

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Croatia: Implications of a UN Withdrawal. (3 pages)	01/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Peter Tarnoff from Toby Gati. Subject: Croatia. (2 pages)	01/12/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. cable	re: Presidential Letter to Tudjman. (2 pages)	01/08/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. cable	re: Tudjman Responds. (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	U.S. Non-Paper Presented to Croatian Envoys. (1 page)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For Peter Tarnoff from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Croatian Decision Not to Renew UNPROFOR. (3 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
005. talking points	Points on the UNPROFOR Mandate. (4 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Tudjman: If There's No Progress. (5 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)
008. talking points	Points on the UNPROFOR Mandate. (2 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)
009a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520044. (4 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
009b. cable	Duplicate of 003a. (2 pages)	01/08/1994	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
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Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2666

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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009c. cable	Duplicate of 003b. (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



IO/UNP

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE

URGENT

TEL. 847-0045

FAX: 847-0039

COVER • ONE PAGES

FROM:

John W. Chamberlin

TO:

NSC - Don Kerrick/Sandy Vershbow - 456-9150

NSC - Susan Rice - 456-9360

OSD - John Klekas - 703-695-6506

JCS - Balkans Unit - 703-697-0180

_____- _____ - _____
_____- _____ - _____

SUBJECT: CROATIA/UNPROFOR - REVISED DRAFT PRES.

STATEMENT

COMMENTS: NOTE: ① PARA 3 - "RECONSIDERATION" IS NOW "REEXAMINATION";

② LAST SENT. PARA 1 (MOVED FROM PARA 2), REFERENCE TO GOC REMOVED;

③ PARA 4, REF. TO ICFF CO - CHAIRS REMOVED; ④ NEW PARA 5

SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH INSTRUCTIONS. AGREE?

JAN-16-1995 19:13 FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK

TO

LC MIG P.002/002

1800 16 January

The Security Council, which has begun its consideration of the Secretary-General's report of 14 January 1995 submitted pursuant to resolution 947 (1994) (S/1995/38), has learned with concern of the position adopted by the Government of the Republic of Croatia concerning the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia beyond 31 March 1995, as set out in the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the Secretary-General of 12 January 1995 (S/1995/38). It is concerned about the wider implications of this development for the peace process throughout the Former Yugoslavia.

The Security Council reiterates its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognised borders. It understands the concerns of the Croatian Government about the lack of implementation of major provisions of the United Nations Peace-keeping Plan for Croatia. It will not accept the status quo becoming an indefinite situation. It believes, however, that UNPROFOR's continued presence in the Republic of Croatia is of vital importance for regional peace and security, and that the United Nations in general and UNPROFOR in particular have a positive role to play in achieving the further implementation of the Peace-keeping Plan and bringing about a settlement which ensures full respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Croatia. It recalls the important role UNPROFOR plays in helping to sustain the cease-fire in Croatia, facilitating humanitarian activities and international relief work, and supporting implementation of the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 (S/1994/1375).

It is in that perspective that the Security Council hopes that discussions over the weeks ahead will lead to re-examination of the position now taken in relation to the continuing role of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia.

Meanwhile, the Security Council calls upon all parties and others concerned to avoid any action or statement which might lead to an increase in tension. It welcomes the conclusion, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, of the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994, and looks to the parties to continue, and accelerate, its implementation; it notes the need for adequate international financial support, and calls on the international community to respond to this need. It calls for the intensification in the coming weeks of all these efforts to consolidate this achievement and to bring about a political settlement in Croatia, and urges the parties to cooperate with these efforts and to negotiate in earnest to that end.

The Security Council affirms its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States there within their internationally recognised borders, and stresses the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof.

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002. memo	For Peter Tarnoff from Toby Gati. Subject: Croatia. (2 pages)	01/12/1995	P1/b(1)

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0277

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
SUBJECT: Update on Bosnia and Croatia

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President updating him on Bosnia and Croatia, following up on the January 11 Deputies Committee meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Tudjman of January 9
Tab B Tudjman's Reply of January 10
Tab C U.S. Proposal to Croatian Envoys of January 11

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/28/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT: Update on Bosnia and Croatia

Deputies met on Wednesday to review diplomatic efforts in Bosnia and to formulate an initial response to President Tudjman's decision to terminate the mandate for UNPROFOR in Croatia. Here's the state of play.

