

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

898

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

3

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Paris Contact Group Meeting. (4 pages)	04/28/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: April 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520545. (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 28, 1995. Record ID: 9520525. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. cable	re: Milosevic's April 26 Meeting with UK Charge. [partial] (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. cable	re: Milosevic's Response to Contact Group Paper. (4 pages)	04/17/1995	P1/b(1)
002e. chart	The UK-FR Proposal. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003. letter	To President Clinton from Radovan Karadzic. (1 page)	04/22/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	What is the NATO Policy for Dealing with Civilians. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	What is the NATO's Responsibility in Dealing with Violations of Safe Areas. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (11 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**IO/UNP**

4/27

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE

URGENT

TEL. 647-0045

FAX: 647-0039

COVER • 2 PAGES**FROM:**

John W. Chamberlin

TO:

NSC - Don Kerrick/Sandy Vershbow - 456-9150

~~STEVE SIMON/ROGER CRESSEY~~NSC - ~~Susan Rice~~ - 456-9360

OSD - John Klekas - 703-695-6506

~~JIM THOMPEN - 703-614-0905~~JCS - ~~Balkans Unit - 703-697-0180~~**SUBJECT:** SARAJEVO AIRPORT: U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION**COMMENTS:** USON drafted this as result of Albright -
Holbrooke conversation this morning. Please give me feedback
ASAP.

U.S. Draft Resolution on Sarajevo Airport

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Noting with extreme concern reports from the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on deliberate attempts, by the Bosnian Serb party, to obstruct the normal functioning of Sarajevo airport,

Noting the Agreement of June 5, 1992 on the Reopening of Sarajevo Airport which was signed by representatives of the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb party, in which they undertook not to interfere in any way with the free movement of UNPROFOR supervised air traffic into and out of Sarajevo airport, such traffic to consist of humanitarian re-supply missions, United Nations and European Community or related missions, and official missions,

Also emphasizing the need for all parties and others concerned to create immediately the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport,

Emphasizing also the continued need for the unobstructed delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs, and the crucial role of Sarajevo airport in the delivery of such assistance,

Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, and in this context acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

- 1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the continued obstruction by the Bosnian Serb party of the normal functioning of Sarajevo airport;**
- 2. Expresses its full agreement with the position of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that attempts by the Bosnian Serb party to obstruct the normal functioning of Sarajevo airport are totally unacceptable and should cease unconditionally;**

3. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party comply fully with the Agreement of June 5, 1992 on the Reopening of Sarajevo Airport, and, in that context, immediately and unconditionally cease all threats, explicit or implied, against United Nations aircraft seeking to land or take off from Sarajevo airport, or those participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to that airport;

4. Further demands that the Bosnian Serb party cease all attempts to impose restrictions on the use of Sarajevo airport by official missions as foreseen in the June 5 agreement, and as implemented by the Bosnian Serb party until recently;

5. Requests that the Secretary General keep it fully informed of discussions with the Bosnian Serb party on the restoration of the normal functioning of Sarajevo airport so that it might take further action as necessary;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9502119
RECEIVED: 17 MAR 95 14

TO: THURMOND, STROM
DOLE, LIEBOWITZ, HELMS, STEVENS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 11 APR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN
CO

CROATIA
NATO

Signed

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY RE NATO EFFORT FOR UNPROFOR W/DRAWAL FM BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 21 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DANVERS
KRECKO
NSC CHRON
SIMON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY *DRS*

DATE *4-12-95*

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9502119

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 KERRICK	Z 95031714 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 LAKE	Z 95032718 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
002 VERSHBOW	Z 95032722 FOR REDO
003 LAKE	Z 95032918 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
004 PRESIDENT	Z 95040717 FOR SIGNATURE
005	X 95041115 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
005 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 95041215 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

