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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: February 28 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520253. (4 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 28, 1995. (1 page)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Paper: Croatia Strategy. (4 pages)	02/25/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. cable	re: GOC Proposals. (4 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	Issue Paper: Should the U.S. Support Step Two. (2 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. paper	The Balkans: The Next Three Months. (8 pages)	02/24/1994	P1/b(1)
001g. note	Balkans Policy Review Issues/Decisions. (2 pages)	n.d	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Still No Signs of "RSK" Flexibility. (4 pages)	01/28/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Options: Enhancing Stability in Front-Line States. (1 page)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: NATO/Bosnia/Croatia. (3 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Reaction to a Large NATO Presence in Bosnia and Croatia. (7 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2670

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, February 28, 1995. (1 page)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)
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001c. draft	Paper: Croatia Strategy. (4 pages)	02/25/1994	P1/b(1)

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Position paper

**CROATIAN PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE TERMINATION OF
UNPROFOR MANDATE**

After three years of UNPROFOR passivity in the area, Croatian occupied territories have yet to be re-integrated in Croatia, as called for in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and several peace plans; Bosnia-Herzegovina is still at war, and Serbia/Montenegro is still under sanctions. Along with recent forming of the 'joint commands' between illegal Serb entities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as repeated and resolute Belgrade's refusal to grant recognition to other successor states, this means that only a radically different approach could bring peace, stability and security to the area of South-eastern Europe.

1. In his letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, dated January 12, 1995, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, has declared the mandate of UNPROFOR to be terminated effective March 31, 1995 at midnight, withdrawing Croatia's consent to the stationing of UNPROFOR on Croatian territory. The President's decision, later reconfirmed by both Houses of the Croatian Parliament, allows for an additional period of three months for completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR units from the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

Further, the President's letter strongly reconfirmed Croatia's willingness and determination to seek, first and foremost, a peaceful re-integration of all temporarily occupied Croatian territories (UNPAs), as well as a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the entire area, in full conformity with the UN Security Council resolutions and Contact Group peace proposals.

Such a long standing policy of the Republic of Croatia clearly implies that, in search for the solution, Croatia is willing and fully prepared to cooperate in good faith with the international community and is ready to consider the future role of different international fora and institutions in the re-integration of the occupied territories.

2. Following its decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate, and fully determined to continue to strive for peace, Croatia is willing to continue and press forward both the negotiations with Croatian Serbs and with the

government in Belgrade. In this regard Croatia seeks full support of the international community.

In this process, Croatia's essential aims are : a) peaceful re-integration of the occupied territories; b) adequate normalisation of relations among all the successor states, and in particular Croatia's relations with Serbia/Montenegro as a most important requirement for the lasting peace in the region; and c) full cooperation and support of Contact Group peace endeavours in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. If proper conditions are created and the right signals sent to the authorities in Belgrade and to Croatian Serbs, the active participation of the international community could lead to a peaceful resolution of the problems. For such a development the following necessary preconditions are : unconditional recognition of Croatia by Serbia/Montenegro as a clear proof that Serbia and Montenegro are giving up the occupation of Croatian territories; full respect of the internationally recognized borders; observance of international law governing relations among states; acceptance of the existing Contact Group peace proposal for Bosnia/Herzegovina; and the elaborated system of mutually dependent sanctions and incentives for the sides concerned.

Such a new stage in re-integration would then open the way to full normalisation of Croato-Serbian relations, and enable Croatia to play even more constructive role in bringing forth the lasting peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. Croatia has signed the cease fire agreement and a number of other, so called economic, agreements with Croatian Serbs. Croatia is willing to proceed with the normalisation of relations with Serbia/Montenegro in accordance with the Joint Declarations of September 30 and October 20, 1992 and Geneva Declaration of January 19, 1994 under the auspices of Co-chairmen of the ICFY. A part of that process is the planned, but yet to be scheduled visit of the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Belgrade.

5. The President of the Republic of Croatia has publicly agreed to attend the Summit proposed by France, under the auspices of the Contact Group, provided that the summit is properly prepared and desired results (especially as elaborated by the United States) are assured in advance.

6. The President of the Republic of Croatia stated that the basic principles of the so-called Z-4 Plan (i.e. territorial integrity of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders; full respect of civil and ethnic minority rights; and, the local autonomy in the region where Croatian Serbs constituted

majority population according to 1991 census), are acceptable. They are already incorporated in Croatian Constitution and the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia. These constitutional provisions, which are on the highest level of international conventions, should be a framework for negotiations relative to the implementation of human and ethnic rights of Croatian Serbs and their local autonomy in certain regions of Croatia. It should be specially emphasized here that these constitutional provisions have been enacted on recommendation and upon approval of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (presided by Mr. Robert Badinter, president of the French Cour de Cassation). Croatia, however, could not accept some proposals in the Z-4, Plan which have no precedent in any system of protection of minority rights. Croatia will, within a short time, present a detailed counter-proposal on resolution of the raised issues, in full conformity with the highest standards of international conventions relating to local and cultural autonomies, as well as human rights and rights of the ethnic communities.

