

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

Row:

34

Section:

1

Shelf:

10

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	The Balkans: The Next Three Months. (8 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)
002. Report	Croatia: Replacing UNPROFOR. (1 page)	02/26/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: The Peaks and Valleys. (5 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. draft	General Approaches to Bosnia Policy. (1 page)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	Active Containment. (5 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)
005. draft	Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (9 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Reinventing Bosnia Policy. (3 pages)	02/23/1995	P1/b(1)
007. draft	Paper: Comments on Draft Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (5 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (4 pages)	02/23/1994	P1/b(1)
009. paper	Update #1. (8 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	The Balkans: The Next Three Months. (8 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED**FAX TRANSMITTAL**

7 page(s) including this cover sheet

TO: S.Vershbow/D.Kerrick

OFFICE: NSC

FAX: 456-9150

PHONE:

FROM: Christopher J. Hoh
Balkan Affairs
EUR/SCE, Room 5221
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

(202) 736-7361 (phone) (202) 647-0555 (fax)

MESSAGE/REMARKS

The Croatian acting DCM just dropped this off, saying Tudjman's office hoped for our reaction before Monday! It's a bunch of maximalist demands with no give, at least that's my first reading.

I gave him a preliminary response: 1. We share Croatia's reintegration goals; 2. We will need time to answer this paper; 3. Their proposals will take months to negotiate, so they should think about giving us more time past March 31; 4. International border control requires Serb consent, since they control much of that territory, but Zagreb's offering nothing to induce the Serbs to agree; 5. the absence of any acceptance of separation zone monitoring suggests Croatia is seeking war, in which case the U.S. won't help.

Position paper

**CROATIAN PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE TERMINATION OF
UNPROFOR MANDATE**

After three years of UNPROFOR passivity in the area, Croatian occupied territories have yet to be re-integrated in Croatia, as called for in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and several peace plans; Bosnia-Herzegovina is still at war, and Serbia/Montenegro is still under sanctions. Along with recent forming of the 'joint commands' between illegal Serb entities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as repeated and resolute Belgrade's refusal to grant recognition to other successor states, this means that only a radically different approach could bring peace, stability and security to the area of South-eastern Europe.

1. In his letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, dated January 12, 1995, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, has declared the mandate of UNPROFOR to be terminated effective March 31, 1995 at midnight, withdrawing Croatia's consent to the stationing of UNPROFOR on Croatian territory. The President's decision, later reconfirmed by both Houses of the Croatian Parliament, allows for an additional period of three months for completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR units from the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

Further, the President's letter strongly reconfirmed Croatia's willingness and determination to seek, first and foremost, a peaceful re-integration of all temporarily occupied Croatian territories (UNPAs), as well as a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the entire area, in full conformity with the UN Security Council resolutions and Contact Group peace proposals.

Such a long standing policy of the Republic of Croatia clearly implies that, in search for the solution, Croatia is willing and fully prepared to cooperate in good faith with the international community and is ready to consider the future role of different international fora and institutions in the re-integration of the occupied territories.

2. Following its decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate, and fully determined to continue to strive for peace, Croatia is willing to continue and press forward both the negotiations with Croatian Serbs and with the

government in Belgrade. In this regard Croatia seeks full support of the international community.

In this process, Croatia's essential aims are : a) peaceful re-integration of the occupied territories; b) adequate normalisation of relations among all the successor states, and in particular Croatia's relations with Serbia/Montenegro as a most important requirement for the lasting peace in the region; and c) full cooperation and support of Contact Group peace endeavours in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. If proper conditions are created and the right signals sent to the authorities in Belgrade and to Croatian Serbs, the active participation of the international community could lead to a peaceful resolution of the problems. For such a development the following necessary preconditions are : unconditional recognition of Croatia by Serbia/Montenegro as a clear proof that Serbia and Montenegro are giving up the occupation of Croatian territories; full respect of the internationally recognized borders; observance of international law governing relations among states; acceptance of the existing Contact Group peace proposal for Bosnia/Herzegovina; and the elaborated system of mutually dependent sanctions and incentives for the sides concerned.

