

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

898

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

3

Stack:

v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Conversations with Milosevic March 17 & 18, 1995. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Main Points Made by Milosevic. (4 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. report	Main Points Made by Richardson. (2 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. report	A Potential Comprehensive Agreement. (2 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. report	Suggestions and Recommendations. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. report	President Milosevic has Pledged to Congressman Richardson. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001g. report	The Copenhagen Agreement. (2 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Contact Group Meeting. (4 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Meeting with Milosevic--Assurances. (6 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Talking Points for Calls to Members of Congress. (2 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Milosevic Revises his Response. (3 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)
006. draft	Agenda: Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995. Record ID: 9520393. (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	Katherine Veit to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: RE: Suggested PC Meeting. (1 page)	03/26/1995	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Paper: Options for Bosnia. (3 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
009a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Russian Peace Plan for Former Yugoslavia. Record ID: 9502331. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
009b. draft	Russian Proposal. [English Translation] (3 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
009c. paper	Russia's Balkan Peace Plan. (4 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Conversations with Milosevic March 17 & 18, 1995. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: **A**

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	Main Points Made by Milosevic. (4 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: B

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. report	Main Points Made by Richardson. (2 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: C

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. report	A Potential Comprehensive Agreement. (2 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: D

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. report	Suggestions and Recommendations. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately scan such dividers. The title from the original document is indicated below.

Divider Title: E

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

001f. report	President Milosevic has Pledged to Congressman Richardson. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
--------------	---	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. report	The Copenhagen Agreement. (2 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA

SERB KRAJINA PRESIDENT: WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGING SIZE OF UNPROFOR

BELGRADE, MARCH 21 (TANJUG) - SERB KRAJINA PRESIDENT MILAN MARTIC SAID TUESDAY THAT THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA IS NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGING THE NUMBER OF U.N. PEACEKEEPERS IN THE SAFE AREAS, BUT HE DEMANDED THAT THEIR MANDATE REMAINS THE SAME. 'THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DECIDE ABOUT THE OPTIMUM SIZE OF THE U.N. PROTECTION FORCE,' MARTIC SAID FOLLOWING THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WITH U.N. MEDIATOR THORWALD STOLTENBERG IN BELGRADE. MARTIC SAID THAT THE 12,000 PEACEKEEPERS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN SERB KRAJINA AND CROATIA 'COULD BE REDUCED TO 5,000, 6,000 OR 7,000.'

MARTIC SAID THAT UNPROFOR'S SIZE COULD BE BIGGER OR SMALLER THAN THE CURRENT ONE, BUT SHOULD BE SUCH TO 'ENABLE IT TO SECURE PEACE ALONG THE SEPARATION LINES.'

SERB KRAJINA DEMANDS THAT UNPROFOR REMAINS IN ITS TERRITORY, MARTIC SAID AND ADDED THAT HE HAD INSISTED ON THIS DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS WITH STOLTENBERG IN BELGRADE ON MONDAY.


'WE HOPE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL OBJECTIVELY CONSIDER ALL POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE VANCE PLAN AND THAT THE PEACEKEEPERS WILL REMAIN IN THE TERRITORY OF SERB KRAJINA WITH THE SAME MANDATE, AS A PROTECTION FORCE,' MARTIC SAID. MARTIC SAID HE HAD DEMANDED FROM STOLTENBERG THAT A SERB KRAJINA REPRESENTATIVE BE PRESENT WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSES THIS ISSUE.

MARTIC SAID THAT CURRENTLY THE KNIN-ZAGREB TALKS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEC. 2 ECONOMIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN FROZEN UNTIL UNPROFOR'S MANDATE IS RESOLVED. 'IF THE SERB KRAJINA DEMAND FOR AN UNCHANGED UNPROFOR MANDATE IS MET, I BELIEVE THE TALKS WILL RESUME,' MARTIC SAID.

