging calls by the Secretary to Hurd, Juppé and Kozyrev, letting them know that a failure to open the airport on acceptable terms will make a Ministerial impossible.
- Raising the issue at the May 5 Contact Group meeting in Paris.

*See accompanying papers

EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

"Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR.

UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:

"... member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of] its mandate ..."

That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and replying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770, the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require that actions by member states and regional organizations be taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN, respectively.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION

NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9, 1993, which read in part:

"...that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas ..., measures including air strikes ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation" of safe areas.

The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General." This has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO
EXCLUSION ZONE

NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9, 1994, which reads in part that NATO:

"... accepts ... the request of the UN Secretary General to launch air strikes, ... at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo ... which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilians, ... and ... in response to artillery or mortar attacks on Sarajevo, ... and ... in response to the identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone [and not under UNPROFOR control] ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above, does NOT apply to restrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by diplomats or official delegations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. draft	Memcon: Meeting Between Vice President Gore and President Tudjman of Croatia; May 7, 1995. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2699

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	The Defeat of Krajina Serb Forces. (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2699

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	re: OPLAN 40104: French Paper on May 4 Meeting. (6 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2699

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Talking Points for Use by Vice President Gore with Prime Minister Major. (2 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2699

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. memo	For Leon Fuerth, Rick Inderfurth, Kenneth Brill, et al. From Andrew Sens. Subject: Additional Principals Tasking. Record ID: 9520564. (1 page)	05/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2699

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20564

May 2, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Additional Principals Tasking on OPLAN 40104
Unanswered Policy Questions

The Bosnia IWG is continuing to develop answers to the unanswered policy questions relating to OPLAN 40104. Attached memorandum formalizes Principals request for a post-UNPROFOR political and diplomatic strategy to focus IWG efforts.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *AS* Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/1/2014*

2013-0677-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

May 8, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN


DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia
~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on May 9, 1995, 1:00-2:30 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Van [Signature] NARA, Date 6/2/2014

2013-0687-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520596. (1 page)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: JCS Talking Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104 Briefing. Record ID: 9503499. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. paper	Croatia and Bosnia: Danger of Escalation. (3 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: Appraisal of Situation. (3 pages)	05/06/1995	P1/b(1)

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