

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - October 1994 [Folder 1]: Principals Committee 9/13 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

851

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34	1	10	2	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 13, 1994. Record ID: 9421055. (1 page)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Diplomatic Strategy on Bosnia: Short and Mid-Term. (8 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Ending U.S. Compliance with the Bosnian Arms Embargo. [CIA Act] [partial] (4 pages)	08/01/1994	P3/b(3)
004. cable	Contact Group Discussion. (2 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
005. memo	For Anthony Lake from Leon Fuerth. Subject: Serbian Sanctions- Related Issues. (4 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Bihac: Possible Exclusion Zone. (2 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Executive Summary - Joint Staff Analysis of Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia. (5 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)
008. talking points	Foreign Policy Meeting. (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
009. paper	Lifting the Arms Embargo: the Policy Context. (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: Action Plan for the Federation. (9 pages)	08/24/1994	P1/b(1)
011. paper	Ending U.S. Compliance with the Bosnian Arms Embargo. [CIA Act] [partial] (4 pages)	08/01/1994	P3/b(3)
012. letter	Jurgen Chrobog to Pauline, Alain, Dick, Vitaly. (3 pages)	09/08/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - October 1994 [Folder 1]: Principals Committee 9/13 [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2655

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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013. cable	re: Mediators Propose a Krajina Political Settlement. (4 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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21055

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 12, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

Mr. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Tuesday, September 13, 2:30-3:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda for the meeting is attached at Tab A. (S)



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/27/2014
7013-0687-F

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Declassify on: OADR

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(b)(3)

DCI

National Intelligence Council

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

Ending US Compliance With the Bosnian Arms Embargo: Military and Political Implications

(b)(3)

A unilateral US decision to suspend compliance with the embargo and arm Bosnian Government forces would intensify the fighting in Bosnia. It would not make a substantial difference on the battlefield unless heavy weapons, extensive training, and logistic support were included. Outside ground and air force intervention would be needed to defend vulnerable Bosnian positions until government forces were prepared to conduct effective multiunit offensive operations. The Bosnian Government's war aims would escalate, leading it to defer diplomatic solutions to the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces would strike quickly after a US decision by launching major attacks to disrupt arms deliveries and would harass, detain and perhaps attack remaining UNPROFOR units. Belgrade would resume full support to the Bosnian Serbs to prevent their defeat. Allied confidence in US leadership could suffer if prior agreements were not reached, especially with Britain and France. Russia would condemn the decision and violate existing embargoes against Serbia. (b)(3)

[003]

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

v2 10/1/2013

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(b)(3)

August 1994

Copy 077

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

Scope Note

For purposes of this Estimate, we assume that the United States decides not to enforce the embargo against the Bosnian Government (and presumably Croatia), and that it decides to provide arms and training to Bosnian Government forces. In addition, we define success as a Bosnian Government that can protect itself without UNPROFOR, defend isolated Bosnian enclaves, and seize and control much of the territory allocated to it in the Contact Group plan. (b)(3)

More Arms for the Bosnian Government

Bosnian Government forces have improved substantially over the last two years and are now better prepared to absorb additional military equipment. For several months, limited amounts of small arms and ammunition from Iran and other Muslim countries have been reaching government forces, but this aid has not been enough to enable them to retake and hold substantial territory now held by the Bosnian Serbs. Without an increased flow of arms, government forces probably could defend only their core areas in northern and central Bosnia against an all-out Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) assault. (b)(3)

A US decision unilaterally to cease enforcement of the arms embargo and supply weapons to Bosnian Government forces would increase the flow and reduce the costs of equipment for the government. Soviet-style weapons, readily available on the world arms market, would be most easily and rapidly integrated by government forces:

- A steady flow of light weaponry and munitions would enable Bosnian Government forces to inflict heavier casualties and regain modest amounts of territory. (b)(3)

Even with additional heavy arms, Bosnian Government forces would continue to be hampered by a general lack of training and an inexperienced leadership that has had difficulty planning and executing large-scale, multiunit, offensive operations:

- We judge that enough heavy weapons to equip six to 10 brigades with 100 to 200 tanks, 60 to 100 armored personnel carriers, 200 to 300 heavy artillery pieces over 100 mm, and 25 to 40 multiple rocket launchers would be required to retake significant amounts of territory without weakening current Bosnian Government defenses.