ASKED TO COMMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING UNPROFOR ON THE BORDER BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA AND THE BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC, MARTIC SAID THE VANCE PLAN HAD EMPOWERED THE PEACEKEEPERS TO MONITOR THE BORDER BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT UNDERScoreD THAT 'REGARDING THE CONTROL (OF BORDERS) - WE CANNOT AGREE.'

STOLTENBERG SAID HE WOULD SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT HIS TALKS IN BELGRADE AND ZAGREB. IN ZAGREB STOLTENBERG MET ON MONDAY EVENING WITH THE CROATIAN PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ADVISOR, HRVOJE SARINIC. 'MY TASK IS IN FACT TO FIND THE COMMON DENOMINATOR FOR A PLAN WHICH COULD BE BEST IMPLEMENTED TO THE GOOD OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION. I AM LOOKING FOR ALL THE COMMON POINTS WHICH COULD RESULT IN A NEW MANDATE FOR THE U.N. TROOPS,' STOLTENBERG SAID.

Border Crossing Points Between Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina



Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	re: Contact Group Meeting. (4 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20361

March 18 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *DK*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
March 17, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 17, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *DK* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Vm Tblm* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*

2013-0687-f

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20361

March 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, March 17, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)


for Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

By Va. Boh NARA, Date 5/29/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 17, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OVP

Leon Fuerth

CIA

Douglas MacEachin

State

Secretary Christopher
Robert Frasure

JCS

General John Shalikashvili

DOD

Secretary Perry

White House

Samuel Berger

OMB

Alice Rivlin

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Former Yugoslavia Policy Review

1. Principals discussed overall U.S. strategy toward the former Yugoslavia and steps to prevent or contain renewed war in Bosnia this spring. They agreed that, in view of our limited leverage and the importance of maintaining the cohesion of NATO, we should maintain our current approach of diplomatic engagement, provision of humanitarian relief, keeping UNPROFOR in place, and measures to contain the conflict. Principals agreed that we should continue to support the Bosnian Government's goal of a political settlement consistent with the Contact Group proposal, but that we should seek to lower public expectations of immediate success; we should also avoid nurturing any illusions on the part of the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

Bosnian Government that we can deliver a settlement or that the U.S. or NATO will intervene militarily on their behalf. ~~(S)~~

2. As a means to revive diplomatic efforts, Principals agreed that the U.S. Contact Group representative should explore the possibility of an agreement on constitutional arrangements for the future Bosnian union as a basis for securing Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia. **(Action: State)** They also agreed that additional options should be developed for using sanctions to increase the isolation of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.

(Action: OVP) In the meantime, the Contact Group offer of sanctions relief in return for mutual recognition of Bosnia and Croatia should remain on the table, notwithstanding Milosevic's negative response to date. ~~(S)~~

3. Principals agreed that we should seek to prevent or contain a reescalation of fighting in Bosnia as the end of the cessation of hostilities approaches. To this end, we should urge the Bosnians to exercise restraint by arguing that we see little prospect that they will improve their situation on the battlefield, that diplomatic efforts have not yet run their course, and that we remain committed to the goal of a political settlement that preserves Bosnia as a single state within its existing borders. We should, at the same time, give them incentives toward restraint by continuing to support the Bosniac-Croat Federation politically and economically. ~~(S)~~

4. Principals discussed ways to restore UN and NATO credibility in order to deter new Bosnian Serb military attacks on the eastern enclaves and other areas. They agreed that the Interagency Working Group should look at the possibility of using NATO air power against Serb air defense sites around Bihac, both to enable the U.S. and NATO to conduct humanitarian air drops in that region and to discourage Serb efforts to strangle Srebrenica and other safe areas. The IWG should also consider options for enhancing the protection of other safe areas, such as the establishment of exclusion zones. These options should be developed with a view toward the possible launch of a U.S. initiative in the second week of April. **(Action: IWG)** ~~(S)~~

