

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - January 1995 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

Row:

34

Section:

1

Shelf:

10

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520104. [partial] (1 page)	01/25/1995	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Krajina Serb Army. (8 pages)	02/01/1995	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Demarch: Modalities of an Approach to Croatia. [NATO] (10 pages)	01/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations. Record ID: 9409463. (4 pages)	01/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Croatia: Renewed Conflict Likely. (8 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	The Spanish Scandal. (3 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
007. paper	UNPROFOR: Withdrawal from Croatia. (5 pages)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1995

Dear Jimmy:


Thank you for your recent letter providing your views on the many difficulties associated with restarting negotiations in Bosnia. Chris has already been in touch with you concerning the actions we took at the United Nations in extending the suspension of sanctions on Serbia for an additional 100 days. Let me personally update you on developments since then.

Overall the cessation of hostilities agreement is holding, but there has been an increase in violations during the past few days. The Contact Group returned to Bosnia on January 23. We hope that with the Blue Route agreement in hand, we can make progress on bringing the parties to the table on the basis of acceptance of the Contact Group plan as the starting point for negotiations on a comprehensive political settlement.

I appreciate your efforts to convince the Bosnian Serbs that now is the time to end their isolation and join the peace process. But the Serbs continue to hold roughly 70% of the territory by military force. Moreover, Serbian President Milosevic remains unwilling to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia within their internationally recognized borders. For these reasons, we believe it is premature to extend any additional sanctions relief.

We will keep you informed of our progress. Again, thank you for writing.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The Carter Presidential Center
One Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

1/26

copy has been
given to LA/2e

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 24, 1995 7:25

95 JAN 24

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to Former President Jimmy Carter

Purpose

To respond to a letter from President Carter.

Background

Former President Jimmy Carter wrote earlier this month regarding the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and called for additional sanctions relief for Serbia. Secretary Christopher provided an immediate reply to a version of the letter that Carter sent to him. We have prepared a personal reply with a brief update on the situation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mr. Carter
Tab B Incoming letter from Mr. Carter
Tab C Christopher reply to Mr. Carter

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



JIMMY CARTER

0458-
0307
95 JAN 20 P3:53

January 12, 1995

To President Bill Clinton

So far as I know, the Bosnian Serbs and the officials of Bosnia-Herzegovina have complied reasonably well with the agreements they signed with me last month, and are now approaching negotiations for a final peace agreement, based on the proposal of the five-nation Contact Group.

I am personally familiar with the reluctance of the parties to accept some facets of the agreements on the three phases: a cease-fire, cessation of hostilities, and then the peace negotiations for four months or more. The future is fraught with serious obstacles, and every means should be utilized to prevent an abandonment of the process. In order to enhance the prospects for continuing good faith efforts by both sides to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict, there should be some acknowledgment of their compliance to date and some reward for future positive action.

On the contrary, the Security Council is now poised to continue the sanctions against Serbia, and indirectly to increase the severity of them as they relate to the Serbs in Bosnia. This is, in effect, punishment instead of reward.


In my report to you on my departure from Bosnia-Herzegovina, I stated:

"I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted."

Page 2

I urge you to have included words to this effect in tomorrow's text extending resolution 943 of 23 September 1994, so that the Secretary General can certify when good faith is demonstrated. My hope is that the sanctions will then be held in abeyance as long as the parties comply with the commitments they have made.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background.

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500-2000

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1995

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your fax of January 12 expressing your thoughts on the peace process and the role of sanctions. We are now seeing real benefits on the ground in the aftermath of your valuable journey to the former Yugoslavia last month. This is indeed a delicate time for the peace process.

Economic sanctions were initially imposed on Belgrade for the role Milosevic's regime played in starting the Bosnian conflict. They will be lifted progressively as the situation changes and as Milosevic helps to bring about such changes.

We do not consider Security Council Resolution 970, which extends the Serbian sanctions suspension an additional 100 days, punishment for Milosevic that could threaten the peace process. Rather, it represents our continued recognition that his closure of the border with Bosnia in August, while far from perfect, is nevertheless a significant step towards peace. Many in Congress had reservations about the further 100-day suspension, and we would certainly have faced difficulty if we had tried to go beyond it.

