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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Tudjman Adamantly. (4 pages)	05/05/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Subject: Letter Delivered by Bosnian Ambassador. Record ID: 9503786. (2 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
003. talking points	Vice President's Meeting with Croatian President Tudjman. (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Official-Informal. (3 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	The Bosnian Army-Bosnian Croat Army. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
006. chart	Notional Peel-Off Options I & II. (2 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: May 9 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520597. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
007b. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 9, 1995. Record ID: 9520596. (1 page)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
007c. cable	re: Meeting with Milosevic. (5 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)
007d. cable	re: European Assistant Secretary Holbrooke Meeting with Tudjman. (4 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)
007e. cable	re: Sarajevo Airport. (2 pages)	05/04/1995	P1/b(1)
007f. talking points	Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9503499. (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

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Nelson

May 17, 1995

BOSNIA: STRATEGIC CHOICES
NSC DISCUSSION PAPER

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Introduction:

We are in a critical period for U.S. policy toward Bosnia that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events before strategic choices are completely dictated by the situation on the ground.

Fundamental U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia:

- Obtain a political settlement that satisfies basic Bosnian government requirements and rolls back some Serb aggression
- End or reduce the fighting
- Prevent spread of conflict to other parts of region
- Maintain relief supplies
- Maintain cohesion with Allies
- Avoid American entanglement in fighting on the ground in the Balkans

Key Strategic Choices:

I. **Whither UNPROFOR:** U.S. support for continued UNPROFOR presence has been based upon an assessment that this course remains the avenue best suited to the majority of our fundamental objectives -- and that, for all of its problems, the alternatives are worse.

- In the current environment, the viability of UNPROFOR is increasingly being called into question.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR is unable to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to UN-protected areas/safe areas.
 - ◆ Fighting among the warring parties is no longer deterred by UNPROFOR presence.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR itself is frequently the subject of attack, and UNPROFOR forces are neither in a position to defend themselves effectively nor to withstand the possible consequences of calling in NATO airpower.
 - ◆ UNPROFOR credibility is thereby undermined with all parties, and NATO credibility in turn eroded as well.

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- Under these circumstances, we must ask whether linking U.S. objectives to continued UNPROFOR presence remains valid in the current environment.
 - ♦ There still do not appear to be any alternatives to UNPROFOR that provide better support for U.S. objectives.
 - ♦ Withdrawal followed by unilateral or predominantly U.S. lift (and strike) risks "Americanizing" the Balkan conflict; even multilateral lift risks widening the scope of the conflict as more external parties move to support regional clients.
 - ♦ Replacement of UNPROFOR with another international presence (NATO? WEU? Coalition of the willing?) would either require U.S. participation on the ground or prove equally ineffective -- and require additional political and financial capital to initiate.
 - ♦ U.S. interests are thus best served by finding a way to restore credibility to the UNPROFOR mission in a manner that permits existing troop contributors to sustain their continued presence and the Bosnian government to agree to retain that presence.
- Options other than withdrawal available for UNPROFOR under the present circumstances:
 - ♦ **Muddle through with the status quo:** French have already indicated likely pullout if current conditions remain unchanged -- may be the thread that unravels the whole fabric of UNPROFOR.
 - ♦ **"Restabilization" of existing UNPROFOR mission with more robust enforcement of existing mandate:** UK avoidance of a confrontational approach in B-H must be overcome if this option is to become viable; additional resources needed to enhance military capabilities of existing UNPROFOR forces not likely to be forthcoming.
 - ♦ **"Retrench and reinvigorate" UNPROFOR mission by withdrawing from untenable positions/missions while pursuing more robust enforcement of remaining mandates:** could be seen as a trade of the eastern enclaves for more effective mission performance around Sarajevo -- implications for eastern enclaves could be very serious; however, this option could satisfy both the French and UK; by retrenching, could also alleviate some of the problems associated with resources to enhance capabilities.
 - ♦ **"Retrench and retreat" by withdrawing and pursuing an even less vigorous approach to mandate enforcement:** the least costly approach, this might be used as a bargaining chip to get the Bosnian Serbs to accede to the conditions for French

forces remaining in UNPROFOR; UK likely to support; however, potentially as damaging to UNPROFOR credibility as the status quo, with the additional public image/moral costs of not only "abandoning" the eastern enclaves, but also "capitulating" in cases where UNPROFOR remains; least likely to be acceptable to Bosnians, who could then refuse to allow continued UNPROFOR presence.

Comment: Only realistic choice may be to seek Allied support to "retrench and reinvigorate". Trade U.S. support for retrenchment for allied and UN pledge to pursue more robust enforcement of remaining mandate, including NATO airstrikes. Fall back to "retrench and retreat" only if no other way to prevent withdrawal.

