

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

898

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

3

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: Your Meeting with General George A. Joulwan. Record ID: 9502737. (3 pages)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1)
002. note	To Walter Slocombe, Joseph Nye, and Joseph Kruzel from Jim Pardue. Subject: Bosnia. (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	If the Bosnian Serbs. (6 pages)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Krajina Serbs Consider New Mandate. (6 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)
005. report	The Bosnian Army. (9 pages)	03/31/1995	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Bosnia: Carter Redux. Record ID: 9502690. (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	For the Secretary of State from Robert Frasure. Subject: A Conversation with Carter on Bosnia. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Contact Group's Final Offer to Milosevic. Record ID: 9502669. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)
007b. draft	Contact Group Proposals, April 1995. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)
008a. memo	Duplicate of 007a. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)
008b. draft	Duplicate of 007b. [with marginalia] (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)
009. agenda	Meeting of NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia, April 14, 1995. Record ID: 9520423. (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: Your Meeting with General George A. Joulwan. Record ID: 9502737. (3 pages)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

GEORGE ALFRED JOULWAN, General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 16 November 1939, Pottsville, Pennsylvania

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 32

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe/Commander in Chief, United States European Command, Belgium, APO AE 09705, since October 1993

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Infantry School, Basic Course
The Armor School, Advanced Course
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy - BS Degree - No Major
Loyola University - MA Degree - Political Science

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) German

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Aug 61	Jan 62	Student, Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger Course, Fort Benning, Georgia
Mar 62	May 63	Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, Company D, 1st Battle Group, 30th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe
May 63	Jun 64	Commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe
Jun 64	Jun 65	S-3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe
Aug 65	Jun 66	Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Jun 66	Nov 67	Commander, Commander B Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, United States Army, Vietnam
Nov 66	Jul 67	S-3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, United States Army Vietnam
Jul 67	Sep 68	Student, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois
Sep 68	Jun 70	Assistant Professor of Military Science, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois
Jun 70	Jun 71	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 71	Jan 72	Operations Officer, later S-3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), United States Army, Vietnam

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Jan 72	Mar 72	Deputy G-3, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), United States Army, Vietnam
Mar 72	Nov 72	Company Tactical Officer, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
Nov 72	Jul 73	Assistant Executive Officer to Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC
Aug 73	Jul 74	Special Assistant to the President of the United States, Office of the President, The White House, Washington, DC
Aug 74	Jun 75	Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Jul 75	Mar 77	Commander, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), United States Army Europe
Jun 77	Jun 78	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Jun 78	Jun 79	Director, Political and Economical Studies, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Jun 79	Sep 81	Commander, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe
Sep 81	Jun 82	Chief of Staff, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe
Jun 82	Nov 85	Executive to the Chairman, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC
Nov 85	Jun 86	Director, Force Requirements (Combat Support Systems), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, DC
Jun 86	Mar 88	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army
Mar 88	Jul 89	Commanding General, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army
Jul 89	Nov 90	Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army
Nov 90	Oct 93	Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
2LT		7 Jun 61
1LT	7 Dec 62	7 Jun 64
CPT	15 Dec 64	7 Jun 68
MAJ	28 Feb 68	7 Jun 75
LTC	1 Jul 74	
COL	1 Feb 79	15 Mar 82
BG		1 Sep 83
MG		1 Sep 86
LTC	1 Sep 89	
GEN	21 Nov 90	

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal
 Defense Distinguished Service Medal
 Silver Star (First Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Legion of Merit (First Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Bronze Star Medal (Second Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Meritorious Service Medal (Third Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Air Medals
 Joint Service Commendation Medal
 Army Commendation Medal (First Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Combat Infantryman Badge
 Presidential Service Badge
 Parachutist Badge
 Ranger Tab
 Expert Infantry Badge
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
 Army Staff Identification Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION USMA

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Special Assistant to the President of the United States, Office of the President, The White House, Washington, DC	Aug 73-Jul 74	Major/Lieutenant Colonel
Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe	Aug 74-Jun 75 (No joint credit)	Lieutenant Colonel
Executive to the Chairman, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	Jun 82-Nov 85	Colonel/Brigadier General
Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama	Nov 90-Oct 93	General
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe/Commander in Chief, United States European Command	Oct 93-Present	General

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. note	To Walter Slocombe, Joseph Nye, and Joseph Kruzel from Jim Pardue. Subject: Bosnia. (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	If the Bosnian Serbs. (6 pages)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Krajina Serbs Consider New Mandate. (6 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	The Bosnian Army. (9 pages)	03/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNITED
NATIONS



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/255
31 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 MARCH 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached report, which was addressed to me on 30 March 1995 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This report by the Co-Chairmen contains the certification referred to in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

95-09498 (S) 030495
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

040495

/...