The question of sanctions relief goes beyond Bosnian Serb agreement to a cessation of hostilities or commencement of negotiations. There are other issues that we see as critically linked to the suspension of sanctions and the return of Serbia-Montenegro to the international community. The recognition of all former Yugoslav republics by Belgrade, the return of Serb-held Croatia to Zagreb's full control, and the restoration of autonomy and full human rights for Kosovo will all be vital in this context.

Nevertheless, the Contact Group may endorse a further sanctions abatement scheme when there is significant progress in the peace process. None of the Contact Group members believes we have reached this point yet.

The Honorable
Jimmy Carter
Plains, Georgia

- 2 -

Once again, I would like to express my thanks for your willingness to contribute to a lasting peace in the Balkans.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Chris".

Warren Christopher

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 24, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(D)*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Former President Carter

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a suggested response to a letter from former President Jimmy Carter regarding the situation in Bosnia. (Response contains perishable information, as situation fluctuates daily. Request expeditious processing.)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to former President Carter
Tab B Incoming correspondence
Tab C Letter from Secretary Christopher to Mr. Carter

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~~SECRET~~

20104

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 25, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 12:30-1:35 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel R. Berger

UN:

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Richard Saunders

CIA:

Douglas MacEachin

Norman Schindler

State:

Peter Tarnoff

Robert Frasure

JCS:

LTG Wesley Clark

BG John Walsh

DOD:

Joseph Nye

John Klekas

White House:

Nancy Soderberg

OMB:

Gordon Adams

John Burnim

NSC:

Alexander Vershbow

Donald L. Kerrick

Susan Rice

Summary of Conclusions

Bosnia: Contact Group Strategy

1. Deputies reviewed the results of the ongoing Contact Group efforts in Bosnia and prospects for renewed negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed to defer discussion of the territorial and constitutional issues that will come up in those negotiations until next week. Deputies requested that, when the Contact Group is engaged, a daily one-page SITREP on Contact Group activities [redacted] (b)(1) and reports from Ambassador Thomas be circulated for Deputies. (Action: State/CIA) [001] 1.4(c)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

V2 10/1/2013

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~UNPROFOR Augmentation

2. Deputies considered options for moving forward with augmenting UNPROFOR and agreed to:

- A) Continue efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR in Bosnia, including support for the additional 6500 troops requested by the UN.
- B) Urge the United Nations to conduct a serious review of UNPROFOR operations aimed at economizing wherever possible.
- C) Press for a redefinition of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, along the lines proposed by the U.S., which could produce eventual offsets to planned plus-ups in Bosnia.
(Action: USUN should begin to encourage the UN Secretariat to focus on a modified mandate)

3. Deputies briefly discussed UNPROFOR funding, noting that the Peacekeeping Deputies would meet on that subject and requested that a plan be prepared for dealing with Congress on funding UNPROFOR. (Action: State) Deputies also requested the preparation of talking points highlighting the value of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and the logic of strengthening it. (Action: JCS)

Croatia: Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate

4. Deputies discussed a strategy to respond to President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires on March 31. They endorsed the three-pronged approach outlined in the State Croatia strategy paper: seek to maintain the essential functions of UNPROFOR in Croatia; launch a negotiating process between Serbs and Croats on a political settlement; and prepare to respond to the worst-case scenario of renewed hostilities. State will flesh out its paper with results of next week's Zagreb-4 diplomatic efforts and a concept for securing Croatian agreement to a redefined UNPROFOR mandate.
(Action: State)

Pol/Mil Aspects of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia

5. Deputies reviewed the ongoing planning at the UN and NATO regarding UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. Deputies requested the following work for a follow-up meeting during the week of January 30:

- A) An independent intelligence assessment of the threat to UNPROFOR forces withdrawing from Croatia. (Action: JCS/CIA) (Due within 48 hours)

~~SECRET~~

- B) An options paper, built on the threat assessment, that includes options ranging from full NATO involvement similar to what is envisaged in Bosnia to more limited options involving air and logistical support. The paper should include the pros/cons of extending to Croatia the President's decision-in-principle to provide U.S. ground forces and an in-depth review of associated prepositioning issues. (Action: JCS, with input from State) (Due Monday, January 30).