7. Croatia proposes that in the next several months the international community adopts and follows a more determined two-track policy.

i) Through a negotiating process such as the proposed Paris summit, and/or other proper mediation, based on an elaborate system of sanctions and incentives, the international community should strive for and ensure : (a) mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia/Montenegro and mutual recognition among other successor states, including declaration of full respect for the international borders and specific consent to station international monitors at points where borders are being or could be violated; (b) obligation of all successor states not to resort to force or interfere into internal affairs of others, with international guarantees in this respect; (c) acceptance of the highest standards of international conventions for minority rights; (d) acceptance of the peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina; (e) speeding-up of the process of succession to the SFR Yugoslavia; (f) maintaining the strategic core of the sanctions regime with the clear understanding that sanction would be suspended or eased only following full implementation of the agreements reached, but not only upon the declaration of intent to do so being issued.

ii) In regard to Croatia specifically, the international community should : (a) help to establish full control and inviolability of the Croatia's international borders; (b) fully contribute to creation of the necessary conditions and overall atmosphere conducive to implementation of the re-integration of the occupied territories, including needed forms of monitoring, of implementation of agreements and of local mediation when necessary; and (c) help further

integration of Croatia into Europe (PHARE, Trade and Cooperation Agreement), as well as stabilization of Croatian economy in order to enable it to begin with the reconstruction, particularly of the war-devastated areas.

8. Fully aware of the concerns existing in different circles in regard to the possible new eruption of violence following the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and in order to contribute to creating desired conditions as elaborated in Para. 7., Croatia further proposes that :

i) During UNPROFOR's withdrawal, NATO should by its presence ensure and guarantee not only the safety of the withdrawing UN troops, but also contribute to general stability in the occupied Croatian territories. Although no incidents are likely to occur which could lead to serious escalation of hostilities, NATO's presence would definitely discourage such events and would be a stabilizing factor in the period before the deployment of monitors and other International Task Forces which would for the time being control Croatian borders. That would also serve to alleviate the fears of international circles which are afraid of the renewal of hostilities.

ii) In the period of 6 months, NATO (or International Task Force - ITF) should be entrusted with establishing appropriate control of the Croatian internationally recognized borders in presently occupied parts of Croatia, and with opening of the major international traffic routes, on land as well as on the Danube and Sava rivers. Croatia, on its part, is willing to use that period to finalize the negotiations with Croatian Serbs regarding their cultural and ethnic autonomy and local autonomy in already mentioned regions.

ITF - consisting of personnel from (primarily) the Contact Group countries, or evolving from the initial NATO presence in Croatia - should be established and specifically mandated for duty in the Republic of Croatia by a special UN Security Council resolution for a period of six months;

iii) The Security Council resolution that shall extend the UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY of Macedonia, must contain operative paragraph that will explicitly state that UNPROFOR mandate in the Republic of Croatia has been terminated and is not being extended after March 31, 1995.

On March 31, 1995 the Security Council should adopt further resolution that will establish the conditions for the future international monitoring and mediation presence in the Republic of Croatia. This resolution must be in accordance with the existing Security Council resolutions confirming Croatia's territorial integrity, and be consistent with General Assembly resolution 49/43 (Situation in the Occupied Territories of Croatia). Croatia and the relevant international bodies (UN or others) shall regulate and formally establish the presence of new International Mediating and Monitoring Task Force in Croatia

simultaneously with the process of UNPROFOR withdrawal, that is no later than June 30, 1995.

iv) UNPROFOR will continue to enjoy Croatia's full cooperation and support in its activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this respect, Croatia is prepared to extend its full hospitality to the UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb, MASH near Pleso, the logistic base in Divulje, Adriatic ports facilities and other facilities used presently by UNPROFOR. Croatia is also willing to consider the appropriate role of UNPROFOR in ensuring the normal and unimpeded land traffic needed for UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9. Croatia is determined to continue the existing negotiations with Croatian Serbs regarding the full re-integration of the occupied parts of Croatia provided that there is a clear and demonstrated understanding on the other side that talks on issues related to political re-integration have to be conducted in good faith. In order to (a) facilitate implementation of the already existing agreements and (b) set the stage for meaningful negotiations related to predominantly political issues of re-integration, Croatia is ready to consider the role of the international community in monitoring and further promotion of these agreements.

Croatia proposes to work out and define a proper arrangement with the European Union and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) related to a possible role of the enlarged European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in monitoring the implementation of all agreements.

Croatia also welcomes possible missions of long or short duration, clearly mandated by the appropriate international institution, e.g. the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to help at the local level in promotion and observance of minority rights and intra-communal relations in areas to be given special status according to the Croatia's Constitution and the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia.

Appropriate international institutions, best suited for specific tasks, could in that way cooperate with the Government of Croatia and Croatian Serbs in preventing conflicts and creating conditions necessary for peaceful re-integration.

Croatia is prepared to further elaborate such an arrangement and enter in arrangements with appropriate institutions.

