

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - January 1995 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

Row:

34

Section:

1

Shelf:

10

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: USD Slocombe and Bosnian Vice President Ganic. (5 pages)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Pale Responds Positively. (5 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Pale Hesitates. (5 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	UNPROFOR Augmentation. (4 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
005. letter	To Secretary of State Warren Christopher from Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic. (1 page)	01/22/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Duplicate of 004. (4 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
007. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 26, 1995. Record ID: 9520085. (1 page)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)
008. paper	Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)
009. report	Key Disagreements. (1 page)	01/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2664

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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20089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee
Meeting on Chechnya and Bosnia on January 20, 1995

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from
the discussion of North Korea. (S)


William H. Ito
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 5/28/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals CommitteeDATE: January 20, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:35 - 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony LakeOVP
Leon FuerthState
Peter TarnoffDOD
Secretary William PerryUN
Ambassador Madeleine AlbrightCIA
Acting Director William
StudemanJCS
ADM William OwensWhite House
Samuel Berger
Nancy SoderbergNSC
Alexander Vershbow
John BeyrleSummary of ConclusionsRUSSIA/CHECHNYA

1. The Principals reviewed the situation on the ground in and around Grozny and discussed the likelihood that Russian forces will continue to face opposition from irregular forces, perhaps augmented by outside mercenaries. The CIA was requested to produce a short (2 pg) paper analyzing the implications of the Chechnya affair for surrounding ethnic regions (e.g., Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia) and actions those regions may be taking in reaction to Chechnya. Action: CIA. ~~(S)~~
2. The Principals agreed on the need for a careful line of public comment that welcomed positive developments, like the prospect of eventual free elections in Chechnya, while not seeming to cheerlead blindly for what might prove an unacceptable solution, e.g., installation of a puppet regime. Press guidance

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

R 5/9/2014

2010-0533-M

prepared for the President's use was circulated to ensure that comments by Principals or their spokespersons would be consistent. ~~(S)~~

3. Principals discussed the need to identify points of leverage we may be able to use to influence Yeltsin and other Russian officials to make the right choices on reform issues and in further steps in Chechnya. Such points could include the scheduling of the next summit, or the nature of Russian participation in Halifax G-7 meeting. Action: NSC and State to develop a game plan. ~~(S)~~

4. Ambassador Albright discussed persistent problems with Russian positions at the U.N. which directly counter or challenge our interests, most notably the UNMIH mandate issue. Principals agreed that if attempts over the coming week to convince the Russians to support the U.S. position are unsuccessful, the President should seek Yeltsin's support in a letter. Action: State to continue diplomatic efforts; NSC to draft letter, if needed. ~~(S)~~

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Bosnia:

1. Principals reviewed the status of the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities agreement and Contact Group efforts to renew negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review territorial and constitutional issues that will arise in the negotiations but that the USG must be careful to avoid any appearance of departing from its commitment to the Contact Group plan. Recognizing the possibility of a continuing impasse in the negotiations, Principals directed that a mid-term diplomatic strategy paper be prepared for Deputies' review as preparation for a future discussion by Principals. Action: State. ~~(S)~~

2. Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for handling the Silajdzic visit. Action: State. ~~(S)~~

Croatia:

3. Principals reviewed options available for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31. Recognizing the important strategic interests that the U.S. has in Croatia, the Principals

directed that talking points prepared for USDP Slocombe's meeting with President Tudjman be appropriately modified to focus on the risks of the decision on the ground, our commitment to a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at reintegration of the occupied areas, and our support for retention of at least part of the UNPROFOR contingent. Action: OSD/State ~~(S)~~

4. Principals discussed the potential difficulties of withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action: State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia. ~~(S)~~

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy:

5. Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the Congress to put the President in the position of having to use the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS^{NB}/ALEXANDER^{AN} VERSHBOW/DANIEL PONEMAN^{DP}

FROM: JOHN BEYRLER^{JB}

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting held January 20, 1995. This summary covers the discussion on Chechnya and Bosnia. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from the discussion on North Korea, for distribution to the wider group of agencies represented in that part of the meeting.

Concurrence by: Donald Kerrick^{DK}; Steve Aoki^{SA}

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/9/2014
2010-0533-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	re: Pale Responds Positively. (5 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2664

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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2. Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for handling the Silajdzic visit. **Action: State.**

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4. Principals discussed the potential difficulties of withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. **Action: State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia.**

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5. Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the Congress to put the President in the position of having to use the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed.