Annex

Operations of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 970 (1995), adopted on 12 January 1995. In that resolution, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General submit every 30 days for its review a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

2. It will be recalled that on 4 August 1994 the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day:

- (a) "To break off political and economic relations with Yugoslavia" ...
... International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- (b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the 'Republika Srpska' (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- (c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the 'Republika Srpska', except food, clothing and medicine."

3. On 19 September, 3 October, 2 November and 5 December 1994 and 5 January, 3 February and 2 March 1995, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council reports from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the state of implementation of the above-mentioned measures (S/1994/1074; S/1994/1124; S/1994/1246; S/1994/1372; S/1995/6; S/1995/104 and S/1995/175). The report dated 2 March 1995 contained the following certification from the Co-Chairmen:

"In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the past 30 days no transshipments were detected by the Mission

/...

across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

4. Developments in the past 30 days are dealt with below. Developments in the remainder of the 100-day period will be covered in a follow-up report.

II. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS ON THE BORDER CLOSURE

5. The legislation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) closing the border with the Bosnian Serbs continues to be in force.

6. On 27 March 1995 the Mission Coordinator signed a memorandum of understanding with the Director of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. M. Kertes, to improve control and provide firmer assurances on supplies of humanitarian aid through the Yugoslav Red Cross. In the opinion of the Mission Coordinator, the improvements in control are significant and substantial. With the Yugoslav Red Cross exclusively determining the destination of the goods to limited agencies in the "Republika Srpska", any commercial link that might have existed in the past between supplier and recipient will be much more difficult to sustain. More importantly, the stricter inspection at loading should ensure that no contraband, including war matériel, is concealed in the consignments. These inspection arrangements are now more or less on a par with those applying to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

7. The Mission has received from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the following analysis of confiscations along the border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for February 1995:

Petrol (gasoline)	12.4 tons
Diesel	13.2 tons
Cigarettes	1.3 tons
Construction material	648 kilograms
Alcohol	2,208 litres
Food items	389 kilograms
Textiles, clothing, footwear	576 kilograms
Fertilizer	19.0 tons
Coffee	110 kilograms
Other goods	1.2 tons
Vehicles	2

For the first time, confiscations of fertilizer have been included in the information provided by the authorities for the month of February.

8. During the month of February, there were 215 customs offence procedures initiated and 41 were finalized. Fines and penalties amounted to 127,300 dinars. During the previous six months, from 4 August 1994 to 31 January 1995, 138 offence procedures were initiated, of which 71 were

finalized. Fines and penalties during this six-month period amounted to 341,450 dinars. These figures give some indication of the sharply increased number of interceptions of smuggling attempts and confiscations. In the opinion of the Mission Coordinator this reflects a tightened degree of control on the border to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the customs authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during the last month.

III. ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND WORK OF THE MISSION

9. As of 1 April 1995, 163 international Mission personnel will be on duty with the Mission. The Mission personnel to date have come from the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. Because of financial difficulties, no new observers are being taken on to replace those who leave. The number of observers will continue to fall until the minimal threshold of 150 is reached or until such time as the current financial constraints are eased. By the Mission's own calculations, an observer complement below 150 may not be able to provide sufficiently credible information to certify whether the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is in compliance with its decision to close its border with Bosnian Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina to all but shipments of humanitarian aid.

10. A new six-month budget for the Mission commencing 1 April was drafted after the 10 March meeting of the Steering Committee. This US\$ 3.66 million budget would, if fulfilled, bring the complement of international observers to 250. An appeal was made to countries members of the Steering Committee to pay their contributions before the end of March to forestall the possible closure of the Mission. The Mission Coordinator personally made this point to embassies in Belgrade during an information briefing on 15 March.

11. The Mission has reacted swiftly to the new fiscal reality presented by the funding crisis by reducing operating costs by 136,000 deutsche mark per month over January costs. Vehicle and office space rental charges have been reduced, and telecommunications expenditures have been cut significantly. As an example of measures undertaken, over the course of the last month the Mission has been able to terminate most of its reliance on hired cars and it is now operating and servicing its own smaller fleet of vehicles. While expenses continue to be reviewed in detail by the Mission, the magnitude of savings that will be generated by future cutbacks is not significant in relation to the overall, persistent problem of inadequate funding.

