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Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: USG Support for Friends of the Federation. (6 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)
002. table	Overview of Sanctions, April 10, 1995. (1 page)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003. report	UNPRFOR. (5 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Inter-Serbian Sanctions #6. (11 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)
005. note	To Don Kerrick from Kathryn Sullivan. [Vershbow's handwritten notes on back] (2 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	OPLAN 40104. (1 page)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)
007. report	Serb Thefts. (3 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

2013-0687-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**10/UNP**

4/21

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE

URGENT

TEL. 647-0045

FAX: 647-0039

COVER • 16 PAGES**FROM:**

John W. Chamberlin

TO:→ NSC - Don Kerrick/Sandy Vershbow - 456-9150 *please pass**ROBERT CRESCEY / STEVE SIMON*NSC - ~~Susan Rice~~ - ~~456-9380~~

OSD - John Klekas - 703-695-6506

*JIM THIGPEN - (703-614-0905) please pass*JCS - Balkans Unit - ~~703-697-0180~~**SUBJECT:**SYG'S REPORT: UNCRO**COMMENTS:** FYI

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4-20-95 : 18:28 :

SELDOVITZ

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UNITED
NATIONS

Security Council

STUART-
I think this is
a good job. DEFEND IT.
Camm

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S. SELDOVITZ
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Distr.
GENERAL
S/
18 April 1995

Original: English

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO
PARAGRAPH 4 OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 981 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995, the Security Council requested me to continue my consultations with all concerned on the detailed implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, as contained in paragraph 3 of the same resolution, "and to report to the Council not later than 21 April 1995 for its approval". This report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. Prior to the adoption of Security Council resolution 981 (1995), I had requested Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), acting as my Special Envoy, to carry out consultations on the mandate. My Special Envoy had meetings with representatives of the Croatian Government and of the local Serb authorities. Following the adoption of resolution 981 (1995), he continued his consultations and met with all concerned, including military authorities on both sides. The consultations have been carried out in close contact with my Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) in Zagreb, Lt. General Bernard Janvier.

- 2 -

IX. BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS

3. The basis for these consultations has been operative paragraph 3 of resolution 981 (1995), and the documents referred to therein, namely:

- (a) the report of the Secretary-General (S/1995/222 and Corr.1), particularly paragraph 72;
- (b) the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia (S/23280, annex III);
- (c) relevant resolutions of the Security Council;
- (d) the Cease-Fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 (S/1994/367);
- (e) the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 (S/1994/1375).

4. The consultations have also been based on the assumption that the deployment of UNPRO and its operations will require the cooperation of all concerned.

III. CONSIDERATIONS

5. Following his consultations with political and military leaders representing the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities, my Special Envoy has recommended the implementation of Security Council resolution 981 (1995) along the lines set out below.

6. My Special Envoy has, in pursuance of his mandate, concentrated his efforts on the tasks to be carried out and on the methods by which these would be implemented. In the light of the serious political differences between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities, it is his view that a pragmatic approach is the only way in which the support and cooperation

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required for implementation of the new Operation's mandate can be obtained.

7. The plan meets the objective of implementing a new mandate with fewer personnel. In the course of his consultations, my Special Envoy repeatedly reminded his interlocutors of the concerns of the troop-contributing nations, whose evaluation of the plan will be decisive for their readiness to contribute personnel to the Operation.

8. My Special Envoy also emphasized that cooperation by the authorities concerned and their continued commitment to existing agreements are pre-requisites for obtaining assistance from the United Nations and for the effective implementation of the tasks assigned to the new Operation.

9. With regard to the new Operation's tasks at the international borders, my Special Envoy has carefully considered the differing views expressed in the course of his consultations. He emphasized the importance of defining precise modalities of implementation which can obtain the cooperation of all concerned, which take into account the safety and security of the troops and which remain strictly within the framework of the tasks assigned.

10. Finally, my Special Envoy has strongly underlined that the United Nations can only assist in solving the conflict. It is up to the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities to make the decisions and pursue the policies required to achieve a peaceful solution. Progress will ultimately require direct contacts and constructive co-operation between those specifically involved.

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IV. PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANDATE OF UNCRO

11. The plan proposed to me by my Special Envoy, following his consultations, is based on the six main tasks identified for UNCRO in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 981 (1995). They are described in the following subsections.