II. Whither OPLAN 40104, given U.S. objective of sustaining UNPROFOR and commitment to assist withdrawal if required?

- There are no guarantees that a viable solution to retaining UNPROFOR in theater can be agreed.
- Withdrawal remains a real, and increasingly likely, option if there is no agreement on a more viable UNPROFOR role.
- Nevertheless, several key issues remain to be resolved before a decision to proceed with withdrawal implementation could be taken with confidence:
 - ♦ **What is the end state we want to leave behind following UNPROFOR withdrawal?** What to avoid may be clearer than what to achieve: avoid merely replacing UN with NATO forces and being unable to leave; avoid debacle of U.S./NATO-led withdrawal being depicted as precursor to brutal ethnic cleansing; avoid loss of NATO credibility to the same extent there has been a loss of UN credibility.
 - ♦ **How does NATO deal with unintended consequences of withdrawal operations?** Massive refugee flow; use of NATO forces as shields by civilians or by warring factions; hostage-taking by warring factions; withdrawal of humanitarian aid providers as a result of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
 - ♦ **Under what conditions could withdrawal or partial withdrawal take place without requiring implementation of OPLAN 40104?** If nations determine that they will accomplish *de facto* withdrawal by merely failing to replace units during normal rotation, no NATO assistance may be necessary. If this resulted in enclaves being left unprotected, would the last forces out require NATO assistance, or could the UN accomplish this on its own?

- The way ahead for OPLAN 40104 is also complicated by a dilemma: we must ensure that our actions in preparation for possible UNPROFOR withdrawal do not precipitate the withdrawal itself.
- ♦ Key is not allowing the existence of a "NATO withdrawal force" to prompt either UN troop contributors to seek early withdrawal or Bosnians to act to cause UNPROFOR withdrawal in the hopes that NATO will replace the UN. **A clear "firebreak" is required between completion of NATO preparation for OPLAN 40104 and initiation of OPLAN implementation.** We must be confident that we understand exactly what steps will be required to get from the present state of NATO planning to this firebreak, and what steps take us beyond it.
- ♦ NATO credibility requires that forces must be trained sufficiently to ensure mission success. ACTREQ requested by SACEUR this week will facilitate identification of forces and training shortfalls, and allow SACEUR to initiate action to rectify those shortfalls. Training in place to NATO standards should be an acceptable alternative to assembling in Europe for training, and send a more restrained signal.
- ♦ Training in place would also permit completion of Congressional consultations prior to movement of any US forces. We may need to lay down marker in NATO that assembly of forces in Europe will require a further political decision.

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Press Guidance

NATO PLANNING FOR UNPROFOR PULLOUT

- U.S. fully supports efforts at NATO to complete prudent military planning for a NATO-led operation to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia should it become necessary.
- President Clinton has committed in principle to provide U.S. forces in support of a NATO-led effort if NATO were asked by the United Nations to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- NATO military and technical experts have for some time been making contingency plans to respond to such a request, should it become necessary.
- The NATO plan, called OPLAN 40104, is not yet complete, but it is flexibly designed to support a wide range of withdrawal scenarios.
- Neither the United States nor NATO expect a deployment to be necessary in the immediate future.
- The U.S. supports the continued presence of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNCRO in the Republic of Croatia.
- UNPROFOR and UNCRO must carry out their missions under extremely difficult circumstances. Their presence remains a key factor in creating an environment conducive to a negotiated settlement.
- The United States believes it is important, in order to enable UN forces to remain on the ground in Bosnia that: (1) they be allowed to fully implement all aspects of their mandates, as outlined in relevant United Nations resolutions, drawing on NATO air support when warranted; and, (2) that they have the assurance that NATO is fully prepared to assist them if withdrawal becomes necessary.

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FINANCING WITHDRAWAL IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

May 2, 1995

Background

Sometime in FY 1995, the NATO allies may have to initiate a military operation to withdraw the U.N. peacekeeping mission (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia. The cost of a withdrawal operation would be approximately \$1.95 billion, with DOD paying \$1.0 billion (51%) for its prominent role in the operation (41,000 of a total withdrawal force of 88,000, or 110,550 including UNPROFOR forces). There has been considerable discussion both within the Administration and with NATO allies on financing arrangements for such an operation. This paper discusses options for funding these costs, with varying results for net U.S. costs, once we have been reimbursed.

