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Folder Title:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: March 17 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520347. (6 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 17, 1995. Record ID: 9520327. (1 page)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Issue Paper: Should the Executive Branch (1). (3 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. draft	Issue Paper: Should the U.S. (1). (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. draft	Issue Paper: Training. (2 pages)	03/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. paper	Support for the Federation-505 Agreement. (3 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)
001g. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick. Subject: RE: Bosnia DC Briefer II. (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
001h. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick and Alexander Vershbow Subject: Bosnia. (1 page)	03/09/1995	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia. (1 page)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Croatia Strategy. (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. chart	NATO Prepositioning Step 2. [NATO] (1 page)	03/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. chart	NATO Oplan 40104. [NATO] (1 page)	03/1995	P1/b(1)

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2013-0687-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TAB A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 17, 1995. Record ID: 9520327. (1 page)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

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TAB B

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW:
UPDATE FOR PRINCIPALS

The Setting: Tudjman's March 12 announcement has reduced the chances of a renewed war in Croatia and a widening of the Balkan conflict. But an escalation of the war in Bosnia remains likely as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches with no movement on the diplomatic track. The ceasefire is already showing signs of unraveling and both sides seem confident of success in a new round of fighting. Silajdzic has declared that the Bosnian Government will not extend the ceasefire beyond April 30 and that Western emphasis on containment amounts to an unacceptable attempt to freeze the status quo. Milosevic's response to the offer of sanctions relief for mutual recognition has been utterly inadequate and Serbian enforcement of the border closure with Bosnia has fallen off markedly since the second 100-day period began in January. The Contact Group is on its last legs and advocates of a lifting of the arms embargo are beginning to stir in both houses of the Congress.

The Gap Between Ends and Means: The NSC paper of February 27 noted that the U.S. has pursued a range of important, but not always compatible, objectives in trying to deal with the Bosnian conflict over the past two years. Moreover, the tools we have applied have varied in response to events and as our priorities have shifted. Since Bihac, we have backed away from attempts to bring NATO air power to bear to enforce UNSC resolutions and pressure the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms more favorable to the Bosnian Government. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- contributing to the present diplomatic impasse.

Broad Strategic Choices: The NSC paper set forth four basic strategic options:

1. Stick with present policy: continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts with reduced expectations of success, focus on containment.
2. Shift to a policy of neutrality regarding terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities; acknowledge we cannot produce a better deal for Bosnians.
3. Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia, including reinforced sanctions on Belgrade for the long haul.
4. Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike.

Deputies did not arrive at any firm conclusions in their one discussion of the NSC paper, but agreed with the thrust of the paper that now is the time to review our overall policy.

They agreed we do not presently have the means to attain the political goals we have set. Discussion tended to favor the first two options.

State argued in favor of option 1, a continuation of our current policy, with the highest priority attached to preventing a major upsurge in fighting that could lead to the departure of UNPROFOR, greater human suffering, and increased pressure for U.S. military involvement. An underlying assumption is that we would put larger equities at risk if we tried to win Allied or Russian agreement to increased military pressure on the Serbs; that an accommodation among the parties will only happen after more fighting and/or a gradual recognition of the need for compromise; and that prolonging today's "relative peace" is better than the alternatives. We would not, however, take the politically and morally questionable step of pressing the Bosnians to accept more "unjust" terms, although we would try to lower Bosnian and public perceptions that the international community has the ability to deliver a "fair" settlement. This strategy could encompass the following:

- continued efforts to engage Milosevic in negotiations over cross-recognition and to gain his support for political settlements in Bosnia and Croatia, using sanctions relief as a carrot;
- follow-up on the agreement with Tudjman on new UN force by seeking to launch political negotiations based on Z-4 principles;
- reinforced efforts to isolate Pale and Knin by strengthening Serbian/Bosnian border closure, closing "back door" that permits Serbian goods to reach Bosnian Serbs through Krajina;
- strengthening the outer ring of sanctions by increasing West European support for sanctions enforcement and working with the front-line states;
- continued efforts to enhance UNPROFOR equipment and rules of engagement in Bosnia, but without pressuring UNPROFOR to adopt a belligerent anti-Serb posture;
- maintaining the structure of the Contact Group even if its effectiveness is limited, so as to deter diplomatic breakouts by Russia or others;
- consideration of selected U.S.-only or U.S.-European diplomatic initiatives;
- increased support for the Bosniac-Croat Federation;
- beefing up UNPROFOR in Macedonia.