[003]

- The Army will require six months to one year of training and logistic support to make effective use of new types of weaponry, particularly tanks and large-caliber artillery, in large-scale, combined arms, offensive operations. (b)(3)

The Bosnian Government's pursuit of its war aims is likely to intensify if the United States begins to supply arms, and it would show even less interest in a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Instead, fighting would escalate as the government sought a military victory that allowed it to control substantially more territory than allocated in the Contact Group's plan. (b)(3)

Bosnian Serb Responses

The Bosnian Serb Army would strike long before large-scale deliveries of arms to

(b)(3)

government forces could be effected. The BSA would attempt to cut off Tuzla and Sarajevo, seize the eastern enclaves, and interdict Bosnian Government lines of communication. It would be unable to destroy the Bosnian Government Army, however. (b)(3)

Remaining UNPROFOR units, especially those isolated in enclaves, would almost certainly be detained by BSA elements seeking human shields against air attacks. Withdrawing UNPROFOR units—including virtually all the Europeans—would be harassed and obstructed. Units opting to continue their mission—primarily the Muslim contingents—would be subject to especially violent attacks:

- Europeans would hold the United States responsible for the safe evacuation of European UNPROFOR contingents. US support for UNPROFOR evacuation would require extensive heavy lift, air transport, air cover, and possibly ground troops. (b)(3)

If our judgments on Bosnian Serb reactions are correct, outside air and ground forces would be needed to protect eastern enclaves and Sarajevo from BSA attack as well as to secure vital lines of communication to these areas. Their participation would be required until government forces were adequately prepared to conduct large-scale combat operations independently. (b)(3)

Regional Spillover

Belgrade probably would not directly intervene simply because the United States lifted its arms embargo. It would, however, abandon efforts to blockade the Bosnian Serbs and allow increased logistic support to them, especially fuel and replacement equipment, to offset improvements in government forces. The Yugoslav Army would intervene if government forces began making substantial gains. (b)(3)

Serbia would be unlikely to undertake provocative action in Macedonia while fighting escalated in Bosnia. Greater US involvement in the region, however, could prompt ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to stage an uprising against Serbia and proclaim independence. (b)(3)

Croatia would be crucial to any plan to lift the arms embargo. Croatian support can be had for a price; it will expect compensation in weaponry, increased political and economic assistance from the West, and US help to regain the Krajina. The Croatian Government still would attempt to limit the amount and type of equipment supplied to government forces that could present a long-term threat to Bosnian Croats. Over the longer term, lifting the arms embargo would feed Croat suspicions about Muslim intentions and could further undermine the fragile Croat-Muslim federation:

- In an attempt to prevent or complicate arms shipments via Croatia, Bosnian Serbs might coordinate operations with Krajina Serbs, risking a reopening of the war in Croatia. (b)(3)

Impact on Humanitarian Aid

Although many aid agencies will pull out in the event of a US decision to end its arms embargo, enough will remain to service northern and central Bosnia. Aid to that region does not pass through Bosnian Serb-held territory. (b)(3)

Delivery of aid to the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo will be problematic. These areas cannot be reached by road; airdrop risks will increase, given the virtual certainty that the BSA would seek to down aircraft participating in humanitarian relief. Sarajevo would have enough food to survive the winter, thanks to efforts by black marketeers, but would be cut off from electricity and gas:

[003]

- Intensified fighting would increase the number of refugees that required assistance. In a worst case, if one of the eastern enclaves falls in winter, thousands of refugees will die. (b)(3)

The Broader Implications

A unilateral US move—without prior agreements, especially with Britain and France, on the future of UNPROFOR forces—could damage allied confidence in Washington's leadership of the NATO alliance. Turkey would be the only NATO ally to support the action. Other alliance partners would object and move immediately to withdraw peacekeeping contingents from Bosnia. Calming Greece's hypernationalism and growing Greco-Turkish tensions would be even more difficult, and European and Balkan misgivings over Muslim Bosnia would become more pronounced. (b)(3)