A. Performing fully the functions envisaged in the Cease-Fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities (S/1994/267)

Functions

12. In accordance with the functions envisaged in the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) of 29 March 1994 UNCRO will:

- (a) monitor the area between the forward troop deployment lines, which are the Lines of Separation agreed to in the CFA;
- (b) monitor that all weapons systems specified in the CFA are deployed in accordance with its provisions. This refers to heavy weapons deployed beyond the 10 km and 20 km lines and in Weapons Storage Sites;
- (c) occupy checkpoints at all crossing points specified in Annex A to the CFA;
- (d) chair the Joint Commissions at all levels;
- (e) conduct the liaison activities required in order to ensure the implementation of the CFA.

- 5 -

Implementation

13. In order to perform these functions fully, UNCRO will have exclusive control of the area between the forward troop deployment lines and will establish static posts as well as carrying out patrols on foot, by vehicle and by helicopter. UNCRO will also have full freedom of movement to monitor the deployment of troops and weapons systems as specified in the CFA.

14. Because of the reduced number of troops available to UNCRO, the commitment of all concerned to the CFA will be decisive for UNCRO's ability to perform its functions fully while ensuring the safety of its troops.

15. The functions envisaged in the CFA will be implemented in the following way:

- (a) static observation posts and check points will be established by UNCRO in the areas most vulnerable to conflict and at locations where they are required to support patrolling activities and ensure the safety of the monitoring force;
- (b) UNCRO will man all the crossing points specified in annex A of the CFA to ensure access for transit, resupply, humanitarian assistance, etc., as well as the crossing of civilians;
- (c) patrols on foot, by vehicle and by helicopter will be conducted between and around these static UNCRO positions;
- (d) static and mobile patrols as well as helicopter patrols will be carried out in order to monitor compliance on

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both sides with the provisions of the CFA related to specific weapons systems;

- (e) mine clearance will be conducted within the area between the forward troop deployment lines in accordance with established principles; UNCRO personnel will supervise and assist relevant authorities in the clearing of mines;
- (f) CIVPOL will supervise the local police which, under the CFA, is obliged to assist UNCRO in the prevention of crime and maintenance of law and order in the area between the forward troop deployment lines;
- (g) CIVPOL will patrol the area between the forward troop deployment lines in order to enhance confidence and identify policing requirements;
- (h) UNCRO will chair Joint Commissions at all levels;
- (i) UNCRO will conduct liaison activities with military and police authorities at all levels.

B. Facilitating implementation of the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 concluded under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (S/1994/1375)

Functions

16. In order to advance the process of reconciliation and the restoration of normal life, UNCRO will:

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18. The Security Council resolutions referred to under this subparagraph are taken to include those relevant to the functioning of UNCRO (freedom of movement, security, self-defence, including close air support) and those directly relevant to the mandate contained in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 981 (1995).

Functions

19. In order to maintain conditions of peace and security and to restore confidence, thereby also facilitating the negotiation of a political solution, UNCRO will:

- (a) provide assistance to needy individuals and communities (Croat, Serb and others), in co-operation with international agencies;
- (b) monitor the human rights situation of individuals and communities (Croat, Serb and others) to ensure that there is no discrimination and that human rights are protected;
- (c) facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons (Croat, Serb and others) in accordance with established international principles and in coordination with UNHCR;
- (d) support local confidence-building measures including socio-economic and reconstruction activities, people-to-people contacts and information exchanges of mutual benefit.

Implementation

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20. UNPRO, through military, civilian and CIVPOL personnel, as appropriate, will implement the above mentioned functions in the following way:

Humanitarian Tasks

- (a) distribute humanitarian aid in conjunction with UNHCR and other international and non-governmental organizations;
- (b) assist medical evacuations, prisoner exchanges, family and humanitarian visits and transfers and co-ordinate responses to emergency humanitarian situations;
- (c) facilitate UNHCR's primary role with regard to the travel of refugees, through territory in which UNPRO is deployed, to refugee camps and holding centres;
- (d) supervise the clearance of mines by the parties when needed to meet humanitarian requirements;

Human Rights

- (e) contribute to deterring human rights abuse by maintaining an overall presence; closely monitor and co-locate with local police forces; monitor judicial institutions to enhance respect for human rights; seek corrective action in case of human rights abuses; and provide an operational link to human rights bodies;
- (f) monitor and protect the welfare and human rights of people in villages of particular sensitivity;