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

6. Deputies discussed the upcoming Silajdzic visit, endorsed the approach outlined in the State paper and agreed to ensure he departs with a better understanding of the tepid support for unilateral lift, together with renewed assurances of our support so that Bosnia can confidently engage in negotiations.

7. Deputies decided to defer publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed until after the Silajdzic visit.

8. Deputies agreed to provide the unclassified version of LTG Clark's Congressional remarks on lift to Congress before the Silajdzic visit.

~~SECRET~~

20104

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 26, 1995



Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
 Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 25,
 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held January 25, 1995.

Concurrence by: Susan Rice *(10)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *sub/ w changes* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *KZ* NARA, Date *5/27/2014*

2013-0687 -F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BERGER, FUERTH, ITOH, LAKE, MCCURRY, REED, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, WOLIN,
BRANSCUM, CLARKER, KERRICK, NSC, RICE, SAUNDERS, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED DTG:051600Z FEB 95

FM: AMCONSUL MUNICH

TO: RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 1236
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4311
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4397
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0011

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000247

STATE PLEASE RETRANSMIT TO NATO-EU COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZL, BR, HR, RS, UK, FR, GM

SUBJECT: TEXT OF FEDERATION WORKING GROUP STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE
CONTACT GROUP MEETING ON THE FEDERATION IN MUNICH ON
FEBRUARY 5 CHAIRED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE.
CABLE ON THE MEETING TO FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

BEGIN TEXT:

MUNICH MEETING ON THE FEDERATION

REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

WE HAVE JUST CONCLUDED AN EXCELLENT MEETING, CONVENED
BY THE UNITED STATES AT THE REQUEST OF THE FEDERATION
OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND INCLUDING THE PARTICIPATION
BY THE CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS, DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN
THE FEDERATION. THE PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED FEDERATION
PRESIDENT ZUBAK, VICE PRESIDENT GANIC AND PRIME
MINISTER SILAJDZIC AS WELL AS CROATIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER GRANIC AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER SUSAK.

THE FEDERATION WAS CREATED ALMOST ONE YEAR AGO AS A
NEW BEGINNING IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, RECONCILIATION
AND STABILITY THROUGHOUT THE REGION. ITS CONSTITUTION
AND THE RELATED AGREEMENTS MUST BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED.
THE PARTICIPANTS TODAY IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF KEY
ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED: BARRIERS TO TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATION IN THE FEDERATION NEED TO BE REMOVED,

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FINANCING NEEDS TO BE ENSURED, UNIFIED BORDER CONTROLS, CUSTOMS, AND POLICE ESTABLISHED, THE PROBLEM OF ROTATION OF THE FEDERAL PRESIDENCY RESOLVED, FEDERAL CANTONS FORMED, AND A JOINT STAFF ESTABLISHED AS A STEP TO AN INTEGRATED MILITARY. THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO RESOLVE THESE IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. THE NATIONS OF THE CONTACT GROUP, AND THE BROADER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WILL SEEK TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED.

THE FEDERATION PLAYS A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN. I AM PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT THIS MEETING FOLLOWS ON THE HEELS OF AN IMPORTANT CONTACT GROUP MEETING WHICH THE PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR AND COMMITMENT TO THE FEDERATION. IN PARTICULAR THE WORK OF THE EU IN MOSTAR AND ELSEWHERE IS OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE FOR THE FEDERATION.

WE ARE TAKING FURTHER INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE OF THE FEDERATION, INCLUDING:

NINE-POINT PLAN TO SUPPORT THE FEDERATION:

1. AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATOR SHALL BE APPOINTED WHO WILL DECIDE ALL MATTERS REFERRED TO HIM BY EITHER SIDE TO ADVANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENT, THE VIENNA AGREEMENT AND THE FEDERATION. THE ARBITRATOR SHALL DECIDE ON THE BASIS OF THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENT, THE VIENNA AGREEMENT, THE FEDERATION CONSTITUTION AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES. HIS DECISIONS WILL BE BINDING ON ALL PARTIES. THE ARBITRATOR SHALL BE APPOINTED BY A PERSON SELECTED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
2. WE WILL FORM A STANDING COMMISSION IN SARAJEVO TO OVERSEE AND MONITOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERATION. A TIMETABLE WILL BE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE PRIORITIES AND SPECIFIC DATES FOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
3. WE WILL SEND IN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERTS TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.
4. WE WILL FOCUS GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE ISSUE OF RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS AS KEY TO THE VIABILITY OF THE FEDERATION.
5. WE WILL OFFER TO SEND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION TEAMS TO HELP IN DEALING WITH DIFFERENCES IN SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES.
6. WE WILL PROPOSE THAT THESE TEAMS WORK WITH EU OFFICIALS IN MOSTAR AND EXPLORE EXPANDED COOPERATION WITH THE EU IN OTHER AREAS.

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7. WE WILL PROPOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED CONSULTATIONS EVERY SIX MONTHS TO REVIEW FEDERATION DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS.

8. WE WILL REVIEW ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO ASSURE THAT WE RESPOND MORE PROMPTLY TO REAL NEEDS AND AMELIORATE COMMUNITY TENSIONS.

9. WE WILL CONDUCT TRAINING SEMINARS FOR FEDERATION OFFICIALS IN THE AREA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

WE WILL BE ASKING OUR FRIENDS IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONSIDER JOINING US IN THESE INITIATIVES.

IN ADDITION, THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE A RETIRED SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER TO ASSIST IN THE INTEGRATION OF FEDERATION MILITARY INSTITUTIONS.

BY INITIATING TODAY'S GATHERING, AND BY THEIR ATTENDANCE, THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FEDERATION. WE ALL AGREED THAT A DEMOCRATIC, MULTI-ETHNIC FEDERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE PEACE PROCESS. IT IS ALSO AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE NEW EUROPE, ONE IN WHICH ETHNIC DIVERSITY CAN FLOURISH AND AGAIN CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE CONTINENT.

FOR CENTURIES, BOSNIANS ENJOYED ETHNIC COEXISTENCE; IT IS WHAT MOST BOSNIANS WANT TODAY. THOSE WHO SEEK OTHER DIRECTIONS CAN EXPECT NO AID FROM THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE BROADER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. CONVERSELY, THOSE WHO HELP BUILD A TRULY MULTI-ETHNIC FEDERATION CAN EXPECT A STRONG AND SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE.

END TEXT.

NICHOLS

FROM:
SITREPT

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Croatia: Renewed Conflict Likely. (8 pages)	01/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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**Congressional Testimony
LTG Clark's Remarks
11 January 1995**

Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that we welcome the opportunity to update you on the current situation on the ground in Bosnia, current operations, options for alleviating the situation, the status of ongoing planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, and efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR.

The situation on the ground has stabilized since the signing of the cease fire on 31 December. The heavy fighting has subsided and the skirmish lines have remained steady since the agreement went into force. Sporadic small arms fire remains a threat, however there is an overall improvement in the conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

From the military perspective, I would like to first assure you that we are continuing with a number of ongoing operations in the Balkans including:

- TF Provide Promise (Humanitarian initiative)**
- Deny Flight (No Fly Zone Enforcement)**
- Sharp Guard (Sanctions Enforcement)**

- **Able Sentry (Stabilizing Force)**

We have no units on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but do have 15 personnel in Sarajevo on the UNPROFOR staff. We are also responsible for funding a proportion, 31 percent, of all costs associated with UNPROFOR--this amounted to \$271 million in Fiscal Year 94.

I would like to open the discussion of lifting the arms embargo by stating briefly that the Joint Staff has studied the impact of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, and while I do not intend on going through the full briefing, I would like to cite some of the key findings that may prove relevant today.

The concept underlying a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would be to improve the ability of the Federation Armed Forces to counter the strengths of the Bosnian Serb Army. Our analysis indicates that, if the US lifts unilaterally, this is an extremely unlikely outcome. Rather, if the arms embargo is unilaterally lifted, we believe that violence and humanitarian suffering in the region will increase.

Let me run through what we believe will happen if the US determines unilaterally to lift the arms embargo.