12. The ferry at Jamena has not been operating since mid-January, and was taken out of the water on the "Republika Srpska" side of the river on 1 February. The high-water level of the Sava River has hindered the effective blockade of the ferry ramp on the Serbian side. On 2 March a second barrier was completed on the ramp and sealed by Mission personnel. This enabled the Mission to close the border crossing-point on 4 March and change its status to a controlled crossing-point. The area will be patrolled by Mission mobile patrols, while it will be

/...

controlled by the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

13. In order to reduce personnel requirements, the border crossing-point at Raca (Sector Bravo) was closed on 23 March. The crossing-point is a bridge behind the FAP Factory near Priboj. The bridge is sealed by a barrier and will be patrolled by Mission mobile patrols while it will be controlled by the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

14. The Mission is now covering 19 border crossings 24 hours a day. Of those, two are train stations. There are no other major changes to the list of border crossings between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) provided as appendix III to the previous report (S/1995/175). In order to staff all remaining border crossings fully, the Mission has been forced to curtail much of its mobile patrolling on the border.

IV. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE MISSION

15. The Mission continues to enjoy full freedom of movement within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

16. On 14 March, a shooting incident occurred at Krstac (Sector Charlie) where individuals crossing the border from the "Republika Srpska" and the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were engaged in an extended shoot-out close to the border crossing-point. Mission personnel, after protected by the police, had to withdraw and continue their observation from a safe place. On 15 March, the situation was considered to have calmed down and the team returned to the border crossing-point. The Chief of the Montenegrin Cabinet called the Mission Coordinator on 17 March to apologize for the fact that the safety of the Mission personnel had been jeopardized by the incident.

17. Between 16 and 18 March, the situation at the Metaljka and Sastavci border crossing-points (Sector Bravo) became tense when some local civilians, while being thoroughly checked by Customs, threatened Mission personnel. Police chiefs and liaison officers of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the scene expressed their concern and asked Mission personnel not to leave the border crossing-points without police escort. Excellent cooperation with the police and the army should be noted in this case. Tension eased on 20 March.

18. On 17 March, Mission personnel at Nudo (Sector Charlie) were threatened by a local drunk civilian. Customs and police response was inadequate and was reported to higher authority for corrective action. On 20 March, in Kotor (Sector Charlie), off-duty personnel were subjected to verbal assaults from a local drunk civilian. The matter was reported to the police, who initiated an investigation, the results of which are pending.

19. On 22 March, a Mission team in Belgrade port was threatened by a local citizen who forced the team's car door open and threatened to use a gun. The team decided to withdraw instantly, until the security of Mission personnel could be ensured. Immediate contacts were made by the Mission Coordinator with

Mr. Kertes, who promised to restore security at once. On 23 March, the team returned to Belgrade port, where the police and local security were present and the situation was restored to normal.

20. Since 25 March, as hostilities resumed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mission personnel at Trbunica and Mali Zvornik (Sector Alpha) and Metaljka and Sula (Sector Bravo) have reported periodically hearing heavy shelling from the Bosnian side of the border. They also heard and observed increased air activity - both helicopter and fixed-wing - on the Bosnian side of the border. The situation is being closely monitored by Mission headquarters.

21. In the early morning of 26 March, two off-duty Mission personnel were physically assaulted in Banja Koviljaca (Sector Alpha) by four drunk local citizens. One of them sustained minor injuries and has now returned to duty. The report was forwarded to the police. One of the perpetrators has been already apprehended.

V. COOPERATION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) WITH THE MISSION

22. The cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be good.

VI. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES

23. The operating principle of the Mission is to base itself on its own observations and on information that it has verified. The Mission Coordinator has maintained a standing request to Governments possessing the technical capacity to provide it with information relevant to its mandate.

24. With reference to the last monthly report concerning an alleged underwater oil pipeline across the Drina river, the search was continued. The only remotely relevant report on the issue was submitted from Sector Alpha on 26 March, where a mobile patrol team discovered remnants of an old pipeline on the beach, near Citluk (CQ 545055). It extended from the water with an open end, corroded and rusted, with no trace of recent use.