Contact Group Strategy

At Tuesday's Contact Group meeting in Paris, agreement was reached to dispatch Contact Group representatives to Belgrade, Sarajevo, Pale and Zagreb in an effort to get negotiations started. In Pale, the group will be authorized only to discuss "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan as the basis for talks, not to renegotiate the plan. This reflects the Bosnian Government's view that the deal Karadzic struck with President Carter was insufficient. It is not yet clear whether either side is really interested in negotiating, as opposed to using the cessation of hostilities to rest and rearm. Nevertheless, State remains hopeful that a formula can be found in the next few weeks that will permit serious shuttle diplomacy by the Contact Group to begin between Sarajevo and Pale.

Deputies will be reviewing the constitutional and territorial issues in detail in preparation for renewed bargaining, although the U.S. will need to stay close to the Bosnian Government to avoid creating any impression we are twisting their arms.

Tudjman's Decision to Eject UNPROFOR

The shaky peace process in Bosnia is now in danger of being overwhelmed by renewed tensions -- and perhaps a new war -- in Croatia. President Tudjman today informed Boutros-Ghali that Croatia will terminate the mandate for UNPROFOR in Croatia when it expires on March 31. In so doing, he rebuffed a letter sent in your name urging that he reconsider this move, as well as strong pressure from the Germans. (Your letter and his reply are attached.) Tudjman claimed that, in two years, UNPROFOR has failed to produce any progress toward reintegration of the Serb-occupied lands, and that UNPROFOR's withdrawal is the only way to

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

shock the Serbs into negotiating seriously. His one concession was to allow an additional three months for a "dignified and orderly" withdrawal.

Before publicizing the decision, Tudjman sent two high-level envoys to Washington to explain his rationale. Deputies agreed that we would urge the Croatians to pull back from demanding UNPROFOR's complete pullout, since this was certain to trigger a new war. We would offer to lead a reinvigorated diplomatic effort and to work with Zagreb on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain only those elements that were performing important functions -- policing the ceasefire, keeping the forces separated, and implementing the recent accord opening the Zagreb-Belgrade highway (Tab C).

In a two-hour meeting with Peter Tarnoff last night, however, the Croatian envoys showed little interest in this proposal. It was clear that they had been sent to inform, rather than consult, with us (and Peter strongly criticized them for this). Tudjman's letter to Boutros-Ghali, while ostensibly revised in response to our ideas, contained little new flexibility. Our Ambassador believes Tudjman has consciously opted for retaking the Krajina by force. The intelligence community, however, believes the chances of success are low -- particularly if Milosevic's forces intervene in support of the Krajina Serbs, as he is likely to do.

We will continue to press the Croatians to reverse course, and we will likely need to begin rolling back aspects of our bilateral relationship to signal our opposition to Tudjman's high-risk gambit. Tudjman needs to know that his brinksmanship will not be cost-free and that his integration into the West is in jeopardy. This said, we need to be careful not to drive Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia. Thus we will proceed with ongoing plans to accelerate diplomatic efforts aimed at a settlement that reintegrates the Krajina while providing substantial autonomy for the Serbs.

Attachments:

- Tab A Letter to Tudjman of January 9
- Tab B Tudjman's reply of January 10
- Tab C U.S. proposal to Croatian envoys of January 11

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**EUR PRESS GUIDANCE
JANUARY 12, 1995**

CROATIA: UNPROFOR

Q: Are we trying to get the Croats to reconsider their decision not to renew the UNPROFOR mandate? Who are the Croats meeting with in Washington, and when?

A: -- CROATIAN REPRESENTATIVES MET YESTERDAY WITH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. THEY EXPLAINED PRESIDENT TUDJMAN'S INTENTION NOT TO AGREE TO AN EXTENSION OF THE UNPROFOR MANDATE IN CROATIA AFTER MARCH 31. UNPROFOR ELEMENTS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO STAY IN CROATIA FOR AS MUCH AS THREE MONTHS AFTER THIS DATE TO EFFECT THEIR WITHDRAWAL AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES FOR UNPROFOR ACTIVITIES IN BOSNIA AND THE FYROM WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED.