Such a new stage in re-integration would then open the way to full normalisation of Croato-Serbian relations, and enable Croatia to play even more constructive role in bringing forth the lasting peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. Croatia has signed the cease fire agreement and a number of other, so called economic, agreements with Croatian Serbs. Croatia is willing to proceed with the normalisation of relations with Serbia/Montenegro in accordance with the Joint Declarations of September 30 and October 20, 1992 and Geneva Declaration of January 19, 1994 under the auspices of Co-chairmen of the ICFY. A part of that process is the planned, but yet to be scheduled visit of the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Belgrade.

5. The President of the Republic of Croatia has publicly agreed to attend the Summit proposed by France, under the auspices of the Contact Group, provided that the summit is properly prepared and desired results (especially as elaborated by the United States) are assured in advance.

6. The President of the Republic of Croatia stated that the basic principles of the so-called Z-4 Plan (i.e. territorial integrity of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders; full respect of civil and ethnic minority rights; and, the local autonomy in the region where Croatian Serbs constituted

majority population according to 1991 census), are acceptable. They are already incorporated in Croatian Constitution and the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia. These constitutional provisions, which are on the highest level of international conventions, should be a framework for negotiations relative to the implementation of human and ethnic rights of Croatian Serbs and their local autonomy in certain regions of Croatia. It should be specially emphasized here that these constitutional provisions have been enacted on recommendation and upon approval of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (presided by Mr. Robert Badinter, president of the French Cour de Cassation). Croatia, however, could not accept some proposals in the Z-4, Plan which have no precedent in any system of protection of minority rights. Croatia will, within a short time, present a detailed counter-proposal on resolution of the raised issues, in full conformity with the highest standards of international conventions relating to local and cultural autonomies, as well as human rights and rights of the ethnic communities.

7. Croatia proposes that in the next several months the international community adopts and follows a more determined two-track policy.

i) Through a negotiating process such as the proposed Paris summit, and/or other proper mediation, based on an elaborate system of sanctions and incentives, the international community should strive for and ensure : (a) mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia/Montenegro and mutual recognition among other successor states, including declaration of full respect for the international borders and specific consent to station international monitors at points where borders are being or could be violated; (b) obligation of all successor states not to resort to force or interfere into internal affairs of others, with international guarantees in this respect; (c) acceptance of the highest standards of international conventions for minority rights; (d) acceptance of the peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina; (e) speeding-up of the process of succession to the SFR Yugoslavia; (f) maintaining the strategic core of the sanctions regime with the clear understanding that sanction would be suspended or eased only following full implementation of the agreements reached, but not only upon the declaration of intent to do so being issued.

ii) In regard to Croatia specifically, the international community should : (a) help to establish full control and inviolability of the Croatia's international borders; (b) fully contribute to creation of the necessary conditions and overall atmosphere conducive to implementation of the re-integration of the occupied territories, including needed forms of monitoring, of implementation of agreements and of local mediation when necessary; and (c) help further

integration of Croatia into Europe (PHARE, Trade and Cooperation Agreement), as well as stabilization of Croatian economy in order to enable it to begin with the reconstruction, particularly of the war-devastated areas.

8. Fully aware of the concerns existing in different circles in regard to the possible new eruption of violence following the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and in order to contribute to creating desired conditions as elaborated in Para. 7., Croatia further proposes that :

i) During UNPROFOR's withdrawal, NATO should by its presence ensure and guarantee not only the safety of the withdrawing UN troops, but also contribute to general stability in the occupied Croatian territories. Although no incidents are likely to occur which could lead to serious escalation of hostilities, NATO's presence would definitely discourage such events and would be a stabilizing factor in the period before the deployment of monitors and other International Task Forces which would for the time being control Croatian borders. That would also serve to alleviate the fears of international circles which are afraid of the renewal of hostilities.

ii) In the period of 6 months, NATO (or International Task Force - ITF) should be entrusted with establishing appropriate control of the Croatian internationally recognized borders in presently occupied parts of Croatia, and with opening of the major international traffic routes, on land as well as on the Danube and Sava rivers. Croatia, on its part, is willing to use that period to finalize the negotiations with Croatian Serbs regarding their cultural and ethnic autonomy and local autonomy in already mentioned regions.

ITF - consisting of personnel from (primarily) the Contact Group countries, or evolving from the initial NATO presence in Croatia - should be established and specifically mandated for duty in the Republic of Croatia by a special UN Security Council resolution for a period of six months;

iii) The Security Council resolution that shall extend the UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY of Macedonia, must contain operative paragraph that will explicitly state that UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Croatia has been terminated and is not being extended after March 31, 1995.

