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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Agenda and Checklist of Issues Principals Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995. Record ID: 9520078. (7 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Terms and Conditions for Agreement. (12 pages)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
002. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995. Record ID: 9520076. (1 page)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)
003. letter	To Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic from Secretary of State Warren Christopher. (2 pages)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	UNPROFOR Augmentation. (2 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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Bosnia - January 1995 [5]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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Tab B

CROATIA

Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman

- The United States is very concerned by your announcement to end UNPROFOR's current mandate in Croatia because it increases the risk of renewed Serbo-Croat war.
- Besides the human casualties that all sides would suffer in the event of hostilities, diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement would suffer, particularly as regards Belgrade's willingness to pressure Pale and Knin.
- If war occurs, we do not believe you have sufficient military capability for a quick, decisive victory. War will be long, costly and risk intervention by Serbia.
- You should not be under any illusion you will have U.S. military support for Croatia in the event you choose a military option. From my discussions with many members of Congress of both parties, I can assure you that there is no support for any U.S. combat involvement in this region, on any side.
- We share your view that the status quo in Croatia must not continue indefinitely, a position that the Security Council endorsed in the January 17 Presidential Statement.
- Nevertheless, our good bilateral relations are predicated on Croatia's cooperation with the Security Council and international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
- We urge you to reconsider, and at a minimum, to allow the most essential elements of UNPROFOR to continue operations:
 - Monitoring the March 1994 cease-fire and separation of forces agreement;
 - Maintaining headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia;
 - Facilitating implementation of the December 1994 Agreement on Economic Confidence-Building Measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-to-Belgrade highway;
 - Escorting humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
 - Maintaining a liaison office in Knin.

- If your actions result in war, Croatia will again become part of the problem in the Balkans rather than part of the solution and will find itself alone.
- The planned intensification of bilateral military cooperation that I originally expected to discuss with you will be difficult to take forward unless there is a satisfactory resolution of the UNPROFOR mandate question.
- Rather than cancel my visit, however, my government wanted to use this opportunity to make clear the depth of our concern.
- We would like to go ahead this year with programs discussed during the November Bilateral Working Group session in Zagreb.
- These include:
 - Acceptance of Croatian students this year at the Marshall Center;
 - Croatian attendance at courses organized under our International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) made possible by U.S. funding in FY 95, as well as your Government's offer to cover additional costs;
 - Initiation of a military-to-military Contact Program that could lead to a team being stationed in Zagreb on a permanent basis.
- Your announcement on UNPROFOR, however, puts these plans in jeopardy, as well as other bilateral programs like the opening of consulates, exchange visitors, and science and technology projects.
- Unless we can be reasonably sure that Croatian action will not reignite hostilities and make these programs impossible to carry out, they will have to be put on hold.
- I would therefore be very interested in your assessment of the current situation and your view of what to expect in the coming months from Croatia in regard to UNPROFOR's presence.

Talking Points--Meeting with Bosnian Govt Leadership
January 23, 1995

- We have always felt that the UN arms embargo unfairly penalizes the Bosnian Govt, which is the victim of Serb aggression. We have worked to correct this situation with a proposal at the UN for a multilateral lifting, but have been unable to garner the necessary support.
- In compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment to the 1995 DoD Authorization Bill, we ceased on November 12, 1994, all operations by our ships in the Adriatic designed to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia Herzegovina. This action cost us heavily in our relations with our closest allies and with Russia.
- We firmly oppose unilateral lift, however. We believe it would only intensify and expand the conflict with no guarantee that it would ultimately help B-H on the battlefield.
- Therefore, the Administration, including the Department of Defense will continue to vigorously oppose unilateral lift in our consultations with and testimony before the Congress.
- I would be interested to clarify your expectations about U.S. military assistance in the event of unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
- If the Dole bill or any such legislation does become law, you should not expect that the USG will act unilaterally and arm or train the Federation forces. This is not only the view of the Administration. On the contrary, while there is considerable sentiment in the Congress to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, there is considerable opposition toward any deeper commitment that would include arming and training Federation forces. This is because, after Viet Nam, there are fears this would mean pressure for the introduction of U.S. combat forces to the conflict. Few in Congress support this, nor does the U.S. military. This is reflected in the final provisions of Senator Dole's bill.
- We believe the best avenue for a justly negotiated settlement is through the Contact Group process, a well-adhered to Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and UNPROFOR remaining in place.
- We specifically oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal and are looking for ways to increase its effectiveness through augmentation of its manpower and equipment so that it can better perform its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