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PER E.O. 13526

72 5/1/2014

2010-0533-M

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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UN Troops in Croatia, January 1995^a



UN Troops in Croatia, January 1995^a



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20089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

January 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS^{NB}/ALEXANDER VERSHBOW^{AV}/DANIEL PONEMAN^{DP}

FROM: JOHN BEYRLER^{JB}

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995

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Concurrence by: Donald Kerrick^{DK}; Steve Aoki^{SA}

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/28/2014

2013-0687-f

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~~SECRET~~

20089

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee
Meeting on Chechnya and Bosnia on January 20, 1995

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the discussion of North Korea. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VR NARA, Date 5/28/2014

2013-0687-i

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 20, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:35 - 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OVP
Leon Fuerth

State
Peter Tarnoff

DOD
Secretary William Perry

UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

CIA
Acting Director William
Studeman

JCS
ADM William Owens

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Beyrle

Summary of Conclusions

RUSSIA/CHECHNYA

1. The Principals reviewed the situation on the ground in and around Grozny and discussed the likelihood that Russian forces will continue to face opposition from irregular forces, perhaps augmented by outside mercenaries. The CIA was requested to produce a short (2 pg) paper analyzing the implications of the Chechnya affair for surrounding ethnic regions (e.g., Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia) and actions those regions may be taking in reaction to Chechnya. **Action: CIA.**

2. The Principals agreed on the need for a careful line of public comment that welcomed positive developments, like the prospect of eventual free elections in Chechnya, while not seeming to cheerlead blindly for what might prove an unacceptable solution, e.g. installation of a puppet regime. Press guidance

~~SECRET~~

prepared for the President's use was circulated to ensure that comments by Principals or their spokespersons would be consistent.

3. Principals discussed the need to identify points of leverage we may be able to use to influence Yeltsin and other Russian officials to make the right choices on reform issues and in further steps in Chechnya. Such points could include the scheduling of the next summit, or the nature of Russian participation in Halifax G-7 meeting. **Action: NSC and State to develop a game plan.**

4. Ambassador Albright discussed persistent problems with Russian positions at the U.N. which directly counter or challenge our interests, most notably the UNMIH mandate issue. Principals agreed that if attempts over the coming week to convince the Russians to support the U.S. position are unsuccessful, the President should seek Yeltsin's support in a letter. **Action: State to continue diplomatic efforts; NSC to draft letter, if needed.**

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Bosnia:

1. Principals reviewed the status of the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreement and Contact Group efforts to renew negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that Deputies should review territorial and constitutional issues that will arise in the negotiations, but that the USG must be careful to avoid any appearance of departing from its commitment to the Contact Group plan. Recognizing the possibility of a continuing impasse in the negotiations, Principals directed that a mid-term diplomatic strategy paper be prepared for Deputies' review as preparation for a future discussion by Principals. **Action: State.**

2. Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for handling the Silajdzic visit. **Action: State.**

Croatia:


3. Principals reviewed options available for responding to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31. Recognizing the important strategic interests that the U.S. has in Croatia, the Principals directed that talking points prepared for USDP Slocombe's meeting

with President Tudjman be appropriately modified to focus on the risks of the decision on the ground, our commitment to a reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at reintegration of the occupied areas, and our support for retention of at least part of the UNPROFOR contingent. **Action: OSD/State**

4. Principals discussed the potential difficulties of withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. **Action: State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia.**

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy:

5. Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the Congress to put the President in the position of having to use the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed.

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY

To:	Don Kerrick
Organization:	NSC
Phone:	456-9151
Fax:	456-9150
From:	John Klekas
Organization:	OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:	703-69 7-6026
Fax:	703-695-6506
Date:	January 23
Pages including this cover page:	4

Comments:

This is the same as what I sent you late last week --
 The ones you wanted Hoh to rework and Chris Hill, Joe Kruzel and--supposedly--
 Vershbow said were OK. Meanwhile, we're sending a FAX to Slocombe
 today to ascertain what he ultimately did say to Tudjman.