25. Another information report was received on 16 March alleging that:

(a) A temporary bridge was set up near Jagustica on the Drina on 17 February 1995 and has been used since then to transport material to the Bosnian Serb Army. Mission mobile and foot patrols proceeded to the area and found that the course of the river there was about 200 metres below a steep cliff, and no bridge was found. The Mission assessment is that, taking into consideration the nature of the terrain and the location of the area (just opposite the Muslim "Zepa pocket" on the other side of the river), it appears very unlikely that there could be continuous shipping of goods across this part of the Drina;

/...

VII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE AUTHORITIES

27. The impact of delays caused by thorough Customs searches is reflected in an incident that happened at Badovinci (Sector Alpha) on 7 March. Local farmers established a blockade with their tractors on the cross-border road in protest at farm vehicles not being given priority to cross. Additional militia and the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were summoned, though it appeared that everyone involved in the protest remained on amiable terms. The next day a meeting was held between the Head of Sector and local authorities and the situation was eased by giving the farmers priority in crossing the border during the early hours of the morning.

29. On 13 March, it was reported from Badovinci that two buses with unarmed but uniformed soldiers were allowed to cross into Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mission Coordinator lodged a formal, high-level protest concerning this matter the following day. Senior authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) promised to take immediate action, and similar incidents have not been reported since.

1. . .

in the border areas with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The police, together with military personnel, have been rebuilding and reinforcing barriers in the area. The Special Envoy of the Mission Coordinator has had discussion with the Second Army Headquarters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to ensure that a correct up-to-date barrier plan is in place. It has been agreed that a greater degree of delegation of responsibility for minor adjustments to the barrier plan needs to be made and that a closer level should be between the Head of Sector Charlie and the Liaison Officer of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). On 20 March, two barriers in this area were partially dismantled and traces of trucks were visible. On 22 March, a Mission mobile patrol found fresh traces of trucks around the restored barriers. On 24 March, a mobile patrol spotted a smuggling attempt from the Bosnia and Herzegovina side (two trucks with timber). The would-be smugglers had to withdraw to Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 26 March, mobile patrols once again discovered traces of smuggling activity - spills of fuel and truck traces around bypasses. A liaison officer of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) claimed that the army did not have enough manpower to cover all bypasses.

31. Bold smuggling attempts are still taking place on the Vilusi and Vracenovici bypasses (Sector Charlie), where the barriers were partially dismantled on 13 March. This problem was solved at the local level by agreement between the army, the police and the Mission. On 15 March the barriers were restored and reinforced. The areas are now also being patrolled frequently by the army and police. The result so far is that two attempts to smuggle fuel across the border have been uncovered.

32. Another possible breach has been detected by the local customs in Belgrade, when they screened (X-ray) 50 per cent of a postal shipment on 11 March and refused a large proportion of the packages, which they considered to be trade.

33. During the period from 13 to 19 March, traffic volumes at all border crossing-points between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the "Republika Srpska" were recorded. Below are the Mission's main findings and observations:

(a) A daily average of 28,850 persons crossed the border at the border crossing-points in both directions during the week, either on foot or in vehicles. The busiest border crossing-points, accounting for more than half of the total traffic volume were Sremska Raca (A02) in Sector Belgrade and Badovinci (A04) and Trbusnica (A06), both in Sector Alpha;

(b) At Sremska Raca, the average daily traffic across the border in both directions was 6,832 persons travelling in 1,113 cars, 167 buses, 167 trucks and 16 tractors or walking. In Badovinci the number of persons crossing averaged 4,697 persons either on foot, or in one of the 1,822 cars, 32 buses and 488 tractors crossing. At Trbusnica, the average number of persons crossing in both directions was 4,345 persons in 1,745 cars, 23 buses and 131 tractors or on foot;

(c) At the remaining 16 border crossing-points average daily traffic flow ranged from a low of 38 persons, 13 cars, 1 bus and 2 tractors at border

crossing-point Sula (B19) in Sector Bravo to 3,655 persons in 1,345 cars, 37 buses, 8 trucks and 75 tractors in Mali Zvornik (A09) in Sector Alpha. The Mali Zvornik foot bridge (A10) was used by an average of 1,360 pedestrians crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis;

(d) At the train stations in Proboj and Usice a daily average of 183 railway cars was sealed and 9 trains crossed the border in both directions;