- While we oppose UNPROFOR's withdrawal, President Clinton is committed, in principle, to provide U.S. support, including the use of ground forces, to any future NATO-led operation to assure a safe withdrawal.
- If UNPROFOR withdraws, we are prepared to seek a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo; and our plans for U.S. air support will continue, although no spotters will be on the ground. Ground operations and responsibility for protecting and providing humanitarian relief will fall to the Bosnian government.
- We also remain prepared to help implement a final peace settlement in Bosnia.
- *(If raised)* We will work with you to expedite the Army's review of your request for non-lethal assistance. (Background: Bosnian DATT raised this issue with OSD Bosnian Task Force on 19 Jan 95. He invited himself to our office with the express purpose of raising this issue and what he articulated as the less than speedy response from DSAA. He indicated that he would have his Govt raise this with USDP directly on Jan 23.)



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

January 13, 1995

95 JAN 13 All : 27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Update on Bosnia and Croatia

Deputies met on Wednesday to review diplomatic efforts in Bosnia and to formulate an initial response to President Tudjman's decision to terminate the mandate for UNPROFOR in Croatia. Here's the state of play.

Contact Group Strategy

At Tuesday's Contact Group meeting in Paris, agreement was reached to dispatch Contact Group representatives to Belgrade, Sarajevo, Pale and Zagreb in an effort to get negotiations started. In Pale, the group will be authorized only to discuss "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan as the basis for talks, not to renegotiate the plan. This reflects the Bosnian Government's view that the deal Karadzic struck with President Carter was insufficient. It is not yet clear whether either side is really interested in negotiating, as opposed to using the cessation of hostilities to rest and rearm. Nevertheless, State remains hopeful that a formula can be found in the next few weeks that will permit serious shuttle diplomacy by the Contact Group to begin between Sarajevo and Pale.

We will be reviewing the constitutional and territorial issues in detail in preparation for renewed bargaining, although the U.S. will need to stay close to the Bosnian Government to avoid creating any impression we are twisting their arms.

Tudjman's Decision to Eject UNPROFOR

The shaky peace process in Bosnia is now in danger of being overwhelmed by renewed tensions -- and perhaps a new war -- in Croatia. President Tudjman today informed Boutros-Ghali that Croatia will terminate the mandate for UNPROFOR in Croatia when it expires on March 31. In so doing, he rebuffed a letter sent in your name urging that he reconsider this move, as well as strong pressure from the Germans. (Your letter and his reply are attached.) Tudjman claimed that, in two years, UNPROFOR has failed to produce any progress toward reintegration of the Serb-occupied lands, and that UNPROFOR's withdrawal is the only way to

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

shock the Serbs into negotiating seriously. His one concession was to allow an additional three months for a "dignified and orderly" withdrawal.

Before publicizing the decision, Tudjman sent two high-level envoys to Washington to explain his rationale. We urged the Croatians to pull back from demanding UNPROFOR's complete pullout, since this was almost certain to trigger a new war. We offered to lead a reinvigorated diplomatic effort and to work with Zagreb on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain only those elements that were performing important functions -- policing the ceasefire, keeping the forces separated, and implementing the recent accord opening the Zagreb-Belgrade highway (Tab C).

In a two-hour meeting with Peter Tarnoff last night, however, the Croatian envoys showed little interest in this proposal. It was clear that they had been sent to inform, rather than consult, with us (and Peter strongly criticized them for this). Tudjman's letter to Boutros-Ghali, while ostensibly revised in response to our ideas, contained little new flexibility. Our Ambassador believes Tudjman has consciously opted for retaking the Krajina by force. The intelligence community, however, believes the chances of success are low -- particularly if Milosevic's forces intervene in support of the Krajina Serbs, as they are likely to do.

We will continue to press the Croatians to reverse course, and we will need to consider rolling back aspects of our bilateral relationship to signal our opposition to Tudjman's high-risk gambit. Tudjman needs to know that his brinksmanship will not be cost-free and that his integration into the West is in jeopardy. This said, we need to be careful not to drive Tudjman into an unholy alliance with Milosevic to carve up Bosnia. Thus we will proceed with ongoing plans to accelerate diplomatic efforts aimed at a settlement that reintegrates the Krajina while providing substantial autonomy for the Serbs.