Next Steps on Croatia

5. Principals discussed the follow-up to President Tudjman's March 12 agreement with the Vice President to work on the mandate for a new UN peacekeeping force in Croatia. They agreed that efforts should continue to complete negotiations by the end of the month on a UNSC mandate for the new force. They noted the continuing difficulties reported by Ambassador Albright with the Croatians on defining a realistic understanding of the mission of "controlling" the international borders. ~~(S)~~

Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

6. Principals discussed the scaled-back or "mini" prepositioning option that had been developed by the NATO Military Authorities in response to some Allies' reluctance to support a larger prepositioning force. The scaled-back option consists of 80 personnel, including up to 20 Americans, who would be deployed to Croatia to set up a communications system to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia, should it become necessary. Principals decided to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to support a decision at NATO to implement the scaled-back prepositioning option, including the deployment of up to 20 U.S. personnel to Croatia, following notification of Congress on Monday, March 20. They further agreed to provide Congress fuller briefings on March 22 by an interagency team. Principals agreed that, in informing Congress, we would characterize this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken even though we oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal.

(Action: NSC/DOD) ~~(S)~~

7. Noting that the larger prepositioning option (1800 total personnel, 440 U.S., 310 of which would be in Croatia) is still an active option at NATO, Principals also agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to agree to form the larger prepositioning force and to conduct training in Germany. The actual deployment of these additional U.S. personnel to Croatia would be subject to another Principals and NAC decision. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

OPLAN 40104 Approval Process

8. Principals agreed to seek time on the President's schedule to brief him on NATO OPLAN 40104 that covers U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. (Action: NSC) They discussed the difficulties we will face in obtaining Congressional authorization and funding for the operation, as reflected in the recent letter from Senators Dole, Helms et al. on the subject. They agreed that, in spite of the difficulties, the scope of the operation argues in favor of seeking Congressional authorization and funding prior to making a commitment of U.S. troops to the operation. ~~(S)~~

ca. 3/16/95

Unofficial translation

Dear Chris.

Pursuing our regular exchange of views on Yugoslavian affairs I would like to inform you of my personal representative's trip to Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, undertaken within the framework of joint efforts to resolve the crisis. His mission was to informally sound attitudes of the sides and see how to proceed next.

We feel that Milosevic, after I have worked with him, is thinking over the idea of suspending sanctions in return for normalizing relations with Bosnia and Croatia and is not rejecting it out of hand. I see this as a positive sign, a possibility to continue working with Belgrade in inching towards a realistic solution.

However, Milosevic is not yet ready to take such a step.

Using well known arguments (reasons for introducing sanctions are no longer there, Belgrade fulfilled all the promises on Bosnia having got nothing in return) he insists on a complete lifting of sanctions. Their suspension doesn't satisfy him since, as they see it in Belgrade, there are not any guarantees that sanctions regime wouldn't be reintroduced for any reasons, even those that have nothing to do with the FRY. Such possible turn of events would create an even more complex impasse.

In general, Milosevic still firmly adheres to the stand which he clarified in his letter from March 4, 1995.

In this situation I think it is useful once again to consider advantages and disadvantages of the approach based on a principle "all or nothing". I believe, the Contact Group could search for additional resources in working with the sides. They should be encouraged towards normalizing relations, bearing in mind that, realistically speaking, this process can be carried out only in stages.

Contacts with Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovich and Silajdzic show that this avenue still holds promise although Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo all have their doubts.

Of course, dividing the process of normalizing relations leading to mutual recognition by time and stages doesn't guarantee agreement of the sides. But an attempt to take into account their legitimate priority concerns in such a way is worth a try.

I understand that for objective reasons it is difficult to change a "package" which took so much work to hammer out but if we don't take extra efforts to find out a compromise acceptable to all sides and hostilities in Bosnia resume, I wouldn't have an impression that the Contact Group had done everything possible to prevent them.

