

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - February 1995 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
34	1	10	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Page 3 of Unknown Paper. (1 page)	02/23/1995	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Funding Yugoslavia-Related Actions. (3 pages)	02/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: February 22 NAC Discussion. (6 pages)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: February 22 NAC Discussion, Military Committee. (5 pages)	02/22/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: February 22 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520225. (6 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 22, 1995. (1 page)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
005c. email	Donald Kerrick to Neal Wolin. Subject: About to Fall off the Cliff. (1 page)	02/16/1995	P1/b(1)
005d. paper	Issue Paper: Should the U.S. Support Step Two. (2 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)
005e. paper	Funding UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (3 pages)	02/17/1995	P1/b(1)
005f. paper	Support for the Federation. (3 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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FES | MARCH | APR | MAY | JUNE | JULY | AUG | SEP

SCENARIO

W/ Bosnia Fight

EROTIA
MARCH 34

Fighting in
Croatia

UNPROF
w/d Begins

COH
expiries

UNPROF w/d for Bosnia Begs

expirations

w/d complete

POSS W/ D
FRY

W/ D

CONVS
S/PT

Decide STEP 2
Deploy STEP 2
Decide Enably Force

Deploy Enably Force
Decide MAIN BODY

Deploy MAIN BODY

CONDUCT w/d

Recognize/
Redeply

Decides to w/d
in Croatia

Decides to
w/d in
Bosnia

BEEF UP
Macedonia

US

Decide Step 2
Consult Hill

Deploy U.S. Commanders

Decide Enably Force

Deploy US Enab Force

Diplomatic Pressure/Tudor

Croatia Decision

Decide MAIN BODY

Consult Hill/Seek Aid (?)

Deploy U.S. Ground Forces

New Diplomatic
Approach

POSS Hill Pressure
for Unilateral Act

Assess
Fight

Consult
Pres to
Join Bos

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THE U.S. FACES 3 TYPES OF COSTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:

UN ASSESSMENTS
FOR UNPROFOR

STATE ISD

≈ \$500 mil.
in FY 95
Unfunded

+

DOD COSTS FOR
CONTINGENCY OPS.
in FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

DOD O50

- HUMANITARIAN
- SANITATION
- NPZ, CAS

≈ \$300 mil. in FY 95
(Incremental costs)

+

U.S. COSTS FOR
NATO EXTRACTION
OF UNPROFOR


DOD ???

≈ COST UNKNOWN
approximately \$2 bil
+


THESE COSTS NEED TO BE VIEWED IN
THE AGGREGATE, NOT IN ISOLATION

IF WE MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO UNPROFOR EXTRACTION, THROUGH NATO, WE OUGHT TO GET SOME RELIEF FROM OTHER COSTS WE ARE INCURRING.


WE SHOULD PAY LESS HERE...



... IF WE MUST PAY MORE HERE



**NATO ALLIES SHOULD GRANT US RELIEF ON UNPROFOR
ASSESSMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR OUR LARGE CONTRIBUTION
TO NATO EXTRACTION**



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
February 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held February 22, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/28/2014*

2013-0687-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, February 22, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2014
203-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 22, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:15 - 3:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

State:

Peter Tarnoff

Robert Frasure

JCS:

LTG Daniel Christman

COL. Tom Bowden

DOD:

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

BG Donald L. Kerrick

Susan Rice

OMB:

Gordon Adams

Kevin Beckell

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to review efforts to obtain Serbian recognition of Bosnia, Croatia, and other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders in exchange for sanctions relief (Plan B) and to review military planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal and Croatia.

2. Deputies reviewed the results of last week's Contact Group efforts on mutual recognition and reaffirmed Principals' decision that we should not agree to any further sanctions relief or other measures that would "sweeten" the offer now under consideration. They agreed it would be helpful to create uncertainty in

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

12 10/1/2013

Milosevic's and Allies' minds about how long U.S. support for broad sanctions relief could be sustained. Deputies directed Ambassador Frasure to inform our European Contact Group partners before their meeting with Milosevic on February 23 that the U.S. had gone as far as it could in offering sanctions relief and that it was unclear how long our support for Plan B would remain in effect. (Action: State)

3. Deputies agreed that prospects for success were low for achieving mutual recognition in exchange for sanctions relief. However, in the event Milosevic attempted to enter new negotiations aimed at modifying the Plan B proposal, serious sanctions-related issues remained and further Deputies' or Principals' review would be required. They decided that no further negotiations beyond the proposal now on the table could begin without further review by the Deputies. Deputies deferred decision on how long to leave Plan B on the table until a review of overall policy is completed next week.