10. In order to safeguard its rights and interests, as well as the rights and interests of other successor States, Croatia draws the attention of the relevant international factors to the particular peril connected with the easing or

suspension of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. If these sanctions are eased or suspended, the nominal holders of title (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro - or under the name of FR of Yugoslavia) on funds, assets, interests and movable and immovable property, which are object of the succession of the former SFR of Yugoslavia, may try to unilaterally dispose of them. This is especially apparent in the case of the deposits in foreign banks which were deposited by the former National Bank of Yugoslavia as the part of federal foreign currency reserves (cca 2 billions of USD), and which are at present blocked in those foreign banks. Therefore any suspension or easing of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro should not affect the funds, assets, interests, movable and immovable property which are objects to the succession procedure.

11. Croatia wishes first and foremost to speed-up the process of negotiations with Belgrade and with Croatian Serbs and give new and strong impetus and dynamics to the overall peace process, in particular the process of re-integration of the occupied Croatia territories.

Croatia firmly believes that its proposals constitute a peaceful way towards the resolution of the present problems, a way to the lasting peace and to the establishment of the new international order in this region.

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FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POLICY REVIEWIntroduction

As we approach a potentially critical period in the Balkans over the next three months, now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy. U.S. policy has, in fact, had some success over the past two years in containing the spread of the war, reducing the level of violence, keeping relief supplies flowing to most areas, and maintaining cohesion with Allies and Russia. What we have been unable to produce is a political settlement in Bosnia or Croatia that rolls back Serb gains sufficiently to be acceptable to the Bosnians and Croats, and to be perceived as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms.

The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught. In Bosnia, after almost a year of effort, the Contact Group is becoming a spent force, with its unity increasingly strained. In Croatia, the Z-4 plan for a political solution is, for all intents and purposes, stillborn, and Tudjman's decision to eject UNPROFOR threatens to destroy even the limited economic confidence-building measures developed over the past year.

As the CIA paper makes clear, there is no "peace faction" among any of the parties, and Milosevic's willingness to pressure his Serb cousins is limited. If we stay on our present course, the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date, and increased pressures for U.S. involvement. The differences between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are largely ones of timing and degree. And as the risk of war increases in Bosnia and Croatia, the dangers of spillover to other areas grow as well.

If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely -- creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid. As international efforts founder, the Bosnians will be able to make an increasingly convincing case for lifting the arms embargo; yet the odds of bringing our Allies and, especially, the Russians along will remain low. Moreover, lifting the arms embargo, to be effective, entails the United States taking other actions that increase our involvement and responsibility.

Interests and Objectives

Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold War Europe.

Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among them:

- To stop or limit the fighting.
- To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
- To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and preserves the territorial integrity and international identity of Bosnia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
- To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and beyond.
- To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of implementing a political settlement.

The tools we have applied have varied over time in response to events, and as our priorities have shifted: Until the end of 1994, we sought to use NATO military power to enforce UNSC resolutions and to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms that provided a better deal for the Bosnian Government ("air power in the service of diplomacy"). After Bihac, however, we consciously shifted the emphasis to maintaining NATO cohesion, recognizing that this would erode U.S. and Alliance credibility and reduce further our negotiating leverage. Yet we did not scale back our political objectives to match our reduced leverage -- leading to the present diplomatic impasse.

The result has been charges of fecklessness and an erosion of confidence in U.S. leadership on other issues. Therefore, we now need to step back and confront these inherent contradictions:

- On the one hand, our own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and effectively abandon the Bosnians.

- On the other hand, we do not presently have the means to attain the political goal we have set -- negotiated settlements that deprive the Serbs of some of their ill-gotten gains -- and we have not been prepared to commit those means. Moreover, there is limited public support in the U.S. or in Europe for doing so.

Basic Strategic Choices

Many of our decisions over the next 2-3 months will be driven by events on the ground. But some of our choices will depend on where we want to go in the longer term. Therefore, before considering specific options, Principals need to decide our overall strategic direction and whether the course chosen is politically sustainable. This, in turn, requires deciding what are our priority interests and sticking with that decision in terms of committing the resources needed to attain our goals. The following, in broad terms, are basic approaches to be considered:

1. Continue our present policy: muddle through while supporting the Bosnians: Maintain the Contact Group and continue to seek a political solution that provides a better deal for the Bosnians, but not commit to increased military pressure on their behalf; rely for leverage on sanctions and efforts to isolate the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs (recognizing that these will be inadequate to the task). Seek to contain the fighting and humanitarian suffering to the extent possible, while maintaining Alliance cohesion. Keep UNPROFOR in place in essentially its present form (improve its effectiveness, but don't press it to take a more confrontational stance against the Serbs). Seek to postpone any lifting of the arms embargo and don't push for use of NATO air power, since this would precipitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Continue to sustain the Federation. Take additional measures in the front-line states to contain spillover of the conflict, such as beefing up UNPROFOR/Macedonia.
 - This would maintain European and Russian support, reduce the risks of deeper U.S. military involvement, and recognize that, absent such involvement, political settlements are not achievable in the foreseeable future.
 - The gap between our goal of a "fair" settlement and our unwillingness to provide the means to that end, however, would leave us vulnerable to charges of diplomatic fecklessness. It would be difficult to persuade the public and pro-Bosnian elements in the Congress that, over time, the maintenance of sanctions, a continued stalemate on the ground, and the solidity of the Federation will bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement along the lines of the

Contact Group plan, and the Krajina Serbs to accept autonomy within Croatia.

- The main weakness of this approach, however, is that the Bosnians and the Croats are not prepared to play along: Both are ready to pursue the military option with renewed vigor over the coming months, putting UNPROFOR's presence in doubt. And the Bosnians will campaign for lift when the ceasefire ends. Our continued rhetorical support for their cause would make it difficult for us to oppose.

2. Adopt a policy of neutrality toward the terms of a settlement and focus on active containment of the conflict: Openly acknowledge that achieving a better solution for the Bosnians is not possible without U.S. actions that it is not in our interest to take. Apart from this shift in approach to the diplomatic track, take essentially the same actions as under the previous approach. Make clear we do not believe multilateral lift is politically attainable and strongly oppose Congressional pressures to lift unilaterally. Abandon Contact Group or suspend its activities, making clear that it is up to the parties, not the international community, to find a mutually acceptable solution. Promote periodic ceasefire agreements. Advise the Bosnians of the need to be realistic about the facts on the ground and agree to terms that acknowledge Serb preeminence (accept territorial outcomes short of 51:49, Serb Confederation with Belgrade; seek protection through links to Croatia, etc.).

- This course would also maintain good relations with the Europeans, avoid a confrontation with Russia, and reduce the potential for U.S. military involvement. We would concentrate our efforts in areas where we have been able to achieve some success: reducing the violence, delivering humanitarian relief, maintaining the Muslim-Croat ceasefire and the Federation, and preventing the spread of the conflict outside of Bosnia and possibly Croatia. By distancing ourselves from the Bosnians' political agenda, we might have greater success in keeping UNPROFOR in place.
- We would suffer harsh criticism from some quarters in the Congress and the public for abandoning the Bosnians and performing another flip-flop. We would need to make the case that it is not in U.S. interests to intervene unilaterally to ensure Bosnian victory, that we cannot gain European or Russian support for firmer measures to help the Bosnians, and that lift alone would probably make things worse for them in any case. We would want to appeal to the significant number of Congressmen whose support for lift is soft, and who are not keen on the deeper military involvement that a credible lift-and-strike policy would require.

- Assuming we can ride out the initial storm, this approach would lower expectations and adjust public opinion to the reality of a continued conflict for which there may be no immediate solution. It would put the onus on the parties to negotiate directly with one another, rather than forcing us to explain repeated failed diplomatic initiatives backed by empty threats. It would force the Bosnians to accept the reality of defeat and the fact that they are destined to live surrounded by Serbs. It might even lead to a de facto indefinite cessation of serious hostilities, reducing both human suffering and public pressures for action.
- The problem with this approach, like the first, is that we may not be able to ride out the storm: the Bosnians may succeed in getting Congress to lift unilaterally, possibly with sufficient votes to override a Presidential veto. Moreover, we would, effectively, be acquiescing in Serb aggression, setting a dangerous precedent for the future.

3. Containment of Conflict and Long-Term Quarantine of Greater Serbia: Abandon efforts to negotiate a political settlement and reimpose full sanctions against Serbia for the long haul. Make clear we will refuse to recognize Serb conquests in Bosnia and Croatia and we will continue to treat Serbia as a pariah state until Serbs accept settlements that restore territorial integrity of Bosnia and Croatia. Refrain from military intervention, take laissez-faire approach to continued fighting among the parties. Concentrate on humanitarian aid, bolstering the Federation politically and economically, and containing spillover to other parts of the region. If UNPROFOR were to withdraw, this could be combined with a lift-and-leave strategy.

- This approach would be analogous to our approach to Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in which we were prepared to wait for decades for a just outcome -- isolating one party while promoting free-market development in the other. It would be based, again, on a recognition that there is no available political solution, and avoid perpetuating false expectations that the international community can impose a settlement. But in contrast to the previous approach, it would be based as well on a judgment that Milosevic remains the problem rather than the solution, despite his recent attempts to play the peacemaker -- distinguishing the victim from the victimizer.
- It is doubtful Russia would agree if we reimposed the sanctions noose around Serbia, however. We might agree with the Russians to disagree about Serbia, perhaps lifting or suspending some or all multilateral sanctions against the FRY -- but maintaining U.S. sanctions -- in exchange for agreement on continued, tightened sanctions against the Pale

and Knin Serbs (but recognizing that Milosevic will try to undermine these to the extent he can get away with it).

- The front-line states' enforcement of sanctions would be difficult to sustain absent substantial financial compensation. Without such compensation, long-term continuation of the sanctions could actually have a destabilizing effect on the region overall. Moreover, this long-term approach could result in further Serb territorial expansion and prolong the humanitarian and refugee crisis for years to come.
- As with approaches 1 and 2, it is not clear we could sustain this course in the face of pressure from the Congress and the Bosnians.

4. Increased U.S. commitment in support of Bosnians, apply military pressure to compel Serb acceptance of a settlement:

In theory, this could involve either: (a) returning to our 1994 approach: press for a more robust UNPROFOR that is prepared to use force against Serbs and make active use of NATO close air support; resume NATO enforcement of exclusion zones, and possibly establish additional exclusion zones; if these measures prove insufficient, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement a multilateral lift-and-strike strategy; or (b) proceeding directly to lift and strike, after helping UNPROFOR to withdraw. In practice, only (b) is feasible, since Allies will not agree to robust military actions while their vulnerable UNPROFOR forces remain in place.

- This would align our policy with Congressional rhetoric and provide the means to back up our declared goals of helping the Bosnians and thwarting Serb ambitions. It would lead to increased fighting, at least in the short term, but might in time give the Bosnians the capability to recover territory and, by altering the situation on the battlefield, convince the Serbs to agree to an equitable political settlement.
- It would, however, create significant strains in our relations with our Allies and the Russians. Our readiness to participate in NATO extraction of UNPROFOR could provide the leverage to win Allied support in the UNSC for multilateral lift. But preventing a Russian veto would be more difficult. It would, at a minimum, require lifting sanctions against Serbia at the same time (although this may be necessary in any event to encourage Milosevic not to resume military support to his Serb cousins).
- Moreover, withdrawing UNPROFOR and explicitly committing to produce a Bosnian success would hasten the onset of the situation we have sought most to avoid, the deployment of U.S. ground forces, leaving us with the responsibility for organizing relief supplies and protecting the enclaves. And

lift - whether unilateral or multilateral -- would commit us to arming and training the Bosnians for an indefinite period, as well as providing air cover, even if we tried to set a time limit on our support. In short, it could Americanize the war, with little likelihood of hastening a political settlement.

Near-Term Decisions

The foregoing choices pertain mainly to the decisions we will need to take in the coming months on Bosnia. In Croatia, the situation may be more urgent, and our goal more straightforward: to prevent a new war over the Krajina. To this end, we need to be clear at the outset that we do not support Croatian military action to reassert control over the Krajina Serbs, and increase pressure on Tudjman to retain at least some portion of UNPROFOR interposed between the warring parties in the separation zone. We cannot go too far in imposing punitive measures on Tudjman, however, given the importance of Tudjman's support for the Federation and our need to use Croatian territory to support any UN/NATO/U.S. operation in Bosnia. We must above all avoid driving Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia.

Finally, to the extent that we decide to focus more on containment of spillover, beefing up or replacing UNPROFOR in Macedonia would take on greater urgency alongside the decisions that we will need to make with respect to Bosnia and Croatia.

With these considerations in mind, the following is a sketch of the options on which decisions will be needed over the next three months.

Options: Croatia

Near Term:

- Make renewed push (in tandem with Germans and other Allies) within next 10 days to convince Tudjman to extend UNPROFOR with reduced mandate (UNPROFOR Lite).
- Fallback: Press for one-time extension of March 31/June 30 deadlines to allow more time for negotiations.

Issue: Whether to threaten limited punitive actions at this stage? Or should we offer Tudjman a carrot?

If these initial efforts fail:

- Begin Step Two prepositioning for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia no later than March 8 (will require Congressional consultations and decisions on funding).
- Offer new, high-level international negotiator to negotiate Croatian settlement, in tandem with final push for acceptance of UNPROFOR Lite.
- Agree in principle to Croatian proposal for international task force (ITF) to replace UNPROFOR that would monitor Croatian-Bosnian border *on condition that* Tudjman agrees to extend ceasefire, agrees the force will also police the separation zone, and agrees to negotiate with Krajina Serbs on basis of principles in Z-4 plan.

Issues: Is ITF feasible? (Border force would be highly vulnerable to attack or hostage-taking by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces, who have traditionally viewed such a force as threat to their survival, and whose acceptance would be a *sine qua non*. Allies would look to U.S. to join the force. But some token presence on the border may be the fig leaf Tudjman needs to back down on ejection of UNPROFOR; Krajina Serbs may accept if it is only way to keep international forces in separation zone.)

Who would comprise the force? (Unarmed civilian monitors? Joint international-Croatian-Krajina Serb police force? NATO? WEU, backed by U.S. air support -- but recognizing that effectiveness would be limited without TACPs?)

Medium Term:

- Withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia

Issues: Nature of U.S. participation?

How to discourage Tudjman from using NATO forces as cover for early offensive (sanctions or other punitive steps? carrots?).

How to deter Krajina Serbs from seizing vacated UNPROFOR positions or threatening NATO forces (air strike threat?)

- Introduce civilian monitors to replace UNPROFOR (e.g. OSCE)

Long Term (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal):

- Contain fighting: Establish no-fly zone in Croatia? Other measures?

- Decide whether to let Tudjman fend for himself (allowing possible Serb victory) or to provide limited support, despite our warnings that he will be on his own.