In addition, we would strongly warn the Bosnian Government of the need to extend the ceasefire and refrain from initiating large-scale hostilities, since this could force the departure of UNPROFOR and jeopardize our readiness to provide assistance to the Federation. We would fight Congressional efforts to lift the embargo unilaterally and seek to persuade the Bosnians that they are better off militarily by making do with a leaky arms embargo rather than forcing the issue of a formal lift.

OVP advocated a similar approach, focusing on the long-term isolation of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs and the strengthening of the outer ring of sanctions, while providing economic and other assistance to the Federation. For the isolation strategy to be effective, there would have to be increased resources and political commitment by us and the Europeans -- to field additional sanctions monitors on the Serbian-Bosnian border and in Croatia, and to induce better enforcement of sanctions against Serbia by the front-line states.

DOD favored shifting toward option 2, a more open posture of neutrality. While we would pursue many of the same steps as State proposes to contain the conflict, we would openly acknowledge that a settlement along the lines of the Contact Group plan is not attainable without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. We would thus distance ourselves from the goal of achieving a better deal for the Bosnians and abandon or downgrade the importance of the Contact Group, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution.

The U.S. Contact Group representative suggested an evolutionary approach, shifting gradually from option 1 to option 2. While we would not disavow the Contact Group plan or impose unfair terms on the Bosnians, we would attempt over time to bring them to the realization that they will have to settle for less. We would, however, seek to "maximize the minimum," i.e. try to get the Bosnians the best terms that the Bosnian Serbs will accept.

None of the Deputies advocated options 3 or 4: a long-term quarantine of Serbia would be difficult to sell to the Russians and Europeans; and renewed military pressure on the Serbs through lift and strike would likely lead to an Americanization of the conflict, even if pursued multilaterally.

The Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff and the NSC staff, however, suggested that a staged multilateral lifting of the arms embargo (beginning with defensive weapons), in tandem with a last-chance effort to secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan, should remain under consideration in the event that UNPROFOR withdrawal and/or Congressional pressures push us toward option 4. Our Allies' interest in U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal gives us leverage to secure their acquiescence in multilateral lift. (The Russians would need to be bought off by means of extending additional sanctions relief to Milosevic.)

Another variant of Option 4 might also be considered: a *threat* by the U.S. and its Allies to withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo multilaterally as a means of shocking the Serbs into negotiating on the basis of the Contact Group plan. In light of the hollowness of past Contact Group threats, however, we would have to demonstrate more convincingly our readiness to make good on the threat.

Can Containment Work? As noted, options 1 and 2 point to roughly the same concrete policy actions. They would make prevention of a new war and containment, rather than achieving a political settlement, our priority goal. **They also have the same flaw: they ignore the fact that the Bosnians would rather fight than settle for the status quo, and they will not readily cooperate with a containment strategy.** If the war escalates and Bosnian suffering once again dominates the headlines and CNN, Hill pressures to lift the arms embargo could become hard to manage.

If we are to prevent a new round of fighting and avoid a serious break with the Bosnians, we need to find additional positive incentives for the Bosnians to exercise restraint. These could include:

- massive economic assistance and political support to the Federation;
- measures to persuade the Bosnians that UNPROFOR is worth keeping, even if it means deferring a lifting of the arms embargo once again (e.g. deployment of additional troops to forcibly open the Blue Route to Sarajevo; a more aggressive effort to get our allies to toughen up UNPROFOR's rules of engagement throughout Bosnia; a return to NATO enforcement of the exclusion zones, etc.); and
- other steps to encourage a deferral of lift, such as a more robust program of military training (albeit one consistent with the arms embargo), intelligence support, etc.

Financial incentives alone will not likely sway the Bosnians, even if we are able to come up with serious money. The latter steps, however, would mean renewed frictions with our Allies and may be unattainable without, in the end, precipitating UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Threatening the Bosnians with punitive actions, on the other hand, would be politically indefensible.

In the final analysis, therefore, we may not be able to prevent the Bosnians from going on the offensive in the spring. The best case may be that the renewed fighting does not lead to any major Bosnian reverses and the current stalemate remains when winter returns. The worst case is that the Serbs respond by overrunning the eastern enclaves and strangling Sarajevo again. Although UNPROFOR countries may hunker down and not decide to withdraw even in the latter scenario, Congress may force the issue with unilateral lift.

