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Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [1]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. March 28 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520396. (5 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995. Record ID: 9520393. (1 page)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	re: March 24: Contact Group Plus Italy. (10 pages)	03/25/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. cable	re: Contact Group Meeting. (4 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. cable	re: Meeting with Milosevic. (6 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. report	Conversations with Milosevic, March 17 & 18, 1995. [with attachments] (13 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
001g. paper	Options for Bosnia. (3 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
002. draft	Paper: A Possible Strategy to Extend the Cease-Fire. (2 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003. report	Croatia: Implications of a New UN Mandate. (8 pages)	03/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2686

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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001b. agenda	Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee on Bosnia and Croatia, March 28, 1995. Record ID: 9520393. (1 page)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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001c. cable	re: March 24: Contact Group Plus Italy. (10 pages)	03/25/1995	P1/b(1)

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TAB C



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MOSCOW

COPY

H. E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary General

UNITED NATIONS
New York

Your Excellency,

I have to draw your attention to the latest in a series of grave incidents in the occupied territories of Croatia in Eastern Slavonia. According to the information available, the military forces of the 'Army of Yugoslavia (AJ)' have made an incursion deep into the territory of Croatia by crossing the Danube bridge in Batina, close to the Croatian-Hungarian border, from the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)'. The troops of BELGRAD of UNPROFOR in the area attempted to 'persuade and negotiate' with the Serbian paramilitary forces in order to prevent this movement, but failed and were forced to withdraw and were kept in detention during the transport of military equipment.

Since the end of January 1993 one armoured company of the 'AJ' has been deployed in Eastern Slavonia close to the confrontation line. Moreover, on a later date further deployments took place, including - but not limited to - one mechanized company, one platoon of tanks and one platoon of self-propelled artillery, backed with an infantry company (totalling over 900 troops). The most recent incident saw the transportation of 25 tanks, one artillery battery and one 'Luna-M' ground-to-ground tactical missile battery, and their deployment east of Beli Manastir and north of Tovarnik. Furthermore, according to available information, part of the 11th and 12th corps of the 'AJ' have been mobilized and placed on alert within the territory of the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)', including the 451st Mechanized Brigade in Sid. These developments pose a serious threat to the security of the Republic of Croatia, and serve as an additional example of the inefficiency of the present United Nations peace-keeping operation and a proof of direct involvement of the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)' in Croatia.

All of this once again confirms that the mechanisms of control of the international borders of Croatia - those presently outside of the effective control of the Croatian Government - are not sufficient. Furthermore, the above-mentioned grave violations of the relevant UNSC resolutions serve to focus our attention on your report to the Security Council on the implementation of a peace-keeping mandate (S/1995/222), which proposes the continuation of the existing insufficient mechanisms.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, I thus have to express deep dissatisfaction and grave concern with the assessments and recommendations contained in your report S/1995/222, and in particular with the following:

1. the report is unbalanced - it overestimates the achievements and underestimates the shortcomings of UNPROFOR's activity in Croatia - and does not realistically reflect the situation of Croatia;
2. the report repeatedly refers to documents that are several years old, but fails to draw the attention and to take into proper consideration more recent developments, such as Security Council resolutions 820 and 871, and General Assembly resolution 49/43;
3. the report draws attention to various elements of the so called Vance Plan, but apparently deliberately fails to address the most important element - the immediate disarming and disbandment of the Serbian paramilitary forces on the occupied territories; further, the report minimizes the validity of the need for the return of refugees and displaced persons, which is of paramount importance not only to a quarter of a million displaced persons but to the entire Croatian society as well;
4. it would appear that in the eyes of the Secretariat the newly proposed mandate would not differ substantially from the existing ones;
5. the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local insurgent authorities on the occupied territories have ~~implicitly~~ been placed on equal footing, since for every step of the deployment of a new mandate and force, their consent is implied;
6. the name of the new operation, as proposed in your latest report, does not include the reference to Croatia, which was one of our clearly stated requests; this is contrary to the established practice in the UN since only three UN operations (UNTSO, UNDOF and UNPROFOR) have hitherto been established without a clear geographic determination; the Government of the Republic of Croatia thus deems this to be highly inappropriate and unacceptable.
7. the report does not provide for, or even suggest, the reliable control of Croatia's internationally recognized borders and therefore does not fulfil the preconditions for Croatia's acceptance of the new mandate as agreed upon in Copenhagen and Washington; furthermore, the provisions in this regard, as set forth in your report, do not reflect adequately the spirit and content of Your Excellency's recent talks with the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, and the subsequent statements as well.