On March 31, 1995 the Security Council should adopt further resolution that will establish the conditions for the future international monitoring and mediation presence in the Republic of Croatia. This resolution must be in accordance with the existing Security Council resolutions confirming Croatia's territorial integrity, and be consistent with General Assembly resolution 49/43 (Situation in the Occupied Territories of Croatia). Croatia and the relevant international bodies (UN or others) shall regulate and formally establish the presence of new International Mediating and Monitoring Task Force in Croatia

simultaneously with the process of UNPROFOR withdrawal, that is no later than June 30, 1995.

iv) UNPROFOR will continue to enjoy Croatia's full cooperation and support in its activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this respect, Croatia is prepared to extend its full hospitality to the UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb, MASH near Pleso, the logistic base in Divulje, Adriatic ports facilities and other facilities used presently by UNPROFOR. Croatia is also willing to consider the appropriate role of UNPROFOR in ensuring the normal and unimpeded land traffic needed for UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9. Croatia is determined to continue the existing negotiations with Croatian Serbs regarding the full re-integration of the occupied parts of Croatia provided that there is a clear and demonstrated understanding on the other side that talks on issues related to political re-integration have to be conducted in good faith. In order to (a) facilitate implementation of the already existing agreements and (b) set the stage for meaningful negotiations related to predominantly political issues of re-integration, Croatia is ready to consider the role of the international community in monitoring and further promotion of these agreements.

Croatia proposes to work out and define a proper arrangement with the European Union and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) related to a possible role of the enlarged European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in monitoring the implementation of all agreements.

Croatia also welcomes possible missions of long or short duration, clearly mandated by the appropriate international institution, e.g. the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to help at the local level in promotion and observance of minority rights and intra-communal relations in areas to be given special status according to the Croatia's Constitution and the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia.

Appropriate international institutions, best suited for specific tasks, could in that way cooperate with the Government of Croatia and Croatian Serbs in preventing conflicts and creating conditions necessary for peaceful re-integration.

Croatia is prepared to further elaborate such an arrangement and enter in arrangements with appropriate institutions.

10. In order to safeguard its rights and interests, as well as the rights and interests of other successor States, Croatia draws the attention of the relevant international factors to the particular peril connected with the easing or

suspension of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. If these sanctions are eased or suspended, the nominal holders of title (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro - or under the name of FR of Yugoslavia) on funds, assets, interests and movable and immovable property, which are object of the succession of the former SFR of Yugoslavia, may try to unilaterally dispose of them. This is especially apparent in the case of the deposits in foreign banks which were deposited by the former National Bank of Yugoslavia as the part of federal foreign currency reserves (cca 2 billions of USD), and which are at present blocked in those foreign banks. Therefore any suspension or easing of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro should not affect the funds, assets, interests, movable and immovable property which are objects to the succession procedure.

11. Croatia wishes first and foremost to speed-up the process of negotiations with Belgrade and with Croatian Serbs and give new and strong impetus and dynamics to the overall peace process, in particular the process of re-integration of the occupied Croatia territories.

Croatia firmly believes that its proposals constitute a peaceful way towards the resolution of the present problems, a way to the lasting peace and to the establishment of the new international order in this region.

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, LAKE, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN, CLARKER, KERRICK, NSC, RICE, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED DTG:271204Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5229

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6090
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1377
RUEHBW/AEMBASSY BELGRADE 8542
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002977

NSC FOR LAKE

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL MARR BK UK

SUBJECT: BRITISH NEWSPAPER ALLEGES U.S. SECRETLY
SUPPLYING ARMS TO BOSNIA

1. RICHARD DOWDEN, DIPLOMATIC EDITOR OF "THE INDEPENDENT," ALLEGES IN TWO ARTICLES APPEARING FEBRUARY 26 AND 27 THAT THE U.S. IS SECRETLY SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES THROUGH THE AIRFIELD AT TUZLA. THE ARTICLES ARE DATED WASHINGTON, WHERE DOWDEN IS CURRENTLY VISITING. (WE UNDERSTAND HE MAY BE SEEING NSA LAKE FEBRUARY 27.) WE PROVIDE BELOW THE TEXT OF THE FIRST ARTICLE, FROM THE "INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY." THE SECOND IS LARGELY A REITERATION OF THE FIRST, WITH SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF "INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY" ARTICLE.