CROATIA

Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman

- The U.S. understands that your intentions are good, but we worry that the consequences of the course you have chosen will prove disastrous for your people and for our bilateral ties.
- We are very concerned by your announcement to end UNPROFOR's current mandate in Croatia because it increases the risk of renewed Serbo-Croat war.
- Without international monitors maintaining the separation of Croatian and Krajina Serb forces, troops will move into the resulting vacuum, and clashes are inevitable.
- In the current climate of both sides feeling strong, escalation into conflict along the entire confrontation line seems unavoidable.
- This includes fighting in Sector East, which would invite Serbian intervention, as well as the prospect of Serb rocket attacks on Croatian cities.
- If war occurs, we do not believe you have sufficient military capability for a quick, decisive victory. War will be long, costly and risk intervention by Serbia.
- You should not be under any illusion you will have U.S. military support for Croatia in the event you choose a military option. From my discussions with many members of Congress of both parties, I can assure you that there is no support for any U.S. combat involvement in this region, on any side.
- Besides the human casualties that all sides would suffer in the event of hostilities, diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement would suffer, particularly as regards Belgrade's willingness to pressure Pale and Knin.
- We share your view that the status quo in Croatia must not continue indefinitely, a position that the Security Council endorsed in the January 17 Presidential Statement.
- Nevertheless, our good bilateral relations are predicated on Croatia's cooperation with the Security Council and international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
- We fully support UNPROFOR's presence, which makes an important contribution to peace and stability in the region, and encourage you in the strongest possible terms to reconsider you decision and accept its continued operation in Croatia.

- Should it prove impossible to maintain UNPROFOR in its current form, we believe that the most essential elements of UNPROFOR must continue their operations:
 - Monitoring the March 1994 cease-fire and separation of forces agreement;
 - Maintaining headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia;
 - Facilitating implementation of the December 1994 Agreement on Economic Confidence-Building Measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-to-Belgrade highway;
 - Escorting humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
 - Maintaining a liaison office in Knin.
- If your actions result in war, Croatia will again become part of the problem in the Balkans rather than part of the solution and will find itself alone.
- The U.S. would be unable to support you, not because we disagree with your objectives, but because we cannot maintain good relations with a government that fails to pursue all peaceful means for resolving its disputes.
- We note that talks on a political settlement between Croats and Serbs have never been seriously pursued and we believe it is essential to launch a negotiating process.
- Toward that end, we are undertaking a major effort to invigorate the diplomatic track. You can expect to see results within a week.
- You cannot expect understanding from Washington for any actions that result in war before a real attempt is made to negotiate your differences.
- The planned intensification of bilateral military cooperation that I originally expected to discuss with you will be difficult to take forward unless there is a satisfactory resolution of the UNPROFOR mandate question.
- Rather than cancel my visit, however, my government wanted to use this opportunity to make clear the depth of our concern.

- We would like to go ahead this year with programs discussed during the November Bilateral Working Group session in Zagreb.
- These include:
 - Acceptance of Croatian students this year at the Marshall Center;
 - Croatian attendance at courses organized under our International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) made possible by U.S. funding in FY 95, as well as your Government's offer to cover additional costs;
 - Initiation of a military-to-military Contact Program that could lead to a team being stationed in Zagreb on a permanent basis.
- Your announcement on UNPROFOR, however, puts these plans in jeopardy, as well as other bilateral programs like the opening of consulates, exchange visitors, and science and technology projects.
- Unless we can be reasonably sure that Croatian action will not reignite hostilities and make these programs impossible to carry out, they will have to be put on hold.
- I would therefore be very interested in your assessment of the current situation and your view of what to expect in the coming months from Croatia in regard to UNPROFOR's presence.

~~SECRET~~

20085

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Thursday, January 26, 1995, 12:00-1:00pm, in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. Taskers for papers and agenda are attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/28/2014

7013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 26, 1995. Record ID: 9520085. (1 page)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2664

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

20085

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICH *(K)*
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Sandy:

*Agencies have been
notified about taskings
on UNPROFOR/Croatia
withdrawal planning
listed in the agenda.*

Sandy V.

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum and agenda for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia to be held on January 26, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to initial the memorandum to agency counterparts at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to counterparts
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/28/2011

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. paper	Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)	01/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2664

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

UN Troops in Croatia, January 1995^a





UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Facsimile Number (202) 647-0967

DELIVER TO:

FROM:

Sandy Vershbow

Name

Amb. Frasure

Name

NSC

Agency & Room #

Room #

(202) 456-9150

FAX No.

456-9151

Office Ext.

647-1126

Office Ext.

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

REMARKS:

"The Contact Group having consulted extensively with the parties, announces that negotiations, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will resume in early February. These negotiations, which will be conducted by the Contact Group, will be on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group Plan as a starting point and are scheduled to last for two months."

U.S. Embassy Officials in Bosnia at Odds Over Talks With Serbs

By ROGER COHEN
Special to The New York Times

SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jan. 22 — Sharp dissent emerged at the American Embassy in Sarajevo today over the Clinton Administration's decision to change its policy and engage in direct negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs despite their rejection of an international peace plan.

The dissent centered on what one official described as attempts by the State Department to oust the American Ambassador to Bosnia, Victor Jackovich, who has always rejected direct talks with the Serbs until they accept the peace plan. He was recalled to Washington on Wednesday for what were officially described as "consultations."

