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Folder Title:

Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

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Section:

1

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10

Position:

1

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V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	Background Paper for Deputies Committee Meeting. [incomplete] (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Croatian Ambassador Darko. (2 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Paper: How to Respond to the UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (2 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520044. (4 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. cable	re: Presidential Letter to Tudjman. (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)
004c. cable	re: Tudjman Responds. (4 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	U.S. Non-Paper Presented to Croatian Envoys. (1 page)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Duplicate of 005. (1 page)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
007. report	Croatia. (3 pages)	01/13/1995	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Deputies Committee background. [incomplete] (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Duplicate of 004c. (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Duplicate of 004b. (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

2013-0687-F

vz2667

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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011a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Presidential Letter to Tadjman on UNPROFOR Renewal. Record ID: 9500173. (2 pages)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1)
011b. cable	Duplicate of 004b. (3 pages)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1)
011c. cable	re: Tadjman Decides UNPROFOR Must Go. (4 pages)	01/07/1995	P1/b(1)
012. cable	re: Tadjman's Decision on UNPROFOR May Be Made Public Before the Washington Talks. (2 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 11, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30-5:55 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel R. Berger

CIA:
Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

JCS:
Adm. William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

State:
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure
Amb. Peter Galbraith

UN:
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

DOD:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel

NSC:
Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the January 10 Contact Group meeting in Paris and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations, while recognizing the political sensitivity of the U.S. going beyond the role of facilitator and adopting a formal position on specific issues.

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v2 10/1/2013

2. Deputies requested two papers for a follow-on meeting during the week of January 16 (papers should be completed by COB January 17):

A) Review and analysis of the sides' positions on the key negotiating issues (Action: CIA).

B) Diplomatic strategy for the period from now until April 30, including possible options for promoting a positive outcome to the negotiations, as well as a recommended strategy in the event negotiations break down (Action: State).

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

3. Deputies considered options for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31, and the position that should be conveyed to the Croatian envoys following the meeting. They agreed that we should seek to reverse the Croatian decision, stress our concern about the risks of a new war in the Krajina and the dangers the decision posed for the safety of UNPROFOR troops, and make clear to Tudjman he will be on his own if he chooses the military option.

4. Deputies agreed that, as an initial response, we would we would urge the Croatians to delay a public announcement of their decision (scheduled for the following day) pending further consultations. If this were not accepted by the Croatians, Deputies agreed that we would urge them to leave the door open to a less-than-complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and to work with us on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain at least those elements that were performing important functions:

- monitoring the March 29, 1994 ceasefire and separation of forces agreement;
- headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
- implementation of the Zagreb-4 economic confidence-building measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway;
- humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
- maintaining a liaison office in Knin to facilitate negotiations.

5. As part of this proposal, Deputies agreed that we would offer to launch a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at the political reintegration of the UN Protected Areas based on the revised Zagreb-4 plan, and to undertake a special diplomatic mission to key Western capitals to develop a coordinated Croatia strategy.

6. Deputies decided that we should not threaten to withdraw the President's commitment to link Serbian sanctions relief to progress toward a Krajina settlement, or threaten other punitive steps, at this time.

7. Deputies agreed to review the situation at their next meeting, including the Congressional dimension, in light of the Croatian response to the U.S. position set forth above. A paper laying out a diplomatic strategy, including an inventory of possible punitive steps in the U.S. bilateral relationship with Croatia, was subsequently tasked by the Interagency Working Group and should be completed by COB January 17 (**Action: State**). In addition, the Joint Staff should review the operational implications of a continued UNPROFOR presence in Croatia in support of Bosnia operations in the context of renewed fighting in the Krajina (**Action: JCS**).

UNPROFOR Strengthening and UNPROFOR Funding

8. Deputies noted the tension between ongoing efforts to strengthen/expand UNPROFOR and the need to reduce our aggregate UN peacekeeping costs. They agreed to address this issue at their next meeting. In the meantime, diplomatic efforts on UNPROFOR strengthening should continue.

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F1137

FBIS

137JAN11

UNCLAS 2K

Croatia 'Quite Satisfied' at Talks With Serbs LD1101163295 Zagreb
Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks between the Croatian state delegation, headed by Hrvoje Sarinic, and representatives of the Serbs from the occupied Croatian areas have ended at the UN Protection Force base at Pleso. The talks were also attended by mediators Owen and Stoltenberg. Tihomir Vinkovic reports on the outcome of the seven-hour talks.

[Vinkovic] Sarinic said that he was quite satisfied with the talks.

