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Bosnia - March 1995 [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: March 3 Principals Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520269. (5 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 3, 1995. Record ID: 9520261. (1 page)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	re: Milosevic's Meeting. (4 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. list	Punative Bilateral Steps. (6 pages)	03/02/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	Decision Paper: Should the U.S. Support Continued Military Preparations. (4 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Compromise on UNPROFOR in Croatia. Record ID: 9501901. (2 pages)	03/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Scheduling Request. Record ID: 9501946. (3 pages)	03/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For Andrew D. Sens from Kenneth C. Brill. Request for March 16 Group Meeting. (2 pages)	03/10/1995	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Paper: Near-Term Croatia Strategy. (4 pages)	03/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
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Bosnia - March 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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001b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 3, 1995. Record ID: 9520261. (1 page)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEWIntroduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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✓ 10/1/2003

Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy; muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.
 - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.
 - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croats are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

- This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.
- We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.
- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

- This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.
- It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.
- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement:

In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

- This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.
- It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).
- Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border *on condition that Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.*

Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. Possibilities: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.
- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?
- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)
- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

~~SECRET~~

11

Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9501901
RECEIVED: 09 MAR 95 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 10 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CROATIA
PEACEKEEPING

UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COMPROMISE ON UNPROFOR IN CROATIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 13 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/29/2006
2013-0687-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9501901

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 95030919 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 95031014 FOR INFORMATION
X 95031114 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950310
002 950310

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MSW LOG # 1901
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MSW A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Soderberg	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	Natl Sec Advisor <u>has seen</u>	_____
Lake	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>MSW</u>	<u>PLS REDO w/ TL CHG</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>Done</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

on: g \execsec \1901.doc

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Compromise on UNPROFOR in Croatia. Record ID: 9501901. (2 pages)	03/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2680

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~SECRET~~

1901

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 9, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Possible Compromise
on UNPROFOR in Croatia

Attached is a memorandum to the President on the emerging deal with Tudjman to create a new UN force in Croatia to replace UNPROFOR.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/29/2011
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
UN

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO 3 MAR PC MTG ON NATO EXPANSION - US PARTICIPATION IN
STEP II OF NATO PREPOSITIONING FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

ACTION: PRES APPROVED W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 07 MAR 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DANVERS
KERRICK
KRECZKO
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/27/2014
2013-0687-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9520282

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 95030319 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
001 KERRICK	Z 95030412 FOR REDO
002 LAKE	Z 95030616 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
003 PRESIDENT	Z 95030621 FOR DECISION
003	X 95031117 PRES APPROVED W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003	950306	VICE PRESIDENT
003	950306	WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 9, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/11/95

✓
MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must not be seen obstructing NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to keep refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, and in turn leading to a wider war.

Our allies would prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and are reluctant to proceed with Step Two deployment at this time, fearing this could hasten UNPROFOR's departure and open the way for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. But deployment may become unavoidable.

While recognizing the real risks, NSC Principals recommend approval of U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon and George concur, though George is concerned that this might trigger a War Powers debate. We have forwarded a copy of the memo to the Vice President. If you approve, State and Defense will consult with Congress next week before informing NATO of our decision.]

John Podesta *JP*
Todd Stern *TS*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
12 10/1/2013

Tony

I want to revisit
when the VP returns
for trip - visit w/ Tudjman

BC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

95 MAR 6 09:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO
Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at \$11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.

After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve  discuss

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20282 REDO

March 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(C)*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for
Step Two of NATO Prepositioning

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SIGNED

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO. Have reworked per Sandy Berger's request.

Concurrences by: *(C)* Alan Kreczko, Bill *(C)* Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/29/2014

7013-0687-#

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20282

March 3, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: BG DON KERRICK *(D)*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on U.S. Support for
Step Two of NATO Prepositioning.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to support Step Two Prepositioning at NATO.

Concurrences by: *(D)* Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

*Have several
per S. B. B. B.
request.*

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/27/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Scheduling Request. Record ID: 9501946. (3 pages)	03/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2680

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For Andrew D. Sens from Kenneth C. Brill. Request for March 16 Group Meeting. (2 pages)	03/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2680

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20318

March 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(10)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
March 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held March 9, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/29/2014*
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20318

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, March 9, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 5/29/2014
2013-0687-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 9, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30pm - 5:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

Madeleine Albright

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

State:Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke
Robert FrasureJCS:

Admiral William Owens

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

DOD:John Deutch
Walter SlocombeSummary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to review the agreement on a new international presence in Croatia worked out on March 6 in Zagreb between Ambassador Holbrooke and President Tudjman. In welcoming the agreement, Deputies noted the discrepancy between Tudjman's expectations of the force controlling Croatia's international borders and what Allies will likely support. In view of this discrepancy, Deputies agreed that the CJCS would place low-key calls to CHODs of principal Allies and UNPROFOR/Croatia troop contributors to describe the meaning of "control" of the border as understood in the agreement. (Action: JCS) (S)

2. Deputies agreed to proceed with planning for the Vice President to meet with Tudjman in Copenhagen on March 12, where the agreement would be finalized and announced by Tudjman, and to prepare for a possible meeting between the President and

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
n 10/1/2013

Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman during the ceremony honoring the one-year anniversary of Federation on March 16. They confirmed that the agreement with Tudjman needed to be finalized and announced before we invited Tudjman to Washington. (Action: State) (S)

3. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Albright should wait until after the agreement has been announced before circulating a draft UN Security Council resolution that would establish the mandate for the new UN force. They agreed, however, that she should preview the main elements to Contact Group counterparts. (Action: USUN) (S)

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 9, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/11/95

✓
MR. PRESIDENT

Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two" prepositioning of communications systems for use in possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Croatia. Step Two would involve agreement to deploy some 450 U.S. military personnel in Europe, 320 of them in Croatia -- though actual deployment would be subject to a further decision of the NAC.