TAB C

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001c. draft	Issue Paper: Should the Executive Branch (1). (3 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Support for Step Two of NATO Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

- As you know, in early December the President informed our Allies that the U.S. would be prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to help UNPROFOR withdraw from *Bosnia*.
- Assisting UN forces in Bosnia, in particular those of our closest Allies, would be an essential demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Failure to offer such support would risk grave damage to NATO.
- We do not want UNPROFOR to depart; it performs a critical function in Bosnia. Our decision to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal was a decision in principle.
- The Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia or Croatia following a withdrawal operation. The sole purpose of deploying troops would be to participate as a NATO-member nation in support of UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- I hasten to note that the UN has not made a formal decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from either Bosnia or Croatia. Fighting, however, could resume in Bosnia later this spring. Heavy fighting could well prompt a UN decision to withdraw.
- It could take as much as 8-12 weeks after a UN request for help and a NATO decision to implement the OP Plan before preparations are complete and forces are in place to commence a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, our senior military commanders recommend that we act now to ensure that the essential first prepositioning steps are taken to ensure the communications network is ready to support a likely major military operation.
- Accordingly, I am asking for your support for a Presidential decision in principle to preposition up to 15 U.S. DOD personnel in Croatia -- to execute the preliminary communications steps associated with NATO's operational plan for extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.
- We will consult with you if further prepositioning steps are required and before any final decision is reached on implementation of the actual withdrawal plan.
- In the interim, NATO's Operational Plan is being updated continuously; and NATO is still working such key issues as final numbers of troops that would be provided from

among the various NATO allies, how the overall operation would be funded, and when precisely the actual prepositioning of communications personnel would begin.

IF ASKED

- Funding for the prepositioning steps would come from existing NATO funds (about \$11 million).
- In light of Tudjman's agreement, we see no requirement for U.S. or NATO combat units to assist in the change of UN forces in Croatia.

TO BE PROVIDED

TAB I

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

March 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to commitments made by your administration to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is our understanding that the recent compromise with the Croatian government may require only a partial withdrawal of U.N. forces from Croatia -- that is if the militant Serbs agree -- and that U.S. involvement is likely to be very limited in such an operation. However, we are aware that you have already committed to providing U.S. military assistance, to include U.S. combat troops, to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina should such a decision be made by either nations participating in UNPROFOR or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While we have consistently opposed your policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and have been critical of the inability and unwillingness of the U.N. forces to fulfill their mandate there, we recognize that U.S. participation to assist the withdrawal of U.N. forces may be necessary. However, we believe that such assistance should not be offered without strict conditions.

The first condition is that the entire withdrawal operation be under unified NATO command -- from start to finish. The "dual-key" arrangement under which NATO currently operates and is subordinate to the United Nations has been a military and political fiasco. Should such an arrangement be extended to any component of the withdrawal operation -- even under peaceful circumstances -- we would strongly oppose U.S. participation.

It is critical that the United States establish concretely and in advance that NATO command is a prerequisite to U.S. participation. As such, we would strongly recommend that this decision be explicitly stated in a U.N. Security Council resolution on the matter. A letter from the U.N. Secretary General in our view would be wholly insufficient; a binding commitment from the countries in the Security Council who are the largest troop contributors to UNPROFOR should be a minimum requirement.

Second, the rules of engagement must be robust. There must be no question that self-defense includes the right of retaliation -- at the discretion of the NATO commander. Those forces that may consider interfering with the withdrawal of U.N.

forces must know in no uncertain terms that if any U.N. or NATO troops are provoked or attacked that they will face massive and disproportionate retaliation, to include all their military assets, not just their immediately-engaged forces.

Third, there must be a common sense rule applied to the withdrawal of heavy equipment belonging to the U.N. protection forces. We understand that those of our allies participating in UNPROFOR would like to remove all of their equipment when they depart. If the environment is calm and peaceful, we would not object to using American forces to facilitate the withdrawal of equipment. Should we be faced with a hostile environment, however, we believe that American lives should not be endangered to rescue equipment.

Finally, U.S. assistance should be premised on an understanding with our allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal clears the way for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. To date, allied objections to lifting the arms embargo have centered on concerns about the safety of allied troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the United States assists in the withdrawal of U.N. forces, the allies must know that we will not tolerate equivocation on the matter of terminating the arms embargo. For three years the Bosnians have been denied their fundamental and inherent right to self-defense and watched as U.N. forces provided cover to the aggressor Serb forces. In sum, U.S. assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be explicitly conditioned on the support of those nations for terminating the arms embargo.

Mr. President, we believe that these military and political conditions -- NATO command, robust rules of engagement, limitations on withdrawal of equipment, and allied agreement on next steps -- are not only essential to securing support from the U.S. Congress, but essential to the success of such a potentially dangerous operation. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond
J. Hill
Bob Stevens
Jesse Helms

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Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive, and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.

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
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
We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.

In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.


For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Sincerely,



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

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN


JOSEPH LIEBERMAN


HENRY J. HYDE


SUSAN MOLINARI


MICHAEL R. MCNULTY


JIM MORAN



Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Washington, D.C.