4. Deputies discussed the results of recent diplomatic efforts in Croatia aimed at retaining UNPROFOR or a remodeled UNPROFOR as a deterrent to renewed fighting. They agreed that the approaching UNPROFOR mandate expiration on March 31 and the possibility of renewed hostilities thereafter in the Krajina could be the catalyst for new fighting elsewhere in the region. Deputies directed that a strategy be promptly developed that outlines how to deal with Tudjman in the run-up to the March 31 UNPROFOR mandate expiration and steps that can be taken to retain an international force of some type as a deterrent to renewed fighting. (Action: State)

5. Deputies discussed how to fulfill Principals' request for a review of potential scenarios to frame policy choices likely to be faced in the next 2-3 months should diplomatic efforts fail to achieve a negotiated settlement. They directed the Interagency Working Group to complete the review by February 27 for subsequent Deputies' and Principals' consideration. The review should include estimated time-lines for events on the ground in Bosnia, Croatia and neighboring areas; an analysis of U.S. interests, objectives and priorities; allied and Congressional attitudes; and U.S. policy options. A process for completion of the study should be presented to Deputies on February 27. (Action: NSC/Interagency Working Group)

6. Deputies reviewed the status of efforts at the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR. They agreed to support the current UN request for logistics and engineering equipment as outlined in the JCS paper. Noting the uncertainty of UNPROFOR's future, Deputies deferred decision on more robust options until the policy options review is completed. (Action: JCS)

7. Deputies reviewed the state of military planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia. They agreed to defer decisions on Step Two prepositioning until DoD completes an internal review of the overall military operational plan and presents a recommendation to Principals. Deputies also deferred discussion of funding options pending completion of the DoD review of the operational plan. (Action: DoD)

8. Deputies deferred discussion and decision on providing training for the Bosnian forces until the policy options review is completed.

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005a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: February 22 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520225. (6 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: LEON FUERTH

SUBJECT: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets
under Plan B

One of the most important implementation issues underlying the Contact Group's Plan B offer to Milosevic is how to manage release of frozen assets. If the international community fails to handle this issue properly, Milosevic could get a massive infusion of cash that he can use to rectify his economy's most pressing problems or -- if the worst happens in Croatia or Bosnia -- finance a Serbian spring offensive. In the longer term, a maladroitness release of assets will also give Milosevic significant advantage over the other Yugoslav successor states by helping him increase his creditworthiness while saddling others with a disproportionate share of outstanding Yugoslav debt.

Blocked assets include bank deposits, credits, debts, real estate and tangible property. We have a good idea of what is frozen in the U.S., but it is less clear how much is held by other governments as many were not as rigorous as we were in seizing assets in the first place and some have since allowed the Serbs to draw on frozen accounts to buy humanitarian goods.

Issues to address in releasing blocked assets include

- determining ownership (successor state issues are not yet settled)
- paying depositors, creditors, and other claimants (the Yugoslav institutions and firms whose assets were frozen owed a lot of money to a lot of people -- including numerous U.S. citizens and firms; those creditors have valid claims for payment if assets are unfrozen)
- payment of war reparations and other penalties

The U.S. Government should seek a thorough international inventory of frozen assets as a first step to their orderly distribution. Then, there should be a meeting of financial and banking experts to discuss how to unblock assets with due provision for the rights of successor states and creditors. We should continue to insist on resolution language mandating that assets not be released until ownership is resolved and legal rights of successor states, creditors, and other claimants are protected.

Remember that Milosevic is a banker. He will find it hard to object to such a process, while he certainly will be quick to take advantage of any openings we give him. So long as our approach requires that claims of others be adjudicated, the time frame for releasing frozen assets is relatively long, which tends to deny Milosevic short-term access for purposes we might find objectionable and preserves some leverage for settling other issues.