"UNITED NATIONS COMMANDERS IN BOSNIA SUSPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ENGAGED IN A CLANDESTINE OPERATION TO SUPPLY WEAPONS TO THE BOSNIAN ARMY IN VIOLATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS EMBARGO.

"THE UN IS STANDING BY REPORTS FROM ITS PEACE-KEEPERS IN BOSNIA THAT ON FOUR SEPARATE OCCASIONS THIS MONTH THEY SPOTTED LARGE MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN NORTHERN BOSNIA BELIEVED TO BE DROPPING OR DELIVERING HIGH-TECH WEAPONRY TO THE BOSNIAN ARMY IN THE AIRFORCE BASE OF WEST TUZLA. NATO HAVE QUESTIONED THE TRUTH OF THE CLAIM, CAUSING THE MOST SERIOUS RIFT SO FAR BETWEEN THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BRITISH AND FRENCH-LED UN OPERATION AND NATO.

"THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF NATO, WILLY CLAES, IS EXPECTED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS FOLLOWING INVESTIGATIONS INTO A REPORT BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL BERTRAND DE LAPRESLE, THE COMMANDER OF UN FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, SAYING THAT ON 10, 12 AND 16 FEBRUARY HIS OFFICERS ON THE GROUND SPOTTED 'TRANSPORT-TYPE AIRCRAFT OF C130 OR LIKE SIZE' IN THE VICINITY OF TUZLA AIR BASE. TWO MORE SIGHTINGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SINCE THEN, ONE ON 17 FEBRUARY AND ONE ON THURSDAY LAST WEEK. THE PLANES, ESCORTED BY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, APPEARED TO BE INVOLVED IN LOW-LEVEL PARACHUTE DROPS, ACCORDING TO UN SOURCES.

"SPECULATION AMONG SENIOR UN OFFICIALS IS THAT THE U.S., EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH A PROXY SUCH AS TURKEY, HAS ORGANIZED THE FLIGHTS. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION IS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS TO FORCE THE LIFTING OF THE UN ARMS EMBARGO. THE SIMPLEST WAY TO HEAD OFF THAT PRESSURE WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT THE BOSNIAN ARMY IS SO WELL SUPPLIED THAT IT DOES NOT NEED THE EMBARGO TO BE LIFTED.

"SPECULATION WITHIN THE UN IS THAT THE MYSTERIOUS AIRCRAFT GAVE NATO AWACS MONITORING THE REGION A 'FRIENDLY' SIGNAL OR THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, KNOWING WHEN THERE WOULD BE A GAP IN NATO SURVEILLANCE, ORGANIZED THE AIR DROP.

"THERE WAS FRANTIC ACTIVITY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPARTMENTS DEALING WITH BOSNIA LAST WEEK AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPE, RICHARD HOLBROOKE, VISITED TURKEY EARLIER IN THE WEEK. A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL YESTERDAY DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE REPORTED FLIGHTS AND SAID THAT IF THEY EXISTED THEY WERE NOT BY U.S. AIRCRAFT. BUT HE SAID THE U.S. HAS NO INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THAT THE U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE ADRIATIC NO LONGER MONITORS IT.

"IF THE U.S. IS USING A PROXY, NATO OFFICIALS CONCEDED TURKEY WOULD BE THE OBVIOUS CHOICE. IT HAS C130 AIRCRAFT WITHIN RANGE OF TUZLA AND IS PART OF NATO. A WESTERN MILITARY SOURCE SAID YESTERDAY: 'IF THE U.S. IS SUPPLYING THE BOSNIA GOVERNMENT, NO ONE (IN NATO) KNOWS BUT THEN THE U.S. WOULDN'T TELL. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DENIABLE BUT IF IT COMES OUT QUITE A FEW PEOPLE WILL WALK OUT. IT WOULD BE SO EMBARRASSING.'