(e) During the period from 1 to 26 March 1995, Sector Belgrade sealed 1,643 trucks and trailers with a total volume of 22,622 tons of humanitarian aid. During the same period, Sector Charlie also sealed 221 trucks carrying 198 tons of humanitarian aid. Trucks are permitted to cross the border into "Republika Srpska" only at Sremska Raca in Sector Belgrade and Vilusi in Sector Charlie, with occasional UNHCR convoys allowed at Mali Zvornik in Sector Alpha and Kotroman in Sector Bajina Basta. Trucks are subject to normal customs checks at the border crossing-point when leaving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and are not allowed to carry fuel in belly tanks. During the period from 1 to 26 March, 108 trucks were denied crossing to "Republika Srpska" for extra fuel or minor customs violations;

(f) ~~Also during the same period, missions conducted several thorough~~ checking level of 21 per cent on unscheduled long-distance buses entering "Republika Srpska" with 368 of 1,768 buses being fully checked and the remaining being controlled with very good partial checks. In total, 101 buses were denied crossing, mainly for carrying excess amount of commercial goods, including fuel, and 1,858 cars and 299 tractors were denied for similar reasons.

~~33. In March, several missions also fielded monitors~~ ~~carrying out~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~border~~ ~~area~~ ~~near~~ ~~Belgrade~~ ~~observed~~ ~~26~~ ~~tracks~~ ~~of~~ ~~likely~~ ~~helicopter~~ ~~flights~~ ~~moving~~ ~~from~~ ~~Bosnia~~ ~~and~~ ~~Herzegovina~~ ~~into~~ ~~the~~ ~~Federal~~ ~~Republic~~ ~~of~~ ~~Yugoslavia~~ ~~(Serbia~~ ~~and~~ ~~Montenegro)~~. While none was observed by Mission personnel from the ground, these clearly constituted border violations. Officers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continued to deny their existence or origin even in the face of comprehensive, credible technical information. There are no reports of those helicopters travelling from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) back into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, for the airspace above the border, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is not closing its border with Bosnia. This is particularly perplexing inasmuch as the efforts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to enhance its closure of the land border during March and in keeping with its commitment have been broadly effective. The Mission will be looking once again at whether anything can be done to enhance the information available on border crossings by air.

VIII. CERTIFICATION

35. In light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, and based on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or national technical means, and aside from the

/...

reported tracking of helicopters crossing the border, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the land border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the past 30 days there were no commercial transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

36. The Co-Chairmen will provide an additional report before the expiration of the 100-day period.

Draft II 4/6/95

Dear Mr. Leader:

We share the concerns you express in your letter of February 17 about the resumption of full scale war in Bosnia. However, we continue to work diligently to contain the conflict and avoid a larger war. Key to that objective is retaining UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia; the recent UN Security Council resolutions keeping UN forces in the region represent significant steps to deter full scale war. Additionally, we are consulting with our Allies about measures we could take to make UNPROFOR more capable. These measures, we believe, reduce the pressure for withdrawal and the need to lift the arms embargo unilaterally.

As well, in the absence of acceptance of the Contact Group plan, we believe the Federation will provide some stability in Central Bosnia and help a substantial number of people to weather any oncoming conflict between the Republic and the rebel Serbs. To this end, we have put in place in the past several months most of the key elements required to push the Federation forward and enable it, over the next year, to acquire the authority needed to govern the 51 per cent of the territory it would inherit were the Contact Group plan to be implemented. Our plans include International Military and Educational Training (IMET) for FY-95.

We have presented to the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GOBH) a draft agreement that would be concluded between the GOBH and the Government of the United States for the provision of IMET assistance for the Federation forces. After this agreement is signed, we intend to implement an IMET program; we have allocated \$70,000 for FY95 from our limited IMET budget. The IMET program was approved as one of a number of things that can be done within law and policy (in particular compliance with the UN arms embargo) to be supportive of the development of the armed forces of the Bosnian Federation.

Other steps include the selection of a new military adviser on the Federation, retired Major General John Sewell, who will help plan the integration of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croat forces within the framework of multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina and UN Security Council Resolution 713.

The newly selected arbitrator, Roberts Owen, has visited the region, established initial contacts, and elaborated a set of procedures. He is ready for business, should either of the parties bring an issue to him. He also has a role should the agreement which the Bosniacs and Croats reached on March 10 (Petersberg agreements) not be fully implemented. The agreement calls for a report by the parties to the Standing Commission in Sarajevo, followed by a review meeting on April 25 on the time schedule for implementation of aspects of the Federation constitution. Outstanding issues at that point should be referred by one or the other party to the arbitrator.