It was agreed that all the signs, apart from the internationally recognized ones, should be removed from the Zagreb- Lipovac highway. As it was confirmed that mines had been removed from the northern part of the pipeline, it will be opened by 23 January. The main problem, which has not been fully solved, is that of what oil company will operate on the occupied areas.

More talks will be held next week to discuss that and other issues concerning the implementation of the agreement of 2 December 1994, Hrvoje Sarinic said after the talks.

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FBIS 01/11/95 12:04:00

FROM:
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002. cable	re: Croatian Ambassador Darko. (2 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)

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
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~~SECRET~~

20025

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 9, 1995



20060

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(P)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
 Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held January 6, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/28/2014
2013 - D687 - F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

20025

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
January 6, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/28/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: January 6, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:10 - 4:15pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

CIA
Douglas MacEachin
Norman Schindler

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

JCS
LTG Wes Clark
BG John Walsh

State
Peter Tarnoff
Robert Frasure

UN
David Scheffer
James O'Brien

DOD
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick
Bill Danvers

WHITE HOUSE
Nancy Soderberg

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions

1. The Deputies reviewed the Interagency Working Group's analysis, conclusions, and recommendations on the inter-Serbian border closure and approved the IWG recommendation to extend sanctions relief for another 100 days, with a positive vote needed to extend and a clause to terminate sanctions relief should Serbian performance deteriorate. The Deputies authorized the IWG to develop a list of minimum essential requirements and supporting objectives for inclusion in a guidance cable for USUN use in developing a new UNSCR. Action: OVP/NSC and State.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

2. The Deputies discussed the options for consulting with Congress on the sanctions relief extension decision and agreed that calls to key members should be made Monday, January 9, before the afternoon meeting at the UN. The Deputies directed that talking points be prepared. Action: NSC

Diplomatic Strategy

3. The Deputies discussed the progress of ongoing Contact Group efforts to restart the negotiations. The Deputies requested that a list of options be developed for influencing the negotiations toward a positive outcome. This should be part of a diplomatic roadmap from now until April 30. The paper should be circulated by COB January 10 for comment prior to another Deputies meeting later in the week. Action: State.

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

4. The Deputies discussed next steps in dealing with Congress on Bosnia and agreed that a single comprehensive briefing on Bosnia should be prepared for use during the sessions next week. Action: State, in coordination with OSD, JCS and NSC.

5. The Deputies discussed timing for publication of the Secretary Perry/General Shalikashvili op-ed, deferring decision until a later date. The Deputies also agreed to develop a list of witnesses outside the Administration to speak on behalf of Administration Bosnia policy. Action: NSC

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003. draft	Paper: How to Respond to the UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (2 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)

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UNCLAS 2XX

Croatia: ICFY Issues Statement on Zagreb Airport Talks AU1101203995
 Zagreb HINA in English 1932 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 11 (HINA) -- Following is the full text of a statement released by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia [ICFY] regarding today's talks between the Croatian Government and Serb authorities from occupied areas.

"At the meeting at Pleso on 11 January 1995, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY have agreed with Mr. Sarinic and Mr. Mikelic on the following provisions for the further implementation of the Economic Agreement signed on 2 December 1994:

1. The Zagreb-Lipovac highway will be brought up to international highway standards. All signs will only be internationally agreed signs and will be located by UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force]. By 17 January UNPROFOR will draw up a timetable for the repair work required which will start immediately.

2. The first group of the ten generator poles which have all been tested under international supervision, will be transported from the Koncar factory to the Obrovac power plant as soon as possible. The repair of damage, packaging and transportation of the remaining generator poles will take place under international supervision. They will all be transported to Obrovac at the earliest possible date.

3. The demining of the oil pipeline block stations which was completed today will be confirmed by UNPROFOR experts by 14 January. On 16 January repair work of the block houses will commence in accordance with the provisions of the Economic Agreement. It is expected that the oil pipeline will be opened at the latest on 23 January.

4. Progress was achieved in today's negotiations on the establishment of a Joint Commercial Oil Company. This will be followed up by the co-chairmen.

5. On 16 January an expert group will meet to review the inspection of the Zagreb-Okucani-Brod-Mirkovci-Tovarnik railway line to decide on further activities to be undertaken.

6. Inspection of water supply systems will commence this week and will be followed immediately with the repair work required, in order to make the first phase operational by 24 February 1995.

7. The first expert group meetings on displaced persons and refugees and on pensions will take place at Pleso and in Knin respectively before the end of January.

8. Joint Commission will meet in Knin on 27 January and in Split on 24 February."

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UNCLAS 21

B-H: Karadzic Accepts Contact Group Plan as Basis for Talks LD1201022495
Belgrade TANJUG in English 0044 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 11 [date as received]

TANJUG) -- The Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic said Wednesday [11 January] that the Bosnian Serb leadership accepted the contact group plan as the basis for talks with the Muslims.

In an interview with the ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP), Karadzic said he agreed that the plan offered by the five-state contact group for Bosnia, which the Bosnian Serbs had formally [words indistinct], could be the basis for talks which he expected to resume soon.

He added, however, that the talks must begin by finding a solution to the problem of Sarajevo.

'If we [words indistinct] not make a good and just arrangement for Sarajevo, we would not give back any piece of land,' AP quoted Karadzic as saying.

He said that once the division of Sarajevo was settled, the Bosnian Serbs would exchange territory northwest of the city for three eastern Bosnian Muslim towns (Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde), which have been designated 'safe havens' by the United Nations.

Karadzic said the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to accept maps that would differ 'just a few kilometers' from the contact group maps in some cases.

The Bosnian Serb side is also ready to give up territory in central Bosnia in order to ensure that its holdings in western and northwestern Bosnia around Banja Luka should form an economically viable unit, he said.

He said, however, that the Serbs could not agree to that part of the contact group plan which gives them only a narrow corridor through the Sava River valley to link their eastern and western territories.

The Bosnian Serbs must also have access to the Adriatic Sea, Karadzic said, and referred to a 'gentlemen's agreement' with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to exchange land to allow the Serbs access to the sea, said AP.

Croatia is interested in that part of Bosnian Serb territory that lies in the hinterland of the Croatian Adriatic resort of Dubrovnik.

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005. paper	U.S. Non-Paper Presented to Croatian Envoys. (1 page)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

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U.S. says Croat ejection of U.N. unwise<

By SID BALMAN Jr.=

UPI Diplomatic Writer=

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11 (UPI) Croatia's decision to oust U.N. peacekeepers from the Krajina could lead to an escalation in fighting and threaten humanitarian efforts in the Serb-held region, U.S. officials said Wednesday.

Although Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has previously made such threats, U.S. officials say he is serious this time. Tudjman "formally" notified the United Nations of his intentions to oust the 8,000 peacekeepers, and this week informed diplomats from the five-nation "contact group" attempting to broker peace in the Balkans.

"We believe that (United Nations Protection Forces) make an essential contribution to peace and stability in the Balkans," State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly said.

"Its patrol of the buffer zone between Croatian government and rebel-Serb forces prevents clashes that otherwise could escalate into a renewed Serb-Croat war. UNPROFOR's role in Bosnia of protecting relief convoys and mediating arrangements between the parties provides vital protection to communities under siege by Serb forces."

Croatia's agreement to allow the U.N. mission expires in March.

Shelly said Tudjman still will permit the United Nations to use Croatian territory as a staging area for the shipment of humanitarian supplies into Bosnia-Herzegovina and for temporarily housing refugees.

Clinton administration diplomats will urge Tudjman to reconsider his decision during meetings with two Croatian envoys Miomir Zuzu and Miroslav Tudjman at the State Department Thursday, U.S. officials said.

Tudjman told Charlie Thomas, the U.S. representative on the contact group, and his counterparts from Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany, during meetings this week that he had grown "impatient" with unsuccessful attempts to end the Balkan conflict, they said.

Tudjman said he would try on his own now to negotiate a withdrawal of Serb nationalist forces from the Krajina, an area of central and south Croatia that has been occupied since the Serb-Croat war ended nearly two years ago, they said.

Tudjman assured representatives from the five powers that he did not intend to take it back through force, they said, but Washington remains "concerned" about that prospect.

"He wants to preserve the territorial integrity of his country," a senior U.S. official said under conditions of anonymity. "I wouldn't necessarily read it as Tudjman having opted for the military option."

Tudjman told Thomas and the others that ejecting U.N. troops would create a perception among the Krajina Serbs that they are no longer under international protection, the official said, which may compel them to enter negotiations on disposition of the territory.

"He came to the conclusion this time they could do more by working directly," the official said. "The presence of UNPROFOR allows the Krajina Serbs to do nothing."