Yel'tsin would condemn a US decision to lift its embargo to preempt hardliners who sought to exploit this issue. Russia also would openly and extensively violate the existing embargoes against Serbia, effectively breaking its pattern of cooperation with the United States on the Yugoslav problem:

- Eastern Europe would be reluctant to publicly support the United States but might use the move to sell arms in the region while reestablishing commercial links to Serbia.
- US actions would legitimize Iran's role in the region as an arms supplier to the Bosnian Government.
- Resolutions condemning US unilateralism would ensue but are unlikely to pass in either the Security Council or General Assembly. Existing UN embargoes and sanction regimes, including those against Iraq, would be weakened. (b)(3)

What Could Affect the Outcome?

- *Conditioning arms shipments to the Bosnian Government by threatening to cut them off, should its forces go beyond the Contact Group allocation, might reassure Western Allies that a diplomatic solution could still be possible.*
- *Easing economic sanctions on Serbia might blunt the Russian Government's criticism and could create an incentive for Belgrade to keep some distance from the Bosnian Serbs and agree to the placement of observers on the Bosnian-Serb border.*
- *A US ground presence in Bosnia might convince the British and French to keep some of their UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, thereby increasing the chances of isolating the Bosnian Serbs and sustaining the flow of humanitarian relief.* (b)(3)

[003]

On the plus side, US unilateral moves will be welcomed in the Muslim world, especially by Turkey. (b)(3)

This Special Estimate was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces and the National Intelligence Officer for Europe and was coordinated with the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. (b)(3)

Vershbow, Alexander R.

From: Reed, James W.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.
Cc: Kerrick, Donald L.
Subject: U.S. Assurances re: UNPROFOR
Date: Friday, September 09, 1994 4:00PM

Sandy:

I spoke with Jane Holl re: assurances the U.S. may have given to pull UNPROFOR's chestnuts out of the fire, if/when required. Jane called BG Tom Hill (now in Hawaii) with whom she worked this issue. They both recall that we did offer unambiguous assurances on this to UNPROFOR; their joint recollection:

– In late June-early July 1992 as the Canadians were opening Sarajevo airport, Powell -- on a close-hold basis -- gave the Canadians oral assurances that we would respond to 911 calls. These assurances were later communicated in cables from the CJCS to his Canadian counterpart.

– The issue arose again in Jan-Feb 1993 as we worked the no-fly enforcement issue. In that context, the assurance to the Canadians was broadened to apply to all of UNPROFOR.

Within the NSC's chron files, Jane said you'll find references to these assurances in summaries from PC's on these events; you may even find copies of the relevant cables attached as tabs to the read-ahead packages for those PCs.

Hill and Holl, however, recommend you call LTG Wes Clark and ask him to have his guys pull out the CJCS cable traffic on this for the most definitive evidence of what assurances were issued.

Hope this helps.

Jim

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2013-0687-F

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Pressure on Bosnia's Serbs

A NOOSE OF sorts is tightening on Bosnia's Serbs, principal perpetrators of the Bosnian wars and principal obstacles to the international peace plan. Serbia, itself badly hurt by sanctions, had sought to pry them off by announcing a blockade of military supplies to its ethnic kin, its erstwhile clients, the Bosnian Serbs. First, it kept monitors to police the blockade, said the Americans, Russians and Europeans. And now Serbia reportedly has accepted monitors. In return, the allies promise to lift some of the sanctions against Serbia.

Serbia could cheat or falter. The Bosnian Serbs will surely conspire to obtain supplies elsewhere. Yet the significance of an effective Serbian blockade cannot be dismissed. From being an irresponsible patron of its client's war and a full-fledged adventurer in its own right, Serbia has become, thanks to sanctions and war fatigue, a potential key participant in ending the war on imperfect but internationally approved terms. This follows from setting aside the goal of a "Greater Serbia" and instead adopting a policy of Serbia first. By imposing a blockade and opening up to the monitors, Serbia takes on the role of chief enforc-

er to deliver the Bosnian Serbs to the international peace plan.