Taking into account the above, on behalf of the Republic of Croatia, I have the duty to inform you and the members of the Security Council that the Republic of Croatia shall not accept the new mandate of the new peace-keeping force on its territory after the present mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia terminates in accordance with our letters S/1995/28 and S/1995/36 unless the following conditions are met:

1. the name of the new operations contains the word Croatia; explicitly confirming the fact that the new operation is to be carried out in its entirety on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Croatia.

2. the mechanisms of the active control of the international borders of the Republic of Croatia in the parts that are not at this moment accessible to the Croatian authorities by the new force are negotiated in detail on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions and have gained the prior formal approval of the Government of Croatia; thus the mechanisms for active control of the Croatia's international borders under the new mandate must be clearly established in respect of imports, exports and all transshipments, consistent with paragraph 12 of Resolution 520 (1993).

In this regard, and in order to facilitate the negotiations, I have the honour to draw your attention to the letter dated 23 March 1995 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to your Excellency.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zagreb, 27 March 1995.

Dr. Mate Granic

M. Granic

ESTON NO 0807 520 NY 28:50 28:50

TAB D

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001d. cable	re: Contact Group Meeting. (4 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. cable	re: Meeting with Milosevic. (6 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)

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Source: *United States Census Bureau, 1950 Census of the United States, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020*

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REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA

SERB KRAJINA PRESIDENT: WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGING SIZE OF UNPROFOR

BELGRADE, MARCH 21 (TANJUG) - SERB KRAJINA PRESIDENT MILAN MARTIC SAID TUESDAY THAT THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA IS NOT OPPOSED TO CHANGING THE NUMBER OF U.N. PEACEKEEPERS IN THE SAFE AREAS, BUT HE DEMANDED THAT THEIR MANDATE REMAINS THE SAME. 'THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DECIDE ABOUT THE OPTIMUM SIZE OF THE U.N. PROTECTION FORCE,' MARTIC SAID FOLLOWING THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WITH U.N. MEDIATOR THORWALD STOLTENBERG IN BELGRADE. MARTIC SAID THAT THE 12,000 PEACEKEEPERS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN SERB KRAJINA AND CROATIA 'COULD BE REDUCED TO 5,000, 6,000 OR 7,000.'

MARTIC SAID THAT UNPROFOR'S SIZE COULD BE BIGGER OR SMALLER THAN THE CURRENT ONE, BUT SHOULD BE SUCH TO 'ENABLE IT TO SECURE PEACE ALONG THE SEPARATION LINES.'

SERB KRAJINA DEMANDS THAT UNPROFOR REMAINS IN ITS TERRITORY, MARTIC SAID AND ADDED THAT HE HAD INSISTED ON THIS DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS WITH STOLTENBERG IN BELGRADE ON MONDAY.

'WE HOPE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL OBJECTIVELY CONSIDER ALL POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE VANCE PLAN AND THAT THE PEACEKEEPERS WILL REMAIN IN THE TERRITORY OF SERB KRAJINA WITH THE SAME MANDATE, AS A PROTECTION FORCE,' MARTIC SAID. MARTIC SAID HE HAD DEMANDED FROM STOLTENBERG THAT A SERB KRAJINA REPRESENTATIVE BE PRESENT WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSES THIS ISSUE.

MARTIC SAID THAT CURRENTLY THE KNIN-ZAGREB TALKS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEC. 2 ECONOMIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN FROZEN UNTIL UNPROFOR'S MANDATE IS RESOLVED. 'IF THE SERB KRAJINA DEMAND FOR AN UNCHANGED UNPROFOR MANDATE IS MET, I BELIEVE THE TALKS WILL RESUME,' MARTIC SAID.

ASKED TO COMMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING UNPROFOR ON THE BORDER BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA AND THE BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC, MARTIC SAID THE VANCE PLAN HAD EMPOWERED THE PEACEKEEPERS TO MONITOR THE BORDER BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT UNDERScoreD THAT 'REGARDING THE CONTROL (OF BORDERS) - WE CANNOT AGREE.'