(1) The Congressional vote would have immediate adverse repercussions among our allies in NATO, most of whom warned us strongly about the risks to their soldiers and the adverse international consequences should the arms embargo be unilaterally lifted.

(2) Following a Congressional vote, the President would issue a determination that would direct that the embargo be unilaterally lifted despite United Nations Security Council Resolution 713. Additionally, restrictions on the issuance of munitions export licenses to Bosnia would be lifted, and the US Government policy to utilize authorities under the Arms Export and Control Act and Foreign Assistance Act would be changed to allow transfer and sale of arms to Bosnia.

(3) Contributing nations would immediately decide to withdraw their forces before the escalation of violence. We have been assured privately and publicly that they will leave. NATO forces and equipment will immediately begin staging for withdrawal operations. Within weeks of the vote to unilaterally

lift the arms embargo and hopefully, before the lift is implemented, the withdrawal operation would commence. The United States has decided in principle to participate in the withdrawal, as described by Mr. Slocombe. Under the best circumstances, there will be little organized threat to the withdrawn UNPROFOR forces or the NATO force, however there would be sniping and intermittent harassment impeding the withdrawal. The withdrawal will take 2 to 4 months to accomplish.

(4) Humanitarian support would fall off. NGO/PVOs also would begin withdrawing as tensions rise and fighting increases. Some of the 248 NGOs/PVOs in country would need to be extracted using the NATO force, lengthening the overall withdrawal process, and further depriving the populace of humanitarian support.

(5) Bosnian Serb Forces would likely begin an offensive. In a coordinated effort, at some point during or immediately after the withdrawal, we anticipate that Serb forces will attack to split Bosnia, overrun eastern enclaves, and deprive Bosnia of military options. The lifting of the arms embargo has sent a signal to the

Serbs that their strength relative to the Bosniaks will only decrease as arms begin to flow to their adversary. They must attack or see their hopes for a greater Serbia vanish. Fighting will escalate. The humanitarian efforts will all but stop as Serbs interdict both governmental and non governmental relief organizations at will.

(6) Bosniak offensive action would also ensue -- fighting designed to protect their people, their existing territory, and enhance their credibility as a military. We believe that despite the Bosniaks superiority in manpower and notable ongoing efforts to build up their forces, the outcome would likely follow the outlines of the battles around Bihac...some initial Bosniak gains followed by Serb counterattacks to cut off and isolate Bosniak forces.

(7) Additional arms would begin to flow into Croatia bound for Bosnia.

(8) Meanwhile, Bosnia would likely appeal for US assistance - unable to defeat Serb heavy weapons, hindered in fighting effectively by trying to absorb the new weapons and build a modern fighting force...there will be charges and counter-charges

of outside intervention...and more urgent appeals to Islamic nations.

(9) If the battlefield situation were to evolve in this manner, the US would confront a profound dilemma....stand aside, or intervene. The arguments for direct US military intervention would be strong.

- That the purpose of lifting was to give the Bosniaks the means to defend themselves...we cannot allow their defeat and slaughter.**
- That US airpower can make a crucial difference...and must be applied quickly to forestall a need for US intervention on the ground**
- That others are already helping the other side.**

Of course, there would also be cogent arguments for not intervening:

- That US intervention -- even from the air alone will substantially raise the risks of widening the war**
- That there are very real limits on what airpower can accomplish in that terrain...if it does not intimidate the Serbs, it may not be able to**

physically prevent them from seizing the eastern enclaves or other actions

- That the US determination to unilaterally intervene in the war will further isolate us from our NATO allies**
- That by military intervention, we will further Americanize the conflict**

(10) While we were debating, regional tensions would continue to rise. The threat of the Serbs would cause all regional parties to lobby for arms for self protection and to take preventive action. The future of the confederation between Bosnia and Croatia would be cast into doubt if the United States does not supply arms to Croatia -- and if we do supply weapons, we might raise the probability that the Croats will attempt to regain the Krajina region by force.

(11) Further widening of the conflict. As the Serbs press the attack, the countries of the region would seek even more intensively to draw in outside support. All parties in the conflict will seek supplies from their benefactors. If the US has lifted unilaterally, it is likely that the Russians or others would begin

overt support to Serb forces throughout the region. There would also be more support for the Bosniaks from Islamic nations, including the most radical, anti-Western elements. Even within NATO, there would be strong tensions between nations, and in some cases strong support for opposite sides.