-2-

Another key element of our policy, the Friends of the Federation, was launched March 16 in Washington and will meet again in Spain in September. We have also met with our own U.S. private sector Friends of the Federation on March 31 and plan to meet with the EU troika April 11 in Washington. We have identified more than \$220 million going to Federation support from Friends, mostly from the EU and its member states. USAID has identified almost \$25 million in FY95 projects which can support the Federation aim of creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina.

We are trying to provide political, economic and military support to the Bosnian Federation, consistent with our national obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions and with our common desire to limit direct U.S. military involvement in Bosnia absent the need to implement a peace plan or withdraw UNPROFOR. We have requested \$xxx in FY95 funds to support the Federation. We hope you will join us in showing that we value this means to establish a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina.

At the same time, we would be less than candid if we implied our support for the Federation extended to extensive training of the Bosnian army. We believe that unit training at this time is virtually synonymous with supplying arms and would violate the spirit of the arms embargo if not the letter. Training the Bosnian army to use specific weapons would tear at the UN/NATO shield of evenhandedness upon which protection of UNPROFOR is based. It would also jeopardize the "experts on mission" status under the UN Privileges and Immunities Convention granted to our U.S. pilots participating in the Deny Flight operations. Such training leads us down the path of direct military involvement and troops on the ground in Bosnia, an outcome we both are seeking to avoid.

Sincerely,

102 047 9667: # 2

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive, and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.


We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.


In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.


For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.


Sincerely,


BOB DOLE



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN


JOSEPH LIEBERMAN


HENRY J. HYDE


SUSAN MOLINARI


MICHAEL R. MCNULTY


JIM MORAN

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Bosnia: Carter Redux. Record ID: 9502690. (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. memo	For the Secretary of State from Robert Frasure. Subject: A Conversation with Carter on Bosnia. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



JIMMY CARTER

April 4, 1995

To President Alija Izetbegovic

I have of course been following closely the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina since my visit there in December, which concluded with my phone call to you from Sarajevo airport. I was heartened by the rapidity with which a cease-fire and then a cessation of hostilities agreement were reached by the beginning of the new year.

Nonetheless, I had hoped more headway could have been made by now in resuming negotiations along the lines suggested by the Contact Group. As you know, Ambassadors Marion Creekmore and Harry Barnes have been in touch periodically with Vice President Ganic to stay informed about your government's views, and of course we have also been talking with the U.S. government, the UN and Dr. Karadzic. We have also followed the discussions with President Milosevic regarding recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. I realize that the developments in Croatia have complicated the situation for the UN and that there is still much to do before that matter is worked out. With regard to the recognition of Bosnia, I understand President Milosevic has not been very forthcoming.

It is increasingly doubtful that the efforts of the Contact Group to orchestrate direct and good faith peace talks at this stage will be successful.

I have been particularly disheartened by the increase in fighting during the last few weeks in Bosnia--even while the cessation of hostilities agreement is still in effect. Without going into details on specifics here, I had hoped that both sides would have been able to show still more restraint.

I have not given up hope that peace can come to Bosnia. Hence I was reassured by some statements in your speech of March 27 on the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 2

I have in mind especially your renewed commitment to democracy and your stress on the need not to miss any chance for peace, because you believe that the war must not last a single day longer than is necessary.


That encourages me to believe that The Carter Center may again be able to be of some use in finding ways to restart meaningful negotiations. At the beginning of your speech, you stated that a future federal organization is possible and desirable. That being the case, I believe that a fruitful path might now be to focus on the basic principles of such an organization. I understand that the Contact Group had provided you with a paper last spring on "Some Possible Elements for a Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina" which might be a possible subject for discussion.

What I have in mind are quiet and private meetings with you, and also with Dr. Karadzic. This would permit us to explore, without any public statements, a range of new approaches that might prevent a return to bloody hostilities and lead to a permanent resolution of the existing differences and the creation of a federal structure acceptable to all groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any beneficial ideas that are developed would then be shared with the U.S. and other governments represented in the Contact Group, as a basis for further peace efforts.

I would be glad to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina for these visits, again representing The Carter Center. I would do so only with the knowledge and approval of American officials.