STOLTENBERG SAID HE WOULD SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT HIS TALKS IN BELGRADE AND ZAGREB. IN ZAGREB STOLTENBERG MET ON MONDAY EVENING WITH THE CROATIAN PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ADVISOR, HRVOJE SARINIC. 'MY TASK IS IN FACT TO FIND THE COMMON DENOMINATOR FOR A PLAN WHICH COULD BE BEST IMPLEMENTED TO THE GOOD OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION. I AM LOOKING FOR ALL THE COMMON POINTS WHICH COULD RESULT IN A NEW MANDATE FOR THE U.N. TROOPS,' STOLTENBERG SAID.

TAB. 3

TAB G

TO BE PROVIDED

TAB H

14

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY
SARAJEVO

22 March, 1995

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros - Ghali
Secretary - General
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

There is a steadily growing gap between the UNPROFOR mandate as provided for by the Security Council and the actual implementation of that mandate. In view of the fact that it was actually always necessary to strengthen those mechanisms, including the UNPROFOR mandate, that promote the cause of peace and humanitarian efforts, this negative tendency toward the erosion of the mandate is most disconcerting at this time.

Therefore, it is imperative that a thorough review be undertaken of both the current Security Council mandate with respect to UNPROFOR and its actual implementation before it is extended beyond March 31, 1995. There are numerous factors as well as developing events that should be considered in this review, including: the changes for UNPROFOR in Croatia and Macedonia; the expiration of the cease - fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the reluctant peace process; Serbia and Montenegro's failure to recognize its neighbors; the deteriorating humanitarian situation; the failure to lift the siege of Sarajevo or even to assure the "Blue Routes"; the harassment of the operations at Sarajevo airport and access routes therefrom; the violation of the exclusion zone around Sarajevo and Gorazde as well as the continuing incursions into the other "safe areas"; the persistent onslaught against Bihać, especially through the violation of our international border with the Republic of Croatia; impeding of humanitarian aid convoys; continuing ethnic cleansing in areas under Serbian occupation; and escalating violations of the "no - fly" zone.

Because the expiration of the current UNPROFOR mandate on March 31, 1995 is a relatively short time away, we would be willing to favorably consider extending the existing mandate for a period of no more than 30 days to accomplish this comprehensive review. We look forward to contributing positively in this review and are prepared to endorse measures designed to promote the peace process, improve effectiveness and the humanitarian situation, and secure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

SIGNED
Alija Izetbegovic
President

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~~SECRET~~

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March 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE

FROM: LEON FUERTH
SUBJECT: Sanctions Policy

Sanctions enforcement is gradually degenerating. It is possible to combat this trend, but to do so requires commitment of assets. The attached paper provides a rundown of areas of slippage and proposed countermeasures.

More effective enforcement of sanctions within existing authorities can further isolate Pale and Knin and may help convince Milosevic that sanctions will continue to bite unless he can help bring about negotiated settlements in Bosnia and the Krajina. On the other hand, Russia and the EU seem to be more interested in trading sanctions for incremental steps towards peace, and the Front Line States are increasingly unwilling to bear the burden of sanctions.

The key question for the Principals to address, therefore, is whether, in terms of our overall strategy in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. Government to press the Western Europeans, Russia, and the Front Line States to strengthen sanctions enforcement as a way to push Milosevic and the Pale and Knin Serbs towards the sorts of negotiated settlements we seek.

The Principals could also review the specific points in the attached paper if there is time. If not, I recommend that the Principals remand those issues to the Deputies for decision and implementation.

Attachment:

Sanctions Options Paper

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SUBJECT: Sanctions Improvements -- Practical Steps

Sanctions fatigue has set in but in an unexpected way. Fatigue is most evident in the West where political will is flagging and the focus is on trading sanctions for incremental, often reversible, progress in negotiations. Front-line states are maintaining enforcement in proportion to the degree of cohesion they perceive in the West and the West's pressure on them to maintain effective sanctions enforcement. Unfortunately, even the U.S. Government's message has been inconsistent, with too little emphasis on the continued importance of sanctions.

Sanctions can still provide significant leverage by isolating Pale and Knin (the "Inner Ring" of sanctions) and convincing Milosevic (the "Outer Ring") that sanctions will continue to bite unless he can help bring about negotiated settlements in Bosnia and the Krajina. By making effective sanctions a priority and devoting increased resources to enforcement programs, the U.S. and the Western Europeans can increase pressure on Pale, Knin, and Belgrade within existing sanctions authority.