In addition to these costs of withdrawal, however, the U.S. is incurring other costs for Bosnia related activities, including peacekeeping assessments, off-shore Adriatic operations and air operations over Bosnia. The Administration therefore has focussed on how we would pay for *all* costs (withdrawal, assessments, and other operations) associated with Bosnia for FY 1995. While DOD costs to date have been funded by the recent supplemental (H.R. 889), the State Department's U.N. assessments have not yet been funded by Congress. Because they will require Congressional approval, the assessments (and DOD's costs) have been added to each funding option to give an inclusive picture of U.S. Bosnia commitments. All FY 1995 Bosnia-related activities are presented in the chart below:

Activities	Cost (gross)	Status
DOD initial costs for participation in NATO withdrawal OPPLAN	\$1.0 billion	requires supp; depending on option, some could be reimbursed by NATO
Additional NATO and/or UN assessments for withdrawal operation	Up to \$420 million	requires supp; reimbursed depending on option.
DOD operations in Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, etc. DOD assets become part of withdrawal plan	\$310 million, of which \$210 million spent thus far in FY95	already funded in FY 95 DOD supplemental
State Dept.'s share of assessed UN peacekeeping for UNPROFOR	Up to \$510 million	supp request denied; requirement still pending

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Cost Options

The financing options are described on the following pages in terms of both gross U.S. costs (paid up front), net U.S. costs (after reimbursements from either NATO or U.N.), and the estimated supplemental request to Congress that would be needed. (See Table 1 attached for a detailed break-out of the costs for each of the options.) A total of nine options (including five analyzed by NATO) for paying FY 1995 Bosnia costs were considered. However, only three options, representative of major funding approaches and resulting in lower net U.S. costs, are evaluated in this paper. (A fourth option more costly to the U.S., but preferred by our NATO allies, is summarized in the attachment). The three options considered are:

- **Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO UN Cost Sharing).** This option would have the least net cost to the United States and shares costs between the U.S., NATO allies, and other U.N. member states.
- **NATO minus UNPROFOR.** This option would fund UNPROFOR through the U.N. budget during withdrawal, with NATO paying for the new additional forces required for withdrawal.
- **Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund.** DOD would pay its \$1.0 billion estimated share of the withdrawal operation without any reimbursements. State Department FY 1995 assessed U.N. peacekeeping costs for Bosnia are paid by other nations to a U.N. voluntary contribution fund.

Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO UN Cost Sharing) Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1.980 m. Net Cost: \$980 m. Supplemental Request: \$1.670 m.

Description: An umbrella "Sec. 607 Agreement" would be negotiated between NATO and the U.N. whereby NATO, in charge of all forces, provides all withdrawal services and initially pays for them. In return, the U.N. would assess other non-NATO nations to help pay for NATO withdrawal costs.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would establish a separate fund to receive contributions; this fund would help pay for withdrawal. The U.N. would then assess all its non-NATO member states for their normal share (approx. 32%, or \$625 million) of the \$1.95 billion withdrawal operation. These assessments would be used by the U.N. to fund the costs of withdrawing non-NATO UNPROFOR forces as well as U.N. administrative and support costs estimated at \$200 million. Any remaining funds (approx. \$425 million) would be given to NATO to reimburse NATO members' costs. NATO would pay the remaining 68% of the \$1.95 billion withdrawal cost by assessing each of its members for their share.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$320 million in new NATO assessments. The State Department would have remaining a U.N. assessment arrearage of \$450 million. DOD would have existing costs of approximately \$210 million for the first seven months of current operations in the Bosnian theater. These costs total \$1,980 million.

Reimbursements: The U.N. would have to reimburse NATO with the remaining resources in the contribution fund. In turn, NATO would have to reimburse its member states out of the U.N. reimbursement as well as out of its own assessments. (NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism.) DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (i.e. deployment and logistics costs of \$1.0 billion incurred before the U.N. or NATO has raised funds from its assessments) from these resources.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,670 million. DOD's share would be \$1,220 m. (\$1,000 + \$320 - \$100 - the latter already paid for by H.R. 889 DOD Supplemental). State Department's share would be \$450. The supplemental request would in principle be offset by later reimbursements (approximately \$1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$670 million.

Advantages

- Lowest net U.S. cost.

- Reduces burden to U.S. taxpayer.
- State's FY 1995 assessment burden would drop slightly (since the U.N. would no longer be paying for the UNPROFOR costs incurred by NATO members transferred over to NATO's command), or at worse remain static.
- Spreads some burden of withdrawal costs to non-NATO U.N. members providing greater equity between U.S., other NATO, and other U.N. members.

Disadvantages

- Might be difficult to gain agreement from the U.N. and NATO to implement for three reasons:
 1. U.N. asked to pay for part of NATO's costs but has no command over forces.
 2. Dual funding mechanisms between U.N. and NATO have never been used before. Would require a level of cooperation and coordination between U.N. and NATO that has never been attempted before.
 3. NATO allies costs will likely be greater and thus Russians and others may balk at underwriting NATO.
- Significant senior White House and policy official involvement would likely be required to secure agreement.
- Reimbursements from NATO may be very slow or may not be made.

NATO Minus UNPROFOR Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$2,140 m. Net Cost: \$1,140 m. Supplemental Request: \$1,830 m.