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to Tudjman of January 9
- Tab B Tudjman's reply of January 10
- Tab C U.S. proposal to Croatian envoys of January 11

Op Ed Piece: Suggested Language on Multilateral Lift

Current policy favors the multilateral lifting of the arms embargo because multilateral action can achieve our objectives without many of the drawbacks of unilateral lift. Multilateral lift prevents serious political splits with allies and sustains the unity of NATO and the international community on this issue. In this regard, multilateral lift necessarily involves the Russians, thus denying the Serbs its most significant ally. Unity among the Contact Group and the five permanent nations on the UN Security Council would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to a lifting of the arms embargo. In the event the Serbs react to lift by intensifying the fighting, with NATO's cooperation, more effective airstrikes and other operations by international forces could be provided from European bases. Moreover, with Russia's help, Serbia could be kept out of the war in Bosnia. Multilateral lift is not totally without risks and adverse consequences. However, unlike unilateral action, those risks and consequences are not solely the responsibility of the US. Instead, they are shared with the international community.

Submitted to USDP for addition. Not yet approved

6 Jan 95: 1200 version--with USDP incorporated NSC/JCS suggested revisions

UNILATERALLY LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA: THE PATH TO AN AMERICANIZED FOURTH BALKAN WAR

When the history of the tragic conflict in the Former Yugoslavia is written, it will be clear that the arms embargo on Bosnia -- imposed in 1991 -- was a mistake. It deprived the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the means of self-defense against the Bosnian Serbs' superiority in tanks and artillery drawn from Tito's old arsenals and from some fresh supplies from outside, notably supporters in Serbia itself. An international agreement to lift the arms embargo multilaterally and deal collectively with the consequences would be both wise and just -- and has been supported by the Administration. But for a variety of reasons, no such multilateral lifting of the arms embargo is in the cards for the near term at least.

Some members of Congress, reacting with understandable frustration, are demanding the U.S. ignore UN resolutions and act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. They claim unilateral lift would ensure that Bosnian government forces receive the arms and training they need to "level the field" and defend themselves. And they claim such a step would do this without drawing the US into the Balkan fighting.

But a realistic look at the facts on the ground and the likely consequences of unilateral US action demonstrate that taking such a seemingly fair, direct, and simple action would be a grave mistake, for both U.S. interests and the people of Bosnia. Among the consequences -- ignored or denied by proponents of unilateral lift -- would be these:

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- Unilateral lift could undermine the most successful diplomatic initiative in many months -- the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, negotiated with the help of former President Carter -- which was just signed by all the warring parties, and is now coming into effect. An American decision now to end the arms embargo could derail that Cessation of Hostilities agreement -- and end the hope of negotiations for a permanent peace.

- The Bosnian Serbs would have every incentive to launch pre-emptive attacks, designed to exploit their advantage before American arms supplies reached Bosnia. While the Serbs probably could not totally defeat government forces, it is virtually certain they would occupy the eastern enclaves and renew military pressure on Sarajevo and elsewhere, especially on relief supply routes.

- Current UNPROFOR operations would end as European and many other contributing countries withdraw from Bosnia, seizing on U.S. action as an excuse to end a commitment that has been costly for them in lives, treasure, and involvement.

- UN and most other outside relief efforts would stop, at the very time humanitarian requirements would increase dramatically, both because of the increased fighting and the withdrawal of Serb cooperation. A high percentage of the food reaching the enclaves comes through Belgrade and Bosnian-Serb controlled territory. All airfields and most land routes are within range of Bosnian Serb artillery. Whatever else they did, the Serbs could easily cut off these relief supplies.

The cumulative effect of these consequences would be strong pressure for greatly increased American involvement. The U.S. would have precipitated the increased fighting

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and the end of international relief and peacekeeping efforts. Moral responsibility for the resulting desperate military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia would shift to the U.S.

In short, unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to U.S. military intervention. It is a way of accomplishing such intervention.

The implications of taking on this responsibility are many and grave. To begin with, the U.S. would have to take over relief efforts, or accept responsibility for the large-scale starvation and refugee flows that would result from the lack of food.

Similarly, unless we were prepared to watch as pre-emptive Serb attacks further battered Bosnian cities and defensive positions, US air strikes would be required to defend these cities and positions. However, the necessary European bases and other NATO support, on which our current, much smaller, air efforts depend, might not be available in the aftermath of a major break with our allies. In any case, airstrikes alone, even with the added planes needed, would probably not halt Serb ground attacks, given the difficult weather and terrain conditions.