I have asked Ambassador Harry Barnes to ascertain your response to this suggestion. I am sending a similar letter and request to Dr. Karadzic. I fervently hope that the two of you will accept my proposal. I would also hope that both of you will take the necessary steps to ensure that the cessation of hostilities agreement is observed for the rest of the month.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,". The first name "Jimmy" is written in a large, flowing script, and the last name "Carter" is written in a slightly smaller, more compact script to its right.



JIMMY CARTER

April 4, 1995

To Dr. Radovan Karadzic

As you know, I have been following closely the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina since my visit there in December at your invitation. I was heartened by the rapidity with which a cease-fire and then a cessation of hostilities agreement were reached by the beginning of the new year.

Nonetheless, as you know from our phone conversation in late January, I had hoped more headway could have been made by now in resuming negotiations along the lines suggested by the Contact Group. Then somewhat later I had sent you the draft of a message I would have been prepared to send you more formally. My conviction has always been that it is critically important to get the peace talks started. In the ensuing weeks, Ambassadors Creekmore and Barnes and their colleagues have stayed in touch regularly with Dr. Djordjevic and Mr. Hanley. We have of course kept in close contact with the U.S. government, the UN, and with Professor Ganic. In addition, we have followed the discussions with President Milosevic regarding recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. I realize that the developments in Croatia have complicated the situation for the UN and that there is still much to do before that matter is worked out.

I have been particularly disheartened by the increase in fighting during the last few weeks in Bosnia itself--even while the cessation of hostilities agreement is still in effect. Without going into details on specifics here, I had hoped that both sides would have been able to show still more restraint.

It is increasingly doubtful that the efforts of the Contact Group to orchestrate direct and good faith peace talks at this stage will be successful.

Page 2

You had written me most recently on March 8 and encouraged me to resume my mission. As was indicated to you at the time through Dr. Djordjevic, I was reluctant to reply until I had a much clearer sense of what the Contact Group was prepared to do next, and particularly of course the U.S. government. I now think I have a reasonable understanding of those factors.

First of all, you should know that I have not given up hope that peace can come to Bosnia. It was that hope that led me to accept your invitation to come to Pale. Hence I was reassured by some statements in your letter. I have in mind especially your renewed assertion that you wish to resolve the conflict by peaceful means and not by violence, and that you are ready to negotiate on the basis of equitable and balanced arrangements. I understand from Dr. Djordjevic that you have sought to limit the military actions on your side.

These factors encourage me to believe that The Carter Center may again be able to be of some use in finding ways to restart meaningful negotiations. On several occasions during our talks in Pale, you stated that you were in agreement with the idea of a future organizational arrangement made up of two entities. That being the case, I believe that a possible path might now be to focus on the principles of such an organization. I understand that you have seen a paper prepared last spring on "Some Possible Elements for a Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina" which might be a possible subject for discussion.


What I have in mind are quiet and private meetings with you, and also with President Izetbegovic. This would permit us to explore, without any public statements, a range of new approaches that might prevent a return to bloody hostilities and lead to a permanent resolution of the existing differences and the creation of a federal structure acceptable to all groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any beneficial ideas that are developed would then be shared with the U.S. and other governments represented in the Contact Group, as a basis for further peace efforts.

Page 3

I would be glad to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina for these visits, again representing The Carter Center. I would do so only with the knowledge and approval of American officials.

I have asked Ambassador Harry Barnes to ascertain your response to this suggestion. I am sending a similar letter and request to President Izetbegovic. I fervently hope that the two of you will accept my proposal. I would also hope that both of you will take the necessary steps to ensure that the cessation of hostilities agreement is observed for the rest of the month.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background. The first name "Jimmy" is written in a large, flowing cursive, and the last name "Carter" is written in a slightly smaller, more compact cursive. The signature is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Contact Group's Final Offer to Milosevic. Record ID: 9502669. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. draft	Contact Group Proposals, April 1995. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. memo	Duplicate of 007a. (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. draft	Duplicate of 007b. [with marginalia] (2 pages)	04/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20423

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 6, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN


MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff


SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on Friday, April 14, 1995, 2:30 - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By  NARA, Date 5/30/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. agenda	Meeting of NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia, April 14, 1995. Record ID: 9520423. (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2692

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20423

April 4, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(D)*
SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
~~April 7, 1995~~ April 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals' meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held ~~April 7, 1995~~. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I. April 14, 1995

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *RV* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Van Zinder* NARA, Date *5/30/2014*

203-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR