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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Balkans Policy Review Issues/Decisions. (2 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: March 2 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520260. (4 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995. Record ID: 9520256. (1 page)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	Decision Paper: Should the U.S. Support Continued Military Preparations. (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. paper	The Balkans: The Next Three Months. (6 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)
002e. paper	Duplicate of 001. (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
002f. paper	The International Military Presence in Macedonia. (3 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Answers to Martić's Questions. (4 pages)	03/14/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	NATO/Bosnia/Croatia. (5 pages)	03/14/1995	P1/b(1)

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Bosnia - March 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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
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TAB A

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, March 2, 1995. Record ID: 9520256. (1 page)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)

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STATE PAPER ON CROATIA STRATEGY
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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEWIntroduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

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Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy: muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.
 - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.
 - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croats are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

- This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.
- We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.
- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

- This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.
- It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.
- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement:

In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

- This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.
- It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).
- Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border on condition that Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

- Decide whether to let Tadjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. Possibilities: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.
- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?
- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)
- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. paper	The Balkans: The Next Three Months. (6 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2679

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | JUN | JUL | AUG | SEP

FIGHTING
RESUMES

BOSNIA
FIGHTING

INTENSIFIES

FRY
VOLUNTEERS

POSS MAJOR FRY
INTERVENTION

CROATIA MANDATE
EXPIRES
UNPROFOR W/D FROM
CROATIA

ESCALATION

W/D
COMPLETE

FIGHTING IN
KRAJINA

UNPROFOR W/D FROM BOSNIA

NATO

DECIDE STEP 2 (COMMUNICATIONS PREPOSITIONING)
DEPLOY STEP 2

DECIDE ENABLING
FORCE

DEPLOY ENABLING
FORCE

CONDUCT WITHDRAWAL

REORGANIZE/
REDEPLOY

DECIDE MAIN BODY

DEPLOY MAIN BODY

DEEP UP
MACEDONIA?

UNPROFOR

DECIDES TO
W/D FROM CROATIA

100 DAY SANCTIONS REVIEW

DECIDES TO W/D FROM BOSNIA

DECIDE STEP 2

INFORM HILL

DEPLOY U.S.
LOG FORCE

NEW
DIPLOMATIC
APPROACH

DEPLOY U.S. FORCES

DECIDE MACEDONIA

DECIDE ENABLING FORCE

BRIEF
40104

DIPLOMATIC PRESS ON TUDJMAN

DEPLOY U.S.
GROUND FORCE

CROATIA DECISION

DECIDE MAIN BODY

CONSULT HILL / SEEK AUTHORIZATION ?

CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE TO
TRAIN BOSNIANS

POSS HILL PRESSURE
FOR UNILATERAL LIFT

END NATO
OPCON

ASSUMPTIONS

NO DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT
FIGHTING RESUMES
UNPROFOR WITHDRAWS
NATO DEPLOYS
U.S. PARTICIPATES

CONFIDENTIAL NF 635A8-M3

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
10/11/2013

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. paper	Duplicate of 001. (2 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2679

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. paper	The International Military Presence in Macedonia. (3 pages)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2679

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20318

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 15, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, March 9, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

By VZ NARA, Date 5/29/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 9, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30pm - 5:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

Madeleine Albright

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

State:

Peter Tarnoff

Richard Holbrooke

Robert Frasure

JCS:

Admiral William Owens

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

DOD:

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to review the agreement on a new international presence in Croatia worked out on March 6 in Zagreb between Ambassador Holbrooke and President Tudjman. In welcoming the agreement, Deputies noted the discrepancy between Tudjman's expectations of the force controlling Croatia's international borders and what Allies will likely support. In view of this discrepancy, Deputies agreed that the CJCS would place low-key calls to CHODs of principal Allies and UNPROFOR/Croatia troop contributors to describe the meaning of "control" of the border as understood in the agreement. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
(S)

2. Deputies agreed to proceed with planning for the Vice President to meet with Tudjman in Copenhagen on March 12, where the agreement would be finalized and announced by Tudjman, and to prepare for a possible meeting between the President and

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

v2 10/1/2013

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman during the ceremony honoring the one-year anniversary of Federation on March 16. They confirmed that the agreement with Tudjman needed to be finalized and announced before we invited Tudjman to Washington. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed that Ambassador Albright should wait until after the agreement has been announced before circulating a draft UN Security Council resolution that would establish the mandate for the new UN force. They agreed, however, that she should preview the main elements to Contact Group counterparts. (Action: USUN) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20318