~~SECRET~~

February 20, 1995

SUBJECT: Controlling Release of FRY Frozen Assets
under Plan B

One of the most important implementation issues underlying the Contact Group's Plan B offer to Milosevic is how to manage release of frozen assets. If the international community fails to handle this issue properly, Milosevic could get a massive infusion of cash that he can use to rectify his economy's most pressing problems or -- if the worst happens in Croatia or Bosnia -- finance a Serbian spring offensive. In the longer term, a maladroitness release of assets will also give Milosevic significant advantage over the other Yugoslav successor states by helping him increase his creditworthiness while saddling others with a disproportionate share of outstanding Yugoslav debt.

Blocked assets include bank deposits, credits, debts, real estate and tangible property. We have a good idea of what is frozen in the U.S., but it is less clear how much is held by other governments. Issues to address in releasing blocked assets include determining ownership (successor state issues are not yet settled; paying depositors, creditors, and other claimants (there are numerous claims against blocked Yugoslav assets -- including by U.S. citizens and firms); and payment of war reparations and other penalties.

The U.S. Government should continue to insist that any UN resolution that unblocks assets mandate that these assets not be released until ownership is resolved and legal rights of successor states, creditors, and other claimants are protected. The U.S. should seek a thorough international inventory of frozen assets as a first step to their orderly distribution. Then, financial and banking experts should discuss how to unblock assets with due provision for the rights of successor states and creditors.

Remember that Milosevic is a banker. He will find it hard to object to such a process, while he certainly will be quick to take advantage of any openings we give him. So long as we require that claims be adjudicated, the time frame for releasing frozen assets is relatively long, which limits Milosevic's short-term access for purposes we might find objectionable and preserves some leverage for settling other issues.

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PER E.O. 13526

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

VZ 10/1/2017

Implementing Plan B

Conditions for sanctions relief	Requirements to enforce conditions
Addressed in 2/15 CG Proposal	
FRY recognition... must be genuine and unequivocal	• Clear definition of "genuine and unequivocal" recognition • Link definition to SC procedures for suspending and reimposing sanctions
Sanctions suspension for 2 month periods, positive SC vote needed for renewal each time	Unambiguous language in SC resolution suspending sanctions
Sanctions enforcement regime against FRY(S&M) must remain in place to allow quick reimposition of full sanctions	• SAMs structure remains in place • Front-line states retain enforcement mechanisms
Restrictions beyond UNSC resolutions to remain in force (no IFI assistance, no UN seat, no readmission to OSCE)	Agreement among CG that these items should be held back as long-term leverage against settlement of region's underlying security problems (e.g.: Kosovo, War Crimes Tribunal)
Significant toughening of monitoring regime on FRY borders with Bosnia and Croatia (more monitors and more equipment)	European agreement to deploy additional monitors and equipment
Sanctions relief to go into effect only after border is more tightly closed and Europeans have deployed additional monitors	Agreed definition of "acceptable" level of closure and monitoring
FRY continues to support CG plan for Bosnia	Links to reimposition and extension language in resolution
FRY endorses principles of Z-4 plan	Links to reimposition and extension language in resolution
NOT Addressed 2/15 CG Proposal	
Mechanism for immediate revocation of sanctions relief if FRY reneges	Unambiguous language in SC resolution stipulating conditions under which sanctions relief would be revoked
Closing the "Back Door:" Goods reaching Pale via Croatian and GOBH territory threaten to make FRY border closure irrelevant	• GOC and GOBH commitment to control trade with Pale Serbs; plus CG/international agreement to control trade on Croatia/Bosnia border (or to cut off both Pale and Knin Serbs) • Support (monitors, technical assistance) for GOC and GOBH • Clarify UNPROFOR role
Protecting interests of successor states and other claimants as financial sanctions are suspended	Agreement that assets will not be released until successor state, creditor, and other claimants concerns have been addressed
Prohibiting trade facilitation agreements with the FRY	Trade preferences and other agreements should be included in the list of non-UNSC sanctions cited above

21 FEB 95

INFORMATION PAPER

1. Purpose. To provide information on the status of United Nation's efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR and a recommendation on the way ahead.

2. Key Points.

- The Deputies Committee has reiterated its support for strengthening UNPROFOR but requested more information on UN intentions, objectives, rationale, and operational impact.

- The UN's objective is to implement the Cessation of Hostilities (COH). The rationale is that the COH is the best mechanism for achieving a negotiated political settlement in Bosnia. If the COH fails, UNPROFOR withdrawal may follow. The operational impact of this uncertainty between strengthening and withdrawal is that the UN is accepting some offers made pursuant to the Hague initiative, but holding on others. Therefore, the UN intends to wait on the outcome of Cessation of Hostilities implementation (agreed zones of separation and heavy weapons exclusion zones) before committing to strengthening UNPROFOR with more robust capabilities. The UN does not support using more robust means to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.