-- THE U.S. HAS EXPRESSED ITS PROFOUND DISAGREEMENT WITH THE CROATIAN POSITION, WHICH COULD PRODUCE RENEWED CONFLICT BETWEEN REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND KRAJINA SERB FORCES.

-2-

- WE WILL BE WORKING WITH CROATIA IN THE NEXT DAYS AND WEEKS IN AN EFFORT TO RESTRICT THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THIS DECISION, BOTH WITHIN CROATIA AND IN NEIGHBORING REPUBLICS.

- THE SECRETARY SPOKE WITH GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER KINKEL ON THIS SUBJECT THIS MORNING AND TOLD HIM WE ASSOCIATE OURSELVES FULLY WITH BONN'S STRONG VIEW THAT THE UNPROFOR MANDATE SHOULD BE RENEWED.

(FYI: Kinkel had just met with Croatian FM Granic and was on his way to a joint press conference.)

Croatian Decision to Terminate UNPROFOR Mandate

- We have expressed our strong disagreement with President Tudjman's decision not to extend UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires at the end of March.
- When we were informed of the impending decision, President Clinton wrote to President Tudjman on Monday night to express his strong concerns.
- The President stressed that, despite UNPROFOR's shortcomings, it is playing a stabilizing role in monitoring the ceasefire and implementing the recent agreement to open the Belgrade-Zagreb highway.
- Its departure could set back peace efforts, lead to renewed fighting between Croatian and Krajina Serb forces, and further destabilize the Balkan region.
- The President received a reply from President Tudjman the following day, and on Wednesday evening, Under Secretary Tarnoff and other State and NSC officials met with Croatian envoys sent to explain the Croatian position.
- We regret that the Government of Croatia has nevertheless proceeded with its decision, while we respect its sovereign right to do so.
- We will be working with the Croatians in the coming days and weeks in an effort to find a solution that could permit the continued presence of UN forces in support of peace in Croatia and mitigate the adverse effects of this decision.

Copy

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Croatia has decided to consider the present mandate of UNPROFOR terminated effective March 31, 1995, with the withdrawal to be completed no later than three months following the expiration of the present mandate. The decision has been submitted to the UN Secretary General in the letter of the President dr. Franjo Tudman, according to the President's constitutional powers and following the two previous resolutions of Croatia's Parliament.

COMMENTS:

- * the presence of UNPROFOR at the beginning has had many positive effects on the situation in Croatia: (a) UNPROFOR has made significant contributions in respect of the humanitarian needs in Croatia, (b) it has played an important role in the partial withdrawal of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) from Croatia, and (c) its arrival signified an end to large-scale hostilities in Croatia

- * but at the same time, UNPROFOR has not been able to carry out most of the major operative provisions of the Vance Plan and the subsequent UN SC resolutions, including resolution 947 (1994)

- * for example, in two years of UNPROFOR presence in Croatia, the process of ethnic cleansing of the Croats and non-Serbs in the occupied territories has been completed: some 600 Croats have been killed and more than 12.000 thousand Croats and non-Serbs have been forcefully expelled - bringing the total of the expelled persons to 390.000 (Croats, Hungarians, Ruthenians, the Czech, Slovaks)

- * Croatia still cares and provides for more than one quarter of a million of the displaced persons; plunder of Croatian wealth and natural resources, as well as destruction of property have continued unabated

- * of the four key provisions of the Vance Plan - (i) demilitarization of the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs), (ii) placing of military observers in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina adjacent to Croatia, (iii) forming of police units in UNPAs consistent with pre-war ethnic proportions and under the UN Civil Police observance, and (iv) returning of displaced persons to their homes, not one has been achieved

- * in this respect the most critical has been the UNPROFOR's failure to establish control of Croatia's international borders, consistent with UN SC Resolution 769 (1992)

- * all this has provided the local Serbian leadership in the occupied territories with a false sense of security, it has enhanced its intransigence and has been proven as the greatest obstacle to successful completion of the negotiations

- * however, primary responsibility for the failure to implement the UN SC resolutions through the presence and activities of UNPROFOR in Croatia, clearly rests and remains with the government of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) and its proxies in the occupied territories of Croatia

- * the FRY and the local Serb authorities consistently continue to reject any decisive measures outlined by the UN SC and GA documents aimed at re-integration of the occupied

territories into the Croatian political and economic systems

- * on the other hand, they have practically completed the process of total inclusion of the occupied Croatian territories into the political, military, economic and administrative system of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in clear contravention of relevant UN SC resolutions, as well as UN GA Resolution 49/43 declaring that the UNPAs are *de facto* occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia

- * it is against this background, the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia by its Resolution of September 23, 1994 (S/1994/1095) decided that the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia would be conditionally extended for a period of one hundred days, only if specific steps would be undertaken and achieved during that period

- * by its Decision of October 6, 1994 the Parliament welcomed the new mandate established by the Security Council resolution 947 (1994), and reaffirmed its decision of September 23, that the UNPROFOR mandate has been terminated, unless specific steps were implemented by January 10, 1995.

- * in the meantime, the occupied Croatian territories have been used for constant attacks on other parts of Croatia and even neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina; even one UN Protected Area (Sector South) in one country, Croatia, is being used for attacks against a UN Safe Zone (Bihać) in another, Bosnia and Herzegovina

- * but nevertheless Croatia has continued to demonstrate and exercise the highest degree of good will, cooperation and restraint during this difficult period : the Zagreb Cease-Fire Agreement has been followed by the Economic Agreements of December 2, 1994 as yet another clear proof of Croatia's full readiness to proceed with its program of peaceful re-integration of the occupied territories

- * but less than ten percent of the Economic Agreements (except with respect to the opening of the Highway in UNPA West, but not fully pursuant to the Agreement) has been implemented so far, with rather slim chances that real further progress is possible, because the local Serbs authorities are rejecting outright any discussions on political re-integration of the occupied territories; they have rejected any notion of the Economic Agreements being an inseparable and composite part of the political solution, and strongly opposed any mention of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions in the introductory parts of the agreements, not to speak of their full implementation

- * therefore it is very clear that the local Serbian representatives have been abusing the process of negotiations to prolong the *de facto* state of occupation and try to turn it into an act of secession

- * in this they are encouraged, supported and guided by the Belgrade government which continues to reject calls for mutual recognition issued by the Security Council, General Assembly, EU and the G-7 Summit in Naples

- * Belgrade is demonstrating the policy of double standards by refusing the notion of recognition, attempting to complete the process of full inclusion of the occupied Croatian territories into the various systems of FRY (Serbia/Montenegro), whilst at the same time seeking the lifting of the sanctions regime

- * any such attempts must be rejected and sanctions should not be suspended before recognition of Croatia within its internationally recognised borders by FRY (Serbia/Montenegro)

* Croatia finds the present situation in the occupied territories totally unacceptable and, given the present static UNPROFOR mandate, the continued presence of UNPROFOR in the occupied territories counterproductive to the peace process

* in light of these aforementioned arguments and Croatia's overall experience during the last two years the President of the Republic of Croatia, dr. Franjo Tudman, has concluded that, despite the positive role UNPROFOR has played in preventing outbreaks of violence and major conflicts in Croatia, the present nature and character of the UNPROFOR mandate do not provide means and conditions necessary for establishing the lasting peace and order in the Republic of Croatia; therefore the President has decided to inform the UN Secretary General that the mandate of UNPROFOR is terminated effective March 31, 1995

* termination of the UNPROFOR mandate will not put an end to the negotiations, but just the opposite - it should provide a crucial new impetus for their more efficient continuation and outcome

* in the spirit of the President's Peace Initiative of November 1, 1993, Croatia continues to offer to all Serbs in Croatia (a) cultural autonomy and highest level of local autonomy in the counties in which the Serbs used to constitute majority according to the pre-war census; (b) full respect of all human rights, and especially minority rights, can be observed and monitored by proper representatives of the international community

* Croatia is willing to closely and fully cooperate with Secretary General's Special Representative regarding the secure presence of UNPROFOR personell in Croatia so that the withdrawal can be accomplished in a dignified, orderly and efficient way

* Croatia stands ready to conclude with the UN an agreement on continued logistic assistance and support for UNPROFOR's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the uninterrupted functioning of the UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb

* Croatia is also prepared to intensify negotiating process with Belgrade leading to recognition within the internationally recognised borders to be followed by normalisation of relations

* should the negotiations with the local Serbs in the interim period bring adequate results, Croatia is ready to re-open the talks on establishing appropriate implementation and international monitoring and confidence building mechanisms