Furthermore, contrary to the claims of unilateral lift backers, the "playing field" in Bosnia is not self-leveling. Simply authorizing U.S. manufacturers to sell arms to Bosnia would not get any arms to Bosnia. For lifting the embargo to have its intended effect of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, the US would have to undertake a major military assistance program to provide arms -- without the cooperation of our major allies.

The financial costs, though substantial, would be the least of the problems in carrying out such an effort. Upgrading Bosnia's light infantry to confront Bosnian Serb heavy weapons successfully is not a simple task--as earlier US efforts to equip local forces

in other countries from Vietnam to El Salvador have shown. Most important, sophisticated arms -- which the Bosnians would need to overcome Bosnian Serb advantages in heavy weapons -- are ineffective without trained soldiers to use them and a continuing stream of support. U.S. trainers, advisers and logistics support personnel on the ground would be necessary to assist the Bosnian Government in using the arms effectively.

A U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would undermine the most important U.S. national security objective for the region -- to avoid a wider war in the Balkans while seeking a negotiated settlement. Among the most serious potential consequences of unilateral U.S. action would, however, be strong pressures a widening of the conflict beyond Bosnia. There are painfully many scenarios for such wider fighting:

- Escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from Krajina (as it did in Bihac), thus extending the actual fighting to Croatia.
- The Belgrade Serbs, though very sympathetic to the Bosnian Serbs now are, under strong international pressure, cutting off supplies to the Bosnian Serbs and pressing them to settle on terms the government of Bosnia has accepted. With the U.S. acting unilaterally, over the objections of our allies and the Russians, it would be difficult if not impossible to convince the Belgrade Serbs to hold back in support of their Bosnian Serb compatriots -- unless we were prepared to threaten Belgrade militarily.
- U.S. military confrontation with Serbia could precipitate a sharp crackdown by Belgrade in the Muslim province of Serbia, Kosovo, a development which would have the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region, and which the US has pledged to meet with force.

- Broader fighting could draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey into conflict.

Neither our horror at the destruction brought by this long and brutal war and at the atrocities of Serbian ethnic cleansing nor our frustration with the irrationality of Balkan rivalries and the difficulty of international peacekeeping should be allowed to cause us to forget that much has been accomplished by international action even as the war has continued. The European role, and our cooperation with Europe, has been central to what has been achieved to moderate the suffering in Bosnia and prevent a wider war. The UN, for all its limitations, has saved thousands of lives by its military and civilian efforts. UNPROFOR, for all its problems, has been the necessary element for the large scale delivery of food, and for support of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. NATO cooperation has been essential for enforcement of the "No Fly Zone," the heavy weapons exclusion zones, and the economic sanctions against Serbia. The Contact Group, which includes Russia as well as key European allies, has been the principal instrument for seeking a negotiated solution.

Maintaining that cooperation and avoiding a fundamental break with our NATO allies over the Bosnian issue is, of course, also essential to our broader national interests in European and international security. Virtually every European nation opposes lifting the arms embargo at this time. Thus U.S. unilateral action would be undertaken in the face of vehement opposition of most NATO allies. The resulting rift would undermine the consensus underlying NATO's unified military command and deeply damage the alliance and the US ability to lead it.

Additionally, hopes of a cooperative relationship with Russia on European security would be seriously jeopardized by actions that Russians of all political stripes would see as US intervention not just against the Bosnian Serbs, but against the Belgrade Serbs as well. Russia would likely counter US action by arming the Serbs, thereby raising the ante and reviving U.S.-Russian confrontation.

Finally, while it is fashionable in some circles these days to ridicule the UN and all its works, the US has an important interest in nations not taking unilateral action in contravention of UN resolutions. Such action not only undermines both international law and internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations, but also it undercuts the US interest in international sanctions being observed. One of the main pressures on the Serbs is the UN embargo on their trade. If the US unilaterally dropped the part of the UN sanctions it finds objectionable, the front line states--Serbia's immediate neighbors--would likely stop enforcing the trade embargo against Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs which they claim has cost them billions of dollars already.

Nor would the effects on sanctions regimes we support be confined to the Balkans. If the US acted alone in this matter, other nations would claim the right to ignore UN embargo resolutions that we strongly favor such as those that pertain to Iraq and other pariah states.

In sum, Congressional action mandating unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia would be a tragic and short-sighted mistake. Unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to US intervention; it is a way of accomplishing such intervention. It would mean the Americanization of responsibility for the war, for unilateral action entails unilateral responsibility for the consequences of that action. We should be under no illusion that the US could responsibly simply lift the arms embargo and

walk away. Nor should we do the only thing that would really produce the Bosnian victory many lift proponents desire -- commit US ground forces to solve the problems of Bosnia.