- The UN has accepted offers of transport helicopters for the mobility they have long desired. Transport helos have been offered by UK (6 LYNX, 6 GAZELLE, and 3 CHINOOK), and France (4 PUMA and 6 GAZELLE). Netherlands transport helos are not required by the UN at this time according to UNDPKO.

- The UN has also accepted all offers of UNMOs (100 requested, 128 offered).

- The US offer of night vision devices has been formally accepted (USUN 040129Z Jan 95).

- The UN has agreed to accept the 58 oversnow vehicles offered by Sweden.

- The UN is requesting more information from nations which offered engineering equipment. France offered 300 combat engineers and Indonesia has offered an engineering battalion. The UN has formally requested more information from the USC on the 20 bulldozers, 10 roadgraders, and 50 dump trucks we offered, specifically with regard to spares (data provided to UN on 17 Feb 95). The UN probably assumes they will need all

items mentioned above whether the strengthening or withdrawal scenario occurs.

- Regarding infantry, mech infantry, and APC offers, the UN has put a "hold" on accepting offers until a clearer picture emerges on COH implementation. "Hold" means the UN is planning to accept the offers if the COH or similar peace plan is implemented. They are gathering information, but not committing to accept the offers until they know if UNPROFOR will withdraw or remain.

- The UN Department of Peace Operations has informed the USUN that the UN is "unable to accept our offer" of 14 AH-1s and 5 OH-58s, per UN FAX dated 16 Feb 95.

- The spread sheet attached displays all offers made by UNPROFOR troop contributors since the CHODs met at the Hague in December 94.

- The status of the UN requests for US offered equipment follows, cost are per DSAA, based on 10 month lease costs:

- NVGs-UN officially requested price and availability - estimated costs for 130 PVS-5B and 20 PVS-5C:

- sale=\$645,000 CSP=\$11,947

- lease=\$35,850 CSP=\$11,947

- CSP = Concurrent Spare Parts

- APCs-officially turned down- USUN 090003Z Jan 95

- Heavy engineer equipment-UN officially requested price and availability:

- 20 D-7 dozers-sale=\$289,300,CSP=\$19,380

- lease=\$80,400,CSP=\$19,380

- Available from POMCUS in Europe

- Condition Code A (serviceable)

- 50 Dump trucks-sale=\$505,000,CSP=\$167,500

- lease= 0, beyond 75% of service life

- Available from POMCUS in Europe

- 43 are in Europe

- 31 Code B (unserviceable/mixed condition)

- 12 Code F (requires repair/overhaul)

- 7 remaining available from excess at Ft Devens.

- No repair facility available in Europe

- Cost to repair in CONUS = \$2M

- Army looking for a less costly repair plan

- 10 Scrapers-sale=\$476,720,CSP=\$31,940

- lease=\$\$6,300,CSP=\$31,940

- Available from POMCUS in Europe

-- Condition Code A

-- Mobile Training Team cost = \$300,000
-- 10 soldiers for 65 days in-country

--AH-1s- UN turned down USG offer on 16 Feb 95

--AN/PPS-5s and PPS-15s-officially requested data on training / maintenance package and costs. DSAA gathering data.

3. Recommendation. Provide costing data and equipment which the UN has requested. Encourage UN to develop priorities and plan to reinforce UNPROFOR, if the COH or similar peace plan is implemented.