For making good, Serbia deserves international reward. But Serbia, which bears the chief responsibility for turning political disintegration in the old Yugoslavia into military conflict, has its work cut out for it. It is not simply that the Bosnian Serbs have spurned the only peace plan on the table. They are still conducting military strangulation missions in Muslim-held enclaves—in eastern Bosnia and, newly in cooperation with Croatian Serbs, at Bihac in the northwest. For Serbia to return to international good graces it must see to the whole large and essential purpose of changing the Bosnian Serbs' policy from war and conquest to peace and withdrawal.

There remains the more familiar option for evening the odds in Bosnia: lifting the international arms embargo that disadvantages the Muslim-led Bosnian government. President Clinton and some of his American critics have in their respective ways favored this option, even as most of the allies reject it. Perhaps it will come to that. But the Serbian blockade of the Bosnian Serbs is the option to play out first.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1994

Bosnia: Ease Both Embargoes

President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia is now willing to let international observers monitor the trade embargo he has imposed on the Bosnian Serbs. In return, the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Russia will ask the U.N. Security Council to begin easing sanctions on the Yugoslav Federation, now consisting only of Serbia and Montenegro.

That makes sense — if the monitors can verify that the embargo is really being enforced. The U.N. imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia to get Belgrade to cut off the Bosnian Serbs. If that is what Belgrade is now doing, it deserves relief. The first steps planned, reopening Yugoslavia's airports to international flights and allowing its citizens to participate in international sporting and cultural events, are harmless enough in themselves.

But it would be a mistake to take even these steps without using the same U.N. resolution to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. The two will be linked only if the Clinton Administration insists on it.

Europe, including Russia, is eager to help Mr. Milosevic, hoping he will pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the international partition plan that the Bosnian Government has already accepted. The partition would be patrolled by international troops, including at least 15,000 Americans.

But these same European countries vehement-

ly oppose Washington's proposal to pressure the Bosnian Serbs by lifting the unjust arms embargo against the Bosnian Government, a step that would eventually let Bosnia protect its own interests without massive international intervention.

Unlike the sanctions against Mr. Milosevic, the Bosnian arms embargo is not tied to specific policies. Originally imposed against all parts of the former Yugoslavia, it disproportionately hurts Bosnia because the heavy weapons left by the Yugoslav Army on Bosnian soil were seized by Serb militias when the fighting began.

Sealing Mr. Milosevic's border will not be enough to overcome this disadvantage. Only when Bosnia can buy arms to defend itself can it assure compliance with any peace terms without outside intervention. There is a risk that Bosnia would use new arms to abandon peace diplomacy and try to recapture lost territory. But that danger can be countered if relief from the arms embargo is linked to Bosnia's continued acceptance of the latest international peace plan.

If the issues of sanctions relief for Yugoslavia and for Bosnia are now separated, Europe will never agree to lift the Bosnia embargo. That is why the United States must insist on linking the two from the outset, beginning this week.

A14

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	For Anthony Lake from Leon Fuerth. Subject: Serbian Sanctions-Related Issues. (4 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - October 1994 [Folder 1]: Principals Committee 9/13 [4]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Bihac: Possible Exclusion Zone. (2 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Executive Summary - Joint Staff Analysis of Lifting the Arms Embargo on Bosnia. (5 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. talking points	Foreign Policy Meeting. (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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009. paper	Lifting the Arms Embargo: the Policy Context. (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	re: Action Plan for the Federation. (9 pages)	08/24/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. paper	Ending U.S. Compliance with the Bosnian Arms Embargo. [CIA Act] [partial] (4 pages)	08/01/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

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~~Secret~~

(b)(3)

DCI

National Intelligence Council

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

Ending US Compliance With the Bosnian Arms Embargo: Military and Political Implications

(b)(3)

A unilateral US decision to suspend compliance with the embargo and arm Bosnian Government forces would intensify the fighting in Bosnia. It would not make a substantial difference on the battlefield unless heavy weapons, extensive training, and logistic support were included. Outside ground and air force intervention would be needed to defend vulnerable Bosnian positions until government forces were prepared to conduct effective multiunit offensive operations. The Bosnian Government's war aims would escalate, leading it to defer diplomatic solutions to the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces would strike quickly after a US decision by launching major attacks to disrupt arms deliveries and would harass, detain and perhaps attack remaining UNPROFOR units. Belgrade would resume full support to the Bosnian Serbs to prevent their defeat. Allied confidence in US leadership could suffer if prior agreements were not reached, especially with Britain and France. Russia would condemn the decision and violate existing embargoes against Serbia.