UPI- 01/11/95 15:38:00

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AIDE-MEMOIRE

Croatia has decided to consider the present mandate of UNPROFOR terminated, effective March 31, 1995, with the withdrawal to be completed no later than three months following the expiration of the present mandate. The decision has been submitted to the UN Secretary General in the letter of the President dr. Franjo Tudman, according to the President's constitutional powers and following the two previous resolutions of Croatia's Parliament.

COMMENTS:

* the presence of UNPROFOR at the beginning has had many positive effects on the situation in Croatia: (a) UNPROFOR has made significant contributions in respect of the humanitarian needs in Croatia, (b) it has played an important role in the partial withdrawal of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) from Croatia, and (c) its arrival signified an end to large-scale hostilities in Croatia

* but at the same time, UNPROFOR has not been able to carry out most of the major operative provisions of the Vance Plan and the subsequent UN SC resolutions, including resolution 947 (1994)

* for example, in two years of UNPROFOR presence in Croatia, the process of ethnic cleansing of the Croats and non-Serbs in the occupied territories has been completed: some 600 Croats have been killed and more than 12.000 thousand Croats and non-Serbs have been forcefully expelled - bringing the total of the expelled persons to 390.000 (Croats, Hungarians, Ruthenians, the Czech, Slovaks)

* Croatia still cares and provides for more than one quarter of a million of the displaced persons; plunder of Croatian wealth and natural resources, as well as destruction of property have continued unabated

* of the four key provisions of the Vance Plan - (i) demilitarization of the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs), (ii) placing of military observers in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina adjacent to Croatia, (iii) forming of police units in UNPAs consistent with pre-war ethnic proportions and under the UN Civil Police observance, and (iv) returning of displaced persons to their homes, not one has been achieved

* in this respect the most critical has been the UNPROFOR's failure to establish control of Croatia's international borders, consistent with UN SC Resolution 769 (1992)

* all this has provided the local Serbian leadership in the occupied territories with a false sense of security, it has enhanced its intransigence and has been proven as the greatest obstacle to successful completion of the negotiations

* however, primary responsibility for the failure to implement the UN SC resolutions through the presence and activities of UNPROFOR in Croatia, clearly rests and remains with the government of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) and its proxies in the occupied territories of Croatia

* the FRY and the local Serb authorities consistently continue to reject any decisive measures outlined by the UN SC and GA documents aimed at re-integration of the occupied

territories into the Croatian political and economic systems

* on the other hand, they have practically completed the process of total inclusion of the occupied Croatian territories into the political, military, economic and administrative system of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in clear contravention of relevant UN SC resolutions, as well as UN GA Resolution 49/43 declaring that the UNPAs are *de facto* occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia

* it is against this background, the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia by its Resolution of September 23, 1994 (S/1994/1095) decided that the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia would be conditionally extended for a period of one hundred days, only if specific steps would be undertaken and achieved during that period

* by its Decision of October 6, 1994 the Parliament welcomed the new mandate established by the Security Council resolution 947 (1994), and reaffirmed its decision of September 23, that the UNPROFOR mandate has been terminated, unless specific steps were implemented by January 10, 1995.

* in the meantime, the occupied Croatian territories have been used for constant attacks on other parts of Croatia and even neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina; even one UN Protected Area (Sector South) in one country, Croatia, is being used for attacks against a UN Safe Zone (Bihać) in another, Bosnia and Herzegovina

* but nevertheless Croatia has continued to demonstrate and exercise the highest degree of good will, cooperation and restraint during this difficult period : the Zagreb Cease-Fire Agreement has been followed by the Economic Agreements of December 2, 1994 as yet another clear proof of Croatia's full readiness to proceed with its program of peaceful re-integration of the occupied territories

* but less than ten percent of the Economic Agreements (except with respect to the opening of the Highway in UNPA West, but not fully pursuant to the Agreement) has been implemented so far, with rather slim chances that real further progress is possible, because the local Serbs authorities are rejecting outright any discussions on political re-integration of the occupied territories; they have rejected any notion of the Economic Agreements being an inseparable and composite part of the political solution, and strongly opposed any mention of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions in the introductory parts of the agreements, not to speak of their full implementation

* therefore it is very clear that the local Serbian representatives have been abusing the process of negotiations to prolong the *de facto* state of occupation and try to turn it into an act of secession

* in this they are encouraged, supported and guided by the Belgrade government which continues to reject calls for mutual recognition issued by the Security Council, General Assembly, EU and the G-7 Summit in Naples

* Belgrade is demonstrating the policy of double standards by refusing the notion of recognition, attempting to complete the process of full inclusion of the occupied Croatian territories into the various systems of FRY (Serbia/Montenegro), whilst at the same time seeking the lifting of the sanctions regime