Prepared by: LtCol Jim Thigpen
UN Division, J-5, Ext 7-5738

UNCLASSIFIED

UNPROFOR STRENGTHENING

STATUS OF HAGUE INITIATED OFFERS TO STRENGTHEN UNPROFOR

<u>GEN DE LA PRESLE'S PRIORITIZED LIST</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT OFFERED</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
9 LYNX AND GAZELLE TYPE HELOS	6 LYNX & 6 GAZELLE 4 PUMA & 6 GAZELLE	UK FRANCE	UN ACCEPTED UN ACCEPTED
5 MECH INFANTRY BNS (EGYPT OFFERED 1 LINE INF BN)	4 MECH BNS	BANGLADESH MALAYSIA PAKISTAN ARGENTINA	UN HOLD UN HOLD UN HOLD UN HOLD
24 MED.LIFT HELOS	3 CHINOOKS	UK	UN CONSIDERING
1 COMBAT ENG BN	1 ENG BN 300 COMBAT ENGINEERS	INDONESIA FRANCE	UN CONSIDERING UN CONSIDERING
100 UNMOS	128	20 DUTCH 4-6 ITALY 20 INDONESIA 20 PAKISTAN 30 BANGLADESH 19 UK 5 NORWAY 8 TURKEY	UN ACCEPTED ALL UNMOS
1 ENG BN (HVY)			
200 CIVPOL	50	JORDAN	150 NEEDED

UNPROFOR STRENGTHENING

8 MORTAR LOC RADAR

DUTCH
TURKEY
NETHERLANDS

NUMBER TBD
NUMBER TBD
NUMBER TBD

8 TACPS

2 OFFERED

1 TURKEY
1 UK

UN CONSIDERING
UN CONSIDERING

LINE TRANSPORT BN

SIGNAL REGIMENT

THEATRE COMM NETWORK

12 HVY LIFT HELOS

ARMED HELO UNIT

14 AH-1S

US

OFFICIALLY
TURNED DOWN
BY UN

1 SQND FW TRANSPORTS
C-130 TYPE

4 F-27S

NETHERLANDS

UN CONSIDERING

1 FIELD HOSPITAL

1 CONSIDERED

ITALY

3 AIRFIELD SNOWBLOWERS

UNPROFOR STRENGTHENING

1123 GENERATORS

NIGHT VISION GOGGLES

150 PVS-5

US

UN ACCEPTED

62 OVERSNOW VEH

58 OVERSNOW VEHICLES

SWEDEN

UN ACCEPTED

30 SNOWMOBILES

GPS TO PLT LEVEL

TBD # OF MINE PROTECTED
VEHICLESBATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE
RADARS

25

US

10 PPS-5
15 PPS-15
UN REQUESTED
DATA ON TRAINING
SPARESADDITIONAL OFFERS:

APCS

50

ITALY

50

USA

100

GERMANY

UN TURNED DOWN

HVV ENG EQUIPMENT

20 BULLDOZERS

US

10 ROAD SCRAPERS

US

50 DUMP TRUCKS

US

UN REQUESTED MORE
DATA ON SPARES
AND CONDITION OF
EQUIPMENT

UNPROFOR STRENGTHENING

HELOS	4	NETHERLANDS	TYPE TBD
REINFORCE LOG BN	TBD	NORWAY	
REINFORCE PRESENT BN	TBD	UKRAINE	
INCREASE CONTINGENT BY ONE COMPANY	TBD	SPAIN	

NOTE: The US has approached Ireland, India, South Korea, Australia, and Ukraine on a bilateral basis to encourage them to offer more resources to strengthen UNPROFOR. This effort is on hold pending UN decisions.

STATUS:

Australia has confirmed that it will not contribute to UNPROFOR. (Canberra 240505Z Jan)

Ireland has told the AMEMBASSY they may be able to contribute one transport company, if asked by the UN. (Dublin 241532Z Jan)

Ukraine has told the AMEMBASSY they are preparing a proposal to the UN offering mine clearing units, a signal unit, and observers.
(Kiev 191403Z Jan)

India has said they are considering the request, but have not received a similar approach from the UN. (New Dehli 181136Z Jan)

South Korea has expressed interest and the Korean Assistant DATT visited J-5, EURDIV on 31 Feb to help the Koreans frame the requirement. ROK wants a formal UN request.

Prepared by: J-5, UNDIV, 7-5738

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. email	Donald Kerrick to Neal Wolin. Subject: About to Fall off the Cliff. (1 page)	02/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. paper	Issue Paper: Should the U.S. Support Step Two. (2 pages)	02/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2672

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005e. paper	Funding UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (3 pages)	02/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2672

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Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Washington, D.C.

17 January 1994

President William J. Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C.
The United States of America

Post-It Fax Note	7671	Date	8 of pages 1
To	John P. ...	From	Alina
Co/Dept	F-11	Subject	was talking
Phone #		Phone #	about
Fax #	645-0555	Fax #	

Dear Mr. President:


The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains committed to the current peace process and expects the international community to pursue the already adopted options to compel Belgrade's proxies in Pale to accept the Contact Group peace plan. In this context, the United States could be uniquely instrumental in both encouraging the Serbs to opt for peace or, the alternative, in helping to prepare our Republic for our self-defense.