004 950407	VICE PRESIDENT
004 950407	WH CHIEF OF STAFF
005 950411 THURMOND, STROM	STATE
005 950411 STEVENS, TED	CIA
005 950411 DOLE, ROBERT J	DEFENSE
005 950411 HELMS, JESSE A	
005 950411 LIEBERMAN, JOSEPH I	
005 950411 WH STRIPPING DESK	

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9502119
RECEIVED: 17 MAR 95 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: DOLE, ROBERT J
ET AL

DOC DATE: 15 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN

CROATIA
CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SEN DOLE ET AL LTR RE WITHDRAWAL OF UN TROOPS FM BOSNIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 21 MAR 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

KERRICK

FOR CONCURRENCE

BEERS
CLARKE
CRESSY
DANVERS

FOR INFO

KRECZKO
SCHWARTZ
SEATON
SESTAK
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2119

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG [Signature] NO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Date: April 11, 1995

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2119
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>OPS</u>	<u>To Podesta</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>OPS 4/12</u>	<u>D</u>
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

✓ CC'd 3/31
5:30 PM

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2119 REDD

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	6	5	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	copy	_____	_____
Berger	7	Nat Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	8	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YKO

**National Security Council
The White House**

Rec'd 3/28
9:17 am

219

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [Signature] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	<u>1</u>	<u>JWR</u>	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg	<u>2</u>	<u>LOPI</u> ✓	
Berger	<u>3</u>	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
<u>Vershbow</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>see TL note</u>

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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cc: _____

COMMENTS:

SV - Shouldn't we add our position in the para of the clip?
yes
3-28-95

Exec Sec Office has diskette

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9502119

REFERRAL

DATE: 12 APR 95

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: THURMOND, STROM

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 11 APR 95

SUBJ: REPLY RE NATO EFFORT FOR UNPROFOR W/DRAWAL FM BOSNIA

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 13 APR 95

COMMENT:

FOR


JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1995

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for the letter that you and Senators Helms, Stevens, Thurmond and Lieberman sent to me on possible U.S. participation in a NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.

As you note, I have agreed in principle to provide U.S. military assistance, including U.S. ground forces, to the withdrawal operation, even though I hope a pull-out by UNPROFOR can be avoided. I am glad that you agree with me that our commitments to our Allies argue strongly in favor of participation in an effort to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal, should it become necessary.

If we must go forward with withdrawal, we will insist on NATO command and control and robust rules of engagement. Our Allies and the UN know this. You may recall that when NATO undertook planning for possible implementation of a peace settlement, I made it clear that a *sine qua non* for U.S. participation was NATO command and control. This would also be a *sine qua non* for our participation in withdrawal. As NATO continues its planning, we will make sure that satisfactory command arrangements are agreed among Allies and that there is clarity in this regard at the UN.

In your letter, you note that a Security Council resolution should specify NATO command over withdrawal. Other UN-NATO cooperative efforts in the region have been established by UNSC resolutions. We think it is likely -- and desirable -- that there will be a UNSC resolution authorizing withdrawal and delineating the command arrangements. Again, should a pull-out become necessary, we will ensure that there is agreement on the relationship between NATO and the UN, and we will seek the kinds of guarantees NATO will need to carry out all necessary action successfully.

We will also insist on robust rules of engagement, as we have made clear from the outset of NATO's contingency planning. NATO military authorities are now discussing the precise rules of engagement that will give the NATO commander the flexibility he needs to protect his forces and effectively carry out his mission with minimum risk. Once decisions are made within the Alliance, we will share them with the UN.

We support a common-sense approach to withdrawal of heavy equipment, whereby in a hostile environment lives would not be endangered to salvage materiel. This does not mean withdrawal would necessarily result in abandonment of all equipment or circumvention of export controls. I am confident that NATO forces would have the wherewithal to remove most, if not all, equipment currently deployed. While the safety of people must be of paramount concern, I will take steps to ensure that equipment is not left in circumstances where it might fall into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. This could be the case in Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, Bihac and anywhere near the lines of conflict. If attempting to remove equipment proved impossible or posed an unacceptable risk, we would consider disabling it.