This memorandum lays out the components of a program for enhanced sanctions enforcement. Many of the steps should be matters of routine sanctions maintenance. However, given flagging Western European support for sanctions and extremely lax enforcement in certain key countries, significant progress is impossible unless the USG puts political weight behind its efforts.

I. Main Problem Areas

A. General

1. Flagging Western European support for the sanctions effort is our main obstacle. The EU has not made sanctions a priority in its relations with the front-line states. EU members have sought to weaken sanctions in the UN Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, leaving the U.S. isolated. Greece and Italy are unwilling to comply with mandatory UN resolutions or even EU directives on sanctions. European governments are also slow to provide necessary resources and support for the sanctions program. (See item II. A.)

B. Outer Ring

1. Fuel, the most critical commodity in both the outer and inner sanctions rings, continues to reach the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs. The main source of leakage is fuel from Italy and Greece entering the FRY from Albania. Significant smuggling also takes

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place across the Danube from Romania and from Greece and Bulgaria through FYROM. Romania has not fulfilled commitments to limit the amount of jet fuel supplied to empty Yugoslav airline (JAT) aircraft shuttling between Timisoara and Belgrade. Hungary has not controlled the "ant trade" of fuel smuggling in private cars and buses and auxiliary tanks on trucks. (See items II. B, C, and G.)

2. Cypriot, Russian, and Greek attitudes towards sanctions continue to create problems. Serbian firms in Cyprus, Russia, and Greece conduct business virtually unimpeded by sanctions, earning hard currency and arranging sanctions-busting trade. Cyprus has proven unwilling to take effective enforcement measures. Russia has yet to pass laws necessary to bring sanctions into effect, and existing decrees are not meaningfully enforced. Russian trade and economic cooperation with Serbia continues. Russia has also taken positions in the Sanctions Committee that prevent closing loopholes. (For example, several of the front-line states will not take stronger steps to control cross border traffic without instructions from the Sanctions Committee, but Russia has blocked Committee action.) Serbian activities in Greece, especially Thessaloniki, continue to flourish. (See item II. D.)

3. Serbian exports through Macedonia of manufactured and agricultural products earn hard currency and support barter trade. Imports via FYROM keep key industries moving. The Macedonian government has no meaningful controls in place at the border with Serbia, and Serb-origin shipments regularly receive false documentation as Macedonian products. FYROM's neighbors -- Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece -- shrug off responsibility for FYROM's trade with Serbia, even though the bulk of goods involved transit, and often originate on, their territory. (See item II. C.)

C. Inner Ring

1. FRY implementation of its border closure with Bosnian Serb-held territory has declined significantly since its high point before renewal of limited sanctions relief in January. At the same time, the ICFY monitoring mission is in financial crisis. ICFY has already cut staffing, and Owen and Stoltenberg threaten to shut down the mission altogether if financial problems are not solved. The U.S. and EU must provide the resources necessary to restore ICFY effectiveness. However, these resources will be wasted, and the ICFY mission's hard work will have no meaning, unless the international community is willing to take a hard line in response to clear Serbian testing at the inter-Serb border. On the other hand, revocation of Phase

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I sanctions relief could cause Milosevic to end his embargo of the Bosnian Serbs altogether. (See item II. E.)

2. The "back door" remains a major source of supply for Pale and Knin Serb forces. Fuel, military supplies and other goods transiting the Dalmatian coast reach Bosnian Serbs through Croat-controlled (and maybe even Muslim-controlled) territory in Bosnia. Diversions to and exports from the Bosnian Serbs through the UNPAS could become a major loophole if economic confidence building measures between Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs are not accompanied by requisite sanctions control. Already there is evidence that goods shipped on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway are diverted to/from Bosnian Serb-held territory. There are only seven Sanctions Assistance Monitors (SAMs) in Croatia -- not enough to cover the Zagreb-Belgrade highway on a 24-hour basis or to monitor commerce through Dalmatia. (See item II. F.)

II. Proposed Actions

A. Establish a united front with Western Europeans on both inner and outer ring sanctions. Take joint and bilateral action to maintain and improve sanctions enforcement. Ensure that front-line state governments understand that sanctions remain an important part of the West's strategy toward the former Yugoslavia and that their performance on sanctions matters to us.

- U.S. officials at every level should stress the importance of sanctions in all appropriate fora. Failure to do so sends the message that sanctions no longer count.
- The USG should press for a U.S.-EU mission to the front-line states to discuss the need for strict implementation and recognize instances of good performance. U.S. Ambassadors to EU and front-line countries should regularly brief host governments on sanctions issues.

B. Control oil smuggling through Albania to the FRY.

- Get the EU to join in pressing Italy and Greece to control oil shipments to Albania through a pre-verification system that allows shipments to legitimate Albanian end users only.
- Jointly press Albania to do a better job.
- Have the NATO-WEU force (SHARP GUARD) cooperate with Albania in stopping oil tankers that have not been pre-verified (may require a change in the current UN mandate).

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C. Persuade FYROM to limit trade with Serbia, and get other countries to control shipments to and from FYROM.

- Press Albania and Bulgaria to cooperate with SAMs to help monitor their trade with FYROM, since much of the FYROM-Serbia trade enters or exists via Albania and Bulgaria.
- Press the EU to do a better job of controlling its trade with FYROM since a substantial portion of FYROM "exports" actually comes from Serbia. (This complements the action above and helps alleviate the burden on Albania and Bulgaria. Serbian exports can be identified, tracked, and caught at the final destination.)

D. We and the EU press Russia, Cyprus, and Greece to control FRY-interest firms operating in their territory and to stop other practices that violate sanctions regulations. We and the EU press Russia and Greece to desist from taking positions in the UN and EU that undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.

E. Decide whether and how specifically to signal that the USG might oppose continuation of Phase I sanctions relief after the current UN resolution expires on April 22.

- Decide whether the U.S. should seek immediate revocation of Phase I sanctions relief if the ICFY mission ceases operation because of financial problems.
- Decide how strongly to protest specific violations of the border closure.

F. Close the "back door" to Pale, starting small by building on what the SAMs have already accomplished in Croatia and on their good relations with the GOC.

- Re-deploy 10-12 U.S. SAMs to Croatia so that the SAM-Croatia can cover the Zagreb-Belgrade highway 24-hours a day.
- Press other SAM donors to bring SAM-Croatia up to 30-35 monitors to cover loading of humanitarian supplies in Zagreb and to re-institute cooperation with Croatian customs on the Dalmatian coast to help prevent shipments of goods to the Bosnian Serbs via Federation territory.
- Provide training and technical assistance for Croatian and Federation Customs. (By helping the GOC and Federation to create the wherewithal to control trade on their borders, we

are also contributing to an important aspect of their national sovereignty.)

G. Tighten enforcement of cross-border trade at the outer ring.

- Press Hungary to control the ant trade and to limit the amount of fuel that trucks can carry into Serbia. Prevent empty trucks from entering Serbia (a major source of smuggled fuel).
- Obtain agreement of EU governments to inspect and seal -- at loading -- UN authorized shipments bound for the FRY. (Almost all authorized shipments for the FRY originating in Western Europe cross at two sites in Hungary. A pre-inspection system would greatly reduce the burden on Hungarian customs and SAMs, thus freeing resources needed to counter smuggling.)
- Press Romania to control the ant trade in fuel, stop the FRY from importing aviation fuel via flights of empty JAT airliners to Timisoara, and stop supplying electricity to the FRY.

H. Resolve outstanding sanctions issues in ways that reinforce the overall sanctions regime.

- Seek front-line state cooperation on implementing a transit route for perishable agricultural products around Serbia as an alternative to pending requests for transit corridors through Serbia. Work with Bulgaria and other front-line States to address overall land transit issues as part of a comprehensive approach that identifies needed enforcement improvements as tradeoffs.
- Identify conditions under which Serb-owned vessels engaged in cabotage (internal trade) can use the Romanian side of the Iron Gates locks while the Serb locks are under repair. Conditions might include ending illegal Danube tolls and other interference with Danube shipping.

I. Decide whether the U.S. should modify its own sanctions regulations to implement Phase I sanctions relief through the sale of repair parts for U.S.-built aircraft being flown by JAT and/or allowing U.S.-FRY sports and cultural contacts.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. draft	Paper: A Possible Strategy to Extend the Cease-Fire. (2 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2686

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. report	Croatia: Implications of a New UN Mandate. (8 pages)	03/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995: Late March [1]

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