What we must do instead, therefore, is continue to work within the international community to limit the scale of fighting, provide humanitarian relief, prevent a wider war, and seek to achieve an early agreed settlement to this tragic conflict. We recognize that any settlement will not be ideal; it will likely on some scale be unjust. But it will be far better than the consequences of expanded war, division from our allies, and likely U.S. combat involvement that a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would bring.



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- You should not be under any illusion you will have U.S. military support for Croatia in the event you choose a military option. From my discussions with many members of Congress of both parties, I can assure you that there is no support for any U.S. combat involvement in this region, on any side.
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- Nevertheless, our good bilateral relations are predicated on Croatia's cooperation with the Security Council and international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
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 - Maintaining a liaison office in Knin.

- If your actions result in war, Croatia will again become part of the problem in the Balkans rather than part of the solution and will find itself alone.
- The planned intensification of bilateral military cooperation that I originally expected to discuss with you will be difficult to take forward unless there is a satisfactory resolution of the UNPROFOR mandate question.
- Rather than cancel my visit, however, my government wanted to use this opportunity to make clear the depth of our concern.
- We would like to go ahead this year with programs discussed during the November Bilateral Working Group session in Zagreb.
- These include:
 - Acceptance of Croatian students this year at the Marshall Center;
 - Croatian attendance at courses organized under our International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) made possible by U.S. funding in FY 95, as well as your Government's offer to cover additional costs;
 - Initiation of a military-to-military Contact Program that could lead to a team being stationed in Zagreb on a permanent basis.
- Your announcement on UNPROFOR, however, puts these plans in jeopardy, as well as other bilateral programs like the opening of consulates, exchange visitors, and science and technology projects.
- Unless we can be reasonably sure that Croatian action will not reignite hostilities and make these programs impossible to carry out, they will have to be put on hold.
- I would therefore be very interested in your assessment of the current situation and your view of what to expect in the coming months from Croatia in regard to UNPROFOR's presence.

**Talking Points--Meeting with Bosnian Govt Leadership
January 23, 1995**

- We have always felt that the UN arms embargo unfairly penalizes the Bosnian Govt, which is the victim of Serb aggression. We have worked to correct this situation with a proposal at the UN for a multilateral lifting, but have been unable to garner the necessary support.
- In compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment to the 1995 DoD Authorization Bill, we ceased on November 12, 1994, all operations by our ships in the Adriatic designed to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia Herzegovina. This action cost us heavily in our relations with our closest allies and with Russia.
- We firmly oppose unilateral lift, however. We believe it would only intensify and expand the conflict with no guarantee that it would ultimately help B-H on the battlefield.
- Therefore, the Administration, including the Department of Defense will continue to vigorously oppose unilateral lift in our consultations with and testimony before the Congress.
- I would be interested to clarify your expectations about U.S. military assistance in the event of unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
- If the Dole bill or any such legislation does become law, you should not expect that the USG will act unilaterally and arm or train the Federation forces. This is not only the view of the Administration. On the contrary, while there is considerable sentiment in the Congress to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, there is considerable opposition toward any deeper commitment that would include arming and training Federation forces. This is because, after Viet Nam, there are fears this would mean pressure for the introduction of U.S. combat forces to the conflict. Few in Congress support this, nor does the U.S. military. This is reflected in the final provisions of Senator Dole's bill.
- We believe the best avenue for a justly negotiated settlement is through the Contact Group process, a well-adhered to Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and UNPROFOR remaining in place.
- We specifically oppose UNPROFOR withdrawal and are looking for ways to increase its effectiveness through augmentation of its manpower and equipment so that it can better perform its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

- While we oppose UNPROFOR's withdrawal, President Clinton is committed, in principle, to provide U.S. support, including the use of ground forces, to any future NATO-led operation to assure a safe withdrawal.
- If UNPROFOR withdraws, we are prepared to seek a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo; and our plans for U.S. air support will continue, although no spotters will be on the ground. Ground operations and responsibility for protecting and providing humanitarian relief will fall to the Bosnian government.
- We also remain prepared to help implement a final peace settlement in Bosnia.
- (*If raised*) We will work with you to expedite the Army's review of your request for non-lethal assistance. (Background: Bosnian DATT raised this issue with OSD Bosnian Task Force on 19 Jan 95. He invited himself to our office with the express purpose of raising this issue and what he articulated as the less than speedy response from DSAA. He indicated that he would have his Govt raise this with USDP directly on Jan 23.)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995. Record ID: 9520076. (1 page)	01/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20060