Finally, you propose that U.S. involvement in a withdrawal effort be predicated on an understanding with our Allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would permit the lifting of the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. I continue to favor a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo if other measures fail to bring about a political settlement acceptable to all parties. Indeed, we have told our Allies that we would expect agreement to lift the arms embargo to follow a forced UNPROFOR departure from Bosnia. However, I would not make agreement on lifting the embargo a precondition for a U.S. demonstration of solidarity in a crisis involving Allied lives. It is our mutual commitment to solidarity in times of crisis on which the Alliance rests.

As you know, both the U.S. and our Allies in UNPROFOR strongly support continuing UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission in Bosnia. This would not be possible were the arms embargo to be lifted before withdrawal. UNPROFOR is likely to leave only in circumstances where it finds itself under attack or threat. As I have said, in such a situation, it would be incumbent on us as NATO members to assist our Allies participating in UNPROFOR, so long as our troops were under NATO command and control and sufficiently robust rules of engagement were in place.

I will certainly want to consult with you and your colleagues in Congress and seek the support of the American people for any decision I might have to make on assisting UNPROFOR withdrawal, as well as on the strategy to be pursued following withdrawal.

I very much appreciate your thoughts on this extremely important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "B" and a long, sweeping underline.

The Honorable Robert Dole
The Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the letter that you and Senators Helms, Stevens, Thurmond and Lieberman sent to me on possible U.S. participation in a NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.

As you note, I have agreed in principle to provide U.S. military assistance, including U.S. ground forces, to the withdrawal operation, even though I hope a pull-out by UNPROFOR can be avoided. I am glad that you agree with me that our commitments to our Allies argue strongly in favor of participation in an effort to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal, should it become necessary.

If we must go forward with withdrawal, we will insist on NATO command and control and robust rules of engagement. Our Allies and the UN know this. You may recall that when NATO undertook planning for possible implementation of a peace settlement, I made it clear that a *sine qua non* for U.S. participation was NATO command and control. This would also be a *sine qua non* for our participation in withdrawal. As NATO continues its planning, we will make sure that satisfactory command arrangements are agreed among Allies and that there is clarity in this regard at the UN.

In your letter, you note that a Security Council resolution should specify NATO command over withdrawal. Other UN-NATO cooperative efforts in the region have been established by UNSC resolutions. We think it is likely -- and desirable -- that there will be a UNSC resolution authorizing withdrawal and delineating the command arrangements. Again, should a pull-out become necessary, we will ensure that there is agreement on the relationship between NATO and the UN, and we will seek the kinds of guarantees NATO will need to carry out all necessary action successfully.

We will also insist on robust rules of engagement, as we have made clear from the outset of NATO's contingency planning. NATO military authorities are now discussing the precise rules of engagement that will give the NATO commander the flexibility he needs to protect his forces and effectively carry out his mission with minimum risk. Once decisions are made within the Alliance, we will share them with the UN.

We support a common-sense approach to withdrawal of heavy equipment, whereby in a hostile environment lives would not be endangered to salvage materiel. This does not mean withdrawal would necessarily result in abandonment of all equipment or circumvention of export controls. I am confident that NATO forces would have the wherewithal to remove most, if not all, equipment currently deployed. While the safety of people must be of paramount concern, I will take steps to ensure that equipment is not left in circumstances where it might fall into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. This could be the case in Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, Bihac and anywhere near the lines of conflict. If attempting to remove equipment proved impossible or posed an unacceptable risk, we would consider disabling it.

Finally, you propose that U.S. involvement in a withdrawal effort be predicated on an understanding with our Allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would permit the lifting of the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. I continue to favor a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo if other measures fail to bring about a political settlement acceptable to all parties. Indeed, we have told our Allies that we would expect agreement to lift the arms embargo to follow a forced UNPROFOR departure from Bosnia. However, I would not make agreement on lifting the embargo a precondition for a U.S. demonstration of solidarity in a crisis involving Allied lives. It is our mutual commitment to solidarity in times of crisis on which the Alliance rests.

