

# FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

898

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

3

Stack:

V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. agenda              | Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 9, 1995.<br>Record ID: 9520256. (1 page)               | 03/07/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. memo                | For Peter Tarnoff from Toby Gati. Subject: Likely Reactions. (2 pages)                                         | 03/02/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. memo                | For Samuel Berger from Leon Fuerth. Subject: An Alternative for the Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (3 pages) | 03/06/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. memo                | For the Deputy Secretary from Toby Gati. Subject: Russia Expands It's Options. (2 pages)                       | 03/02/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 005. paper               | Inter-Serbian Sanctions #5. (6 pages)                                                                          | 03/02/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. paper               | Krajina Serb Army. (11 pages)                                                                                  | 03/01/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007. paper               | Decision Paper: Should the U.S. Support Continued Military Preparations. (4 pages)                             | 03/03/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2682

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON D C 20506

20295

March 7, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*  
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*  
SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
March 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held March 9, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies  
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*

*2013-0687-F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS  
Associate Director for National  
Security Director for National  
Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the U.S. to the UN

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK  
Secretary, Joint Staff  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on March 9, 1995, 5:00-6:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. Papers should be circulated by the lead agency NLT COB March 8. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A      Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/27/2014

2013-0687-F

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                    | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. agenda              | Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 9, 1995.<br>Record ID: 9520256. (1 page) | 03/07/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

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National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F  
vz2682

### RESTRICTION CODES

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| 002. memo                | For Peter Tarnoff from Toby Gati. Subject: Likely Reactions. (2 pages) | 03/02/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

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National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

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Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2682

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~~SECRET~~

20278

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 6, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the U.S. to the United  
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK  
Executive Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS  
Associate Director for  
National Security &  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached  
at Tab A. (S)

  
for Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 5/29/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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A  
B

A.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 2, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 6:00 - 7:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia and Croatia (8)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

State:

Strobe Talbott

Peter Tarnoff

Richard Holbrooke

JCS:

LTG Wesley Clark

COL. Walter Buchanan

DOD:

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

BG Donald L. Kerrick

OMB:

Gordon Adams

Keith Beckell

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss the strategy for Ambassador Holbrooke to pursue in a final push with President Tudjman aimed at reversing his decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia on March 31. They agreed that retention of interpositional forces along the confrontation line is vital to prevent renewed fighting between the Croatian and Krajina Serb forces. The price for retention of the interpositional force for Tudjman may be agreeing to demand for forces along Croatia's border with Bosnia, but it is not clear we can support a border force and American participation would be very difficult. If Tudjman is willing to agree to the interpositional force,

Deputies agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should only offer to discuss a possible border force with Allies. Deputies asked State to prepare a paper for Principals' consideration on Friday, March 3, illustrating the approach Ambassador Holbrooke will use in his meeting with President Tudjman next week. (Action: State)

~~(S)~~

2. Deputies discussed the issue of Step Two prepositioning of NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia. They agreed that the issue should be presented to the Principals Friday for decision. They requested that the decision paper be modified to reflect the Deputies' discussion. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed to meet in informal session Saturday, March 4, to discuss the NSC-staff paper "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review." ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

20278

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER  
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*  
FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(K)*  
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies  
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
March 2, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 2, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *(mk)* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*

*2013-0687-F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003. memo                | For Samuel Berger from Leon Fuerth. Subject: An Alternative for the Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (3 pages) | 03/06/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2682

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20278

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies  
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
March 2, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of  
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and  
Croatia held March 2, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at  
Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/29/2017*

*2013-0687-F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20278

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the U.S. to the United  
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK  
Executive Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS  
Associate Director for  
National Security &  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached  
at Tab A. (S)

Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/29/2014  
2013-0687-F

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 2, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 6:00pm - 7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia and Croatia (8)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

James O'Brien

David Scheffer

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

State:

Strobe Talbott

Peter Tarnoff

Richard Holbrooke

JCS:

LTG Wesley Clark

COL. Walter Buchanan

DOD:

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

WHITE HOUSE

Nancy Soderberg

OMB:

Gordon Adams

Keith Beckell

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

BG Donald L. Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss the strategy for Ambassador Holbrooke to pursue in a final push with President Tudjman aimed at reversing his decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia on March 31. They agreed retention of interpositional forces along the confrontation line is vital to prevent renewed fighting between the Croatian and Krajina Serb forces. The price for retention of the interpositional force may be agreeing to Tudjman's demand for forces along Croatia's border with Bosnia, but it is not clear we can support a border force. If Tudjman is willing to agree to the interpositional force, Deputies agreed that Ambassador Holbrooke should only offer to discuss a possible

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

border force with Allies. Deputies asked State to prepare a paper for Principals' consideration on Friday, March 3, illustrating the approach Ambassador Holbrooke will use in his meeting with President Tudjman next week. (Action: State) (S)

2. Deputies discussed the issue of Step Two prepositioning of NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia. They agreed that the issue should be presented to the Principals Friday for decision. They requested that the decision paper be modified to reflect the Deputies' discussion. (Action: NSC) (S)

3. Deputies agreed to meet in informal session Saturday, March 4, to discuss the NSC-staff paper "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review." (S)

Q Mr. President, if we could come back to foreign policy. Are you prepared to send American troops to Croatia at the end of the month to help in the withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers if President Tudjman sticks to his deadline? And can you foresee beyond now any circumstances in which you would keep those troops there or expand the number of American ground troops in the region to help avert the wider war that so many people fear

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the United States has sent troops, as you know, to Macedonia as part of the United Nations effort to try to limit the scope of the Bosnian War. And we have committed to help get the U.N. peacekeepers out of Bosnia if the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia collapses. We have done everything we could do to persuade President Tudjman not to suspend the U.N. mission in Croatia because we fear that it will lead to a wider war there.

We feel a strong responsibility to our U.N. and, many of them our NATO allies as well, to try to help them, and we are trying to work through whatever plans would be appropriate to give that sort of assistance. But I do not foresee -- I have worked very hard to avoid the long-term commitment of American ground troops in that region, and I will continue to do that.

I think that this is something that has to be handled through the United Nations. I have offered NATO support, and I have been willing to work with our allies who were willing to put their troops on the ground there because they thought it was an area in which Europe ought to take the lead. And that's generally the system I think we should continue to observe.

Q Mr. President, you mentioned health care reform yesterday and again today as one way you could achieve deficit reduction. I wonder if we're going to see any concrete proposals from you in this legislative session on health care reform.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you will see concrete proposals in this legislative session.

Q From you?

THE PRESIDENT: From me, yes. But I want to do it insofar as I can, with the Congress. As I said in the State of the Union address, I think last time I bit off more than I could chew. They saw that and then they decided to back away from their proposals and just take the political position they would kill anything we propose. And I think I made a mistake, but I think they did, too. And what I hope we ought to do now -- what I think we ought to do now, is to figure out a way to help Americans get more affordable health care and to solve this problem. And if we do it in the right way, we will continue to

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1765

March 6, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*  
FROM: DONALD L. KERRICK *(D)*  
SUBJECT: Hamilton Letter to Secretary Christopher

Attached is a copy of a recent Lee Hamilton letter to Secretary Christopher regarding the President's decision on participating in an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. The letter provides a flavor of the questions that will be raised when Hill consultations begin.

We will place the entire 40104 approval process on the next Deputies agenda. NATO may seek approval on the overall OPLAN as early as March 22. If so, we need to have a clear picture of what steps to take on the Hill before that time.

Attachment  
Tab A Hamilton Letter

cc: Bill Danvers  
Alan Kreczko  
Rick Saunders

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*  
*2013-0687-F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK  
Chairman

BILL GOODLING, PENNSYLVANIA  
JAMES LEACH, IOWA  
TOBY ROTH, WISCONSIN  
HENRY HYDE, ILLINOIS  
DOUG BERFUTER, NEBRASKA  
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, NEW JERSEY  
DAN BURTON, INDIANA  
JAN MEYERS, KANSAS  
ELTON GALLEGLY, CALIFORNIA  
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, FLORIDA  
CASS BALLINGER, NORTH CAROLINA  
DANA ROHRBACH, CALIFORNIA  
DON MANZULLO, ILLINOIS  
ED ROYCE, CALIFORNIA  
PETER KING, NEW YORK  
JAY M. CALIFORNIA  
SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS  
DAVID FUNDERBURK, NORTH CAROLINA  
STEVE CHABOT, OHIO  
MARK SANFORD, SOUTH CAROLINA  
MATT SALMON, ARIZONA  
RICHARD J. GARON  
Chief of Staff

9500-1227  
One Hundred Fourth Congress

# Congress of the United States

## Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

February 22, 1995

LEE H. HAMILTON, INDIANA  
Ranking Democratic Member

SAM GEJDENSON, CONNECTICUT  
TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA  
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, NEW JERSEY  
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA  
GARY L. ACKERMAN, NEW YORK  
HARRY JOHNSTON, FLORIDA  
ELIOT L. ENGEL, NEW YORK  
ENRIQUE FALCÓN, MEXICO  
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, CALIFORNIA  
DONALD M. PAYNE, NEW JERSEY  
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, NEW JERSEY  
ROBERT MENENDEZ, NEW JERSEY  
SHERRILL BROWN, OHIO  
CYNTHIA MACINTYRE, GEORGIA  
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA  
ALBERT R. WYNN, MARYLAND  
MICHAEL MCRAITY, NEW YORK  
JAMES P. MORAN, VIRGINIA

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN  
Democratic Chief of Staff

The Hon. Warren Christopher  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On January 3, I wrote to you regarding the President's decision in principle to commit U.S. ground forces to a future NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. I appreciated your reply of January 19.

I am writing again because my policy and process concerns about this decision persist. Indeed, they have been sharpened, as a result of: (1) the increasingly fragile situation in Bosnia; (2) information provided to the Committee that the first contingency steps to implement a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia are now going forward; and (3) the decision of the Croatian government to terminate the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia after March 31, 1995.

I would like to ask a number of questions about U.S. policy:

1. Does the President's commitment to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia extend to a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia as well?
  - If such a commitment has not been made, is it under active consideration at this time?
  - What would be the U.S. troop and cost requirements of such an additional commitment?
2. How would a prior withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia complicate an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia?
  - How would an UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia change the U.S. troop, cost and logistics requirements of a NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia?

9500-1418

3. How does the possibility of renewed fighting in both Bosnia and Croatia affect your estimates of the U.S. troop and cost requirements of a NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal?
  - If fighting resumes, do you believe that U.S. forces participating in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR will be able to keep out of the conflict?
4. I appreciate the Department of State's reply of January 19th, "that the Administration has no intention of keeping U.S. ground forces in Bosnia following a withdrawal operation." I agree with that policy limitation, but I remain concerned about the strong pressures on U.S. ground forces -- during and in the aftermath of an UNPROFOR withdrawal -- to intervene in the conflict:
  - o To provide humanitarian assistance;
  - o To protect civilian populations; or
  - o To respond to military provocations by parties to the conflict.
  - How do you address each of these issues, from the standpoint of keeping U.S. forces focused on their mission, and preventing mission creep?

I also want to reiterate my concern, which I know you share, that a commitment to put U.S. ground troops in harm's way is the most serious undertaking a President can make.


To my knowledge, the President has yet to make a public case for sending U.S. ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. Unless or until the President makes that case directly to the American people, I believe there will be little support for his decision in the Congress or among the public at large. I strongly urge the President to state the policy and explain the commitment.

The Hon. Warren Christopher  
February 22, 1995  
Page 3

I appreciate your attention to this letter, and I look forward to your answers to the several questions raised.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lee H. Hamilton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "L" and "H".

Lee H. Hamilton  
Ranking Democratic Member

LHH:mcs

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20282 REDO

March 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*  
FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(V)*  
SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for  
Step Two of NATO Prepositioning.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO. Have reworked per Sandy Berger's request.

Concurrences by: *(V)* Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers *(V)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*

*2013-0687 -F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO  
Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at \$11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

v2 10/1/2013

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.

After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground, and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two, but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking, and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision, ~~required before the U.S. personnel are deployed to Croatia.~~

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*The actual Ltr of US am to Croatia subject to a*

March 6, 1995

## MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the U.S. to the United  
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK  
Executive Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS  
Associate Director for  
National Security &  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia and Croatia, March 3, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at  
Tab A. ~~(S)~~

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By Va. Tbs NARA, Date 5/29/2014

2013-0687-F

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 3, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting  
on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIA

Admiral William Studeman

OVP

Leon Fuerth

JCS

General John Shalikashvili

State

Secretary Christopher

White House

Samuel Berger

DOD

John Deutch

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

USUN

Ambassador Rick Inderfurth

Summary of ConclusionsCroatian Decision to Eject UNPROFOR

1. Principals discussed strategy for convincing President Tudjman to reconsider his decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate, focusing on the approach that Assistant Secretary Holbrooke should take in his March 6 meeting with Tudjman. They approved the overall approach set forth in the State Department paper and draft talking points: on the one hand, a tough message insisting that Tudjman allow interpositional forces to remain in the separation zone between Croatian and Krajina Serb forces, and raising the prospect of punitive measures if Tudjman remains intransigent; on the other hand, an understanding of his difficult political environment and a willingness to work with him on a new mandate for a force to replace UNPROFOR.

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PER E.O. 13526

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Declassify on: OADR

v2

10/1/2013

2. In response to Tudjman's demand for peacekeeping forces or observers along Croatia's international border, Principals agreed that Holbrooke should unequivocally rule out the possibility that the U.S. would contribute to such a force. If Tudjman is prepared to agree to retaining the interpositional force in the separation zone, Holbrooke may indicate a readiness to take this up with U.S. Allies, but without encouraging him to believe there is a significant likelihood of NATO assuming this mission.

3. Principals agreed that the possibility of a visit by Tudjman to the U.S. in mid-March for the first anniversary of the Bosniac-Croat Federation could provide an inducement for Tudjman to compromise on UNPROFOR. They affirmed the Deputies' recommendation that Holbrooke should make clear that the minimum requirement for such a visit would be a three-month extension of UNPROFOR's mandate and Tudjman's agreement to retain interpositional forces as part of any UNPROFOR successor force.

4. Principals agreed that, following Holbrooke's meeting with Tudjman, we would seek German agreement on a joint demarche to Tudjman by the President and Chancellor Kohl.

5. Principals requested an analysis of the potential impact on Tudjman's policies and support for the Federation in the event the U.S. carried out punitive measures in the event he remained intransigent on ejecting UNPROFOR. (Action: CIA)

#### Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

6. To sustain our leadership of the Alliance, principals decided to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to support a decision at NATO to implement Step Two prepositioning in Croatia of communications systems and personnel needed to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. This decision would be subject to prior Congressional consultations early in the week of March 6. (Based on subsequent discussion among Principals, it was agreed to delay implementation of these steps for one week.) (Action: NSC)

7. Principals agreed that, in the Congressional consultations, we would characterize this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to deploy U.S. forces as part of a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would also state that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter, if and when a decision is taken to withdraw UNPROFOR, and that we will seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. (Action State and DOD, in coordination with NSC)

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20280

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 4 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals  
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
March 3, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 3, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *VR* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

*as amended*

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *VR* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*

*2013-0687 -F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20282

March 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for  
Step Two of NATO Prepositioning.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his  
approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO.

Concurrences by: *N/A* *N/A*  
*CF* Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/29/2024*

*2013-0617-F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO  
Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at \$11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

VZ 10/1/2013

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train steps that will make UNPROFOR withdrawal more likely and lead to the wider war diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through. Principals agree that while we will not press the Alliance to execute Step Two, it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

In considering this issue, we weighed the political risks to diplomatic efforts to reverse Tudjman's UNPROFOR decision against the military risks of delaying NATO's readiness to support withdrawal should it become necessary. The Principals decided, in balance, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground, and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by Principals and the NAC.

Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking, and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, an Interagency team will brief leadership and key committees on Monday and Tuesday. Principals will reconvene on Tuesday to evaluate Congressional reaction.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with a subsequent decision required before the U.S. personnel are deployed to Croatia.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                            | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004. memo                | For the Deputy Secretary from Toby Gati. Subject: Russia Expands It's Options. (2 pages) | 03/02/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2682

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                         | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005. paper               | Inter-Serbian Sanctions #5. (6 pages) | 03/02/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2682

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                 | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 006. paper               | Krajina Serb Army. (11 pages) | 03/01/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2682

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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20255

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the U.S. to the United  
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK  
Executive Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS  
Associate Director for  
National Security &  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia and Croatia, February 28, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached  
at Tab A. (S)

  
for Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/29/2014

293-0687-X

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B

A.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:45 - 6:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia and Croatia (8)

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

James O'Brien

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

State:

Peter Tarnoff

Richard Holbrooke

Robert Frasure

JCS:

LTG Wesley Clark

MG Jared Bates

DOD:

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

BG Donald L. Kerrick

OMB:

Gordon Adams

Kevin Beckell

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to discuss our strategy for dealing with Croatia in the run-up to the March 31 UNPROFOR mandate expiration date. They requested that the State strategy paper be expanded to include a list of incentives and disincentives designed to obtain a positive decision from President Tudjman on retaining UNPROFOR or a similar force. The paper should include options and recommended alternatives to UNPROFOR that we would subsequently propose to Tudjman, in addition to the five-point mandate presented to the Croats in January. Additionally, Deputies asked that the disincentives include specific areas of U.S. and European assistance that we might threaten to suspend if

Tudjman refuses to retain UNPROFOR in the separation zone, as well as possible carrots to induce his cooperation. The paper should be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2, for consideration by the Deputies that afternoon. (Action: State with JCS input)

(S)

2. Deputies discussed the issue of prepositioning NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and/or Croatia. Deputies agreed that the issue should be presented to the Principals this week with two options. Option One would authorize U.S. support for prepositioning now as a precautionary move without prejudice to possible future decisions regarding UNPROFOR withdrawal, U.S. participation, and the funding for such actions. Option Two would defer a decision on prepositioning until the military operational plan is reviewed and Congressional authorization and funding have been obtained. Deputies directed that an options paper be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2, for Deputies' review that afternoon and Principals' review Friday, March 3. (Action: JCS/NSC) (S)

3. Deputies deferred discussion on the NSC-staff paper "Former Yugoslavia Policy Review" until their next meeting on March 2. For those discussions, they requested a supporting paper outlining options for beefing-up Macedonia should UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or renewed fighting threaten to expand the conflict. The paper, to include alternative agency views, should be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2. (Action: OSD) (S)

~~SECRET~~

20255

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 1, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER  
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*  
FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(K)*  
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions <sup>From</sup> ~~for~~ the Deputies  
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
February 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held February 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *(Signature)* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Van Tol* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*

*2013-0687 -F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

20280

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals  
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
March 3, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held March 3, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Vm Thiel NARA, Date 5/29/2014

2013-0687 F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 007. paper               | Decision Paper: Should the U.S. Support Continued Military Preparations. (4 pages) | 03/03/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 898

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F  
vz2682

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]