January 17, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
and Croatia, January 11, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/28/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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20060

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 11, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:30-5:55 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Ray Converse

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Richard Saunders

JCS:

Adm. William Owens

LTG Wesley Clark

State:

Richard Holbrooke

Robert Frasure

Amb. Peter Galbraith

UN:

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

DOD:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kruzel

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the January 10 Contact Group meeting in Paris and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations, while recognizing the political sensitivity

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PER E.O. 13526

12 10/1/2013

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of the U.S. going beyond the role of facilitator and adopting a formal position on specific issues. ~~(S)~~

2. Deputies requested two papers for a follow-on meeting during the week of January 16 (papers should be completed by COB January 17):

A) Review and analysis of the sides' positions on the key negotiating issues (Action: CIA).

B) Diplomatic strategy for the period from now until April 30, including possible options for promoting a positive outcome to the negotiations, as well as a recommended strategy in the event negotiations break down (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

3. Deputies considered options for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31, and the position that should be conveyed to the Croatian envoys following the meeting. They agreed that we should seek to reverse the Croatian decision, stress our concern about the risks of a new war in the Krajina and the dangers the decision posed for the safety of UNPROFOR troops, and make clear to Tudjman he will be on his own if he chooses the military option. ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies agreed that, as an initial response, we would we would urge the Croatians to delay a public announcement of their decision (scheduled for the following day) pending further consultations. If this were not accepted by the Croatians, Deputies agreed that we would urge them to leave the door open to a less-than-complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and to work with us on a new UNPROFOR mandate that would retain at least those elements that were performing important functions: ~~(S)~~

- monitoring the March 29, 1994 ceasefire and separation of forces agreement;
- headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

- implementation of the Zagreb-4 economic confidence-building measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway;
- humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
- maintaining a liaison office in Knin to facilitate negotiations.

5. As part of this proposal, Deputies agreed that we would offer to launch a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at the political reintegration of the UN Protected Areas based on the revised Zagreb-4 plan, and to undertake a special diplomatic mission to key Western capitals to develop a coordinated Croatia strategy. ~~(S)~~

6. Deputies decided that we should not threaten to withdraw the President's commitment to link Serbian sanctions relief to progress toward a Krajina settlement, or threaten other punitive steps, at this time. ~~(S)~~

7. Deputies agreed to review the situation at their next meeting, including the Congressional dimension, in light of the Croatian response to the U.S. position set forth above. A paper laying out a diplomatic strategy, including an inventory of possible punitive steps in the U.S. bilateral relationship with Croatia, was subsequently tasked by the Interagency Working Group and should be completed by COB January 17 (**Action: State**). In addition, the Joint Staff should review the operational implications of a continued UNPROFOR presence in Croatia in support of Bosnia operations in the context of renewed fighting in the Krajina (**Action: JCS**). ~~(S)~~

UNPROFOR Strengthening and UNPROFOR Funding

8. Deputies noted the tension between ongoing efforts to strengthen/expand UNPROFOR and the need to reduce our aggregate UN peacekeeping costs. They agreed to address this issue at their next meeting. In the meantime, diplomatic efforts on UNPROFOR strengthening should continue. ~~(S)~~

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20060

January 13, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
January 11, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held January 11, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve *mlr* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/28/2014*

2013-0687 -f

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. letter	To Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic from Secretary of State Warren Christopher. (2 pages)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2665

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	UNPROFOR Augmentation. (2 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2665

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [5]

2013-0687-F

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
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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400SV
FI

OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY

To:	Don Herrick
Organization:	NSC
Phone:	456-9151
Fax:	
From:	Jim Parden
Organization:	OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:	703-69
Fax:	703-695-6506
Date:	19 JAN 95
Pages including this cover page:	8

Comments:

Op Ed Piece: Suggested Language on Multilateral Lift

Current policy favors the multilateral lifting of the arms embargo because multilateral action can achieve our objectives without many of the drawbacks of unilateral lift. Multilateral lift prevents serious political splits with allies and sustains the unity of NATO and the international community on this issue. In this regard, multilateral lift necessarily involves the Russians, thus denying the Serbs its most significant ally. Unity among the Contact Group and the five permanent nations on the UN Security Council would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to a lifting of the arms embargo. In the event the Serbs react to lift by intensifying the fighting, with NATO's cooperation, more effective airstrikes and other operations by international forces could be provided from European bases. Moreover, with Russia's help, Serbia could be kept out of the war in Bosnia. Multilateral lift is not totally without risks and adverse consequences. However, unlike unilateral action, those risks and consequences are not solely the responsibility of the US. Instead, they are shared with the international community.