Andrey

**REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY
SARAJEVO**

22 March, 1995

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros - Ghali
Secretary - General
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

There is a steadily growing gap between the UNPROFOR mandate as provided for by the Security Council and the actual implementation of that mandate. In view of the fact that it was actually always necessary to strengthen those mechanisms, including the UNPROFOR mandate, that promote the cause of peace and humanitarian efforts, this negative tendency toward the erosion of the mandate is most disconcerting at this time.

Therefore, it is imperative that a thorough review be undertaken of both the current Security Council mandate with respect to UNPROFOR and its actual implementation before it is extended beyond March 31, 1995. There are numerous factors as well as developing events that should be considered in this review, including: the changes for UNPROFOR in Croatia and Macedonia; the expiration of the cease - fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the reluctant peace process; Serbia and Montenegro's failure to recognize its neighbors; the deteriorating humanitarian situation; the failure to lift the siege of Sarajevo or even to assure the "Blue Routes"; the harassment of the operations at Sarajevo airport and access routes therefrom; the violation of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo and Gorazde as well as the continuing incursions into the other "safe areas"; the persistent onslaught against Bihac, especially through the violation of our international border with the Republic of Croatia; impeding of humanitarian aid convoys; continuing ethnic cleansing in areas under Serbian occupation; and escalating violations of the "no - fly" zones.

Because the expiration of the current UNPROFOR mandate on March 31, 1995 is a relatively short time away, we would be willing to favorably consider extending the existing mandate for a period of no more than 30 days to accomplish this comprehensive review. We look forward to contributing positively in this review and are prepared to endorse measures designed to promote the peace process, improve effectiveness and the humanitarian situation, and secure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

SIGNED
Alija Izetbegovic
President



COPY

Republika Hrvatska / Republic of Croatia
Predsjednik / President

New York, 22 March 1995

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Your Excellency,

I would like to state the position of the Republic of Croatia with regard to the Vance Plan (S/23280, Annex III) for Croatia of 1991.

As we are both aware, the Vance Plan has fulfilled but one small part of its goals: apart from the - as least formal - withdrawal of the former JNA forces from the territory of Croatia, nothing else has been achieved: the heavy weapons of the "Serbian Territorial Defense Forces" are not kept under United Nations control in storage depots; United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) have not been demilitarized, nor have the paramilitary units within them been disbanded; the human rights of members of the non-Serbian population within the UNPAs are being constantly violated; not a single refugee has returned home, to the contrary - as you are aware - some 600 Croats and other non-Serbs have been killed and 12,000 forcibly displaced from UNPAs while under UNPROFOR supervision.

I would like to emphasize that the Vance Plan was an interim arrangement; it was to remain in force "in certain areas of Croatia" until an "overall settlement" or a "political solution" was found and the European Community came with a viable peace plan. The Republic of Croatia has on many occasions reiterated that - following the Security Council resolutions 815 (1993), 871 (1993), and 947 (1994), and the General Assembly resolution 49/43 - the solution has clearly been defined: the negotiations on the conclusion of the conflict can take place only on the basis of respect for the territorial and legal framework of the Republic of Croatia.

The Vance Plan has been overtaken by the developments on the ground. The introduction of "pink zones" (to which the Republic of Croatia has, upon your own assessment (S/24188), agreed voluntarily); the emergence of "blue zones" after the Zagreb Agreement of 29 March 1994, and the Economic Agreement, have altered the overall framework for the "solution", and made the Vance Plan largely irrelevant. In our view, these developments and the present situation have even rendered the Vance Plan an obstacle for earnest negotiations within the Republic of Croatia.


Dr. Franjo Tuđman

(Gac) **TALKING POINTS**

The new draft (March 21, 17:00) is to a large extent unacceptable to Croatia. Croatia's main demands have not been taken into consideration to a satisfactory degree. The same is true for the elements from President Tudjman's Copenhagen statement and the joint Copenhagen "sub-paper."

The new draft indicates that the position of the Serbian side and the Secretariat, with support from France and the U.K., that the mandate remains basically unchanged, has won out. The foundation for the new mandate is once again the Vance plan.

We should like to emphasize the following critical elements, even though there are other points that are unacceptable:

-- The name of the new operation is UNCRO (UN Confidence Resolution Operation), even though in the draft, it is referred to in places as UN Force in Croatia (UNFIC). This detail indicates that the writers of the draft may be privy to the upcoming report of the Secretary-General; the Secretariat has created this form so that the words CROATIA and FORCE can be excluded from the name.

-- Paragraph 3/D that should establish control of the borders is completely unacceptable to Croatia. What does "Assisting in controlling by monitoring and reporting ..." mean? Assist WHOM? The said paragraph also refers to the Vance plan in the context which indicates that stationing on the border points should not prejudice a "political solution."

-- Amendments submitted by Croatia on the first draft have not been taken into consideration at all. Punitive measures for violation of the border are an absolute must.

-- Mandate would be for one year. Croatia cannot accept an initial mandate that is longer than six months.

Croatia should like to emphasize that it remains fully committed to all elements of the Copenhagen agreement and that it accepts new UN forces on its territory. However, we cannot accept the situation where the Serbian side dictates conditions for deployment of new forces and when the Vance plan is to be the *modus operandi*. In order to mitigate the possible future misuse of the Vance plan, and taking into consideration that most elements of the plan have not been implemented in there years, Croatia has officially withdrawn its support for the Vance plan in today's letter by President Tudjman to the Secretary-General. The definition of the political solution called for by the Vance plan has already been clearly established in various Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

Despite claims to the contrary, we are witness once again to a situation where the approach used in negotiations, is to give concessions to the Serbian side at the expense of the highly cooperative position of Croatia. The message of the new draft seems to suggest that the international community is working in a way that the sanctions regime should be minimized or eliminated, while the new mandate in Croatia is to be merely changed cosmetically or actually *defacto* weakened.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	re: Meeting with Milosevic--Assurances. (6 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. draft	Talking Points for Calls to Members of Congress. (2 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CIA

27 February 1995

Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia

Information and evidence drawn from refugee debriefings, press reports, and international relief agencies indicate that the overwhelming majority of ethnic cleansing that has been carried out in Bosnia is the work of ethnic Serb forces.

- Croats and Muslims in Bosnia have also committed atrocities and forced ethnic Serb civilians to flee, but the ethnic cleansing actions carried out by Bosnian Serbs are unrivalled in scale, intensity, and ferocity.

Sustained campaigns of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs since 1992 have probably resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands more, and the radical recasting of Bosnia's demographic makeup.

- Ninety percent of non-Serbs who lived in the parts of Bosnia now under Serb control have been driven out or killed, according to estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
- A majority of the 1,300,000 displaced persons within Bosnia are Muslims--most expelled from their homes by Serb ethnic cleansing--as are a majority of the approximately 1,000,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia who now reside elsewhere in Europe and third countries.

The Bosnian Serb Army, ethnic Serb paramilitary groups, Bosnian Serb political leaders, and police and security authorities have played central roles in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

- Consistent patterns of political-military collusion and coordination are apparent in ethnic Serbs' seizure of control of many areas of Bosnia; many non-Serb refugees from throughout Bosnia have described such takeovers in strikingly similar terms.
- The worst rounds of ethnic cleansing took place earlier in the Bosnian conflict in 1992 and 1993, but Serb efforts to expel non-Serbs continue, with more than 13,000 evicted from northern Bosnia since last summer, according to UNHCR and press reports.

UNCLASSIFIED

The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (known informally as the UN War Crimes Tribunal), Richard Goldstone, this month brought charges of crimes against humanity against the commander--who is also charged with genocide--and guards at the Omarska detention camp in northwestern Bosnia. It was the site of alleged mass atrocities committed by ethnic Serbs and functioned from May to September 1992.

- Following announcement of the indictments on 13 February, Goldstone stated that he will follow the evidence and hold accountable political and military leaders "who knew or had reason to know of serious violations of international humanitarian law and failed to take action to prevent those violations or to punish those who committed them."

Goldstone appears to be moving toward filing war crimes charges against Bosnian Serb leaders, possibly including "President" Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb Army commander General Ratko Mladic. In future indictments, however, he also almost certainly will charge some Croats and Muslims with violations of international humanitarian law.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20359

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1995

95 MAR 18 12:33

3/20

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *R*

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia.

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces to deploy to Croatia as part of NATO Step Two Prepositioning.

Background

Principals met Friday afternoon to discuss next steps in NATO prepositioning following this week's activities at NATO. Last week, you tentatively approved U.S. participation in a Step Two option that involved nearly 1800 personnel, including 450 Americans, 320 of which would deploy to Croatia. This was subject to completion of Congressional consultations and a subsequent decision by Principals before actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia.

Facing criticism from some Allies, NATO military authorities this week developed a scaled-back prepositioning option involving only 80 personnel, including up to 20 Americans, who will deploy to Croatia to set up a communications system. NATO is seeking our agreement to identify and deploy the forces to support this step. Even with the smaller option, not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may not result in the immediate deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia. But we should be prepared to deploy the 20 in any case.

The larger option you previously approved is still an active option and NATO is seeking our agreement to identify the forces (450 Americans) and to authorize training in Germany. A subsequent decision by the NAC will be required, however, before the larger force deploys to Croatia. Shali believes the decision is many weeks away.

After considering the impact of the Tudjman decision and the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, Principals agreed that we should agree to participate in this precautionary step. The Tudjman decision reduces the threat to the U.S. forces who will deploy to Croatia. But the ever-increasing likelihood that

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
v2 10/11/2013

large-scale fighting will resume in Bosnia this spring necessitates the continuation of prudent military steps to prepare for UNPROFOR withdrawal should it become unavoidable.

If you agree, we will inform Congress on Monday of our intention to participate in the small NATO prepositioning step and follow with fuller briefings on Wednesday. We will cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken even though we oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal. We will inform NATO of our decision on Tuesday.

We do not expect this step will provoke much controversy on the Hill, since the deal with President Tudjman makes UNPROFOR withdrawal unlikely, at least in the short term. But a new letter to you from Senators Dole, Helms et al. (attached) makes clear that we will face tough sledding if and when a decision to withdraw is made. The letter insists on full NATO command, without any UN dual-key, and robust rules of engagement as preconditions for U.S. participation in any NATO extraction operation (which are fully consistent with our position). But more importantly, the letter demands that Allies commit to support multilateral lifting of the arms embargo post-withdrawal as the *quid pro quo* for U.S. participation.

We are seeking time on your schedule to fully brief you on the NATO plan (OPLAN 40104) that covers U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. Principals agree that, notwithstanding the difficulties we will face on the Hill, the scope of the operation argues in favor of seeking Congressional authorization and funding in advance of committing U.S. troops to the operation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support the scaled-back option, including the deployment of up to 20 U.S. personnel to Croatia, following notification of Congress.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to agree to form the larger force (450 Americans) and conduct training in Germany, with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals decision.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachment

Tab A President's Decision Memo

Tab B Letter from Senators Dole, Helms, Thurmond et al.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 9, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/11/95

✓
MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must not be seen obstructing NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to keep refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, and in turn leading to a wider war.

Our allies would prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and are reluctant to proceed with Step Two deployment at this time, fearing this could hasten UNPROFOR's departure and open the way for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. But deployment may become unavoidable.

While recognizing the real risks, NSC Principals recommend approval of U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon and George concur, though George is concerned that this might trigger a War Powers debate. We have forwarded a copy of the memo to the Vice President. If you approve, State and Defense will consult with Congress next week before informing NATO of our decision.]

