

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - April 1995 [2]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001a. memo               | For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: April 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520470. (6 pages) | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001b. agenda             | Meeting of NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia, April 14, 1995. Record ID: 9520470. (1 page)                      | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001c. cable              | re: Contact Group Meeting with President Tudjman. (2 pages)                                                                  | 04/12/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001d. draft              | Information Paper: To Provide...Information on the Status of OPLAN 40104. (1 page)                                           | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001e. draft              | Information Paper: To Provide Information on the Status of Decisions. (1 page)                                               | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001f. draft              | Information Paper: To Provide the CJCS Information on the Status of Decisions. (3 pages)                                     | 04/12/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001g. draft              | Information Paper: To Provide the CJCS definitions of the NATO Reporting System. (1 page)                                    | 04/05/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002a. memo               | For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Issue Sheet: Extending Sanctions Relief. Record ID: 9520483. (3 pages)           | 04/14/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002b. report             | Inter-Serbian Sanctions #6. (11 pages)                                                                                       | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002c. paper              | The End of the Second Hundred Days. (4 pages)                                                                                | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. paper               | Bosnia: All Sides Gearing Up. (3 pages)                                                                                      | 04/14/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. cable               | re: U.S. Views on 31 March ICFY Report. (6 pages)                                                                            | 04/12/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F

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### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005. paper               | Considering the Impact of Lifting Phase One Sanctions. (3 pages) | 04/11/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. paper               | Bosnia Funding Discussion Paper. (5 pages)                       | 04/14/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER, CRESSEY, KERRICK, LAKEA, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR\_SPECIAL

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PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 121236Z APR 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5483

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001773

NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AND EUR/SCE  
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL

TAGS:

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

REF: STATE 86669

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. MILOSEVIC REPLIED TO THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL ON RECOGNIZING BOSNIA (REFTEL) WITH A CLEAR NO, AN ASSESSMENT SHARED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP AFTER AN APRIL 11 FIVE-HOUR MEETING/DINNER WHICH STARTED AT 6:00 P.M. HE EXPLAINED THAT TO RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT STATE OF BOSNIA (AS OPPOSED TO THE FUTURE UNION OF BOSNIA) WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION OF THE IZETBEGOVIC GOVERNMENT, A MOVE WHICH WOULD BE "COUNTERPRODUCTIVE" AS IT WOULD DRIVE THE BOSNIAN SERBS INTO A WAR FEVER FED BY A SENSE OF ABANDONMENT AND BETRAYAL.

3. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO CONVINCE THE BOSNIAN SERBS THAT THEY ARE ON THE WRONG TRACK IS TO OFFER BELGRADE "FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IMMEDIATELY." MILOSEVIC DID NOT SHARE THE SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA. ALL SIDES HE BELIEVES -- INCLUDING IZETBEGOVIC -- ARE INTERESTED IN EXTENDING THE CEASE-FIRE. THE ONLY GLIMMER OF HOPE FOR THE RECOGNITION PACKAGE WAS WHEN AFTER FIVE HOURS,

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MILOSEVIC LOOKED DOWN AT THE TWO PAGE PROPOSAL LYING FACE DOWN ON THE TABLE IN FRONT OF HIM, AND SAID: "OKAY, I'LL READ IT." FOLLOWING THE MILOSEVIC MEETING, THE CG MET BRIEFLY AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO COMPARE NOTES AND TO CHASTISE RUSSIAN REP ZOTOV FOR HIS REFUSAL TO ENDORSE THE PROPOSAL IN FRONT OF MILOSEVIC AND FOR HIS COMMENTS TO THE PRESS CALLING FOR FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF. END SUMMARY.

4. BRITISH UK REP EHRMAN OPENED THE MARATHON MEETING WITH A 15 MINUTE POINT BY POINT DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL EXPLAINING ALONG THE WAY THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE DETERIORATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ALL OUT WAR. MILOSEVIC STARED AT EHRMAN WITH A LOOK OF RAPT FASCINATION AND AT THE CONCLUSION ASKED: "IS THAT IT? THAT'S ALL?"

5. VISIBLY ANNOYED, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD MOST OF THE ELEMENTS BEFORE, THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW. HE THEN SAID: "ON THE BASIS OF MY COUNTRY'S EARNEST EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE I EXPECT THAT YOU, THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS, WILL RECOMMEND UNANIMOUSLY THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE FRY BE LIFTED. WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, SERVED OUR PROBATIONARY PERIOD WITH FULL COOPERATION. NOW IS THE TIME FOR YOU TO RESPOND ACCORDINGLY." HE LOOKED OVER TO HIS SECRETARY, ASKED IF HE HAD GOTTEN IT ALL DOWN AND TOLD HIM TO TYPE IT UP AND DISTRIBUTE IT TO THE CONTACT GROUP. "THAT'S MY REPLY," HE EXPLAINED.

6. ASKED TO ELABORATE, MILOSEVIC SAID THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES "ENDLESSLY" WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP IN THE PAST. THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT TO REASON WITH. THIS IS DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO LIFT SANCTIONS AND HELP HIS POSITION AGAINST THE BOSNIAN SERBS WHO STUBBORNLY BELIEVE THAT THE CONTACT GROUP MUST BE ANTI-SERB. HE ADMONISHED HIS INTERLOCUTORS FOR "NOT SEEING THE SITUATION CLEARLY" AND FOR PAYING EXCESSIVE ATTENTION TO "MARGINAL GUYS" SUCH AS IZETBEGOVIC AND KARADZIC.

7. MILOSEVIC GLANCED AT THE PROPOSAL, ALLOWED THAT IT MIGHT BE AN EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL BUT THAT IT MISSED THE POINT. "YOU KNOW WE HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT WAR" HE DECLARED. "IF YOU WANT TO SUPPORT PEACE IT IS LOGICAL TO SUPPORT THE ONLY RELIABLE FACTOR FIGHTING FOR PEACE, SERBIA." MILOSEVIC ADMITTED THAT HIS EFFORTS WITH THE PALE ASSEMBLY HAD GONE VERY SLOWLY, BUT EXPLAINED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BORNE FRUIT HAD SERBIA BEEN GRANTED MORE SANCTIONS RELIEF WHEN HE MADE THE IMPORTANT DECISION TO SUPPORT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8. MILOSEVIC PROFESSED DISBELIEF AT THE FAILURE OF THE CONTACT GROUP TO SEE HIS SIDE OF THINGS. "MAYBE YOU WANT TO KEEP THE WAR ON" HE THEORIZED. MILOSEVIC RACED THROUGH SOME RECENT HISTORY OF THE PEACE PROCESS, STARTING WITH THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN AND INSISTED THAT NOTHING SHORT OF FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE. "PARTIAL SUSPENSION MEANS NOTHING FOR US." GERMAN REP STEINER TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE ORIGINS OF PLAN "A" AND PLAN "B" BUT MILOSEVIC WAVED HIM OFF DECLARING: "WE HAVE PASSED  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BELGRADE 001773

NODIS

EUR FOR FRASURE AJD EUR/SCE  
NSC FOR VERSHBOW

FROM CHRIS HILL

E.O. 12356:DECL

TAGS:

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC ON BOSNIA RECOGNITION: NO

THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD: FIRST TWO MONTHS THEN 100 DAYS THEN ANOTHER 100 DAYS." SUSPENSION, HE EXPLAINED, IS A HUMILIATION, AND HE CITED THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROMISE TO GET NATURAL GAS INTO SERBIA, A DELIVERY WHICH NEVER CAME AND WHICH IN MILOSEVIC'S VIEW SHOWED " AN ABSENCE OF STYLE." HE ALSO MENTIONED THE HELICOPTER FLIGHTS AS A FIGMENT OF SOMEONE'S IMAGINATION. "THEY ARE PROBABLY MUSLIM OR TURKISH. BESIDES, THEY WERE HEARD GOING FROM BOSNIA INTO SERBIA. WHAT WOULD THEY BE CARRYING? WOOD AND POTATOES?"

9. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE "BOSNIAN UNION" WAS A FAIR OFFER, BASED ENTIRELY ON THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. US REP TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A PROMISSORY NOTE. TO BE MEANINGFUL, RECOGNITION MUST BE OF THE EXISTING STATE OF BOSNIA. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE FUTURE UNION WAS FIRM, AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS "RECOGNITION NOW" OF A FUTURE UNION. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT RECOGNITION OF THE UNION WOULD "BYPASS" KARADZIC AND PUT ALL THE PRESSURE NEEDED ON HIM, WITHOUT BEING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. MILOSEVIC INSISTED THAT BOSNIA TODAY IS NOT A STATE, "IT'S A BATTLEFIELD." NONE OF THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS SHOWED ANY INTEREST IN PURSUING OTHER RECOGNITION CONCEPTS. THE FRENCH REP ALONE TRIED TO BE HELPFUL BY ADDING: "YOU CAN SAY YOU ONLY RECOGNIZE BOSNIA, NOT THE IZETBEGOVIC GOVERNMENT."

~~SECRET~~

10. NOR DID ANY OF THE CONTACT GROUP ENGAGE MILOSEVIC WHEN HE TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE FRY AS A SUCCESSOR STATE. NONE OF THE OTHER REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA DISPUTE THE FRY'S STATUS AS SUCH, HE ARGUED. STEINER AND HILL TOLD HIM THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN PURSUING THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME AND MILOSEVIC DROPPED IT.

11. MILOSEVIC SAID THAT THE WEST WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DROP SANCTIONS. "YOU CANNOT KEEP SOMETHING IN PLACE WHICH IS HARMING 150 MILLION PEOPLE." IF RUSSIA WANTS TO LIFT THE SANCTIONS THAT WILL BE ENOUGH FOR SERBIA, HE ARGUED.

12. MILOSEVIC IS CONVINCED THAT CARTER WILL COME AND THAT KARADZIC WILL WELCOME HIM, AS THE FORMER PRESIDENT IS HIS TICKET TO RESPECTABILITY. "KARADZIC WILL LIE AGAIN TO CARTER. HE WILL NOT FOLLOW THROUGH ON ANY COMMITMENTS." HE WAS DERISIVE ABOUT THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP, CALLING THEM ALL "LIARS". "KOLJEVIC IS DRUNK EVERY DAY BY 10:00 AM." AS FOR KARADZIC, "HE'S NOT A PSYCHIATRIST, HE'S A PATIENT!" MILOSEVIC SEES SOME POSSIBILITY THAT MLADIC WILL BREAK WITH HIS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERS, MILOSEVIC BELIEVES, ARE OBSESSED BY THE IDEA THAT IF THEY ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN WITH ITS MAP, THEY MAY BE STUCK WITH IT IF THEY ARE UNABLE TO WORK OUT THE SWAPS THAT THEY FEEL HAVE TO BE MADE, SUCH AS A 16 KM BRZKO CORRIDOR. MILOSEVIC BELIEVES THE CONTACT GROUP MAY WANT TO HAVE CONTACTS WITH THE BANJA LUKA LEADERSHIP WHICH HE CLAIMS IS MUCH MORE ENLIGHTENED THAN THE CROWD FROM PALE. "BUT FIRST I'LL HAVE TO CHECK THIS OUT."

13. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVENING, MILOSEVIC LOOKED DOWN AT THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL AND SAID HE WOULD READ IT AND GET BACK TO THE GROUP WITH HIS COMMENTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS DIFFERENCES ARE FUNDAMENTAL: HE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTING STATE OF BOSNIA, AND HE WILL ACCEPT NO LESS THAN FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF.

14. COMMENT: THE CONTACT GROUP MET BRIEFLY AT MIDNIGHT AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO COMPARE NOTES. EVERYONE AGREED THAT DESPITE HIS WILLINGNESS TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL, MILOSEVIC HAD GIVEN THE GROUP A FIRM NO. THE MEMBERS AGREED THAT HE ACTED AS THOUGH HE WAS UNDER LITTLE PRESSURE, AND DID NOT EVEN SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA WAS GETTING OUT OF HAND.

~~SECRET~~

15. AT THE END OF THE POST-MORTEM, THE GROUP PUT ZOTOV IN THE HOT SEAT FOR HIS COMMENTS TO THE BELGRADE PRESS EARLIER IN THE DAY TO THE EFFECT THAT MOSCOW SUPPORTS FULL SANCTIONS RELIEF. STEINER, LOOKING INTENTLY OVER HIS WIRE RIMMED ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BELGRADE 001773

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TAGS:

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GLASSES, HELD UP THE CG PROPOSAL IN HIS HAND AND ASKED ZOTOV WHETHER HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED IT. ZOTOV, VISIBLY PERSPIRING AND TUGGING AT HIS COLLAR, EXPLAINED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT NOT AS A CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER AS SOMETHING "WORKED OUT IN THE CONTACT GROUP." ZOTOV PLEADED: "IT WAS THE BEST I COULD DO." PERINA  
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<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 03

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CROATIA

UN efforts to develop operational plans for UNCRO are lagging, and the situation on the ground in Croatia remains uncertain and tense. This presents two dangers for limiting the Balkan conflict to a small war in Bosnia. First, hostilities could result as both sides flex their muscle with clashes, cease-fire violations, exercises, and other provocations. The most serious of these has been the Croatian advance west from Bosnia toward Croatian Serb headquarters in Knin.

The second danger is that international energy will be consumed by getting UNCRO deployed, instead of using the limited time UNCRO buys us to push for settlement talks. Without progress toward reintegration and reconciliation in Croatia, we will have a much harder time keeping Zagreb on the path of peaceful means in dealing with the Serbs.

The parties remain far apart on what they will agree to publicly regarding UNCRO's presence and operations. The UN Secretariat therefore plans to propose a general, "implementable" plan for UNCRO next week and ask the UNSC to approve it irrespective of whether the parties embrace it entirely. This approach reflects the reality that important details of UNCRO's operations will only be defined in day-to-day operations on the ground. Ambassador Albright emphasized to UN representatives Akashi and Stoltenberg Wednesday that time is limited and the plan they present to the UNSC must be in line with the Gore-Tudjman Copenhagen announcement.

We must try to meet minimum Croatian expectations that Zagreb gets something out of all the recent fuss besides a name change. GOC anxiety that Tudjman will be seen at home as having sold out is real. This is reflected in Croatia's latest letter to Boutros Ghali, which is tough in putting demands on UNCRO that are not entirely reasonable. From our viewpoint, UN redeployment out of the UNPA's and onto their periphery, i.e. the separation zone and the international border, is important. What the border force actually does is less important, provided it at least puts more soldiers at checkpoints that UNPROFOR did.

At the same time, we should try to launch direct talks between Knin and Zagreb. We would start by approaching the other Z-4 members (EU, Russia, UN) and encouraging them to support such an effort. While pushing for political talks in order to start people on both sides thinking about the prospect of serious negotiations, we could at first focus on the economic confidence-building measures, implementation of which has bogged down in some cases.

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001e. draft              | Information Paper: To Provide Information on the Status of Decisions. (1 page) | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F  
vz2691

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001f. draft              | Information Paper: To Provide the CJCS Information on the Status of Decisions. (3 pages) | 04/12/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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2013-0687-F  
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| 001g. draft | Information Paper: To Provide the CJCS definitions of the NATO Reporting System. (1 page) | 04/05/1995 | P1/b(1) |
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(15)



NOTIONAL LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY  
'LIFT AND EXTRACT'

Key Dates

April 14:                    Principals Committee Meeting

April 21:                    UN vote on extension of limited sanctions relief

April 24:                    Senate resumes

April 30:                    Cessation of Hostilities ends

May 1:                      House Resumes

May 9:                      Moscow Summit

Already planned or scheduled events

April 19:                    SecState lunch with Rep. Livingston

April 29:                    SecDef breakfast with Gingrich

May 2/3:                    House: Consultative Group (SecState, SecDef, CJCS, NSA, USUNamb) Possible Senate also.  
(Tentative)

Individual Contacts:

Senate

Republicans

Sen. Stevens  
Sen. Bond  
Sen. Coverdell  
Sen. Coats  
Sen. Burns  
Sen. Hutchison

Democrats

Sen. Boxer  
Sen. Bryan  
Sen. Kerry  
Sen. Levin  
Sen. Moseley-Braun  
Sen. Robb  
Sen. Simon  
Sen. Wellstone  
Sen. Lieberman  
Sen. Bradley

House

Rep. Gingrich  
Rep. Armey (voted against lift last year)  
Rep. DeLay ( " )  
Rep. Hyde

Potential group briefings:

Senate Freshmen (Senators Snowe, Santorum, Grams, Kyl, Thomas and Inhofe supported unilateral lift in the House)  
Sen. Lugar (SFRC Subcommittee on Europe)  
Sen. Warner (Armed Services Subcommittee on AirLand Forces)  
Sen. Hatfield (Appropriations Committee)  
Sen. Thurmond (Armed Services) (voted for lift)  
Sen. Daschle (DPC)  
Key Senate opponents of lift (Sens. Nunn, Lugar, Sarbanes, Kerry, Kerrey)

Rep. Livingston (Appropriations) (voted for lift)  
Rep. Spence (National Security)  
Rep. Hamilton (HIRC Democrats)  
Rep. Combest (HPSCI)  
Democratic Freshmen and Sophomores  
Reps. Peterson, Reed, and Spratt (House Democratic Task Force on National Security)

Schedule:

Week of April 17: Staff calls to interested Members re sanctions vote (Leadership, DOD Big Eight, State Big Twelve plus Levin, Biden, Lugar, Lieberman)

Week of April 24:

--Individual briefings for Senators on lift and ops plan.

--Possible briefing for key Members of Armed Services at Pentagon

--Perry meeting with Gingrich

--Placement of lift and extract op eds

Week of May 1:

--Formal presentation of ops plan to funding and authorizing committees; Group briefing team plus budgeteers

--Consultative Group for House leadership (possibly also Senate)

--Individual and Group briefings for House Members (can slip depending on planned House consideration of Gilman bill)

Week of May 8:

--Continuation of and follow up on previous week activities.

Briefing Teams\*:

Group briefings: Tarnoff, Slocombe, Clark

Individual briefings: Holbrooke, Kruzel, JCS rep

\*Should include Budget people (S/RPP, DoD Comptroller) as appropriate for Appropriations committees.

BOSNIA: GOING FOR A SMALL WAR

Milosevic's firm and final "no" to the Contact Group on April 11 leaves international diplomatic efforts on Bosnia at a dead-end. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Government is understandably distrustful of a Carter mission and we expect nothing to come from the initiative. Senior Carter Center officials say the former President is unlikely to re-enter the fray without both sides' concurrence. These developments have ended any realistic chance that Izetbegovic's conditions for extending the cease-fire -- Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia or Karadzic's acceptance of the Contact Group plan -- will be met.

For purposes of Allied solidarity and in the hope that it can be revived at a later date, we should keep the Contact Group in mothballs, ready to be used should events on the ground merit. Representatives can and should continue to meet, as they will next Wednesday in Vienna. At the same time, we should not portray the Group as alive and well -- and working on ideas to bring the conflict to an end. This would only damage our credibility, both in the region and with our public and press.

With the diplomatic track exhausted, we must now focus on keeping the fighting to the lowest possible levels. This means convincing an extremely reluctant Bosnian Government that this is in its interest. Bob Frasure will travel to Sarajevo next week to sound out Bosnian leaders. He will press for private assurances that the stakes will not be raised in the fighting to come, particularly in and around Sarajevo. The Bosnians, however, feeling they have no choice, may decide that a dramatic gesture -- either an attempt to open a corridor to Sarajevo or asking for UNPROFOR withdrawal -- is their only hope for creating movement towards a settlement. We should therefore be prepared to offer incentives for keeping the fighting to a minimum.

With diplomacy at a dead-end, there are two possible incentives for use in approaching the Bosnians: 1) working for a robust UNPROFOR and 2) introducing a UN resolution that blesses the Contact Group map.

General Joulwan believes that UNPROFOR Commander Rupert Smith views the latest Serb outrages in Sarajevo and Gorazde as tests of his mettle. While we do not necessarily share General Joulwan's optimism, a more robust UNPROFOR (as opposed to a beefed up UNPROFOR) is one of the few remaining carrots to offer the Bosnians in return for moderation on the battlefield. In addition, a robust UNPROFOR, which in essence means an UNPROFOR ready to enforce the exclusion zones, would help deflate pressure on the Hill for lifting the arms embargo. If the political will exists on our side, we should continue pressuring the British and French to accept this point. If not, the option holds little prospect for success.

Another point of leverage worth exploring is a UN resolution that blesses the Contact Group plan and map, something Silajdzic has sought for several months. The idea is to tie a UNSC resolution to continuation of the cease-fire or a private commitment to limit fighting. Bosnian doubts about Allied and Russian resolve in sticking to the map might lead them to pursue such a trade-off. However, whether this is enough to convince the Bosnians to delay action on a matter of supreme national interest is highly questionable.

Any other options we may have -- e.g., further isolating Karadzic, reimposing sanctions on Milosevic -- are long-term strategies with little chance for putting off new fighting. In fact, in the short-term more pressure on the Serbs is likely to exacerbate fighting.