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Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons

- (g) provide appropriate support to UNHCR for the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in conditions of safety, security and dignity and in accordance with established international principles;

Confidence-Building

- (h) promote local economic, social and reconstruction projects of mutual benefit and support the negotiation and implementation of such projects;
- (i) promote people-to-people contacts, including humanitarian, media, local, commercial and administrative exchanges and be available to provide security to these activities where appropriate--

- D. Assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons, over the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the border crossings for which UNCRO is responsible, as specified in the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia (S/23280, annex III)

Functions

21. UNCRO will carry out these monitoring and reporting functions at designated Border Crossing Points (BCPs). Traffic crossing over the international borders will be monitored for military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons. All information concerning the movement of military personnel,

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equipment, supplies and weapons will be reported to the United Nations Security Council through the Secretary-General.

Implementation

22. The above mentioned functions will be implemented in the following way:

- (a) UNCRO will carry out its tasks at designated Border Crossing Points (BCPs) by deploying with a strength sufficient to perform these tasks and maintain troop safety and security. These deployments will include a number of permanent and temporary BCPs;
- (b) all vehicles and personnel will stop at the BCPs. They will be visually checked in order to verify whether they carry military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons;
- (c) in cases where military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons are detected, UNCRO will give notice that the crossing of such personnel and items would be in violation of Security Council resolutions and will be reported to the United Nations Security Council;
- (d) UNCRO will compile any information on the crossing of such personnel and items and report this information to the United Nations Security Council through the Secretary-General.

E. Facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of the Republic of Croatia

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Functions

23. UNCRO's tasks will be concentrated on providing advice and assistance to agencies involved in international humanitarian deliveries to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of Croatia.

Implementation

24. To implement these functions, UNCRO will:

- (a) facilitate convoy clearances from the Croatian Government and from the local Serb authorities;
- (b) facilitate route clearances from the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities;
- (c) escort humanitarian convoys as required for their security and protection;
- (d) maintain routes when required and within the limits of its resources.

25. Monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula in accordance with resolution 779 (1992)

Functions

25. In order to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, UNHCR will patrol and maintain a permanent presence on the most southerly portion of the peninsula. They will also monitor the area five kilometres on either side of the border and report on the presence of any military forces.

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26. Full freedom of movement including freedom of access into and out of the areas will be essential.---

27. This task will continue, as at present, to be performed by unarmed military observers only. It will require the co-operation of both sides and their commitment to demilitarization.

Implementation

28. The functions will be carried out as follows:

- (a) UNMOs will patrol and sustain a continuous presence in the vicinity of the Prevlaka/Ostra peninsula;
- (b) UNMOs will monitor the area five kilometres on each side of the border between BN 898149 and BN 966998 by patrolling;
- (c) liaison will be conducted with the military and civil authorities of the parties at all levels in order to resolve violations or disputes;
- (d) Theatre Headquarters (UNPF-HQ) ~~will convene the Joint~~ Inter-State Commission to mediate and resolve any disputes that are beyond the competence of a lower level of authority.

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V. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

29. My Special Representative and the Theatre Force Commander at the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (UNPF-HQ) have analyzed the functions and responsibilities enumerated in sections A to F above and assess that an overall total of some 8,750 troops would be required for their implementation, on the assumption that the military and civilian staff of the operation will enjoy the necessary cooperation of all concerned. The troops will be deployed in accordance with operation requirements determined by UNPF-HQ and UNCRO. The requirements for civilian staff, UNMOs and CIVPOL as well as administrative and logistical support elements will be submitted to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in the context of an overall budget submission for UNPF-HQ, UNCRO, UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP, in accordance with the recommendation made in paragraph 84 of my report S/1995/222 of 22 March 1995. It is expected that the strength of the United Nations forces currently in Croatia can be reduced to the proposed level of 8,750 and their deployment completed by 30 June 1995.

VI. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

30. In accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 981 (1995), discussions have been pursued with the Government of the Republic of Croatia concerning a status of forces agreement for the presence of UNPF-HQ, UNCRO, and, for a transitional period, UNPROFOR, on its territory, as well as for the use of Croatian territory for the support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Difficulties have arisen as a result of demands by the Croatian authorities which are incompatible with the model status of forces agreement (A/45/594 of 9 October 1990) and with Security Council resolutions 908 (1994) and 981 (1995).

- 15 -

31. On 1 April 1995, my Special Representative wrote to the President of Croatia referring to operative paragraph 11 of resolution 981 (1995) and requesting an early meeting of representatives to finalize the matter. Following a meeting on 10 April, UNPF-HQ forwarded a draft agreement to the Croatian authorities on 14 April. A further meeting is expected to take place in the course of the current week.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

32. In spite of serious differences of approach, my Special Envoy's assessment is that there is enough common ground between the Croatian government and the local Serb authorities to make it possible to implement resolution 981 (1995). The Cease-Fire Agreement provides a level of stability on the basis of which negotiations and efforts of reconciliation can take place. The Economic Agreement will, when fully implemented, provide an essential contribution to the normalization of life and the restoration of confidence. These two agreements are pillars of common interest which can reinforce the future process of reconciliation and normalisation for the people living in this area. In this regard, I lay special emphasis on measures intended to provide protection and to advance the process of reconciliation as well as the new operation's ability to promote such measures.

33. The situation on the ground is volatile. Without the requisite sense of responsibility on the part of all concerned, it could quickly deteriorate further. However, in spite of these circumstances and the serious political differences which continue to exist, both the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities are aware that the alternative to this plan would be more violence and a resumption of war.

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34. As was to some degree the case in February 1992 when UNPROFOR was originally established, the plan set out above does not have the formal acceptance and full support of either the Croatian Government or the local Serb authorities. The risk therefore remains that either or both sides will fail to cooperate with the United Nations in its implementation. In these circumstances, it is not without misgiving that I present these proposals to the Council. On the other hand, the proposed plan provides for a pragmatic implementation of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 981 (1995) and the alternative to its adoption would be the withdrawal of United Nations forces and the resumption of war. If the two sides seriously wish to avoid a renewal of the conflict, it is up to them to provide the necessary conditions for the new Operation to discharge its responsibilities successfully.

35. I therefore recommend that the Security Council approve the arrangements set out in the present report and authorize the deployment of UNCRO to implement them.

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- (a) facilitate and support the opening of transportation networks, as well as of water and energy facilities, within the limits of its resources;
- (b) support the negotiation and implementation of further economic and humanitarian measures which are included in the Economic Agreement or which may be agreed in subsequent negotiations.

Implementation

17. UNCRO will implement these functions in the following way:

- (a) provide a security presence for the repair, opening and functioning of the networks and facilities mentioned above;
 - (b) provide administrative, technical, logistic and engineering advice and support;
 - (c) supervise demining activities required in order to restore, open and operate networks and facilities mentioned above;
 - (d) co-chair with ICFY the Joint Commission established by the Economic Agreement;
 - (e) co-ordinate the implementation of economic projects agreed in negotiations.
- C. Facilitating implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including the functions identified in paragraph 22 of the above-mentioned report (S/1995/222 and Corr.1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20487

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 19, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, April 14, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A: Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Va Zan NARA, Date 5/29/2014

2013-0687-F

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20487

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 14, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Strobe Talbott
Robert Frasure

DOD
William Perry

OMB
Gordon Adams

USUN
Madeleine Albright

Chief of Staff
No Representative

CIA
Admiral William Studeman

JCS
General John Shalikashvili

White House
Samuel Berger

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Brigadier General Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions

1. Principals discussed whether and under what conditions to support extension of limited sanctions relief for the FRY beyond the second 100-day period that ends on April 22. Principals agreed that while the border closure has proven less effective than desired, other variables, including the situation on the ground and views of Allies and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, must be taken into account. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526

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Duration of Sanctions Relief

2. Principals agreed to support a conditioned extension of sanctions relief for less than 100 days, with the exact timeframe to be determined after consultations with the Bosnian Government. Principals agreed that State should seek definitive views from the Bosnian Government (**Action: State**) and that Ambassador Albright should incorporate those views in negotiations with Allies on the length of additional sanctions relief. (**Action: USUN**) (S)

Conditions for Sanctions Relief

3. Principals agreed that additional conditions must be included in any new extension of sanctions relief. Those conditions could include, but are not limited to, an end to all cross-border helicopter flights, the termination of telecommunication links between Serbia-Montenegro and Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia, an end to exports from Serbia-Montenegro to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia under the auspices of the Yugoslav Red Cross and an end to bus transit of Serb soldiers across the border. The U.S. will also pursue measures aimed at closing the "back door," the transshipment of FRY goods through Croatia to Bosnian Serb territory. Principals authorized Ambassador Albright to discuss conditions that should be applied to sanctions relief extension. (**Action: USUN**) (S)

Tactics

4. Principals discussed the difficulties that will be encountered in crafting an acceptable resolution extending sanctions relief and authorized Ambassador Albright to negotiate with Allies and the Government of Bosnia in the drafting of the resolution. They also agreed that Ambassador Albright should use the threat of a veto in order to ensure the resolution meets U.S. conditions. (S)

Sanctions Tightening Measures

5. Principals deferred discussion of additional sanctions issues and remanded to the Deputies Committee approval of measures to close the "back door" and reduce the transshipment of oil to Serbia-Montenegro through Albania. Principals also asked Deputies to continue efforts to resolve ICFY related funding issues that are hindering ICFY operations. (**Action: OVP/State**)

Contact Group Status and Prospects

6. Principals reviewed the lack of progress in the Contact Group's latest efforts to gain Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav Republics in exchange for additional sanctions relief. They agreed that the Contact Group was nearing its useful end as a negotiating body but that we would continue to support the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement, noting that Bosnian Serb continued rejection of the plan remains the primary obstacle to peace. Principals authorized Ambassador Frasure to discuss with the Bosnians the importance of reducing the level of violence in any renewed fighting in order to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

(Action: State) (S)

OPLAN 40104 Approval ProcessOPLAN 40104

7. Principals reviewed the status of OPLAN 40104 that covers NATO participation in UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia. Noting that unanswered policy questions remain, they directed the IWG to develop a list of unanswered policy questions and answers relating to the plan for Deputies' review before briefing the plan to the President and Congress. (Action: NSC with input from State/OSD/JCS) Principals agreed that Congressional consultations should be completed before voting to approve the plan in the NAC or identifying specific U.S. units that will participate in the operation. (S)

Command and Control

8. Principals reaffirmed that U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal is possible only if the operation is under full NATO command and control. They agreed that Ambassador Albright should remind the UNSYG of the requirement for NATO command and control. (Action: USUN) Principals further directed that clear guidance be provided to our representatives at NATO concerning the approval process within the USG. (Action: State/JCS) (S)

NATO Prepositioning

9. Principals reviewed the progress of NATO prepositioning efforts, noting that the SACEUR had been given the authority by the North Atlantic Council to deploy the Step Two mini-prepositioning force (80 personnel, including 20 U.S.). Deployment is expected in late April or early May. Principals agreed that because the NATO operation has not begun, the deploying mini-prepositioning forces will be under national command, NATO operational control and UN tactical control. These

command arrangements are similar to those in place for the other U.S. military personnel already serving in Croatia. Principals agreed that concerned Congressional Staff and members should be briefed on these arrangements before the deployment begins.

(Action: JCS) Subsequent decisions will be required before deploying the maxi-prepositioning force to Croatia and regarding the appropriate command and control arrangements at that stage.

~~(S)~~

Options for Strengthening UNPROFOR

10. Principals briefly reviewed the progress of ongoing efforts with the British and the French to strengthen UNPROFOR. Noting that Allies remain very reluctant to undertake meaningful strengthening measures, Principals agreed that the CJCS would report on further progress following his meetings with his counterparts during the week of April 24 in Brussels.

(Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20487

April 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
April 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held April 14, 1995.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth *LF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *AV* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Jan Tbl* NARA, Date *5/30/2014*

2013-0687-F

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. table	Overview of Sanctions, April 10, 1995. (1 page)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2690

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. report	UNPRFOR. (5 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Inter-Serbian Sanctions #6. (11 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. note	To Don Kerrick from Kathryn Sullivan. [Vershbow's handwritten notes on back] (2 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

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Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2690

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006. report	OPLAN 40104. (1 page)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

2013-0687-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. report	Serb Thefts. (3 pages)	04/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - April 1995 [1]

2013-0687-F
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