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
12 10/1/2013

John Podesta *JP*
Todd Stern *TS*

Tony

I want to re-visit
when the VP returns
to trip - visit w/ Tudjman

BC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

95 MAR 6 P9:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO
Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at \$11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.


After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve

A handwritten signature, possibly "D. A. ...", is written over a horizontal line. A checkmark is drawn to the left of the signature.

Disapprove _____

2119

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

March 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing in regard to commitments made by your administration to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is our understanding that the recent compromise with the Croatian government may require only a partial withdrawal of U.N. forces from Croatia -- that is if the militant Serbs agree -- and that U.S. involvement is likely to be very limited in such an operation. However, we are aware that you have already committed to providing U.S. military assistance, to include U.S. combat troops, to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina should such a decision be made by either nations participating in UNPROFOR or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While we have consistently opposed your policy toward the former Yugoslavia, and have been critical of the inability and unwillingness of the U.N. forces to fulfill their mandate there, we recognize that U.S. participation to assist the withdrawal of U.N. forces may be necessary. However, we believe that such assistance should not be offered without strict conditions.

The first condition is that the entire withdrawal operation be under unified NATO command -- from start to finish. The "dual-key" arrangement under which NATO currently operates and is subordinate to the United Nations has been a military and political fiasco. Should such an arrangement be extended to any component of the withdrawal operation -- even under peaceful circumstances -- we would strongly oppose U.S. participation.

It is critical that the United States establish concretely and in advance that NATO command is a prerequisite to U.S. participation. As such, we would strongly recommend that this decision be explicitly stated in a U.N. Security Council resolution on the matter. A letter from the U.N. Secretary General in our view would be wholly insufficient; a binding commitment from the countries in the Security Council who are the largest troop contributors to UNPROFOR should be a minimum requirement.

Second, the rules of engagement must be robust. There must be no question that self-defense includes the right of retaliation -- at the discretion of the NATO commander. Those forces that may consider interfering with the withdrawal of U.N.

forces must know in no uncertain terms that if any U.N. or NATO troops are provoked or attacked that they will face massive and disproportionate retaliation, to include all their military assets, not just their immediately-engaged forces.

Third, there must be a common sense rule applied to the withdrawal of heavy equipment belonging to the U.N. protection forces. We understand that those of our allies participating in UNPROFOR would like to remove all of their equipment when they depart. If the environment is calm and peaceful, we would not object to using American forces to facilitate the withdrawal of equipment. Should we be faced with a hostile environment, however, we believe that American lives should not be endangered to rescue equipment.

Finally, U.S. assistance should be premised on an understanding with our allies that UNPROFOR's withdrawal clears the way for lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. To date, allied objections to lifting the arms embargo have centered on concerns about the safety of allied troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the United States assists in the withdrawal of U.N. forces, the allies must know that we will not tolerate equivocation on the matter of terminating the arms embargo. For three years the Bosnians have been denied their fundamental and inherent right to self-defense and watched as U.N. forces provided cover to the aggressor Serb forces. In sum, U.S. assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be explicitly conditioned on the support of those nations for terminating the arms embargo.

Mr. President, we believe that these military and political conditions -- NATO command, robust rules of engagement, limitations on withdrawal of equipment, and allied agreement on next steps -- are not only essential to securing support from the U.S. Congress, but essential to the success of such a potentially dangerous operation. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond
J. Hill
John Stevens
Jesse Helms

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	re: Milosevic Revises his Response. (3 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. draft	Agenda: Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995. Record ID: 9520393. (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	Katherine Veit to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: RE: Suggested PC Meeting. (1 page)	03/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Paper: Options for Bosnia. (3 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

009a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Russian Peace Plan for Former Yugoslavia. Record ID: 9502331. (1 page)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
------------	---	------------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. draft	Russian Proposal. [English Translation] (3 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009c. paper	Russia's Balkan Peace Plan. (4 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2687

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]