"A UN WITHDRAWAL FROM FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IS NOW REGARDED AS INEVITABLE IN WASHINGTON. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT WILL HAVE TO SEND THOUSANDS OF TROOPS TO THE REGION TO COVER THE RETREAT. ANALYSTS EXPECT THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXPULSION OF THE UN FROM CROATIA TO LEAD TO FULL-SCALE WAR IN THE BALKANS. THE RESUPPLY OF THE BOSNIAN ARMY WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WOULD AT LEAST GIVE BOSNIA A CHANCE OF PROTECTING SOME OF ITS TERRITORY."

END TEXT.

3. THE SECOND ARTICLE, IN "THE INDEPENDENT" FOR FEBRUARY 27, REITERATED THE ALLEGATIONS AND MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

-- "SENIOR COMMANDERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN YUGOSLAVIA WERE STILL AT LOGGERHEADS WITH NATO YESTERDAY...."

-- "ACCORDING TO A REPORT BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL BERTRAND DE LAPRESLE...THE INCIDENTS ON 10 AND 12 FEBRUARY WERE ASSESSED TO HAVE BEEN 'TWO CLANDESTINE RESUPPLIES' OF 'HIGH-VALUE/HIGH-TECHNOLOGY GUIDED MISSILES OR PERHAPS SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES. NATO HAS DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FLIGHTS AND QUESTIONED THE REPORTS' ACCURACY."

-- "WHAT HAS INFURIATED UN COMMANDERS IS THAT WHEREAS NATO HAS PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED UN REPORTS OF FLIGHTS AND INCLUDED THEM AS VALID SIGHTINGS IN ITS OWN REPORTS, THIS TIME NATO HAS GONE OUT OF ITS WAY TO DISCREDIT THEM."

-- "ACCORDING TO THE WASHINGTON POST LAST TUESDAY, NATO OFFICIALS SAID THE AWACS WERE NOT FLYING ON 10 OR 12 FEBRUARY. YESTERDAY, HOWEVER, A NATO SPOKESMAN SAID THE PLANES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN COVERING THE AIRFIELD AND WOULD HAVE SPOTTED A FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT."

-- ONE SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL "SUGGESTED THAT IF THE FLIGHTS WERE REAL, THEY MIGHT BE FROM A MUSLIM COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO BOSNIA SUCH AS IRAN. HE DISMISSED THE IDEA THAT TURKEY MIGHT BE INVOLVED AS 'DUBIOUS.'"

CROWE

FROM:
SITREPR

UNCLASSIFIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. Report	Croatia: Replacing UNPROFOR. (1 page)	02/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	re: The Peaks and Valleys. (5 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BRANSCUM, KERRICK, NSC, RICE, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED

DTG:241512Z FEB 95

FM: USMISSION USNATO

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0400
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1242
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 3237
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000775

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

STATE FOR EUR-RPM DONALD, EUR, EUR/CT, S/NIS, PM, AND IO
STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR VERSHBOW; OVP FOR FUERTH
DEFENSE FOR USDP, DASD(ISP/RU&E), AND ISA(EUR-NATO)
JCS FOR LTG CLARK AND LTG CHRISTMAN
USUN FOR HUME

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MARR, NATO, ODA, HRUN, BK, SR

SUBJECT: FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR NATO SUPPORT OF
UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

REF: USNATO 00746 DTG 221857Z FEB 95

1. REF REPORTED THE 22 FEB DISCUSSION ON FINANCIAL ISSUES CONCERNING NATO SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL, REQUESTING GUIDANCE FOR A MEETING OF THE PROVISIONAL POLICY COORDINATION GROUP REINFORCED BY FINANCIAL EXPERTS (PPCG/R) ON MONDAY, 27 FEB. PARA 5 OF REF REQUESTS GUIDANCE FOR THE PPCG/R MEETING BY OOB 27 FEB. THE CONVENING LETTER FOR THE PPCG/R MEETING HAS BEEN FAXED TO STATE (EUR-RPM) AND OSD (ISA-NATO). THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES AMPLIFICATION OF THAT REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE.