* in this regard, the implementation of relevant UN SC and GA resolutions as a part of the political re-integration - and in particular full implementation of the Economic Agreements concluded under the auspices of the ICFY, UNPROFOR and EUMM and signed by the local Serb authorities by March 31, 1995 - shall be considered crucially important criteria by Croatia

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	For Peter Tarnoff from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Croatian Decision Not to Renew UNPROFOR. (3 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2666

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. talking points	Points on the UNPROFOR Mandate. (4 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2666

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Tudjman: If There's No Progress. (5 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2666

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2666

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

C 28

95 JAN 18 11:22

S/S #

016310

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 2 + cmt
FROM: Chris Hoh EUR/SCE x67361 5221
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Slocombe Talker for Tudjman

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>OSD</u>	<u>J. Klekas</u>	<u>697-6026</u>	<u>4D-776</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>S. Vershbow</u>	<u>456-9151</u>	<u>368 OEOB</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☒

REMARKS: Here's our draft talker for Slocombe to
use with Tudjman. Not fully cleared here yet, but
I wanted your thoughts asap. Thanks, CD

S/S Officer: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 5/28/2014
2013-0687-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. talking points	Points on the UNPROFOR Mandate. (2 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2666

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



FXI

OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY

To:	Don Kerrick
Organization:	NSC
Phone:	456-9151
Fax:	456-9150
From:	John Klekas
Organization:	OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:	703-69 7-6026
Fax:	703-695-6506
Date:	January 16
Pages including this cover page:	6

Comments: These are TPs for USD Slocombe's trip, starting this weekend, to Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. We would like to have NSC clearance of these TPs asap. [I've sent a set to Jack Zetkovic for State's clearance]

Urgent

CROATIA

Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman

U.S. - Croatian Bilateral Relations

- U.S. - Croatian relations are based on Croatia's record of cooperation with the international community. In light of such cooperation, we are prepared to pursue and build on the March 1994 package of incentives that President Clinton approved in recognition of your cooperation in the establishment of a Federation of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and delineation of an eventual confederation between Croatia and Bosnian Croats.
- U.S. - Croatian Cooperation got off to a fine start last year:
 - As you know, under the bilateral aid framework agreement we signed last May, the U.S. spent \$30.5m for health and humanitarian assistance in FY 94 and have programmed more than \$15m for FY 95.
 - We are undertaking a program to help with bank restructuring and privatization, while working out treaties on bilateral investment and taxation.
 - We have also signed agreements and begun small-scale projects in material sciences, natural resources development, agriculture, and energy conservation, as well as on civil and human rights and democratization.
 - Most recently, in November, we signed a defense cooperation agreement and are offering training for the Croatian military in civil affairs and other fields (allowed by the UN arms embargo).
- *[If raised by Tudjman]* Notwithstanding your announcement on the UNPROFOR mandate, the President has made no decision on whether to alter these bilateral agreements or withdraw his commitment to link Serbian sanctions relief to progress toward a Krajina settlement.

Termination of UNPROFOR's Mission

- We are very concerned by your decision to ask UNPROFOR to leave Croatia when its UN Security Council mandate expires at the end of March.
- We understand your frustration with the lack of progress toward a political settlement with the Krajina Serbs. Nevertheless UNPROFOR's presence, however flawed, is essential for minimizing conflict between your military forces and ethnic Serb forces.

An upsurge in clashes following UNPROFOR's departure could escalate into a wider war, with the risk of renewed intervention from Serbia by the Yugoslav Army.

- President Clinton is heartened by your assurance {via letter} that Croatia has not opted for a military solution but, we remain concerned about unintentional incidents that could escalate out of control.
- If war occurs, we do not believe you have sufficient military capability for a quick, decisive victory. War will be long, costly and risk intervention by Serbia.
- You should not expect*
• ~~I cannot assure you of U.S. military support to Croatia in the event you choose a military option.~~ *Indeed, C will be very much alone.*
- We hope, therefore, that you will reconsider your decision in light of both the risks of renewed warfare and the danger to UNPROFOR inherent in conducting a withdrawal operation under current conditions.
- At a minimum, we urge you to allow a considerable UNPROFOR presence, and to work with us on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain at least those elements that were performing important functions:
 - monitoring the March 29, 1994 cease-fire and separation of forces agreement;
 - maintaining headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia;
 - implementing the Zagreb -4 economic confidence-building measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway;
 - escorting humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
 - maintaining a liaison office in Knin to facilitate negotiations.