[011]

(b)(3)

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VZ 10/1/2013

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(b)(3)

August 1994

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

Scope Note

For purposes of this Estimate, we assume that the United States decides not to enforce the embargo against the Bosnian Government (and presumably Croatia), and that it decides to provide arms and training to Bosnian Government forces. In addition, we define success as a Bosnian Government that can protect itself without UNPROFOR, defend isolated Bosnian enclaves, and seize and control much of the territory allocated to it in the Contact Group plan. (b)(3)

More Arms for the Bosnian Government

Bosnian Government forces have improved substantially over the last two years and are now better prepared to absorb additional military equipment. For several months, limited amounts of small arms and ammunition from Iran and other Muslim countries have been reaching government forces, but this aid has not been enough to enable them to retake and hold substantial territory now held by the Bosnian Serbs. Without an increased flow of arms, government forces probably could defend only their core areas in northern and central Bosnia against an all-out Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) assault. (b)(3)

A US decision unilaterally to cease enforcement of the arms embargo and supply weapons to Bosnian Government forces would increase the flow and reduce the costs of equipment for the government. Soviet-style weapons, readily available on the world arms market, would be most easily and rapidly integrated by government forces:

- A steady flow of light weaponry and munitions would enable Bosnian Government forces to inflict heavier casualties and regain modest amounts of territory. (b)(3)

Even with additional heavy arms, Bosnian Government forces would continue to be hampered by a general lack of training and an inexperienced leadership that has had difficulty planning and executing large-scale, multiunit, offensive operations:

- We judge that enough heavy weapons to equip six to 10 brigades with 100 to 200 tanks, 60 to 100 armored personnel carriers, 200 to 300 heavy artillery pieces over 100 mm, and 25 to 40 multiple rocket launchers would be required to retake significant amounts of territory without weakening current Bosnian Government defenses.
- The Army will require six months to one year of training and logistic support to make effective use of new types of weaponry, particularly tanks and large-caliber artillery, in large-scale, combined arms, offensive operations. (b)(3)

[011]

The Bosnian Government's pursuit of its war aims is likely to intensify if the United States begins to supply arms, and it would show even less interest in a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Instead, fighting would escalate as the government sought a military victory that allowed it to control substantially more territory than allocated in the Contact Group's plan. (b)(3)

Bosnian Serb Responses

The Bosnian Serb Army would strike long before large-scale deliveries of arms to

(b)(3)

government forces could be effected. The BSA would attempt to cut off Tuzla and Sarajevo, seize the eastern enclaves, and interdict Bosnian Government lines of communication. It would be unable to destroy the Bosnian Government Army, however. (b)(3)

Remaining UNPROFOR units, especially those isolated in enclaves, would almost certainly be detained by BSA elements seeking human shields against air attacks. Withdrawing UNPROFOR units—including virtually all the Europeans—would be harassed and obstructed. Units opting to continue their mission—primarily the Muslim contingents—would be subject to especially violent attacks:

- Europeans would hold the United States responsible for the safe evacuation of European UNPROFOR contingents. US support for UNPROFOR evacuation would require extensive heavy lift, air transport, air cover, and possibly ground troops. (b)(3)

If our judgments on Bosnian Serb reactions are correct, outside air and ground forces would be needed to protect eastern enclaves and Sarajevo from BSA attack as well as to secure vital lines of communication to these areas. Their participation would be required until government forces were adequately prepared to conduct large-scale combat operations independently. (b)(3)