2. THE PRIMARY ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION IS THE EXTENT, IF ANY, OF UN FUNDING AND/OR REIMBURSEMENT FOR NATO SUPPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OF THE UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL. IN THE DISCUSSIONS LAST SPRING ON NATO IMPLEMENTATION OF VANCE-OWEN, ALL ALLIANCE NATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE U.S., INDICATED A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR FULL REIMBURSEMENT OF ALL COSTS OF THE OPERATION FROM THE UN, USING THE UN PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF ASSESSMENT. SOME NATIONS (CANADA IN PARTICULAR) EVEN GO SO FAR AS TO MAKE UN REIMBURSEMENT A PREREQUISITE TO NATO PARTICIPATION IN THE WITHDRAWAL.

3. WITH REGARD BOTH TO WITHDRAWAL AND TO THE PREVIOUS VANCE-OWEN IMPLEMENTATION, THE U.S. HAS DECLINED TO TAKE A POSITION UNTIL THE FULL DETAILS OF THE OPERATION (COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE, NATURE, AND DURATION OF MISSION, ETC.) ARE KNOWN. HOWEVER, SINCE THE UN HAS STATED THAT ANY POTENTIAL REIMBURSEMENT MUST BE NEGOTIATED IN ADVANCE OF THE ENABLING UN RESOLUTION, THE POSITION OF THE U.S. CREATES DIFFICULTIES FOR NATO IN ANY DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UN ON FINANCIAL ISSUES, AND COULD DELAY THE PROCESS PAST THE POINT WHERE REIMBURSEMENT IS POSSIBLE. THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND MOST ALLIES BELIEVE THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE CONFRONTED URGENTLY, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF UNSYG BOUTROS-GHALI'S DECLARATION IN A LETTER TO SEC GEN CLAES THAT COSTS OF WITHDRAWAL "WOULD BE BORNE BY NATO."

4. ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUE TO BE DISCUSSED CONCERNS THE ALLOCATION OF COSTS WITHIN THE OPLAN 40104 WITHDRAWAL BUDGET. THE BUDGET SHOWS "NATO COMMON COSTS" OF 515 MILLION USD, "NATIONAL COSTS" OF 1.4 BILLION USD, AND COSTS FOR "NON-NATO USE OF NATO ASSETS" OF 37 MILLION USD. WITHIN THE "NATO COMMON COSTS" IS AN AMOUNT OF 369 MILLION FOR CONSOLIDATED LOGISTICS (RATIONS, POL, MEDICAL, PORT AND AIRPORT SERVICES, ETC.) THAT UNDER NORMAL NATO FUNDING POLICY WOULD BE "NATIONAL COSTS" RATHER THAN "COMMON FUNDED COSTS". ALTHOUGH IT IS APPRECIATED THAT THE COMMANDER NEEDS CONTROL OVER LOGISTICS, THE MAJORITY OF NATIONS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE WILLING TO FUND THESE COSTS COMMONLY. NOTE: THE QUESTION OF UN REIMBURSEMENT DOES NOT DIRECTLY IMPACT THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE BUDGET WAS DRAWN TO BE NEUTRAL WITH REGARD TO FUNDING SOURCES. END NOTE.

5. OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN INCLUDE: THE POTENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR PRE-FINANCING ON THE PART OF NATO AND/OR THE UN, THE EXTENT OF CONTINUING UN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR FORCES (BOTH NATO AND NON-NATO), AND THE MANDATE TO BE GIVEN TO NATO PERSONNEL IN DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UN.

6. ON A PARALLEL TRACK, THE MILITARY BUDGET COMMITTEE (MBC) IS NEARING COMPLETION OF ITS COUNCIL-DIRECTED SCREENING OF THE WITHDRAWAL BUDGET. A DRAFT OF THE MBC REPORT IS EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE EARLY NEXT WEEK. THE REPORT ANALYZES THE WITHDRAWAL BUDGET IN DETAIL, NOTING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDER WHICH THE BUDGET WAS DEVELOPING AND
HIGHLIGHTING VARIOUS ISSUES OF CONCERN, INCLUDING THOSE
DISCUSSED ABOVE IN RELATION TO THE PPCG/R MEETING.
GUIDANCE ON THE MBC REPORT WILL BE SOUGHT AS SOON AS IT
IS AVAILABLE.
HUNTER

FROM:
SITREPT

UNCLASSIFIED

Croatia Points

Article in Saturday Washington Post reports The President is nearing a decision to send U.S. Ground forces to Croatia to support a potential withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

Points to Make:

- o We are concerned by Croatia's decision to end the mission of the UN forces in Croatia after their mandate expires on March 31.
- o We are urging President Tudjman to reconsider his decision which seems likely to spark renewed war between Croatia and the Krajina Serbs.
- o We strongly favor the retention of UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia. UNPROFOR has clearly played a positive role in reducing the level of violence and easing the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- o UNPROFOR withdrawal would increase likelihood of renewed fighting not only in Croatia, but also in Bosnia. Not clear how outcome of renewed fighting would end.
- o While no decisions have been made to withdraw, the UN and NATO are doing contingency planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from both Croatia and Bosnia, should it become necessary.
- o The extent of NATO and U.S. support for those operations depends partly on what the UN authorities request.
- o (If asked) Inappropriate to discuss matters placed before the President for decision. Commitment of U.S. ground forces is a decision for the President after consultations with his advisors and the Congress.

Sandy --

Attached is a description of the option I outlined yesterday and some comments on your paper. Sorry it's a few hours late.

Could you or Don please let me know when you plan to circulate another paper? Our number here is 736-7555. If necessary, you can reach me at home, (202) 337-6634.

Thanks

Jim O'Brien

6333

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. draft	General Approaches to Bosnia Policy. (1 page)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	Active Containment. (5 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. draft	Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (9 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Reinventing Bosnia Policy. (3 pages)	02/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

OSD INPUT TO FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION: Add the following paragraphs on macro decisions.

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. The first decision for the Principals is to choose between one of two basic positions: Neutrality or take sides on behalf of the Bosnian Government.

Neutrality is an extension of our current policy. The strategy for this policy is one of active containment. Under this approach, we openly recognize that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without active US measures which, thus far, we have been unwilling to take. This course aligns us with the Europeans, it avoids a confrontation with Russia and it reduces the potential for the commitment of US forces into the former Yugoslavia. The primary focus of our diplomatic and military strategy is stopping the fighting and preventing a spread of conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia.

The alternative policy is to commit ourselves explicitly to getting a better deal for the Bosnians. The selection of this position aligns us with Congressional pressure and puts actions--training and arming--to back up our stated goal to help the Bosnians. The price will be confrontation with our NATO allies, Russia, increased fighting in Bosnia and the likelihood of Americanizing the war.

INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES:

-Recommend that you concentrate the Principals on critical national interests and delete the list of objectives. In that regard, the paper does not identify as an interest what we have publicly stated as the most vital security interest in the Balkans: Prevent the spread of the conflict into a broader Balkan war. Recommend the following statement of interests:

Our vital national interest is to deter the spread of the current conflict in the Balkans. Other interests are to limit the level and nature of the violence, to mitigate the humanitarian effects of the war, maintain our strategic relationship with key allies and protect the credibility of NATO, avoid a conflict with Russia, and ensure that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-cold war Europe.

-Whether considered as an interest or an objective, keeping US ground forces out of the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia is a fundamental principle of US policy. Recommend the following insertion:

Above all else, the US has remained firm in its commitment to deploy US ground forces to Bosnia and Croatia only to implement a negotiated peace plan and subsequently to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia.

OPTIONS:

-If our primary interest is containment, Macedonia, where the potential for spill over is greatest, is the highest priority issue, although it may not appear to be the most urgent. From a timing standpoint, Croatia deserves more immediate attention than Bosnia because of the March 31 deadline. Therefore, recommend that the paper rank the options according to our interests and urgency. Macedonia and Croatia should be given greater emphasis.

-Croatia: The paper should recognize that Croatia is critical for any UN/NATO/US operation in Bosnia. Tudjman cannot be eager for war and must recognize now that he cannot easily win a war in the Krajina. If the international community offers him an out, he probably will take it. However, that out must be in the form of an interpositional force not just border monitors who are potential hostages.

-Bosnia: The Contact Group diplomatic effort has reached a dead end. Unless we are prepared to fashion a diplomatic strategy that concedes more of the battlefield reality to the Serbs, diplomacy will go nowhere. We currently have no diplomatic leverage. Even our economic leverage is minimal given Milosevic's recent rejection of the offer of sanctions relief.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. draft	Paper: Comments on Draft Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (5 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Former Yugoslavia Policy Review. (4 pages)	02/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. paper	Update #1. (8 pages)	02/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2671

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]