(12) The conflict may spin out of control. The escalation in fighting and the additional weapons flowing into the region would lead to a widening of the war.

In sum, these are the long-term implications of unilaterally lifting of the arms embargo:

(1) There would be an Americanization of the war. Explicit U.S. involvement would likely be required, including both U.S. Close Air Support (CAS) to assist the Bosnians and ground forces for ensuring humanitarian aid flows and for filling the vacuum created by UNPROFOR withdrawal, unless we wish to see the Bosnian state partitioned between Serbia and Croatia.

(2) Damage to NATO would be extensive and perhaps irreparable. There would be a significant impact on our alliance relationships that would impair our cooperation within NATO and undermine 45 years of alliance cooperation. Loss of access to

key NATO basing, infrastructure, or overflights is a virtual certainty. NATO relevance will be thrown into doubt the very time we are seeking to establish NATO as the central foundation for a new European security architecture.

(3) Unilateral lift would also have a detrimental impact on our national credibility both within our alliance and at the United Nations. The long-term impact of our non-compliance with a United Nations Security Council Resolution would call into question our reliability, motives and ability to exercise global leadership. Other sanctions efforts, such as Iraq and Libya, would be weakened as well.

(4) A dangerous East-West confrontation becomes a real possibility, as does a geographic widening of the war.

(5) Finally, unilateral lift is unlikely to provide any reasonable solution to the problem on the ground in Bosnia.

The focus of the scenario that I have developed applies primarily to a unilateral lift of the arms embargo. If this were to be a multilateral effort, many of these problems would be obviated.

In the event that the embargo is lifted or that the UNPROFOR mission is determined no longer to be viable, UNPROFOR will have to withdraw. NATO has already made the determination to support this effort. As a result, NATO planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal is ongoing.

Planning for withdrawal of UNPROFOR began in July, when it was recognized that UNPROFOR would be unable to execute such a complex and difficult operation without substantial assistance from NATO. The current status is that a NATO concept plan was presented to the Military Committee in Brussels and sent back to SACEUR for detailed planning. The detailed plans have been completed in draft by Allied Command Europe and briefed to SACEUR.

The essence of the plans, as we understand them, is to provide additional combat brigades, with supporting elements to assist UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Some portion of the force will, in all likelihood, need to be stationed in Bosnia prior to the commencement of the withdrawal. The operation would be conducted under NATO control, with appropriate rules of

engagement to facilitate force protection as well as mission accomplishment.

As previously stated, the President has expressed our commitment to participate in such an operation, subject to a detailed review of the plans, and consultation with Congress.

However, we continue to believe that the option with the greatest chance of long-term success is to encourage UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina until a negotiated settlement can be reached. To this end, an informal meeting of Chiefs of Defense from the NATO nations, the Russian Federation, NATO staff, UN Secretariat and the Commander of UNPROFOR was held in The Hague from 19-20 December in which participants formulated a number of military recommendations to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness.

The results of the meeting were unanimous. There was "a unified resolve to continue UNPROFOR's mission in order to help alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in conflict areas of the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the meeting recognized the important role UNPROFOR is playing in creating the

conditions favorable to the eventual achievement of a negotiated settlement."

The meeting's specific recommendations cover various steps for improving the capabilities, effectiveness and the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and reducing its vulnerability. These include measures:

- Enhancing the effectiveness and self-defense capabilities of UNPROFOR. Examples include equipment, communications enhancements and the improvement of liaison between UNPROFOR and the warring parties.**
- Facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and the enclaves.**

Finally, the meeting reaffirmed the crucial importance of maintaining UNPROFOR's impartial mission until a negotiated settlement can be reached.

At this time, capitals are examining potential national contributions that could be made with an aim towards an improvement in UNPROFOR's effectiveness.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I would be happy to entertain your questions at this time.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	The Spanish Scandal. (3 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - January 1995 [2]

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vz2662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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UN Troops in Croatia, January 1995^a



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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	UNPROFOR: Withdrawal from Croatia. (5 pages)	01/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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