Regional Spillover

Belgrade probably would not directly intervene simply because the United States lifted its arms embargo. It would, however, abandon efforts to blockade the Bosnian Serbs and allow increased logistic support to them, especially fuel and replacement equipment, to offset improvements in government forces. The Yugoslav Army would intervene if government forces began making substantial gains. (b)(3)

Serbia would be unlikely to undertake provocative action in Macedonia while fighting escalated in Bosnia. Greater US involvement in the region, however, could prompt ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to stage an uprising against Serbia and proclaim independence. (b)(3)

Croatia would be crucial to any plan to lift the arms embargo. Croatian support can be had for a price; it will expect compensation in weaponry, increased political and economic assistance from the West, and US help to regain the Krajina. The Croatian Government still would attempt to limit the amount and type of equipment supplied to government forces that could present a long-term threat to Bosnian Croats. Over the longer term, lifting the arms embargo would feed Croat suspicions about Muslim intentions and could further undermine the fragile Croat-Muslim federation:

- In an attempt to prevent or complicate arms shipments via Croatia, Bosnian Serbs might coordinate operations with Krajina Serbs, risking a reopening of the war in Croatia. (b)(3)

[011]

Impact on Humanitarian Aid

Although many aid agencies will pull out in the event of a US decision to end its arms embargo, enough will remain to service northern and central Bosnia. Aid to that region does not pass through Bosnian Serb-held territory. (b)(3)

Delivery of aid to the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo will be problematic. These areas cannot be reached by road; airdrop risks will increase, given the virtual certainty that the BSA would seek to down aircraft participating in humanitarian relief. Sarajevo would have enough food to survive the winter, thanks to efforts by black marketeers, but would be cut off from electricity and gas:

- Intensified fighting would increase the number of refugees that required assistance. In a worst case, if one of the eastern enclaves falls in winter, thousands of refugees will die. (b)(3)

The Broader Implications

A unilateral US move—without prior agreements, especially with Britain and France, on the future of UNPROFOR forces—could damage allied confidence in Washington's leadership of the NATO alliance. Turkey would be the only NATO ally to support the action. Other alliance partners would object and move immediately to withdraw peacekeeping contingents from Bosnia. Calming Greece's hypernationalism and growing Greco-Turkish tensions would be even more difficult, and European and Balkan misgivings over Muslim Bosnia would become more pronounced. (b)(3)

Yel'tsin would condemn a US decision to lift its embargo to preempt hardliners who sought to exploit this issue. Russia also would openly and extensively violate the existing embargoes against Serbia, effectively breaking its pattern of cooperation with the United States on the Yugoslav problem:

- Eastern Europe would be reluctant to publicly support the United States but might use the move to sell arms in the region while reestablishing commercial links to Serbia.
- US actions would legitimize Iran's role in the region as an arms supplier to the Bosnian Government.
- Resolutions condemning US unilateralism would ensue but are unlikely to pass in either the Security Council or General Assembly. Existing UN embargoes and sanction regimes, including those against Iraq, would be weakened. (b)(3)

What Could Affect the Outcome?

- *Conditioning arms shipments to the Bosnian Government by threatening to cut them off, should its forces go beyond the Contact Group allocation, might reassure Western Allies that a diplomatic solution could still be possible.*
- *Easing economic sanctions on Serbia might blunt the Russian Government's criticism and could create an incentive for Belgrade to keep some distance from the Bosnian Serbs and agree to the placement of observers on the Bosnian-Serb border.*
- *A US ground presence in Bosnia might convince the British and French to keep some of their UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, thereby increasing the chances of isolating the Bosnian Serbs and sustaining the flow of humanitarian relief.* (b)(3)

[011]

On the plus side, US unilateral moves will be welcomed in the Muslim world, especially by Turkey. (b)(3)

This Special Estimate was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces and the National Intelligence Officer for Europe and was coordinated with the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. (b)(3)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. letter	Jurgen Chrobog to Pauline, Alain, Dick, Vitaly. (3 pages)	09/08/1994	P1/b(1)

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013. cable	re: Mediators Propose a Krajina Political Settlement. (4 pages)	09/12/1994	P1/b(1)

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