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(10)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
March 9, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held March 9, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve *ml*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/27/2014*

2013-0687-5

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

2012

COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

234 FORD HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(202) 225-1901

25 MAR 13 AID : 45

March 10, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our strongest opposition to any further lifting of sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro, and to argue instead for a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Today, three years after the Bosnian conflict began, it is clear that a negotiated settlement can only be achieved if there are parameters to tolerated behavior. The Serb aggressors clearly have exceeded those parameters, and must pay the price of doing so. Yet, there seems to be no plan whatsoever for getting these militants to return any significant part of the territory they seized by force.

The Contact Group plan was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with a two-week deadline for a clear response and severe repercussions for any side rejecting it. If anything, the Contact Group countries should have had the resolve to have stayed on this course they set for themselves, but they did not. The Bosnian government accepted it, unconditionally and on time. The Bosnian Serbs in Pale effectively rejected it with an escalation of violence against the Bosnian people and UN personnel as well. Through diplomatic wrangling, however, the international response was to ease sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro, one of the very measures with which we threatened the Bosnians if they were to reject the Contact Group plan.

In addition, the split between the Belgrade authorities and the Bosnian Serb militants occurred because of pressure, not coaxing. It was precisely when he was facing the prospects for intensified sanctions, as agreed by the Contact Group foreign ministers, that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic distanced himself from Radovan Karadzic and the other militants. Since easing sanctions instead, the distancing has narrowed, and the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has deteriorated significantly.

In light of this dreadful situation, we cannot support any suggested easing of existing sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro. This clearly is not the way to go. Reports of cross-border traffic between Serbia and Serb-held Bosnia, in fact, argue for the reimposition of those few sanctions that were eased. To be clear, we are not arguing for additional new conditions for the easing of sanctions; that, we believe, would be counter-productive. But, it is every bit as counter-productive to ease sanctions when the reasons for their imposition in the first place have not been addressed.

The President
March 10, 1995
Page 2

The Contact Group had previously viewed a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina as a last resort, if everything else had failed. We did not agree with this approach, but even if we did, the current situation requires examination of last resort options. We introduced this week a resolution calling for the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina no later than May 1, 1995, with strong bipartisan support just as exists in the Senate.

Lifting the embargo is admittedly no panacea, but it is better than what we have now, after three years of lopsided fighting that has no sign of ending. If the international community has no intention of taking any other decisive action to compel the aggressors to stop, then the Bosnians must be given the capability to defend themselves. As even the Bosnians have proposed, give the Serb militants a few months to accept the Contact Group plan before the lifting actually takes place, but make it clear now that the choice of whether it will be lifted or not rests on their decision.

Lifting the arms embargo is a matter of principle, given Bosnia-Herzegovina's inherent right to self defense. Beyond that, if we do not take this step soon, the Serb militants will view the international community as appeasing them, and will then demand even more. Moreover, the Bosnian Federation your Administration has worked so hard to develop and maintain cannot survive if both partners view the Serb militants as getting away with their aggression. They will react on the basis not of their common desire, but of their perceived interests and need for survival, even at the expense of each other. In short, we must act now, or we will lose Bosnia-Herzegovina as a united, multi-ethnic state fully integrated into Europe. Instead, we will face prolonged instability in the Balkans, which is most definitely not in our national interest.


We therefore view maintaining the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina as causing the war to continue and to escalate, not the contrary. And frankly, we are frustrated by continued opposition to changing this situation. Like you, Mr. President, we would prefer to see this done multilaterally, and we urge you to undertake every effort to convince our friends and allies to join the United States in lifting the embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This approach, Mr. President, is more likely to bring peace and stability to the Balkans than the sanctions-easing policies now under consideration.

Sincerely,



CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
Chairman



STENY H. HOYER
Ranking Minority Member

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY *SB*
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached are copies of letters sent to the White House from several members of Congress.

Since these letters address national security issues, I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response. The letters are as follows:

- 1) Chris Smith (R-NJ) and Steny Hoyer (D-MD), concerning Bosnia; and
- 2) Tom Lantos (D-CA), concerning Romania.

Thank you for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call LeeAnn Inadomi at x67500.

Enclosure

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	re: Answers to Martic's Questions. (4 pages)	03/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2679

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	NATO/Bosnia/Croatia. (5 pages)	03/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 898

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - March 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
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