Pros: Our participation would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO. Our allies' forces on the ground are in danger and we must not be seen obstructing NATO military planning needed to protect them. Cons: prepositioning could embolden Tudjman to keep refusing any UNPROFOR successor force, moving us toward commitment of a large-scale ground force to help extract UNPROFOR, and in turn leading to a wider war.

Our allies would prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and are reluctant to proceed with Step Two deployment at this time, fearing this could hasten UNPROFOR's departure and open the way for air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. But deployment may become unavoidable.

While recognizing the real risks, NSC Principals recommend approval of U.S. participation in Step Two. Leon and George concur, though George is concerned that this might trigger a War Powers debate. We have forwarded a copy of the memo to the Vice President. If you approve, State and Defense will consult with Congress next week before informing NATO of our decision.]

John Podesta *JP*
Todd Stern *TS*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

rz 10/1/2013

Tony

I want to re-visit -
when the VP returns
for trip - visit w/ Tudjman

BC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1995

95 MAR 6 09:26

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO
Prepositioning for UNPROFOR Withdrawal

Purpose

To obtain your agreement for U.S. forces' participation in Step Two of NATO prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Background

Principals met Friday to discuss U.S. participation in Step Two of NATO's ongoing efforts to prepare to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. We are seeking your approval to inform NATO that the United States agrees to support Step Two of NATO's efforts to preposition communications systems and operators in Croatia. Step Two includes deployment of approximately 450 U.S. military personnel within Europe, including 320 to government-controlled areas of Croatia, although the timing of the actual deployment of the prepositioning force will be subject to a subsequent NAC decision.

NATO and UNPROFOR military planning for UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal from Bosnia has been underway for several months. With UNPROFOR withdrawal a possibility this spring, NATO began to take action in February by executing Step One, which initiated the process of establishing an enhanced theater communications system. No U.S. forces were involved. With Step One well underway, NATO is seeking approval to execute Step Two, which will deploy military personnel to set up and operate the communications system.

Prepositioning is a necessary step to support a large operation. Nearly 1800 personnel are involved, including the 450 Americans. The total NATO cost for prepositioning is estimated at \$11.3M and comes from existing NATO funds (the U.S. pays 25 percent), although we will pay our own transportation and sustainment costs. An orderly withdrawal of UNPROFOR cannot begin until

eight weeks after the prepositioning occurs; thus Shali argues that delaying a decision will put Allied forces at risk.

This decision would carry significant risks, even though it would send the right signal about U.S. leadership in NATO, support our military leaders and maximize military preparedness. In the worst case, it could set in motion a series of events leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and renewed fighting, with NATO and U.S. forces left on the ground to deal with the aftermath. Tudjman might welcome the NATO deployment as a stepping stone to a larger NATO and U.S. ground role as UNPROFOR's replacement. Emboldened by NATO and U.S. forces in Croatia, Tudjman could become even more intransigent on accepting an UNPROFOR successor force. This could move us closer to an actual commitment of ground forces for a large-scale operation to extract UNPROFOR, the exact dimensions of which will remain unknown until the plan is completed in about two weeks. With NATO on the ground, or positioned to extract UNPROFOR, the decision to withdraw UNPROFOR will be easier for the UN and troop contributors to make. If they withdraw, renewed fighting is a certainty and the wider war we feared will have been facilitated by NATO's deployment into Croatia. While we anticipate a subsequent NAC decision will be taken to deploy the forces into Croatia, with each incremental step, it becomes more unlikely that our decision will be reversible. In fact, if NATO decides to conduct the operation, large-scale U.S. participation is inevitable.

Not all Allies support prepositioning, so our decision may prove academic for the time being. The French have been the most adamant, calling for a delay on the grounds that putting NATO personnel on the ground in Croatia would undermine efforts to change Tudjman's mind. Other Allies have voiced similar concerns and fear that NATO prepositioning will set in train the steps described above, leading to UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the wider war that diplomatic efforts aim to prevent. They also see UNPROFOR's departure as the opening to lifting the arms embargo and accompanying air strikes. Allies prefer to keep UNPROFOR in place and muddle through.

After balancing the risks against the military requirements, Principals decided that, because of the danger to our Allies who have forces on the ground and to sustain our leadership of the Alliance, we should make the commitment to support Step Two. This will permit the personnel to be organized and trained, with their actual deployment subject to a further decision by the NAC. Principals agreed that we will not press those Allies who are reluctant to execute Step Two but that it is important that the U.S. not be seen as obstructing NATO military planning needed to reduce the risks to Allied forces.

Principals also concluded that, in view of the Congressional interest that the deployment of 320 U.S. military personnel to Croatia will generate, consultations must be completed before informing NATO of our decision. We would seek to cast this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to help in a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would make clear that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter (more formidable) undertaking and seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. If you agree, State and Defense will brief leadership and key committee chairs early next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize U.S. representatives at NATO to support Step Two prepositioning, subject to consultations with Congress, and with the actual deployment of U.S. personnel to Croatia subject to a subsequent NAC and Principals' decision.

Approve  *discuss*

Disapprove _____

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