"These are not consultations," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "They have offered Mr. Jackovich another ambassadorship and they are trying to ease him out because he opposes bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table in this way."

Charity Dennis, a State Department spokeswoman, said she had no information on why Mr. Jackovich was in Washington at such a sensitive time in Bosnia. Mr. Jackovich did not respond to two calls to his Virginia home.

Charles H. Thomas, the United States envoy to Bosnian peace negotiations, carried out the new American policy today by going to the Bosnian Serbs' stronghold of Pale and meeting with their leader, Radovan Karadzic. The change in policy was announced on Thursday in a letter from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Bosnia's President, Alija Izetbegovic.

In contrast to his previous visits to Bosnia, Mr. Thomas was not accompanied by the officials from Russia, Britain, France and Germany, the countries that with the United States make up what diplomats call the contact group.

Until last month, when cracks began to appear in the Clinton Administration's policy of isolating the Bosnian Serbs until they accepted the contact group plan, such visits to Pale were barred.

Mr. Jackovich stood strongly behind this former policy of using diplomatic isolation, military threats and economic pressure to compel the Serbs to bend.

But on Thursday, the day after Mr. Jackovich was recalled to Washington, his deputy at the Embassy, John Menzies, went to Pale for unpublished talks with the Bosnian Serbs. "Yes, I went to Pale," Mr. Menzies said, but declined to give further details.

It was on Thursday that Mr. Christopher's letter to President Izetbegovic arrived, explaining that the United States had decided "to resume a dialogue with Pale" because of the new opportunities afforded by a four-month cease-fire that went into effect on Jan. 1.

Thus even before Mr. Izetbegovic, who was then in Cairo, had time to respond to Mr. Christopher's letter, the ranking American diplomat in Sarajevo had gone to Pale. The town near Sarajevo is the capital of what the rebel Serbs in Bosnia call their republic. The Serbs who hold 70 percent of Bosnian territory after 33 months of war.

A United Nations Security Council resolution approved last September calls for an end to any political dialogue with the Serbs until they accept the contact group plan in full. This plan would oblige the Serbs to give up a third of the land they hold and accept 49 percent of Bosnia, with the balance going to a Muslim-Croat federation.

Mr. Christopher's letter said the American decision to engage the Bosnian Serbs in a dialogue was conditional on the roads into Sarajevo being opened. The roads into this encircled city were still closed today.

again on Monday before the expected arrival in Sarajevo of his contact group colleagues. Thus the United States, in a sharp reversal of policy, has now taken the lead in talks with the Serbs.

Mr. Jackovich's absence from Sarajevo at a time when Mr. Thomas and Mr. Menzies are visiting Pale fits a pattern established over the last two months.

The Ambassador was also called away shortly before Charles E. Redman, who used to have Mr. Thomas's job and is now Ambassador to Germany, went to Pale on an explor-

atory visit in December. The man who accompanied Mr. Redman at that time was Mr. Menzies, who took up his post in November and also accompanied Mr. Thomas today.

It was Mr. Redman's visit that initiated the Clinton Administration's softening toward the Serbs. This continued later in December when former President Jimmy Carter — clearly acting for the Administration — engaged in the shuttle diplomacy between Pale and Sarajevo that led to the current cease-fire. Once again, while Mr. Carter was here, Mr. Jackovich was out of town.

Dissent has long racked the shifting American diplomatic approach to Bosnia. In 1992, at the beginning of the war, several diplomats quit the State Department because of what they regarded as the Bush Administration's inadequate response to the Serbs' policy of killing or evicting Muslims in the territory they held.

The Serbian policy has been toned down since then and the killing has stopped, but forced evictions and mistreatment of Muslims continue.

Officials said Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke had spoken to Mr. Menzies about Mr.

Jackovich's present recall even before the Ambassador knew that he was going back to Washington. Mr. Holbrooke was described as the architect of the new American policy.

Shortly before he left for Washington, Mr. Jackovich confided to people who know him that he found the Serbs' ability to set the agenda in Bosnia excruciating and the Clinton Administration's reluctance to use even mild force to back up diplomacy dismaying.

The aim of Mr. Thomas during his current visit is to persuade Mr. Karadzic and the Muslim-led Bosnian Government to agree to resume political negotiations on a peace settlement. The Bosnian Government insists that the Serbs first accept the

contact group peace map, which was initially portrayed as a take-it-or-leave-it plan.

But the Serbs do not want to accept a plan that would divide their territory into what they say are indefensible and economically weak fragments. The most they have offered is to resume talks "on the basis of the contact group plan."