Options: Bosnia

Near Term:

- Keep Plan B on the table.

Issues: If so, for how long? Possible modifications/extensions that aren't sweeteners -- e.g. put forward detailed proposal on constitutional arrangements for future Bosnian Union?)

- Consider staged or scaled-back Plan B -- i.e. ask Milosevic to identify the steps he would take in "partial recognition" of Bosnia and Croatia, determine whether they could be linked to limited sanctions relief.

Issues: What could Milosevic do beyond tightening border closure to justify sanctions relief? (We could not justify additional relief for tightening a border that should be sealed already. Possibilities: close the "back door" to Croatia; cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal; recognize Bosnia's border and territorial integrity but not the Sarajevo Government.)

Should we take parallel steps in support of Bosnians to reduce Bosnian/Congressional criticism -- e.g. IMET, other training for Bosnians?

- Continue efforts to isolate Pale irrespective of Plan B: increase border monitors; close Krajina back door.
- Consider whether to reduce or end the activity of the Contact Group as such, in order to emphasize the need for the parties themselves to undertake territorial and constitutional discussions. (This would permit private or individual mediators to operate.) Or agree to French international conference without prior agreement on mutual recognition?
- Explore efforts to increase international support for the Federation: material assistance and political support (envoys to and from, participation in international conferences, agreements such as our proposed 505 agreement, etc.)
- Approach the UN to reconsider its decision not to expand UNPROFOR with the troops already offered (i.e. urge UN to increase UNPROFOR numerically to enable it to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively, especially along the Blue Route, as opposed to changing its ROE).

Medium Term:

Decision depends on the choice of overall strategic approach as described above:

- Muddle through, continue to support Bosnians rhetorically, continue diplomatic efforts, but focus on containment.
- Shift to policy of neutrality toward terms of settlement and active containment of conflict; end or suspend Contact Group activities, acknowledge we cannot produce better deal for Bosnians.
- Containment of conflict and long-term quarantine of Greater Serbia.
- Renewed push for military measures in support of Bosnians: withdraw UNPROFOR, multilateral lift and strike

Long Term:

- Maintain support for Federation to forestall Muslim-Croat splits. Intensify isolation of Pale and Knin Serbs.
- Maintain support for War Crimes Tribunal.
- Withdraw UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, with lift possibly implemented in stages (beginning with defensive weapons) and tied to "final offer" to accept Contact Group plan.

Issue: Are we prepared to lift unilaterally if Allies support us in UNSC but Russians veto? Alternatives to lift?

- Abandon support for lift, take tough line with Congress and Bosnians, stick with one of the containment options.

Options: Containing Spillover

- Beef up or replace UNPROFOR/Macedonia

Issues: When and how? (Enlarge existing force under UN command? Replace with NATO division?)

- Continue efforts to defuse Greece/FYROM dispute.
- Shore up outer wall of sanctions against Serbia.
- Expand bilateral aid/infrastructure programs in south Balkans.
- Expand bilateral military cooperation and economic cooperation with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia.
- High-level visits to front-line states.

Decision Timeline

See chart

Attachments:

CIA paper - The Balkans: The Next Three Months
Decision Timeline

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. paper	The Balkans: The Next Three Months. (8 pages)	02/24/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

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Bosnia - February 1995 [2]

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
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001g. note	Balkans Policy Review Issues/Decisions. (2 pages)	n.d	P1/b(1)

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002. cable	re: Still No Signs of "RSK" Flexibility. (4 pages)	01/28/1995	P1/b(1)

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THE GUARDIAN
Saturday February 25 1995

UN analysts believe Nato connives at secret flights

Bosnians 'are being covertly armed'

SV
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Julian Borger in Zagreb

REPEATED United Nations reports of mysterious cargo flights into territory held by the Bosnian government have driven a new wedge between UN peacekeepers and Nato.

Nato says the reports are misleading, but UN officials stood by their account yesterday and privately accused Western generals of trying to cover up a secret arms supply operation.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gary Coward, a spokesman for the UN Protection Force (Unprofor) yesterday reported sightings of propeller-driven aircraft flying near the government army airbase at Tuzla, northern Bosnia, on Thursday night in violation of a flight ban. It is the fourth such sighting this month.

The "no-fly" zone is no longer being vigorously enforced by Nato, and helicopters have recently been used extensively, particularly by Serb rebels around the embattled government enclave of Bihać. If large transport aircraft are now making sorties, it would imply the involvement of outside powers.

Nato investigators produced a report dismissing the sightings, which was sent to UN headquarters in New York earlier this week.

"We've been saying all along that we have nothing that would substantiate these reports and that has been confirmed in this report," said a Nato officer yesterday.

But UN civilian officials have resisted pressure from Nato and some senior Unprofor military officers to issue a statement retracting their reports.

"We are not going to tell a lie," said one UN source. "It would cast doubt on anything we ever reported in the future."

The source said a retraction would be an act of disloyalty to the UN monitors involved.