U.S. Policy regarding a Diplomatic Settlement

- The U.S. supports the plan (Z-4) proposed by international mediators in Zagreb. It would restore Croatian sovereignty to its internationally-recognized territory while allowing autonomy for Serb majority areas.
- That plan is not a take-it-or-leave-it plan; rather it is an expression that the U.S., Russia, EU and UN believe Croatia and the Krajina Serbs must begin to resolve their differences or you will slide back into war.

TALKING POINTS FOR MACEDONIA

- The United States continues to work for stability in the FYROM and improved relations between Skopje and Euro-Atlantic security organizations, such as NATO and the OSCE.
- The U.S. commitment to the FYROM is represented by the deployment of our combat forces here. FYROM is the only one of the Yugoslav successor states where the United States, working through the United Nations, has stationed combat troops. This UN force is doing an important job of monitoring the border with Serbia and acting as a stabilizing force in the region.
- The Memorandum of Cooperation between our two defense establishments, signed last November, initiated a Bilateral Working Group (BWG) that parallels similar agreements with most countries in Central Europe and provides a framework for security cooperation. In the BWG, we are working on a number of training programs that will help to bring the FYROM military in line with Western standards. These programs include the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and FYROM participation in the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany.
- We continue to support normalization of economic and political relations in the region. Our colleagues at the State Department are working through Special Envoy Matthew Nimetz and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the UN to assist in negotiations FYROM and Greece.
- We understand FYROM's desire for full diplomatic relations with the United States, but this step will only be possible when there is concrete progress in resolving the dispute between FYROM and Greece.
- In the meantime, our bilateral relations--including the BWGs and the \$13 million aid program for the current fiscal year, can continue.

**Talking Points--Meeting with Gen de Lapresle
January 22, 1995**

- The U.S. continues to oppose the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Without UNPROFOR's presence, most assuredly the humanitarian situation would deteriorate and the level of violence would increase.
- The U.S. does favor increasing the capability of UNPROFOR so that it can be more effective in accomplishing its mission.
- As you know, we have offered to sell/lease to the UN a package of equipment to do just that and are actively encouraging other nations to do the same.
- We also support the Secretary General's request to augment UNPROFOR with an additional 6,500 troops.
- The perception by many in the U.S. is that UNPROFOR has been humiliated and intimidated (by the Serbs). We need to change those perceptions if strong support for the UN proposal is to be maintained in the U.S. The two actions outlined above are essential first steps to change those beliefs.
- We also continue to believe in firm military action and the use of NATO air power when UNPROFOR forces are threatened.
- NATO contingency withdrawal planning (for UNPROFOR personnel) continues and is very nearly completed. It is about to enter final staffing at NATO HQ (President Tudjman remains the wild card in this matter). As we have stated before, this is not an action the U.S. wants to occur. However, the U.S. will participate fully in any NATO-assisted effort, including providing ground troops. Key principles of that involvement are that it: be NATO-led with UNPROFOR personnel under NATO command (no "dual key"); operate under NATO ROE; and require upgrading of the communications, intelligence, logistics, mobility, and air transport assets.
- The Clinton Administration has had some initial success through testimony before Congress during the week of 9-15 January 1995 in dissuading members of the notion that we should unilaterally lift the arms embargo. We will continue to present our message with the hope of preventing any unilateral lift legislation reaching the President Clinton's desk.