American officials said that the fact Mr. Thomas went alone to Pale was insignificant. They said other contact group officials were due to arrive on Monday and Mr. Thomas simply took advantage of a couple of spare days in Europe to pursue talks with the Serbs. Up to now, the contact group officials have always acted together.

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
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
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY

To:	Don Kerrick
Organization:	NSC
Phone:	456-9151
Fax:	456-9150
From:	John Klekas
Organization:	OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:	703-697-6026
Fax:	703-696-8508
Date:	1/20/95
Pages including this cover page:	4

Comments:

This is a complete text of the Slocombe TPs for Croatia, i.e., it incorporates the additions Chris Hoh just made this evening. Kruzel won't look at this until tomorrow morning but, if you can clear this tonight, it will likely be all set to go with Kruzel when he gets on the plane tomorrow. Please advise.

Urgent

CROATIA

Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman

- The U.S. understands that your intentions are good, but we worry that the consequences of the course you have chosen will prove disastrous for your people and for our bilateral ties.
- We are very concerned by your announcement to end UNPROFOR's current mandate in Croatia because it increases the risk of renewed Serbo-Croat war.
- Without international monitors maintaining the separation of Croatian and Krajina Serb forces, troops will move into the resulting vacuum, and clashes are inevitable.
- In the current climate of both sides feeling strong, escalation into conflict along the entire confrontation line seems unavoidable.
- This includes fighting in Sector East, which would invite Serbian intervention, as well as the prospect of Serb rocket attacks on Croatian cities.
- If war occurs, we do not believe you have sufficient military capability for a quick, decisive victory. War will be long, costly and risk intervention by Serbia.
- You should not be under any illusion you will have U.S. military support for Croatia in the event you choose a military option. From my discussions with many members of Congress of both parties, I can assure you that there is no support for any U.S. combat involvement in this region, on any side.
- Besides the human casualties that all sides would suffer in the event of hostilities, diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement would suffer, particularly as regards Belgrade's willingness to pressure Pale and Knin.
- We share your view that the status quo in Croatia must not continue indefinitely, a position that the Security Council endorsed in the January 17 Presidential Statement.
- Nevertheless, our good bilateral relations are predicated on Croatia's cooperation with the Security Council and international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
- We fully support UNPROFOR's presence, which makes an important contribution to peace and stability in the region, and encourage you in the strongest possible terms to reconsider your decision and accept its continued operation in Croatia.

- Should it prove impossible to maintain UNPROFOR in its current form, we believe that the most essential elements of UNPROFOR must continue their operations:
 - Monitoring the March 1994 cease-fire and separation of forces agreement;
 - Maintaining headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia;
 - Facilitating implementation of the December 1994 Agreement on Economic Confidence-Building Measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-to-Belgrade highway;
 - Escorting humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
 - Maintaining a liaison office in Knin.
- If your actions result in war, Croatia will again become part of the problem in the Balkans rather than part of the solution and will find itself alone.
- The U.S. would be unable to support you, not because we disagree with your objectives, but because we cannot maintain good relations with a government that fails to pursue all peaceful means for resolving its disputes. } NO
- We note that talks on a political settlement between Croats and Serbs have never been seriously pursued and we believe it is essential to launch a negotiating process.
- Toward that end, we are undertaking a major effort to invigorate the diplomatic track. You can expect to see results within a week.
- You cannot expect understanding from Washington for any actions that result in war before a real attempt is made to negotiate your differences.
- The planned intensification of bilateral military cooperation that I originally expected to discuss with you will be difficult to take forward unless there is a satisfactory resolution of the UNPROFOR mandate question. }
- Rather than cancel my visit, however, my government wanted to use this opportunity to make clear the depth of our concern.

- We would like to go ahead this year with programs discussed during the November Bilateral Working Group session in Zagreb.
- These include:
 - Acceptance of Croatian students this year at the Marshall Center;
 - Croatian attendance at courses organized under our International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) made possible by U.S. funding in FY 95, as well as your Government's offer to cover additional costs;
 - Initiation of a military-to-military Contact Program that could lead to a team being stationed in Zagreb on a permanent basis.
- Your announcement on UNPROFOR, however, puts these plans in jeopardy, as well as other bilateral programs like the opening of consulates, exchange visitors, and science and technology projects.
- Unless we can be reasonably sure that Croatian action will not reignite hostilities and make these programs impossible to carry out, they will have to be put on hold.
- I would therefore be very interested in your assessment of the current situation and your view of what to expect in the coming months from Croatia in regard to UNPROFOR's presence.

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