* any such attempts must be rejected and sanctions should not be suspended before recognition of Croatia within its internationally recognised borders by FRY (Serbia/Montenegro)

* Croatia finds the present situation in the occupied territories totally unacceptable and, given the present static UNPROFOR mandate, the continued presence of UNPROFOR in the occupied territories counterproductive to the peace process

* in light of these aforementioned arguments and Croatia's overall experience during the last two years the President of the Republic of Croatia, dr. Franjo Tudman, has concluded that, despite the positive role UNPROFOR has played in preventing outbreaks of violence and major conflicts in Croatia, the present nature and character of the UNPROFOR mandate do not provide means and conditions necessary for establishing the lasting peace and order in the Republic of Croatia; therefore the President has decided to inform the UN Secretary General that the mandate of UNPROFOR is terminated effective March 31, 1995

* termination of the UNPROFOR mandate will not put an end to the negotiations, but just the opposite - it should provide a crucial new impetus for their more efficient continuation and outcome

* in the spirit of the President's Peace Initiative of November 1, 1993, Croatia continues to offer to all Serbs in Croatia (a) cultural autonomy and highest level of local autonomy in the counties in which the Serbs used to constitute majority according to the pre-war census; (b) full respect of all human rights, and especially minority rights, can be observed and monitored by proper representatives of the international community

* Croatia is willing to closely and fully cooperate with Secretary General's Special Representative regarding the secure presence of UNPROFOR personell in Croatia so that the withdrawal can be accomplished in a dignified, orderly and efficient way

* Croatia stands ready to conclude with the UN an agreement on continued logistic assistance and support for UNPROFOR's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the uninterrupted functioning of the UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb

* Croatia is also prepared to intensify negotiating process with Belgrade leading to recognition within the internationally recognised borders to be followed by normalisation of relations

* should the negotiations with the local Serbs in the interim period bring adeaquate results, Croatia is ready to re-open the talks on establishing appropriate implementation and international monitoring and confidence building mechanisms

* in this regard, the implementation of relevant UN SC and GA resolutions as a part of the political re-integration - and in particular full implementation of the Economic Agreements concluded under the auspices of the ICFY, UNPROFOR and EUMM and signed by the local Serb authorities by March 31, 1995 - shall be considered crucially important criteria by Croatia

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007. report	Croatia. (3 pages)	01/13/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

2013-0687-F

vz2667

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Republika Hrvatska / Republic of Croatia

Predsjednik / President

*His Excellency
Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary General of the
United Nations*

Excellency,

The on-going crisis in South-Eastern Europe, started by the aggression of the Yugoslav Communist Army and of Serbia and Montenegro, following the dissolution of the former SFR of Yugoslavia, against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, has become a grave security threat to the whole region. In its progress the crisis has disrupted international peace and paralyzed numerous international fora : the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc. The unspeakable crimes committed against humanity and great suffering of millions of people have been putting an ever increasing strain on international institutions and humanitarian organizations.

The international community, including the United Nations, has been involved in attempts to resolve the crisis from its outbreak. The Vance Plan and the UNPROFOR mission had positive effects on the situation in the beginning. UNPROFOR and UNHCR, as well as other humanitarian organizations, have made significant contributions in respect of humanitarian needs in Croatia. UNPROFOR played an important role in the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) from Croatia (although the JNA left on that occasion its armament to the local Serb insurgents). UNPROFOR's arrival signified an end to large-scale hostilities in Croatia. During its engagement more than 50 of its members have lost their lives and more than 500 have been wounded while valiantly carrying out their duties in Croatia. Croatia will always remain grateful and will remember their ultimate sacrifice and the loss to their families.

Despite its endeavours, UNPROFOR has been unable to implement the most important operative provisions of the Vance Plan and subsequent Security

Council resolutions, including the latest Resolution 947(1994). The key provisions of the Vance Plan (Res. 740/1992, preceded by the Res. 721/1991) included: the demilitarization of the UNPAs (i.e., disarming and disbanding of rebel Serb units); the establishment of the local police force (with only side arms) in a proportion reflecting the national composition of the population which lived there before the hostilities, under civilian UN police monitors; the deployment of military observers in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina adjacent to Croatia; the return of displaced persons to their homes. None of these provisions have been implemented. Moreover, a critically important element of the peace process, i.e., the control of Croatia's international border, provided for by Resolution 769 (1992), has not been enforced.