Description: NATO would provide and pay for the new troops and equipment needed for withdrawal. The U.N. would retain budgetary control over all UNPROFOR forces, including those of NATO member states, for the six month period they are being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would fund all costs incurred by UNPROFOR forces (e.g. logistics) during withdrawal. It would do so partially out of its current UNPROFOR budget. For the remainder, the U.N. would assess its member states a nominal amount to redeploy UNPROFOR troops and equipment out of country. NATO would fund the costs (e.g. deployment/ redeployment, basic logistics) of all forces used for withdrawal that were not originally in UNPROFOR. It would do so by assessing NATO member states for their share of the operation.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$420 million in new NATO assessments as part of its share to cover all NATO costs. The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly \$10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany. It would also have remaining a U.N. assessment arrearage of \$500 million. DOD would have existing costs of approximately \$210 million for the first seven months of current operations in the Bosnian theater. Total U.S. Gross costs would be \$2,140 million.

Reimbursements: There would be no reimbursements from the U.N. NATO would reimburse its member states out of its own assessments. (NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism.) DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (approx. \$1.0 billion).

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,830 million. DOD's share would be \$1,320 m. (\$1,000+ \$420-\$100 already paid for by H.R. 889 DOD Supplemental). State Department's share would be \$510. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. \$1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$830 million.

Advantages

- State's FY 1995 assessment burden remains the same since U.N. costs are basically unchanged.
- A lower net cost for the U.S. (though higher than Option 1).

- NATO allies have indicated they might accept this option as a last resort.

Disadvantages

- Higher net U.S. costs than Hybrid option.
- U.S. share of NATO assessment would increase if any NATO nation makes a political decision to opt out of participating in withdrawal, since assessment shares are based upon the number of nations participating in operations.
- Reimbursements from NATO may be very slow or may not be made.

Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1,210 m. Net Cost \$1,210 m. Supplemental Request: \$900 m.

Description: Each nation would pay its own costs in executing the withdrawal operation. NATO member troops currently in UNPROFOR would revert back to their respective nations' militaries. Non-NATO members of UNPROFOR would remain under UNPROFOR while being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: Each nation would pay its own costs from its own treasury. The U.N. would cover the costs of drawing down non-NATO UNPROFOR troops from within the existing UNPROFOR budget. Because the U.S. would be paying the majority of withdrawal costs (i.e. \$1.0 of \$1.95 billion) while representing just over one third of all ~~(110,500)~~ forces in theater (including UNPROFOR troops being withdrawn), our NATO allies and others (Japan, Saudi Arabia, et al.) would agree to pay \$500 million to a special U.N. voluntary fund. This fund would be used to pay the FY 1995 State Department U.N. assessment arrearages for UNPROFOR. As a practical matter, this option shifts the burden of U.S. international peacekeeping obligations in Bosnia from the State Department budget to the Defense budget. This occurs because DOD bears costs, that otherwise would be reimbursed, to permit the U.S. to solicit funds to cover the existing UNPROFOR assessment.

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U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. DOD would have existing costs of approximately \$210 million for the first seven months of Bosnia operations. These costs total \$1,210 million.

Reimbursements: There would be none.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$900 million. DOD's share would be \$900 m. (\$1,000-\$100 already paid for by H.R. 889 DOD Supplemental). State Department would have no share since its costs would be paid for by the voluntary contribution fund. With no reimbursements, there would be no offsets for such. The net supplemental request would equal \$900 million.

Advantages

- Would eliminate U.S. UNPROFOR debt and place U.N. on sounder financial footing.
- Helps maintain U.N. solvency, while discouraging perceptions of the U.S. as a country that freely accepts financial obligations it will not meet.

Disadvantages

- Would have significantly higher U.S. net costs because there would be no reimbursements to the U.S.
- Would be difficult to sell to the Congress, since U.S. covers the majority of the costs of the withdrawal effort.
- The other countries would have to commit in advance to paying certain amounts to the U.N. fund to insure that commitments exist to cover the \$500 million. This would require active solicitation of funds along the Desert Storm model.
- Would be strongly resisted by DoD and most likely Congress as an attempt, albeit indirect, to cover U.N. assessments in the DoD budget.

Attachment: Table 1 -- Financing Options for FY 1995 Bosnia-Related Activities
Tab 1 -- NATO Preferred Funding Option

Table 1: Financing Options for FY 1995 Bosnia-Related Activities
(\$ in Millions: Assumes Full Reimbursement from NATO and/or U.N.)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 PayWay 1/
Total Withdrawal Costs (For 6 Months of Operations)	1,950	1,950	1,950
Financed By: NATO	1,326	1,750	
Financed By: National Costs			1,950
Financed By: United Nations	624	200	
Gross US Costs re Bosnia For FY95	1,980	2,140	1,210
State	<u>450</u>	<u>510</u>	<u>0</u>
New Withdrawal Assessment	0	10	0
FY 1995 UN Assessment	450	500	0
DOD	<u>1,530</u>	<u>1,630</u>	<u>1,210</u>
Withdrawal Cost	1,000	1,000	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	0
Other FY 1995 Bosnia Costs	210	210	210
Withdrawal Cost Reimbursements	1,000	1,000	0
DOD	1,000	1,000	
Net US Costs re Bosnia For FY95	980	1,140	1,210
State	<u>450</u>	<u>510</u>	<u>0</u>
New Withdrawal Assessment	0	10	0
FY 1995 UN Assessment	450	500	0
DOD	<u>530</u>	<u>630</u>	<u>1,210</u>
Withdrawal Cost	0	0	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	0
Other FY 1995 Bosnia Costs	210	210	210

1/ NATO allies contribute to "Voluntary Fund" that would be used to pay State's UN assessment.

TAB 1

NATO Preferred Financing Option

Our NATO allies prefer a fourth financing option that would place as much of the withdrawal costs as possible in the U.N. and U.S. (as opposed to NATO) budgets. This would reduce the NATO allies' financial burden since they pay a smaller share of U.N. assessments than NATO assessments (e.g. U.K. assessments for NATO are roughly three times their U.N. share).

Enhanced UNPROFOR and U.N. Share

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1,810 m. Net Cost: \$1,700 m. Supplemental Request: \$1,500 m.

Description: The U.N. would fund some of the withdrawal costs of NATO. Specifically, it would maintain control of *all* UNPROFOR forces (as in NATO minus U.N. Option above) *and* it would fund the basic logistics costs of all troops (NATO and UNPROFOR) on the ground in Bosnia. Nations sending troops for the withdrawal operation would pay the majority of costs (e.g. deployment / redeployment, logistics outside of Bosnia, et al.). NATO would fund only the common costs of headquarters and communications / engineering requirements.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would increase the size of the UNPROFOR budget by the equivalent of 6,000 additional troops currently authorized (although no troops would actually be added to UNPROFOR). The U.N. would use the increased funds to pay partially all costs incurred by UNPROFOR forces during withdrawal (as in NATO Minus U.N. Option above). It would also assess its member states for the costs of providing logistics to the withdrawal force in Bosnia. The participating nations would pay those costs not covered by the U.N. or NATO (for common costs of approx. \$110 million) out of their own treasuries. NATO would assess its member states to cover its common costs.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$30 million in new NATO assessments for common costs. The State Department would incur a new U.N. assessment of approximately \$70 million. It would also have remaining a U.N. assessment arrearage of \$500 million. DOD would have existing costs of approximately \$210 million for the first seven months of Bosnia operations. These costs total \$1,810 million.

Reimbursements: Both the U.N. and NATO would owe DOD reimbursements totaling approximately \$110 million.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,500 million. DOD's share would be \$930 m. (\$1,000 + \$30 - \$100 already paid for by H.R. 889 DOD Supplemental). State Department's share would be \$570. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. \$110 million). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$1,400 million.

This option is the most expensive to the U.S., in terms of net costs, of any of the nine options originally considered by the interagency working group.

Pay Your Own Way/Voluntary Fund

<u>COST OF OPTION</u>			
<u>Activities</u>	<u>Gross US Costs</u>	<u>Reimbursements</u>	<u>Minimum Net US Costs</u>
DOD Direct Cost of Participation in NATO OpPlan	1,000	n/a	1,000
Additional NATO Assessments	0	n/a	0
DOD first seven months costs	210	n/a	210
UN Assessment	[450]	[-450]	0
TOTAL	1,210	0	1,210

<u>SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST TO CONGRESS</u>			
<u>Activities</u>	<u>Supp. Request</u>	<u>Reimbursements</u>	<u>Minimum Net Supplemental</u>
DOD Direct Cost of Participation in NATO OpPlan	1,000	0	1,000
Costs of withdrawal already paid for by FY 95 DOD Supp (HR 889)	-100		-100
Additional NATO Assessments	0	n/a	0
UN Assessment	[450]	[-450]	0
TOTAL	900	--	900

\$450 million will be paid to the UN by other UN Member countries who will agree to contribute to a voluntary fund to pay U.S. assessments to UN as price for non-reimbursed US involvement in withdrawal

HYBRID

<u>COST OF OPTION</u>			
<u>Activities</u>	<u>Gross US Costs</u>	<u>Reimbursements</u>	<u>Minimum Net US Costs</u>
DOD Direct Cost of Participation in NATO OpPlan	1,000	-1,000	0
Additional NATO Assessments	320	n/a	320
DOD first seven months costs	210	n/a	210
UN Assessment	450	n/a	450
TOTAL	1,980	-1,000	980

<u>SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST TO CONGRESS</u>			
<u>Activities</u>	<u>Supp Request</u>	<u>Reimbursements</u>	<u>Minimum Net Supplemental</u>
DOD Direct Cost of Participation in NATO OpPlan	1,000	[-1,000]	1,000
Costs of withdrawal already paid for by FY 95 DOD Supp (HR 889)	-100		-100
Additional NATO Assessments	320	n/a	320
UN Assessment	450	n/a	450
TOTAL	1,670	--	1,670

\$1,000 million reimbursement will be credited to the Treasury Dept when the reimbursement actually comes into the government.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	re: Official-Informal. (3 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2698

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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005. paper	The Bosnian Army-Bosnian Croat Army. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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006. chart	Notional Peel-Off Options I & II. (2 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: May 9 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520597. (5 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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007b. agenda	NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 9, 1995. Record ID: 9520596. (1 page)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

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007c. cable	re: Meeting with Milosevic. (5 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 897

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Bosnia - May 1995: Early [1]

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007d. cable	re: European Assistant Secretary Holbrooke Meeting with Tudjman. (4 pages)	05/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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8

Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport

The Problem

After their successful challenge to the French at the illegal Sierra-4 checkpoint and their even more humiliating treatment of Contact Group representatives at Sarajevo airport, the Bosnian Serbs know they can keep bullying the United Nations and get whatever they want. The UN has no fall-back position for its talks with Karadzic; it long-ago ruled out the option of enforcing its control of the airport and the environs of Sarajevo. In his initial report on the situation, the Secretary General made it clear that the airport could be kept open only with the parties' agreement.

Referring to nonexistent precedents and claiming that the airport is Serb territory merely managed by the UN, Karadzic and his minions have threatened to fire on UN aircraft carrying anything but UNPROFOR military personnel. On April 27, the Serb commander overseeing the airport turned back a plane with civilians aboard and Karadzic announced that he will never allow foreign diplomats to land at Sarajevo, "especially diplomats from hostile nations, like Iran and the United States."

Prognosis: Humiliation and Strangulation

In the end, the UN may be able to maintain the airport as a logistical base for its own severely limited activities, but unless the UN can persuade the Bosnian Serbs otherwise, Sarajevo will lose its air link to the outside world. The GOBH will be isolated and the city will be strangled by closure of land routes.

And the Serbs may go further. In recent weeks, the Bosnian Serb Army has made obvious preparations for a massive attack on Sarajevo -- digging tank emplacements, replacing wooden and sandbag revetments encircling the city with reinforced concrete, etc. General Smith has said he expects the Serbs to "pick off the enclaves one-by-one" and then go for "the real prize enclave -- Sarajevo itself."

In response to these moves, the GOBH is certain to take into its own hands the future of its capital city. The B-H Army has already engaged in probing actions north and south of the city -- possibly setting the stage for an all-out offensive to punch one or two corridors into Sarajevo from nearby government-controlled territory. As Bosnian Vice President Ganic has stated, "We want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and do its job while the Serbs want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and not do its job." In the case of Sarajevo, the Bosnians will not long accept an UNPROFOR that is powerless to counter the Serbs.

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VZ 10/1/2013

Our Limited Options

The key to keeping UNPROFOR on the ground and to avoiding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia is to take aggressive and decisive measures to keep Sarajevo Airport open for all traffic. The legal authority exists to do so and military options are being prepared.* But if we are truly serious, we must begin immediately to build a consensus among our allies and at the UN, threatening realistic consequences for inaction.

Among our options are the following:

- Using existing authority to permit NATO air activity of the following sorts:
- 1) Close air support in defense of UNPROFOR troops at the airport, who have in recent days been shelled by the Bosnian Serbs;
- 2) Air strikes based on the fact that Sarajevo is being strangled;
- 3) Air strikes based on the fact that the exclusion zone is being violated.

Diplomatically, we could begin with the following steps:

- Consulting immediately with allies bilaterally, at NATO and at the UN on Serb non-compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions, which call for unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance including "safe and secure access" to Sarajevo Airport, and provide for the use of force to protect the Sarajevo safe area. The UN Security Council is to act Wednesday to issue a Presidential Statement on the airport that will call for its re-opening in accordance with the 1992 Airport Agreement.
- Convening a meeting of the NAC to discuss military measures to ensure compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions.
- Arranging calls by the Secretary to Hurd, Juppe and Kozyrev, letting them know that a failure to open the airport on acceptable terms will make a Ministerial impossible.
- Raising the issue at the May 5 Contact Group meeting in Paris.

*See accompanying papers

EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

"Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR.

UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:

"... member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of] its mandate ..."

That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and replying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770, the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require that actions by member states and regional organizations be taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN, respectively.

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION

NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9, 1993, which read in part:

"...that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas ..., measures including air strikes ..."

NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation" of safe areas.

The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General." This has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

-2-

AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO
EXCLUSION ZONE

NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9, 1994, which reads in part that NATO:

"... accepts ... the request of the UN Secretary General to launch air strikes, ... at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo ... which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilians, ... and ... in response to artillery or mortar attacks on Sarajevo, ... and ... in response to the identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone [and not under UNPROFOR control]"

NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.

UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are 770, 836 and 844.

In addition to the UN/NATO authorities, collective self-defense would authorize states to use air power at the request of the Bosnian Government. Such use of air power could be restricted by UN Security Council resolutions -- e.g., by the establishment of the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above, does NOT apply to restrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by diplomats or official delegations.

~~SECRET~~

1 May 1995

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options to reopen Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
2. (U) Background. Sarajevo air operations have been periodically interrupted by the Bosnian Serbs since the beginning of the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces control the area surrounding the airport and the major land routes into Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs have the capability to attack aircraft in flight and while unloading on the airfield. Aircraft are threatened by both antiaircraft weapons and conventional direct and indirect ground systems. The Bosnian Muslims also have the capability, though to a lesser extent, to interdict air operations. UNPROFOR has documented numerous occasions of BiH fire.
3. (S) Discussion. The following options are available for consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo:

Assumptions:

- New UNSCR(s) required to implement a military option will be adopted by the Security Council.
- A parallel diplomatic effort to secure the opening of Sarajevo will be undertaken.

OPTION 1: Secure Sarajevo Airport - forcibly secure and maintain a DMZ around Sarajevo. Create a demilitarized zone (8-10km) around Sarajevo airfield which denies the Bosnian Serbs from employing weapons against aircraft that are in flight or on the ground. This option could require up to a division sized force to secure the airfield and remove the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim presence from the immediate area.

UNPROFOR Action:

- UNPROFOR seize (if necessary) and establish administrative control over the Sarajevo airport
- Secure airfield perimeter and approaches using a combination of troops equipped with means of acquisition for various types of attack. May include night vision devices, GPS, artillery acquisition battery.
- Take direct action to secure high terrain and buildings from belligerents. Move civilians outside of airport safe zone (2-3km). Combatants excluded inside 8-10km zone.

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- Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport. Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to 10 km from the airport.
- NATO Airborne AC-130 and helicopter response capability to attack sniper/mortar/artillery positions. Consider use of a ground quick reaction force.

Belligerent Reaction:

- "Administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government in Pale, e.g., refusing to guarantee the safety of UN flights.
- Employ random sniping incidents due to the particular vulnerability of aircraft
- Small arms fire directed either at aircraft or ground personnel. Will be disruptive even if not directed at airport operations per se.
- Random or continuous mortar and artillery attacks designed to damage the airfield, aircraft or simply to disrupt operations.
- Employment of man portable IR surface to air missiles/AAA designed to directly attack aircraft.
- Employment of longer range systems (heavy artillery, SA-2s from ranges of 30-50kms).
- Horizontal escalation elsewhere in B-H; hostage taking, attacks on ground convoys, attacks on UN personnel, disruption of utilities into Sarajevo and other enclaves.
- BiH may target UNPROFOR attempting to blame the BSA in order to encourage a NATO response against the BSA.

Counteraction:

- Difficult if not impossible to counteract Bosnian Serb horizontal escalation/asymmetric responses.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- Counterbattery radar, NODs, GPS, and other long range acquisition devices linked to means of reaction.
- Up to a brigade dedicated to airport security with heavy quick reaction force, up to a brigade sized force to remove combatants from the Sarajevo airport area.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support
- Air assault capability (company sized)

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~~SECRET~~**Pol-Mil Considerations:**

- UNPROFOR/Allies unlikely to support "offensive" operation to open airport.
- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- Allies could call for large US troop and equipment contribution.
- Bosnian Serbs could advertise DMZ as form of ethnic cleansing.

Risk Assessment:

- Irrespective of any of the military measures taken, the absolute safety of transport/civilian aircraft cannot be guaranteed given the threat environment.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, transport, and AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- UNPROFOR would be required to redeploy forces to support this option which could create increased risk in other areas. Only French, UK, Dutch, Canadian forces capable of accomplishing tasks associated with this option.
- Without significant force enhancements, UNPROFOR forces outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Airport sits astride confrontation line; will be difficult to establish which party is responsible for firing.

OPTION 2: Use CAS and air strike packages to support delivery of humanitarian aid flights. Marshall significant NATO air package to suppress immediate threats around Sarajevo airport as aid is flown into and unloaded at the airfield. Package could include integration of target acquisition systems to assist in locating indirect firing systems. Given the nature of the threat surrounding the airfield, target acquisition (rifleman, AA gun, mortar) would be extremely difficult. As a consequence, the ability to deliver effective suppressive fire against these type targets would be extremely difficult.

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UNPROFOR Action:

- Deploy target acquisition system to Sarajevo airfield. Deploy TACPs to Sarajevo area.
- Package aid deliveries so that CAS/air strike packages support specified high density delivery periods.
- Clearly state intent to use NATO air support for protecting aid deliveries into Sarajevo.
- Specify target categories (high value, artillery pieces, headquarters in Sarajevo vicinity) that NATO may strike in response to Serb attack on humanitarian aid flights.

Belligerent Reaction:

- Continued "administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the airport. Blocking aid outside airport.
- Threats from Bosnian Serb government refusing safety of flights.
- Hostage taking - placing hostages at weapons sites.
- Direct attack against humanitarian flights.
- BiH may manipulate NATO's intent to use air power to their advantage.

Counteraction:

- Direct attack against targets engaging aircraft.
- Direct attack against Bosnian Serb high value targets.

Recommended Force Enhancements:

- AC-130 aircraft.
- EW CAP (EA-6B, EF-111s).

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Troop contributing nations unlikely to support air option due to concern for safety of deployed troops.
- "Dual key" arrangement remains key factor in control of air strikes.
- Could require significant US contribution in terms of air assets.
- Bosnian Serbs likely to use collateral damage as media weapon against US/NATO. Given this scenario, attempts to suppress sniper/mortar fires in an urban environment have a high potential for collateral damage.

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~~SECRET~~**Risk Assessment:**

- Air power alone insufficient to protect humanitarian aid flights and keep airfield open. Threat/target difficult to identify and acquire (snipers, mortars, urban environment, mountainous topography).
- Support aircraft (AC-130) at high risk in semi-integrated air defense network.
- Bosnian Serbs can react in ways (hostage taking, utility shut-down) which limit the effectiveness of air power options.
- High probability of collateral damage and fratricide.

OPTION 3: Open and maintain a road corridor from the Adriatic coast to Sarajevo (15km through Bosnian Serb held territory).

UNPROFOR Action:

- Enhance convoy ability to protect themselves by employing a graduated range of security responses from self protection through heavy force (armor/Infantry Fighting Vehicle) security escorts.
- UNPROFOR can create and employ a "Quick Reaction Force" consisting of heavy ground maneuver units, assault forces, and possibly helicopters.
- To counter interdiction efforts UNPROFOR can obtain and employ combat engineer units/assets moving with convoys or reacting to specific points.
- Provide each convoy with TACPs and continuous overhead air escort (helo/fixed wing).

Belligerent Reaction:

- Incidents of civil disobedience on the part of the population, e.g. crowds blocking roads.
- Halt and delay convoys with intent to delay aid delivery or steal ("tax") contents of the convoys.
- Sniping or other acts of random violence to intimidate and disrupt or stop convoys.
- Attacks on convoys to prevent delivery of aid or as a punitive measure in response to UNPROFOR (or opposing) belligerent actions.
- Belligerents may stop/delay aid by interdicting LOC.
 - Barricade roadway Mine road segments
 - Destroy bridges Block tunnels

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~~SECRET~~**Counteraction:**

- Difficult to counteract Bosnian Serb indirect responses - mining roads, destroying bridges (72 choke points on the Ploce - Sarajevo route).

Recommended Force Enhancements.

- Up to a brigade for route security (approx 15 km).
- Quick Reaction Force (mech and air assault).
- 1-2 engineer battalions.
- AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support.
- MP units.

Pol-Mil Considerations:

- Additional troop contributions to support new mission unlikely.
- UNPROFOR/NATO allies could call for significant US contribution.
- UNPROFOR unlikely to accept full enforcement of mandate.

Risk Assessment:

- Bosnian Serb indirect/asymmetrical responses can halt aid delivery.
- Current UNPROFOR forces not capable of providing robust ground escort package. Without enhancements, UNPROFOR forces would be outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
- Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with limited logistics base.
- Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft (especially helicopters, AC-130s) in a semi-integrated air defense network.
- Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force casualties.
- Routes parallel numerous hot spots near the active confrontation line. Convoys may encounter indirect fire from the fighting.

NOTE: These options were developed based on the assigned mission - reopen Sarajevo airport. The options are intentionally robust based on the threat capabilities and areas required to be secured. An air strike only package directed against high value targets throughout Bosnia was not considered. This approach could be perceived as purely offensive and unrelated to the

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direct opening of the airport at Sarajevo. The danger to relief operations and UNPROFOR troops could rise dramatically given this approach to reopening Sarajevo.

5. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation. The military options are high risk, high cost operations. Unless the US is willing to employ ground forces to support the securing of Sarajevo airfield and/or the coastal route to Sarajevo, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR or NATO will support a military option. At this time, the Joint Staff recommends against executing a military option.

Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007e. cable	re: Sarajevo Airport. (2 pages)	05/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Early [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2698

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007f. talking points	Points for Congressional OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9503499. (4 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)

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