The most detailed UN report, by a Norwegian helicopter pilot, described a plane resembling a C-130 (a US-made transport) making a descent over the Tuzla airstrip on February 10, disappearing from view and then climbing again.

Nordic UN troops went to investigate but were fired on and temporarily detained by Bosnian government soldiers.

Further reports on February 12 and 17, including observations by a British intelligence officer, mention large multi-propeller planes accompanied by jet fighters flying over Tuzla. UN analysts believe the flights are part of an arms supply operation in support of the Bosnian government, carried out with Nato connivance.

Nato has not published its

own findings but they are believed to suggest that UN observers were confused by nearby Serbian civilian planes, or Nato training sorties.

UN officials describe the Nato report as absurd and a "whitewash". They say civilian routes pass nowhere near Bosnia and are not used after nightfall, and that it is unlikely a large number of trained UN monitors would mistake a jet for a propeller plane.

The US has repeatedly called for the arms embargo imposed on the whole of former Yugoslavia to be lifted in the case of the Bosnian government.

The proposal has been opposed by most of America's European allies, particularly France and Britain, who believe it would lead to an escalation of the war.

But at a security conference in Munich earlier this month there were signs of growing European reluctance to endanger the Atlantic alliance on the issue, and some observers believe that the US has taken this as a green light to begin covertly arming the Bosnians.

"It's a covert operation. There's no doubt about it," said one UN source yesterday.

"I expect the British and the French are turning a blind eye to it, because the Americans have said 'you don't want the embargo lifted, do you?'"

The attached is a very major story with implications that go far beyond Bosnia. First, there is the willingness of a US-dominated NATO to sabotage a vital UN peacekeeping mission and endanger the Atlantic alliance. Then there are questions of international law. Why has the US chosen to break international law and UN resolutions -- both the no-fly zone (a resolution sponsored by the US) and the arms embargo?

Why are American military air traffic controllers -- wearing the UN blue helmets of neutrality -- being allowed (according to Newsweek's military correspondent Col. David Hackworth) to set up laser guidance systems to direct NATO air attacks against the Serbs? Why is the US risking a much wider war in Europe by siding against old allies, and in favor of an increasingly hardline Muslim government whose principal backers are the terrorist states of Iran and Sudan? What pragmatic or moral justification can there be in measures which will prolong and intensify a bloody ethnic conflict in Europe?

George Bogdanich

SERBNET MEDIA CENTER

THE MEDIA ARM OF THE SERBIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. -SERBNET

23 February 1995

U.N. RELATIONS WITH BOSNIAN MUSLIMS "HAVE HIT ROCK BOTTOM"

U.N. COMPLAIN OF "ORCHESTRATED HARASSMENT" BY "BIH ARMY"

AP 23 Feb 95 9:13 EST SARAJEVO [...] The United Nations complained of what it called "an orchestrated campaign" by the Bosnian government army to harass peacekeepers and restrict their movement. Spokesman Alexander Ivanko said relations between the United Nations and the Bosnian government "have hit rock bottom."

SARAJEVO, Feb 23 (Reuter) - A United Nations official on Thursday accused the Bosnian government army of obstructing peacekeepers in what appeared to be an orchestrated campaign of harassment. The actions seemed to stem from frustration with the peacekeeping mission and the Moslem-led government's belief that the former commander of the U.N. force, British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, had caved in to its Bosnian Serb foes, U.N. sources said.

U.N. Protection Force spokesman Alexander Ivanko, listing U.N. problems with government troops, said: "A number of incidents in the last few days suggest there may be an orchestrated campaign organised by the BiH (Bosnian army) against UNPROFOR personnel. What started as irritating incidents became more and more harassing", he said.

Government troops were now restricting peacekeepers's movements north of Tuzla and in eastern Bosnia, preventing them from patrolling near confrontation lines, Ivanko said. He declined to speculate on reasons for the tougher stance.

US 'secretly supplying weapons to Bosnia'

UNITED NATIONS commanders in Bosnia suspect that the United States is engaged in a clandestine operation to supply weapons to the Bosnian army in violation of an international arms embargo.

The UN is standing by reports from its peace-keepers in Bosnia that on four separate occasions this month they spotted large military transport aircraft in northern Bosnia believed to be dropping or delivering high-tech weaponry to the Bosnian army in the airforce base of West Tuzla. Nato have questioned the truth of the claim, causing the most serious rift so far between the British and French-led UN operation and Nato.

The Secretary-General of Nato, Willy Claes, is expected to issue a statement within the next 48 hours following investigations into a report by Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Lapresle, the commander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, saying that on 10, 12 and 16 February his officers on the ground spotted "transport-type aircraft of C130 or like size" in the vicinity of Tuzla air base. Two

**From Richard Dowden
and John Carlin
in Washington**

more sightings have been reported since then.

Speculation among senior UN officials is that the US, either directly or through a proxy such as Turkey, has organised the flights. The Clinton administration is under heavy pressure from Congress to force the lifting of the UN arms embargo. The simplest way to head off that pressure would be to ensure that the Bosnian army is so well supplied that it does not need the embargo to be lifted.