Mr. Secretary General,

As the previous UNPROFOR mandate was about to expire, you came to the conclusion, in your Report to the Security Council (S/1994/1667 of September 17, 1994), that the Vance Plan and all subsequent resolutions had not been implemented due to the opposition of rebel Serbs in UNPAs, with the exception that (notwithstanding frequent violations) armed hostilities had ceased. You further concluded that UNPROFOR was in no position to discharge its responsibilities and meet the demands justifiably made by Croatia, because it lacked the required forces and resources, and that such a stalemate contributed to sustaining the unsatisfactory status quo.

The situation has not changed since at all. The responsibility still rests with the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and its proxies in the occupied territories of Croatia. The Belgrade government and the local Serb authorities in Knin have accepted only some minor provisions of the Security Council resolutions. They continue to reject any decisive measures outlined by the Security Council and the General Assembly aimed at reintegrating the occupied territories into Croatia. On the contrary, the process of integrating the occupied territories of Croatia into the political, military, legal and administrative system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues despite the General Assembly Resolution 49/43 of last month declaring that the UNPAs are de facto occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia.

In the two years of UNPROFOR presence in Croatia, the process of ethnic cleansing of the Croats and non-Serbs in the occupied territories has been completed. Before the arrival of UNPROFOR Serb insurgents, aided by the JNA, expelled (ethnically cleansed) from the occupied territories 390,000 non-Serb residents (Croats, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, etc.) and killed many thousands at the same time. Some 600 Croats have been killed and 12,000 of them forcefully expelled since UNPROFOR has been entrusted with

protection of these territories. Plunder of Croatian wealth and natural resources, as well as destruction of property, have continued. Moreover, the occupied territories of Croatia have been used for constant attacks on other parts of Croatia and even Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community has recently been aghast and scandalized when the UN Safe Zone of Bihać in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina has been unchallengedly attacked by Serb insurgents from UNPAs. These attacks by the UNPA Serbian forces continue even today, despite the general cease-fire agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in gross violation of all international norms.

Croatia has demonstrated and exercised the highest degree of good will, co-operation and restraint during the last two difficult years. Croatia has even accepted considerable modifications to the Vance Plan, such as the establishment of the 'pink zones' and the 'blue lines', the latter being an element of the Zagreb Cease-fire Agreement of March 29, 1994, which has been grossly violated, most blatantly so through the co-ordinated offensive and aggression on Bihać by the Serbs from the occupied territories of Croatia.

The Economic Agreements signed on December 2, 1994, which have to be viewed as yet another clear proof of Croatia's full readiness to proceed with its programme of peaceful re-integration of the occupied territories, are not being implemented except with respect to the opening of the highway in UNPA West, but even that has not been done pursuant to the Agreement. Less than one-tenth of these Agreements have been implemented so far, with rather slim chances for real further progress, because local Serbs are interpreting the resolutions and decisions of the UN, and the Economic Agreements, as allowing them to secede from Croatia.

Excellency,

Croatia finds the present situation in the occupied territories wholly unacceptable. Moreover, given the present inefficient UNPROFOR mission, Croatia finds the continued presence of UNPROFOR in the occupied territories to be significantly counterproductive to the peace process. The Serb intransigence and UNPROFOR's reserve is de facto allowing and promoting occupation of parts of Croatia's territory. The 'freezing' of a negative status quo is unacceptable for the Croatian Government.

The Parliament of the Republic of Croatia, by its Resolution of September 23, 1994, decided that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate in Croatia would be conditionally extended for a period of one hundred days, following its expiration on September 30, only if specific steps were undertaken and results achieved during that period.

On the basis of the aforementioned and Croatia's overall experience during the last two years I can only conclude that, although UNPROFOR has played an important role in stopping violence and major conflicts in Croatia, it is an indisputable fact that the present character of the UNPROFOR mission does not provide conditions necessary for establishing lasting peace and order in the Republic of Croatia, a sovereign UN Member State.

Mr. Secretary General,

Therefore, as the President of the Republic of Croatia, I have the honour to inform you that the UNPROFOR mandate is hereby terminated effective March 31, 1995 in accordance with Resolution 947 (1994).

The Croatian Government will immediately contact your Special Representative Mr. Y. Akashi and will discuss with him all the questions regarding the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces. We hope it will be accomplished in a dignified, proper and efficient way till the end of the mandate or no later than three months after the expiry of the mandate.