**Talking Points--Meeting with Bosnian Govt Leadership
January 23, 1995**

- We have always felt that the UN arms embargo unfairly penalizes the Bosnian Govt, which is the victim of Serb aggression. We have worked to correct this situation with a proposal at the UN for a multilateral lifting, but have been unable to garner the necessary support.
- In compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment to the 1995 DoD Authorization Bill, we ceased on November 12, 1995, all operations by our ships in the Adriatic designed to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia Herzegovina.
- We firmly oppose unilateral lift, however. We believe it would only intensify and expand the conflict with no guarantee that it would ultimately help B-H on the battlefield.
- Therefore, the Department of Defense will continue to vigorously oppose unilateral lift in our consultations with and testimony before the Congress and would recommend that the President veto any legislation that contained provisions for the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
- If the Dole bill or any such legislation does become law, there is no guarantee that the USG will arm or train the Federation forces. On the contrary there is considerable sentiment in the Congress to lift the arms embargo but to avoid any deeper commitment that would include arming and training Federation forces and most certainly the introduction of U.S. combat forces to the conflict.
- We believe the best avenue for a justly negotiated settlement is through the Contact Group process, a well-adhered to Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and UNPROFOR remaining in place.
- We specifically oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal and are looking for ways to increase its effectiveness through augmentation of its manpower and equipment so that it can better perform its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
- While we oppose UNPROFOR's withdrawal, President Clinton is committed, in principle, to provide U.S. support, including the use of ground forces, to any future NATO-led operation to assure a safe withdrawal.
- If UNPROFOR withdraws, our plans for U.S. air support will continue, although no spotters will be on the ground. Ground operations and responsibility for protecting and providing humanitarian relief will fall to the Bosnian government.
- We also remain prepared to help implement a final peace settlement in Bosnia.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20060

January 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
January 11, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held January 11, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014

2013-0687 F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20060

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

2

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
and Croatia, January 11, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/28/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 11, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30-5:55 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin
Ray Converse

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Richard Saunders

JCS:

Adm. William Owens
LTG Wesley Clark

State:

Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure
Amb. Peter Galbraith

UN:

David Scheffer
James O'Brien

DOD:

Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the January 10 Contact Group meeting in Paris and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations, while recognizing the political sensitivity of the U.S. going beyond the role of facilitator and adopting a formal position on specific issues.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

2. Deputies requested two papers for a follow-on meeting during the week of January 16 (papers should be completed by COB January 17):

A) Review and analysis of the sides' positions on the key negotiating issues (Action: CIA).

B) Diplomatic strategy for the period from now until April 30, including possible options for promoting a positive outcome to the negotiations, as well as a recommended strategy in the event negotiations break down (Action: State).

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

3. Deputies considered options for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31, and the position that should be conveyed to the Croatian envoys following the meeting. They agreed that we should seek to reverse the Croatian decision, stress our concern about the risks of a new war in the Krajina and the dangers the decision posed for the safety of UNPROFOR troops, and make clear to Tudjman he will be on his own if he chooses the military option.

4. Deputies agreed that, as an initial response, we would urge the Croatians to delay a public announcement of their decision (scheduled for the following day) pending further consultations. If this were not accepted by the Croatians, Deputies agreed that we would urge them to leave the door open to a less-than-complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and to work with us on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain at least those elements that were performing important functions:

- monitoring the March 29, 1994 ceasefire and separation of forces agreement;
- headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
- implementation of the Zagreb-4 economic confidence-building measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway;
- humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
- maintaining a liaison office in Knin to facilitate negotiations.

5. As part of this proposal, Deputies agreed that we would offer to launch a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at the political reintegration of the UN Protected Areas based on the revised Zagreb-4 plan, and to undertake a special diplomatic mission to key Western capitals to develop a coordinated Croatia strategy.

6. Deputies decided that we should not threaten to withdraw the President's commitment to link Serbian sanctions relief to progress toward a Krajina settlement, or threaten other punitive steps, at this time.

7. Deputies agreed to review the situation at their next meeting, including the Congressional dimension, in light of the Croatian response to the U.S. position set forth above. A paper laying out a diplomatic strategy, including an inventory of possible punitive steps in the U.S. bilateral relationship with Croatia, was subsequently tasked by the Interagency Working Group and should be completed by COB January 17 (Action: State). In addition, the Joint Staff should review the operational implications of a continued UNPROFOR presence in Croatia in support of Bosnia operations in the context of renewed fighting in the Krajina (Action: JCS).

UNPROFOR Strengthening and UNPROFOR Funding

8. Deputies noted the tension between ongoing efforts to strengthen/expand UNPROFOR and the need to reduce our aggregate UN peacekeeping costs. They agreed to address this issue at their next meeting. In the meantime, diplomatic efforts on UNPROFOR strengthening should continue.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Today's Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520044. (4 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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009b. cable	Duplicate of 003a. (2 pages)	01/08/1994	P1/b(1)

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2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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009c. cable	Duplicate of 003b. (3 pages)	01/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2666

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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