Speculation within the UN is that the mysterious aircraft gave Nato AWACs monitoring the region a "friendly" signal, or that the Central Intelligence Agency, knowing when there would be a gap in Nato surveillance, organised the air drop.

There was frantic activity in the State Department and National Security Council departments dealing with Bosnia last week and the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Richard

Holbrooke, visited Turkey earlier in the week. A senior US official yesterday denied knowledge of the reported flights and said that if they existed they were not by US aircraft. But he said the US has no interest in maintaining the arms embargo.

If the CIA is using a proxy, Nato officials conceded, Turkey would be the obvious choice. It has C130 aircraft within range of Tuzla and is part of Nato. A Western military source said yesterday: "If the US is supplying the Bosnia government, no one [in Nato] knows but then the US wouldn't tell. It would have to be deniable but if it comes out quite a few people will walk out. It would be so embarrassing."

A UN withdrawal from former Yugoslavia is now regarded as inevitable in Washington. The administration has concluded it will have to send thousands of troops to cover the retreat. Analysts expect the expulsion of the UN from Croatia to lead to full-scale war in the Balkans. The re-supply of the Bosnian army with sophisticated weapons would at least give Bosnia a chance of protecting some of its territory.

The Independent on Sunday Feb. 26, 1995

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003. paper	Options: Enhancing Stability in Front-Line States. (1 page)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	re: NATO/Bosnia/Croatia. (3 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2670

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Reaction to a Large NATO Presence in Bosnia and Croatia. (7 pages)	02/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - February 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2670

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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20095

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, February 22, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


(Andrew D. Sens)
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

By _____ NARA, Date _____

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Declassify on: OADR

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20095

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 22, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:15 - 3:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

USUN:

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

State:

Peter Tarnoff

Robert Frasure

JCS:

LTG Daniel Christman

COL. Tom Bowden

DOD:

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

BG Donald L. Kerrick

Susan Rice

OMB:

Gordon Adams

Kevin Beckell

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met to review efforts to obtain Serbian recognition of Bosnia, Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders in exchange for sanctions relief (Plan B) and to review military planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal and Croatia. ~~(S)~~

2. Deputies reviewed the results of last week's Contact Group efforts on mutual recognition and reaffirmed Principals' decision that we should not agree to any further sanctions relief or other measures that would "sweeten" the offer now under consideration. They agreed it would be helpful to create uncertainty in

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

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Milosevic's and Allies' minds about how long U.S. support for broad sanctions relief could be sustained. Deputies directed Ambassador Frasure to inform our European Contact Group partners before their meeting with Milosevic on February 23 that the U.S. had gone as far as it could in offering sanctions relief and that it was unclear how long our support for Plan B would remain in effect. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed that prospects for success were low for achieving mutual recognition in exchange for sanctions relief. However, in the event Milosevic attempted to enter new negotiations aimed at modifying the Plan B proposal, serious sanctions-related issues remained and further Deputies' or Principals' review would be required. They decided that no further negotiations beyond the proposal now on the table could begin without further review by the Deputies. Deputies deferred decision on how long to leave Plan B on the table until a review of overall policy is completed next week. ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies discussed the results of recent diplomatic efforts in Croatia aimed at retaining UNPROFOR or a remodeled UNPROFOR as a deterrent to renewed fighting. They agreed that the approaching UNPROFOR mandate expiration on March 31, and the possibility of renewed hostilities thereafter in the Krajina, could be the catalyst for new fighting elsewhere in the region. Deputies directed that a strategy be promptly developed that outlines how to deal with Tudjman in the run-up to the March 31 UNPROFOR mandate expiration and steps that can be taken to retain an international force of some type as a deterrent to renewed fighting. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

5. Deputies discussed how to fulfill Principals' request for a review of potential scenarios to frame policy choices likely to be faced in the next 2-3 months should diplomatic efforts fail to achieve a negotiated settlement. They directed the Interagency Working Group to complete the review by February 27 for subsequent Deputies' and Principals' consideration. The review should include estimated time-lines for events on the ground in Bosnia, Croatia and neighboring areas; an analysis of U.S. interests, objectives and priorities; allied and Congressional attitudes; and U.S. policy options. A process for completion of the study should be presented to Deputies on February 27. (Action: NSC/Interagency Working Group) ~~(S)~~

6. Deputies reviewed the status of efforts at the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR. They agreed to support the current UN request for logistics and engineering equipment as outlined in the JCS paper. Noting the uncertainty of UNPROFOR's future, Deputies deferred decision on more robust options until the policy options review is completed. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

7. Deputies reviewed the state of military planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia. They agreed to defer decisions on Step Two prepositioning until DoD completes an internal review of the overall military operational plan and presents a recommendation to Principals. Deputies also deferred discussion of funding options pending completion of the DoD review of the operational plan. (Action: DoD) ~~(S)~~

8. Deputies deferred discussion and decision on providing training for the Bosnian forces until the policy options review is completed. ~~(S)~~

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20095

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 23, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
February 22, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held February 22, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/28/2014*

20B-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~