Croatia is also prepared to conclude with the United Nations an agreement on continued logistic assistance and support for UNPROFOR's operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the continued and uninterrupted functioning of the UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb. In both aspects the UN can fully count and rely on the continued support and assistance of the appropriate Croatian governmental institutions.

Excellency,

The termination of the UNPROFOR mandate will not put an end to the negotiations; on the contrary, it should provide a new impetus for their more efficient outcome. The Republic of Croatia remains committed to its long-standing policy of peaceful re-integration of its occupied territories and continues to offer to all Serbs in Croatia cultural autonomy and the highest level of local autonomy in the counties in which the Serbs constituted the majority according to the pre-war census. Full respect of all human rights, and especially minority rights, can be observed and monitored by appropriate representatives of the international community.

Croatia is also prepared to intensify the negotiating process with the Belgrade authorities leading to mutual recognition within internationally recognized borders. It is, however, our most determined demand that the sanctions against the Belgrade regime and Bosnian Serbs should not be

suspended before the recognition of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders by Belgrade, as a prerequisite for the peaceful reintegration of occupied parts of Croatia.


Should the negotiations with local Serb authorities be successful, Croatia is willing to re-open the discussion on establishing appropriate implementation and international monitoring of confidence building mechanisms.

The Republic of Croatia remains deeply grateful and indebted to the thousands of UNPROFOR men and women who have served honourably in Croatia, to Your Excellency, to the UN Security Council, to the many UNPROFOR troop-contributing countries, and to all Member States that have financed and supported the present peacekeeping operation in Croatia.

Our decision should not be misunderstood under any circumstances. Croatia remains fully committed to the interests of the international community focused on peaceful establishment of a new international order in the region, and to its responsibility therein. The international community should continue to count on Croatia in this regard.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

*The President
of the Republic of Croatia*



Dr. Franjo Tuđman

Zagreb, January 12, 1995

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Deputies Committee background. [incomplete] (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

2013-0687-F

vz2667

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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UNPROFOR OPERATIONS IN CROATIA

UNPROFOR's operations in Croatia now consist of the following functions:

- Patrolling the separation zone between Croatian and Serb forces, to monitor compliance with the March '94 cease-fire;
- Facilitating implementation of the December '94 agreement to re-open the highway through Sector West and restore water, electric, and oil supply across the confrontation line;
- Monitoring the situation in the Serb-held areas;
- Supporting UNPROFOR operations in Macedonia and Bosnia, including some escort of relief convoys in and through the UNPAs;
- Running a political operation that mediates among the parties and reports to the UNSYG on the Balkan conflict.

Under the Vance Plan, the UNSC charged UNPROFOR with creating conditions of security to allow negotiations, disarming militias, and protecting persons from armed attack. These mandates have largely gone unfulfilled due to lack of Serb cooperation. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR maintains a significant presence in the UN Protected Areas and other Serb-held "pink zones."

UNPROFOR consists of 14,937 personnel in Croatia, according to 1994 year-end figures. They are deployed as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters	203	28	1223	1463
Sector North	3638	156	202	3996
Sector South	3932	141	211	4284
Sector East	1640	122	212	1974
Sector West	2945	85	190	3220

The national make-up of the troop contingents is as follows:

Sector North	Danish	908
	Ukrainian	545
	Polish	1136
	Jordanian	995
Sector South	Czech	898
	Kenyan	981
	Canadian	764
	Jordanian	1210
Sector East	Belgian	628
	Russian	978
Sector West	Argentine	994
	Jordanian	1022
	Nepalese	901

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	Duplicate of 004c. (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

2013-0687-F

vz2667

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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010. cable	Duplicate of 004b. (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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vz2667

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^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-CROATIA 1STLD

^Croatia will not renew UNPROFOR mandate - Premier
(Eds: Updates with different interpretation of mandate)
By Mark O'Neill

BEIJING (Reuter) - Croatia will not extend the mandate of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the third of its country occupied by Serbs when it expires at the end of January, Prime Minister Nikica Valentic said Wednesday.

Croatia's interpretation of the mandate differs from that of the United Nations Security Council, which says it runs until the end of March after being renewed for six months Sept. 30.

Valentic's government has approved UNPROFOR's mandate in the Krajina region of Croatia that is occupied by the Serbs until January 31 but will not extend it beyond that date, Valentic told a news conference during a five-day visit to China.

"The UNPROFOR has not fulfilled its task there," he said.
"What the UNPROFOR is doing in Croatia is to maintain the status quo, actually providing aid to the Serbs through giving oil and food to them.