17 January 1994

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.
The United States of America

Post-#	Fax Note	7871	Date	1/17/94
To	John P. ...		From	Alma
Co/Dept	F41		Subject	Letter was talking about
Phone #	645-0555		Phone #	
Fax #	645-0555		Fax #	

Dear Mr. President:

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains committed to the current peace process and expects the international community to pursue the already adopted options to compel Belgrade's proxies in Pale to accept the Contact Group peace plan. In this context, the United States could be uniquely instrumental in both encouraging the Serbs to opt for peace or, the alternative, in helping to prepare our Republic for our self-defense.

Once again, we are not calling for United States combat troops in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but only for pursuing a measure already adopted by the United States Congress in the fiscal year 1994 defense authorization bill. Specifically, we request that the United States review the means by which to train personnel of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina outside of our Republic's borders and with no battle risks to United States military personnel.

We await to hear from your Government as to how we may begin these training efforts. We believe this measure can be most decisive in preparing our Republic for continuing our defense against aggression or, in the event a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured. Regardless, this measure will encourage the Pale Serbs and Belgrade to reconsider opting for war and will instill greater confidence within our Republic for the peace process and for peace, whenever or however that is achieved.

Please accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest considerations and thank you for your continuing support.

Sincerely,

Sven Alkalaj
Ambassador

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. draft	Issue Paper: Training. (2 pages)	03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2689

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. paper	Support for the Federation-505 Agreement. (3 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow) .
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2689

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick. Subject: RE: Bosnia DC Briefer II. (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2689

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001h. email	Alan Kreczko to Donald Kerrick and Alexander Vershbow Subject: Bosnia. (1 page)	03/09/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

2013-0687-F

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEWIntroduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy; muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.

- This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.
- The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croats are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

- This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.
- We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.
- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

- This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.
- It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale.

and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.
 - As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.
4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement: In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.
- This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.
 - It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).
 - Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border on condition that Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. Possibilities: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.
- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?
- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)
- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. paper	Steps to Prevent Renewed War in Bosnia. (1 page)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2689

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	Croatia Strategy. (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. chart	NATO Prepositioning Step 2. [NATO] (1 page)	03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. chart	NATO Oplan 40104. [NATO] (1 page)	03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 16, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton today met with President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman, President of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Kresimir Zubak, Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic and Member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic. The President dropped by a meeting that the visiting leaders were having with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, United States Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, Deputy National Security Adviser Samuel Berger and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke, to mark the first anniversary of the signing of the Washington Accords that established the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The President also met privately with President Tudjman in the Oval Office.

Recalling that one year ago he had hosted the ceremony in Washington where the first steps were taken to restore hope and peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the President noted that the Washington Accords had ended the bitter fighting between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats. The establishment of the Federation demonstrated that a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democracy was still possible in that war-ravaged country.

The President also extended his personal appreciation and admiration to President Tudjman for his recent agreement to work on a mandate for a new UN force that will help avoid the renewal of war in Croatia and a widened conflict in the region.

#

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500458
RECEIVED: 23 JAN 95 08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: CARTER, JIMMY

DOC DATE: 12 JAN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

SERBIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM CARTER TO PRES RE PEACE NEGOTIATION FOR FINAL PEACE IN BOSNIA
BASED ON PROPOSAL OF FIVE NATION CONTACT GRP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 26 JAN 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
KERRICK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CLARKE
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

0458



JIMMY CARTER

95 JAN 20 P3:53

January 12, 1995

To President Bill Clinton

So far as I know, the Bosnian Serbs and the officials of Bosnia-Herzegovina have complied reasonably well with the agreements they signed with me last month, and are now approaching negotiations for a final peace agreement, based on the proposal of the five-nation Contact Group.

I am personally familiar with the reluctance of the parties to accept some facets of the agreements on the three phases: a cease-fire, cessation of hostilities, and then the peace negotiations for four months or more. The future is fraught with serious obstacles, and every means should be utilized to prevent an abandonment of the process. In order to enhance the prospects for continuing good faith efforts by both sides to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict, there should be some acknowledgment of their compliance to date and some reward for future positive action.

On the contrary, the Security Council is now poised to continue the sanctions against Serbia, and indirectly to increase the severity of them as they relate to the Serbs in Bosnia. This is, in effect, punishment instead of reward.


In my report to you on my departure from Bosnia-Herzegovina, I stated:

'I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted.'

Page 2

I urge you to have included words to this effect in tomorrow's text extending resolution 943 of 23 September 1994, so that the Secretary General can certify when good faith is demonstrated. My hope is that the sanctions will then be held in abeyance as long as the parties comply with the commitments they have made.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is centered below the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500-2000