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**DRAFT**

13-Apr-95 13:01

INFORMATION PAPER

1. (U) Purpose. To provide options, and a strategy, to strengthen UNPROFOR.
2. (U) Background. The Principals Committee met 28 March 1995 and agreed the US should immediately approach the British and French to explore measures to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia.
3. ~~(C)~~ Assessment. At the 11 April Troop Contributors Meeting (TCM), Mr. Akashi and GEN Janvier recounted UNPROFOR's successes, most of which they feel are not recognized. Additionally, they indicated the equipment and manpower previously offered by nations, and subsequently accepted by the UN, is all that is needed. This is a clear indication of UNPROFOR priorities and the likelihood that they would not accept any new initiatives.

CJCS's lengthy discussion with the British CHOD indicated great reluctance on the part of the British. However, the CJCS and his British and French counterparts have agreed to discuss these options at a flag officer/staff level meeting next week. The British, French, and the UN will likely resist all efforts to move UNPROFOR beyond a current Chapter VI impartial posture. Our major leverage is their concern in preventing US Congressional action on unilateral lift. We should use this leverage to encourage UNPROFOR to act with a stronger hand to enforce the current mandate.

4. ~~(C)~~ Options. There are specific options that may strengthen UNPROFOR ability to perform within its mandate. These include:

- **Securing Sarajevo and Tuzla Airports.** The focal points of international interest in the conflict. Measures would include securing the perimeter, approaches, high terrain, and buildings. Establish a safe zone with increased armored patrols, and airborne immediate response capability.
- **Establishing a ground corridor between Konjic and Sarajevo.** Would ensure the free flow of aid into Sarajevo. This would require forces trained in crowd control, armored self-protection of convoys, combat engineers, TACPs moving with convoys, and a "quick reaction force."
- **Establish ground corridors between Sarajevo and eastern enclaves.** Same as above, would ensure free flow of aid to enclaves.
- **Create cease fire lines.** UNPROFOR, without use of force, can not physically separate the warring factions. This initiative must be one fought

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Declassify On: OADR

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on the political front, and decided among the warring parties. A cessation of hostilities or peace agreement is required to define cease fire lines.

- **Increase the number of, and consolidate UNPROFOR into, safe areas and exclusion zones.** Protects the civilian population and ensures access for aid. Not compatible with the use of the safe areas for military activities. Enforcing demilitarization requires increases in UNPROFOR's capability. Need to provide ground and air mobility assets, and a "quick reaction force" securing the safe areas. Will require secure lines of communication to safe areas to ensure delivery of aid.
- **Enhance capabilities within UNPROFOR.** Provide heavy lift helicopters, engineer battallions, UNMOs, civilian police, TACPs, counter battery radars, and mobility assets.

5. ~~(C)~~ Execution Strategy. To execute this initiative the following steps are necessary:

- CJCS contact British and French CHODs proposing new initiative. (Complete)
- Expand US proposals (shown above), study options for effectiveness and risk. Provide to British and French on 18 April.
- Convene a tri-lateral flag/staff working group 19-20 April in Washington. (Scheduled)
- Brief tri-lateral proposal to CHODs (possibly off line at the MC/CS) and refer to capitals by end of April.
- Brief to President 1 May. Consult with Congress, if necessary, on 2-5 May.
- Introduce initiative to UNSYG, SRSG, UNPROFOR Commanders by 8 May.

6. ~~(C)~~ Summary. Proactive actions to deliver humanitarian aid and permit freedom of movement for UNPROFOR must be carefully weighed against the associated risks and benefits. Strict enforcement of these measures may place UNPROFOR at odds with both the GOBH and the SRBH. Impartiality and the delivery of humanitarian assistance are UNPROFOR's first priorities.

Prepared by: John Roberti, LCDR, USN

European Division, J-5, Ext 49431.

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| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002a. memo               | For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Issue Sheet: Extending Sanctions Relief. Record ID: 9520483. (3 pages) | 04/14/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
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Bosnia - April 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F

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| 002b. report             | Inter-Serbian Sanctions #6. (11 pages) | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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| 002c. paper              | The End of the Second Hundred Days. (4 pages) | 04/13/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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51

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|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003. paper               | Bosnia: All Sides Gearing Up. (3 pages) | 04/14/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                     | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004. cable               | re: U.S. Views on 31 March ICFY Report. (6 pages) | 04/12/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2691

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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| 005. paper               | Considering the Impact of Lifting Phase One Sanctions. (3 pages) | 04/11/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F  
vz2691

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                              | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 006. paper               | Bosnia Funding Discussion Paper. (5 pages) | 04/14/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F  
vz2691

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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