As you know, both the U.S. and our Allies in UNPROFOR strongly support continuing UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission in Bosnia. This would not be possible were the arms embargo to be lifted before withdrawal. UNPROFOR is likely to leave only in circumstances where it finds itself under attack or threat. As I have said, in such a situation, it would be incumbent on us as NATO members to assist our Allies participating in UNPROFOR, so long as our troops were under NATO command and control and sufficiently robust rules of engagement were in place.

I will certainly want to consult with you and your colleagues in Congress and seek the support of the American people for any decision I might have to make on assisting UNPROFOR withdrawal, as well as on the strategy to be pursued following withdrawal.

I very much appreciate your thoughts on this extremely important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "B" and a long, sweeping underline.

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the letter that you and Senators Helms, Stevens, Thurmond and Lieberman sent to me on possible U.S. participation in a NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.

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We will also insist on robust rules of engagement, as we have made clear from the outset of NATO's contingency planning. NATO military authorities are now discussing the precise rules of engagement that will give the NATO commander the flexibility he needs to protect his forces and effectively carry out his mission with minimum risk. Once decisions are made within the Alliance, we will share them with the UN.

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I will certainly want to consult with you and your colleagues in Congress and seek the support of the American people for any decision I might have to make on assisting UNPROFOR withdrawal, as well as on the strategy to be pursued following withdrawal.

I very much appreciate your thoughts on this extremely important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1995

Dear Joe:

Thank you for the letter that you and Senators Helms, Stevens, Thurmond and Lieberman sent to me on possible U.S. participation in a NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.

As you note, I have agreed in principle to provide U.S. military assistance, including U.S. ground forces, to the withdrawal operation, even though I hope a pull-out by UNPROFOR can be avoided. I am glad that you agree with me that our commitments to our Allies argue strongly in favor of participation in an effort to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal, should it become necessary.

If we must go forward with withdrawal, we will insist on NATO command and control and robust rules of engagement. Our Allies and the UN know this. You may recall that when NATO undertook planning for possible implementation of a peace settlement, I made it clear that a *sine qua non* for U.S. participation was NATO command and control. This would also be a *sine qua non* for our participation in withdrawal. As NATO continues its planning, we will make sure that satisfactory command arrangements are agreed among Allies and that there is clarity in this regard at the UN.

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Finally, you propose that U.S. involvement in a withdrawal effort be predicated on an understanding with our Allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would permit the lifting of the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. I continue to favor a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo if other measures fail to bring about a political settlement acceptable to all parties. Indeed, we have told our Allies that we would expect agreement to lift the arms embargo to follow a forced UNPROFOR departure from Bosnia. However, I would not make agreement on lifting the embargo a precondition for a U.S. demonstration of solidarity in a crisis involving Allied lives. It is our mutual commitment to solidarity in times of crisis on which the Alliance rests.

As you know, both the U.S. and our Allies in UNPROFOR strongly support continuing UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission in Bosnia. This would not be possible were the arms embargo to be lifted before withdrawal. UNPROFOR is likely to leave only in circumstances where it finds itself under attack or threat. As I have said, in such a situation, it would be incumbent on us as NATO members to assist our Allies participating in UNPROFOR, so long as our troops were under NATO command and control and sufficiently robust rules of engagement were in place.

I will certainly want to consult with you and your colleagues in Congress and seek the support of the American people for any decision I might have to make on assisting UNPROFOR withdrawal, as well as on the strategy to be pursued following withdrawal.

I very much appreciate your thoughts on this extremely important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bin", with a large, stylized initial "B" and a cursive "in".

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the letter that you and Senators Helms, Stevens, Thurmond and Lieberman sent to me on possible U.S. participation in a NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia.

As you note, I have agreed in principle to provide U.S. military assistance, including U.S. ground forces, to the withdrawal operation, even though I hope a pull-out by UNPROFOR can be avoided. I am glad that you agree with me that our commitments to our Allies argue strongly in favor of participation in an effort to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal, should it become necessary.

If we must go forward with withdrawal, we will insist on NATO command and control and robust rules of engagement. Our Allies and the UN know this. You may recall that when NATO undertook planning for possible implementation of a peace settlement, I made it clear that a *sine qua non* for U.S. participation was NATO command and control. This would also be a *sine qua non* for our participation in withdrawal. As NATO continues its planning, we will make sure that satisfactory command arrangements are agreed among Allies and that there is clarity in this regard at the UN.

In your letter, you note that a Security Council resolution should specify NATO command over withdrawal. Other UN-NATO cooperative efforts in the region have been established by UNSC resolutions. We think it is likely -- and desirable -- that there will be a UNSC resolution authorizing withdrawal and delineating the command arrangements. Again, should a pull-out become necessary, we will ensure that there is agreement on the relationship between NATO and the UN, and we will seek the kinds of guarantees NATO will need to carry out all necessary action successfully.

We will also insist on robust rules of engagement, as we have made clear from the outset of NATO's contingency planning. NATO military authorities are now discussing the precise rules of engagement that will give the NATO commander the flexibility he needs to protect his forces and effectively carry out his mission with minimum risk. Once decisions are made within the Alliance, we will share them with the UN.

We support a common-sense approach to withdrawal of heavy equipment, whereby in a hostile environment lives would not be endangered to salvage materiel. This does not mean withdrawal would necessarily result in abandonment of all equipment or circumvention of export controls. I am confident that NATO forces would have the wherewithal to remove most, if not all, equipment currently deployed. While the safety of people must be of paramount concern, I will take steps to ensure that equipment is not left in circumstances where it might fall into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. This could be the case in Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, Bihac and anywhere near the lines of conflict. If attempting to remove equipment proved impossible or posed an unacceptable risk, we would consider disabling it.

Finally, you propose that U.S. involvement in a withdrawal effort be predicated on an understanding with our Allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would permit the lifting of the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. I continue to favor a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo if other measures fail to bring about a political settlement acceptable to all parties. Indeed, we have told our Allies that we would expect agreement to lift the arms embargo to follow a forced UNPROFOR departure from Bosnia. However, I would not make agreement on lifting the embargo a precondition for a U.S. demonstration of solidarity in a crisis involving Allied lives. It is our mutual commitment to solidarity in times of crisis on which the Alliance rests.

As you know, both the U.S. and our Allies in UNPROFOR strongly support continuing UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission in Bosnia. This would not be possible were the arms embargo to be lifted before withdrawal. UNPROFOR is likely to leave only in circumstances where it finds itself under attack or threat. As I have said, in such a situation, it would be incumbent on us as NATO members to assist our Allies participating in UNPROFOR, so long as our troops were under NATO command and control and sufficiently robust rules of engagement were in place.

I will certainly want to consult with you and your colleagues in Congress and seek the support of the American people for any decision I might have to make on assisting UNPROFOR withdrawal, as well as on the strategy to be pursued following withdrawal.

I very much appreciate your thoughts on this extremely important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2119

4/11/95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1995 95 APR 7 P5:47

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Dole et al. Regarding Bosnia

Purpose

To respond to Senator Dole et al. concerning Bosnia.

Background

Senators Dole, Helms, Stevens, Thurmond and Lieberman signed a letter to you proposing conditions for U.S. participation in a NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia. Most of these are consistent with our current policy: NATO command; robust rules of engagement; putting the safety of the troops ahead of rescuing Allies' equipment. Dole and company, however, would also make U.S. participation contingent on a commitment by allies to support multilateral lift post-withdrawal. While we have told allies we would expect them to do this, we feel it would be wrong to make it a quid pro quo for our participation. Our recommended response makes these points and warns that we would not be prepared to go down the road of lifting the embargo without being sure of Congressional support for the substantial assistance to the Bosnians that would be required.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senator Dole
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

March 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to commitments made by your administration to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is our understanding that the recent compromise with the Croatian government may require only a partial withdrawal of U.N. forces from Croatia -- that is if the militant Serbs agree -- and that U.S. involvement is likely to be very limited in such an operation. However, we are aware that you have already committed to providing U.S. military assistance, to include U.S. combat troops, to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina should such a decision be made by either nations participating in UNPROFOR or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While we have consistently opposed your policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and have been critical of the inability and unwillingness of the U.N. forces to fulfill their mandate there, we recognize that U.S. participation to assist the withdrawal of U.N. forces may be necessary. However, we believe that such assistance should not be offered without strict conditions.

The first condition is that the entire withdrawal operation be under unified NATO command -- from start to finish. The "dual-key" arrangement under which NATO currently operates and is subordinate to the United Nations has been a military and political fiasco. Should such an arrangement be extended to any component of the withdrawal operation -- even under peaceful circumstances -- we would strongly oppose U.S. participation.

It is critical that the United States establish concretely and in advance that NATO command is a prerequisite to U.S. participation. As such, we would strongly recommend that this decision be explicitly stated in a U.N. Security Council resolution on the matter. A letter from the U.N. Secretary General in our view would be wholly insufficient; a binding commitment from the countries in the Security Council who are the largest troop contributors to UNPROFOR should be a minimum requirement.

Second, the rules of engagement must be robust. There must be no question that self-defense includes the right of retaliation -- at the discretion of the NATO commander. Those forces that may consider interfering with the withdrawal of U.N.

forces must know in no uncertain terms that if any U.N. or NATO troops are provoked or attacked that they will face massive and disproportionate retaliation, to include all their military assets, not just their immediately-engaged forces.

Third, there must be a common sense rule applied to the withdrawal of heavy equipment belonging to the U.N. protection forces. We understand that those of our allies participating in UNPROFOR would like to remove all of their equipment when they depart. If the environment is calm and peaceful, we would not object to using American forces to facilitate the withdrawal of equipment. Should we be faced with a hostile environment, however, we believe that American lives should not be endangered to rescue equipment.

Finally, U.S. assistance should be premised on an understanding with our allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal clears the way for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. To date, allied objections to lifting the arms embargo have centered on concerns about the safety of allied troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the United States assists in the withdrawal of U.N. forces, the allies must know that we will not tolerate equivocation on the matter of terminating the arms embargo. For three years the Bosnians have been denied their fundamental and inherent right to self-defense and watched as U.N. forces provided cover to the aggressor Serb forces. In sum, U.S. assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be explicitly conditioned on the support of those nations for terminating the arms embargo.

Mr. President, we believe that these military and political conditions -- NATO command, robust rules of engagement, limitations on withdrawal of equipment, and allied agreement on next steps -- are not only essential to securing support from the U.S. Congress, but essential to the success of such a potentially dangerous operation. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond *Ben Tan*
J. Hill *Jack Stevens*
Jesse Helms

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2119 REDO

March 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Senator Dole et al. on
Bosnia

Senators Dole, Helms, Thurmond, Stevens and Lieberman have signed a letter to the President proposing conditions for U.S. participation in a NATO-led effort to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia. Attached at Tab A is a revision to the suggested reply sent to you earlier. I have added a reaffirmation of our support for multilateral lift in the middle paragraph on page 2.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers, Alan Kreczko, Steve Simon

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Suggested Response
Tab B Incoming

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Paris Contact Group Meeting. (4 pages)	04/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: April 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520545. (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2695

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, April 28, 1995. Record ID: 9520525. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002c. cable	re: Milosevic's April 26 Meeting with UK Charge. [partial] (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2695

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW,
WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: SECRET DTG:261652Z APR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5644

////

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 002048

NODIS

OP CENTER PLS PASS EUR A/S HOLBROOKE AND DAS FRASURE
NSC FOR VERSHBOW.

E.O. 12356: DECL

TAGS: PREL, SR

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC'S APRIL 26 MEETING WITH UK CHARGE

Released in Part
VZ 10/1/2013

REF: BELGRADE 1868 → follows this cable →

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UK CHARGE ROBERTS HAS GIVEN US A BRIEF READ-OUT OF HIS APRIL 26 MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC, AT WHICH ROBERTS WAS INSTRUCTED BY LONDON TO SEEK CONFIRMATION OF MILOSEVIC'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PAPER RECEIVED ON APRIL 17 (REFTEL).

3. ROBERTS SAID THAT HE WROTE OUT HIS SPEAKING NOTES (AND PASSED THE PAPER TO MILOSEVIC) SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING BY MILOSEVIC OF WHAT THE UK WAS ASKING. THE FULL TEXT OF THESE SPEAKING NOTES IS TRANSMITTED IN PARA 7 BELOW.

4. ACCORDING TO ROBERTS, MILOSEVIC READ THE PAPER CAREFULLY AND THEN RESPONDED THAT HE WAS PUZZLED BY THIS NEED FOR CLARIFICATION, SINCE THE PAPER WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH HIS OWN PROPOSAL OF APRIL 17. IN THE DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES, MILOSEVIC SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY EVERYTHING COULD NOT BE HANDLED BY ONE PAPER, BUT DID NOT SEE THIS ISSUE AS A LARGE PROBLEM.

5. THE CONTENTIOUS DISCUSSION CENTERED AROUND HOW MUCH SANCTIONS RELIEF WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE CONTACT GROUP, WITH MILOSEVIC CONTINUING TO INSIST ON "LIFTING" OF ALL SANCTIONS. ROBERTS REPORTEDLY ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POSSIBLE, AS HE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED LAST TIME, BUT
THAT SANCTIONS RELIEF COULD BE "SUBSTANTIAL."

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

MILOSEVIC DID NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY BUT INSTEAD ARGUED THAT OIL AND FUEL WERE IN HIS VIEW NON-STRATEGIC, AND THAT SUSPENSION RATHER THAN LIFT WAS IN ANY CASE HUMILIATING AND SUBJECT TO REVERSAL THROUGH FABRICATIONS SUCH AS THE HELICOPTER CHARGES. HE STRONGLY COMPLAINED IN THIS CONTEXT ABOUT UNSCR 988 AND HOW IT AGAIN SHOWED THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES TO WORK WITH HIM CONSTRUCTIVELY.

6. IN SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSION, ROBERTS SAID THAT MILOSEVIC CONFIRMED ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED ON APRIL 17 BUT MADE CLEAR THAT THE DEGREE OF SANCTIONS RELIEF REMAINED AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE, WITH TOUGH NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD TO FIND COMMON GROUND.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF UK SPEAKING NOTES:

(b)(1)

E.O. 13526

1.4 (b)

1.4 (d)


[002c]

1.4 (b)

1.4 (d)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



E.O. 13526

1.4 (b)

1.4 (d)

[002c]

(b)(1)

END TEXT.

PERINA

FROM:
SITREPT

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. cable	re: Milosevic's Response to Contact Group Paper. (4 pages)	04/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. chart	The UK-FR Proposal. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2695

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
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Sanctions Relief in Return for Tighter Border Closure and Bosnian Recognition



¹ All suspensions are for successive, limited periods. UNSC action required to extend suspensions.

Continuation of suspensions to depend on continued progress toward negotiated settlement of the conflicts.

² Strategic goods include crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. letter	To President Clinton from Radovan Karadzic. (1 page)	04/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	What is the NATO Policy for Dealing with Civilians. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	What is the NATO's Responsibility in Dealing with Violations of Safe Areas. (1 page)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (11 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995: DC/PC 04/27-28 [2]

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