Submitted to OSDP for addition. Not yet approved

6 Jan 95: 1200 version--with USDP incorporated NSC/JCS suggested revisions

**UNILATERALLY LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA:
THE PATH TO AN AMERICANIZED FOURTH BALKAN WAR**

When the history of the tragic conflict in the Former Yugoslavia is written, it will be clear that the arms embargo on Bosnia -- imposed in 1991 -- was a mistake. It deprived the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the means of self-defense against the Bosnian Serbs' superiority in tanks and artillery drawn from Tito's old arsenals and from some fresh supplies from outside, notably supporters in Serbia itself. An international agreement to lift the arms embargo multilaterally and deal collectively with the consequences would be both wise and just -- and has been supported by the Administration. But for a variety of reasons, no such multilateral lifting of the arms embargo is in the cards for the near term at least.

Some members of Congress, reacting with understandable frustration, are demanding the U.S. ignore UN resolutions and act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. They claim unilateral lift would ensure that Bosnian government forces receive the arms and training they need to "level the field" and defend themselves. And they claim such a step would do this without drawing the US into the Balkan fighting.

But a realistic look at the facts on the ground and the likely consequences of unilateral US action demonstrate that taking such a seemingly fair, direct, and simple action would be a grave mistake, for both U.S. interests and the people of Bosnia. Among the consequences -- ignored or denied by proponents of unilateral lift -- would be these:

- Unilateral lift could undermine the most successful diplomatic initiative in many months -- the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, negotiated with the help of former President Carter -- which was just signed by all the warring parties, and is now coming into effect. An American decision now to end the arms embargo could derail that Cessation of Hostilities agreement -- and end the hope of negotiations for a permanent peace.
- The Bosnian Serbs would have every incentive to launch pre-emptive attacks, designed to exploit their advantage before American arms supplies reached Bosnia. While the Serbs probably could not totally defeat government forces, it is virtually certain they would occupy the eastern enclaves and renew military pressure on Sarajevo and elsewhere, especially on relief supply routes.
- Current UNPROFOR operations would end as European and many other contributing countries withdraw from Bosnia, seizing on U.S. action as an excuse to end a commitment that has been costly for them in lives, treasure, and involvement.
- UN and most other outside relief efforts would stop, at the very time humanitarian requirements would increase dramatically, both because of the increased fighting and the withdrawal of Serb cooperation. A high percentage of the food reaching the enclaves comes through Belgrade and Bosnian-Serb controlled territory. All airfields and most land routes are within range of Bosnian Serb artillery. Whatever else they did, the Serbs could easily cut off these relief supplies.

The cumulative effect of these consequences would be strong pressure for greatly increased American involvement. The U.S. would have precipitated the increased fighting

and the end of international relief and peacekeeping efforts. Moral responsibility for the resulting desperate military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia would shift to the U.S.

In short, unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to U.S. military intervention. It is a way of accomplishing such intervention.

The implications of taking on this responsibility are many and grave. To begin with, the U.S. would have to take over relief efforts, or accept responsibility for the large-scale starvation and refugee flows that would result from the lack of food.

Similarly, unless we were prepared to watch as pre-emptive Serb attacks further battered Bosnian cities and defensive positions, US air strikes would be required to defend these cities and positions. However, the necessary European bases and other NATO support, on which our current, much smaller, air efforts depend, might not be available in the aftermath of a major break with our allies. In any case, airstrikes alone, even with the added planes needed, would probably not halt Serb ground attacks, given the difficult weather and terrain conditions.

Furthermore, contrary to the claims of unilateral lift backers, the "playing field" in Bosnia is not self-leveling. Simply authorizing U.S. manufacturers to sell arms to Bosnia would not get any arms to Bosnia. For lifting the embargo to have its intended effect of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, the US would have to undertake a major military assistance program to provide arms -- without the cooperation of our major allies.