"Under such circumstances, we cannot agree to the renewal of the mandate."

Under the Security Council resolution, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali must give a progress report by January 20 on what has been done to implement plans to reunite Croatia with the region occupied by the Serbs.

The Security Council also promised to consider this month a review of the mandate.

Thursday Croatian President Franjo Tudjman will make a detailed statement to Boutros-Ghali on the UNPROFOR issue, Valentic said.

Zagreb wants to resume control of Krajina and is angry with UNPROFOR because it has not been able to do so.

The decision not to extend the mandate does not mean Croatia has chosen war, Valentic said, adding that both Serbia and Croatia know the consequence of war. He was referring to their bitter 1991 conflict during the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.

Speaking of Bosnia, Valentic said all parties -- especially

INTERNATIONAL

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Serbia and Montenegro -- must reach a peaceful political settlement in the remaining three and a half months of the four-month cease-fire.

The cease-fire, brokered by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, has generally been holding since it came into effect on December 24.

"If not, there is a danger of an escalation of the conflict which might extend to the whole former Yugoslavia or even outside," he said.

Croatia could not accept the current situation in which the Serbs, who account for 32 percent of the population of Bosnia, occupied more than 70 percent of its territory as well as one-third of the territory of Croatia, Valentic said.

His government suggested several principles to resolve the conflict, including one calling for all republics of the former Yugoslavia to recognize each other.

The Serbs of Krajina say they do not want to live under the Croatian government.

Valentic, on his first visit to China since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992, met President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and other top officials.

He arrived Monday and was due to visit Xian and the southern city of Kunming before leaving Friday. Several agreements are to be signed during his visit, including a consular accord and another on double taxation.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Presidential Letter to Tadjman on UNPROFOR Renewal. Record ID: 9500173. (2 pages)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [7]

2013-0687-F
vz2667

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011b. cable	Duplicate of 004b. (3 pages)	01/09/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011c. cable	re: Tudjman Decides UNPROFOR Must Go. (4 pages)	01/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

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012. cable	re: Tudjman's Decision on UNPROFOR May Be Made Public Before the Washington Talks. (2 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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**EUR PRESS GUIDANCE
JANUARY 11, 1995**

CROATIA: UNPROFOR REDUCTION

Q: What is the U.S. view regarding Croatia's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mission in Croatia?

- A: -- WE ARE CONCERNED BY REPORTS THAT CROATIA WILL ASK UNPROFOR TO LEAVE CROATIA WHEN ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE EXPIRES AT THE END OF MARCH.**
- WE BELIEVE THAT UNPROFOR MAKES AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN THE BALKANS.**
- ITS PATROL OF THE BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN CROATIAN GOVERNMENT AND REBEL SERB FORCES PREVENTS CLASHES THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO A RENEWED SERBO-CROAT WAR;**
- ITS ROLE IN BOSNIA PROTECTING RELIEF CONVOYS AND MEDIATING ARRANGEMENTS AMONG THE PARTIES PROVIDES VITAL PROTECTION FOR COMMUNITIES UNDER SIEGE FROM SERB FORCES;**

- 2 -

- ITS PRESENCE IN MACEDONIA CREATES A FIREBREAK TO HELP CONTAIN THE BALKAN CONFLICT.
- CROATIA'S DECISION, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, WOULD NOT AFFECT UNPROFOR'S OPERATIONS UNTIL THE END OF MARCH AND WOULD APPLY ONLY TO ITS MISSION IN CROATIA, NOT TO ITS SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR ACTIVITY IN BOSNIA AND MACEDONIA.
- WE WILL EXPLORE THESE ISSUES IN THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK OF CROATIAN SPECIAL ENVOYS MIOMIR ZUZUL (MEE-OH-MEER ZOO-ZOOL) AND MIROSLAV TUDJMAN (MEER-OH-SLAV TOODGE-MAN).
- WE BELIEVE IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR CROATIA TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND WITH INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PURSUE PEACE IN THE BALKANS.

-3-

- THE ISSUE AT HAND IS THE SLOW PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN CROATIA, WHICH MUST RESTORE CROATIAN SOVEREIGNTY TO ITS INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED TERRITORY WHILE GUARANTEEING AUTONOMY FOR SERB COMMUNITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL PERSONS IN CROATIA.

- WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE "ZAGREB FOUR" PROCESS TO PURSUE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SERB-OCCUPIED CROATIA.

- WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT THERE IS ESSENTIAL FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND WE EXPECT ZAGREB'S ACTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT GOAL.