Once again, we are not calling for United States combat troops in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but only for pursuing a measure already adopted by the United States Congress in the fiscal year 1994 defense authorization bill. Specifically, we request that the United States review the means by which to train personnel of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina outside of our Republic's borders and with no battle risks to United States military personnel.

We await to hear from your Government as to how we may begin these training efforts. We believe this measure can be most decisive in preparing our Republic for continuing our defense against aggression or, in the event a negotiated settlement, for an effective deterrent and source of stability as peace is secured. Regardless, this measure will encourage the Pale Serbs and Belgrade to reconsider opting for war and will instill greater confidence within our Republic for the peace process and for peace, whenever or however that is achieved.

Please accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest considerations and thank you for your continuing support.

Sincerely,


Sven Alkalaj
Ambassador

SENT BY:Xerox Telecopier 7021 : 2-17-95 : 13:50 :

2022252035-

202 647 9667: # 2

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

February 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive, and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Hercegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

There can be no question about your authority to direct the provision of such training. Section 1404 of the 1995 Defense Department Authorization Act (the so-called Nunn-Mitchell provision) required the Administration to present options to the Congress for training the pro-government forces in Bosnia. Other provisions of law, including section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, give you authority to deliver such training. Further, the provision of such training by the United States would not violate existing Security Council resolutions or relevant principles of international law.

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2022252035-


202 647 9667: # 3


We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.


In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.


For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.


Sincerely,


BOB DOLE



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN


JOSEPH LIEBERMAN


HENRY J. HYDE


SUSAN MOLINARI


MICHAEL R. MCNULTY


JIM MORAN

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005f. paper	Support for the Federation. (3 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2672

RESTRICTION CODES

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2022252035-

202 647 9667: # 2

Congress of the United States**Washington, DC 20515****February 17, 1995**

**The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500**

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge immediate action by you on the war in Bosnia. While diplomats talk in the wake of former President Carter's visit to the region, there is strong reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs will continue to reject peace. If the war in Bosnia resumes full scale, we do not believe the situation will continue as it has for the last three years. UNPROFOR's already weakened position will become even more untenable, and pressure for its withdrawal will increase.

In the event of either significant Serbian escalation or of UNPROFOR withdrawal, the case for ending the international arms embargo of Bosnia becomes even more compelling. We trust that, in such circumstances, your Administration would move expeditiously to end the United Nations embargo. Should that not be possible, however, we would expect the Congress to vote to unilaterally end participation by the United States in the embargo.

In any event, the United States has an obligation to prepare for the most likely scenarios in Bosnia. If the embargo is to be ended, either multilaterally or unilaterally, we will want to see direct U.S. involvement in the conflict held to a minimum. The surest way to minimize direct U.S. involvement after the embargo is ended is to act now to train the pro-government forces in strategy and tactics and the use of some of the weapons they are likely to obtain.

Such training would reduce the risk to the pro-government forces of any preemptive Serbian offensive, and would be an alternative to sending U.S. forces into Bosnia to provide training after the embargo is ended. Such training should be provided outside of Bosnia in order to avoid any risk to U.S. trainers. We understand that such training can be provided at a small fraction of the cost we currently are paying for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, and that it could be completed in less than six months. We also understand that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would welcome such training, and indeed already has submitted a formal request to you in this regard.

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
202 647 9667: 3

We believe you should take this step in order to be better prepared for the likely next phase of the war in Bosnia and in order to reduce the likelihood that U.S. forces will become directly involved in that war. It is important to note, however, that a program of training the pro-government forces in Bosnia would give the United States additional leverage in the ongoing negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Beginning a training program now would make clear to the Bosnian Serbs our determination to bring about a just and sustainable peace, and would underscore to them the probable cost of prolonging the conflict.


In other words, in the hands of able diplomats, a policy of training the pro-government forces for war could prove to be a powerful instrument for bringing about peace.

For all these reasons, we urge you to initiate promptly a program of military training for the pro-government forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Sincerely,




BOB DOLE



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN



JOSEPH LIEBERMAN




HENRY J. HYDE



SUSAN MOLINARI



MICHAEL R. MCNULTY



JIM MORAN