The financial costs, though substantial, would be the least of the problems in carrying out such an effort. Upgrading Bosnia's light infantry to confront Bosnian Serb heavy weapons successfully is not a simple task--as earlier US efforts to equip local forces

in other countries from Vietnam to El Salvador have shown. Most important, sophisticated arms -- which the Bosnians would need to overcome Bosnian Serb advantages in heavy weapons -- are ineffective without trained soldiers to use them and a continuing stream of support. U.S. trainers, advisers and logistics support personnel on the ground would be necessary to assist the Bosnian Government in using the arms effectively.

A U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would undermine the most important U.S. national security objective for the region -- to avoid a wider war in the Balkans while seeking a negotiated settlement. Among the most serious potential consequences of unilateral U.S. action would, however, be strong pressures a widening of the conflict beyond Bosnia. There are painfully many scenarios for such wider fighting:

- Escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from Krajina (as it did in Bihac), thus extending the actual fighting to Croatia.
- The Belgrade Serbs, though very sympathetic to the Bosnian Serbs now are, under strong international pressure, cutting off supplies to the Bosnian Serbs and pressing them to settle on terms the government of Bosnia has accepted. With the U.S. acting unilaterally, over the objections of our allies and the Russians, it would be difficult if not impossible to convince the Belgrade Serbs to hold back in support of their Bosnian Serb compatriots -- unless we were prepared to threaten Belgrade militarily.
- U.S. military confrontation with Serbia could precipitate a sharp crackdown by Belgrade in the Muslim province of Serbia, Kosovo, a development which would have the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region, and which the US has pledged to meet with force.

- Broader fighting could draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey into conflict.

Neither our horror at the destruction brought by this long and brutal war and at the atrocities of Serbian ethnic cleansing nor our frustration with the irrationality of Balkan rivalries and the difficulty of international peacekeeping should be allowed to cause us to forget that much has been accomplished by international action even as the war has continued. The European role, and our cooperation with Europe, has been central to what has been achieved to moderate the suffering in Bosnia and prevent a wider war. The UN, for all its limitations, has saved thousands of lives by its military and civilian efforts. UNPROFOR, for all its problems, has been the necessary element for the large scale delivery of food, and for support of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. NATO cooperation has been essential for enforcement of the "No Fly Zone," the heavy weapons exclusion zones, and the economic sanctions against Serbia. The Contact Group, which includes Russia as well as key European allies, has been the principal instrument for seeking a negotiated solution.

Maintaining that cooperation and avoiding a fundamental break with our NATO allies over the Bosnian issue is, of course, also essential to our broader national interests in European and international security. Virtually every European nation opposes lifting the arms embargo at this time. Thus U.S. unilateral action would be undertaken in the face of vehement opposition of most NATO allies. The resulting rift would undermine the consensus underlying NATO's unified military command and deeply damage the alliance and the US ability to lead it.

Additionally, hopes of a cooperative relationship with Russia on European security would be seriously jeopardized by actions that Russians of all political stripes would see as US intervention not just against the Bosnian Serbs, but against the Belgrade Serbs as well. Russia would likely counter US action by arming the Serbs, thereby raising the ante and reviving U.S.-Russian confrontation.

Finally, while it is fashionable in some circles these days to ridicule the UN and all its works, the US has an important interest in nations not taking unilateral action in contravention of UN resolutions. Such action not only undermines both international law and internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations, but also it undercuts the US interest in international sanctions being observed. One of the main pressures on the Serbs is the UN embargo on their trade. If the US unilaterally dropped the part of the UN sanctions it finds objectionable, the front line states--Serbia's immediate neighbors--would likely stop enforcing the trade embargo against Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs which they claim has cost them billions of dollars already.

Nor would the effects on sanctions regimes we support be confined to the Balkans. If the US acted alone in this matter, other nations would claim the right to ignore UN embargo resolutions that we strongly favor such as those that pertain to Iraq and other pariah states.

In sum, Congressional action mandating unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia would be a tragic and short-sighted mistake. Unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to US intervention; it is a way of accomplishing such intervention. It would mean the Americanization of responsibility for the war, for unilateral action entails unilateral responsibility for the consequences of that action. We should be under no illusion that the US could responsibly simply lift the arms embargo and

walk away. Nor should we do the only thing that would really produce the Bosnian victory many lift proponents desire -- commit US ground forces to solve the problems of Bosnia.

What we must do instead, therefore, is continue to work within the international community to limit the scale of fighting, provide humanitarian relief, prevent a wider war, and seek to achieve an early agreed settlement to this tragic conflict. We recognize that any settlement will not be ideal; it will likely on some scale be unjust. But it will be far better than the consequences of expanded war, division from our allies, and likely U.S. combat involvement that a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would bring.