

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - October 1994 [Folder 1]: Principals Committee 9/13 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

851

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
34	1	10	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Trilateral Meeting with UK and French. (4 pages)	09/30/1994	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Demilitarizing the Sarajevo-Ilijas Route. (3 pages)	09/30/1994	P1/b(1)
003. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 23, 1994. Record ID: 9421112. (1 page)	09/22/1994	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Muslim-Croat Federal Army. (7 pages)	09/23/1994	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Inter-Serbia Sanctions. (1 page)	09/26/1994	P1/b(1)
006. draft	Background Paper for the President on Meeting with Bosnian President Izetbegovic. (3 pages)	09/25/1994	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Bosnia: The Way Ahead. (1 page)	09/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - October 1994 [Folder 1]: Principals Committee 9/13 [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2652

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10/1

✓ Sandy — Bill —

Alan —

CSD is seeking our
views on the attached
thoughts.

Jon

P.4

**OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
EUROPEAN POLICY**

Don

Walt Slocombe
has asked us for
some thoughts on a
legislative strategy
today. Would you
look at this and
give me a call

Jim

JAMES W. PARDEW, JR.

SEP 30 '94 15:12 R 2110M T1

Elements of a Legislative Strategy for Bosnia

Nunn Amendment Requirements -- Key Excerpts

- *International Policy: If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the CG proposal by the date that is the later of October 15, 1994 or the end of the 10-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President...should, not later than 14 days thereafter, formally introduce ... in the UNSC a resolution to terminate the Bosnia arms embargo...no later than December 1...*

-- Strategy: Forward a UNSCR to lift the arms embargo in principle, but suspend action to that end for six months. The resolution would specify that, at the end of the six month period, the UN Secretary General would report to the Security Council on progress by the Bosnian Serbs towards acceptance of the Contact Group proposal. Upon receipt of the Secretary General's report, the UNSC would issue a final resolution to lift the arms embargo, if required.

- *Unilateral U.S. Policy: (1) If by the earlier of November 15, 1994, or the end of the 15-day period beginning on the date on which a resolution described in subsection (e) (or a similar resolution) is formally introduced, the UNSC has not agreed to such a resolution and the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the CG proposal --*

(2) ...no funds...may be used for the purpose of participation in...the enforcement of the Bosnia arms embargo...other than as required of all UN member states under the UNSC resolution (#713) and the Charter of the UN.

(A) the funding limitation specified in paragraph (2) shall be in effect;

-- Strategy: NSC lawyers opine that the delay in multilateral lift does not relieve the requirement for implementation of the unilateral provisions of Nunn. If so, cut-off of funds for embargo monitoring, ~~however~~, would not be operationally workable under the new B-H proposal for a six month delay in implementing multilateral lift. Accordingly, our strategy is to go to the Hill to underscore the new circumstances and this contradiction, and ask for a modification to the legislation. In addition, OSD and JCS would prepare reports for the Hill that clearly identify the operational complexity created by separating enforcement of economic sanctions from enforcement of the arms embargo under Operation SHARP GUARD. } under

(B) the president shall submit a plan to, and shall consult with, Congress on the manner in which U.S. Armed Forces...would provide training to the armed forces of ... Bosnia...

-- Strategy: The Administration would provide, on a classified, closed-door basis, the general outlines of contingency plans that *might* go into effect if at the end of the six-month period the UNSC passes a resolution to proceed operationally with lifting the embargo.

(C) the President shall submit a plan to, and shall consult with, congress regarding the unilateral termination by the U.S. of compliance with the ...arms embargo...

-- Strategy: The briefing discussed above in paragraph (b) would include contingencies both for the U.S. role under multilateral lift, and our role under a hypothetical unilateral lift situation.

- *The President may waive the (funding) limitation in the case of the U.S. military personnel serving in NATO headquarters positions.*
- *INTERIM POLICY. -- If the Bosnian Serb faction attacks ...areas that have been designated by the UN as "safe areas", the President...should promptly formally introduce...in the UNSC a resolution that authorizes a selective lifting of the Bosnia arms embargo...*

-- Strategy: Emphasize rigorous enforcement, expanded air attack options (e.g., CAS beyond "direct and proportional"), extension of the exclusion zones, and other proposals (conditions) submitted by the B-H government at the UN.

Drafted 9-30-94 (Revision 2)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21112

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, September 23, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia tentatively scheduled for September 23, 1994. If the PC is to be held, the agenda should be circulated today. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/27/2014*
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21112

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on
Tuesday, September 23, 2:30-4pm in the White House Situation
Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda for
the meeting is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/27/2014

203-067-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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003. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 23, 1994. Record ID: 9421112. (1 page)	09/22/1994	P1/b(1)

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PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

BOSNIA

Discussions with Yeltsin

- We had very helpful discussions on Bosnia and remain united in our efforts to obtain a Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group's proposal.
- Our overall goal, which we share with other members of the Contact Group, remains a negotiated settlement to the difficult and tragic problems in Bosnia. We're half-way there in that the Bosnian government has accepted the international peace plan. But the Bosnian Serbs have not.
- Last week the international community brought some new pressure to bear against the Bosnian Serbs:
- The UN Security Council passed a new resolution tightening economic sanctions specifically against the Bosnian Serbs.
- NATO engaged in an air strike in retaliation for Bosnian Serb shelling of a French armored personnel carrier in the Sarajevo exclusion zone.
- As I stressed at the UN, we will be pressing for stricter enforcement of UN restrictions and for immediate action to end the strangulation of Sarajevo. NATO stands ready to act if the Serbs do not lift the siege.

Lifting of Arms Embargo

- We discussed the implications of lifting the arms embargo and agree there are consequences if it is lifted. We have previously agreed in the Contact Group that lift remains the tool of last resort should the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject peace.
- If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the Contact Group plan by October 15, I will seek Security Council action to lift the arms embargo as it applies to the Bosnian Federation.
- Based on a proposal from President Izetbegovic, that resolution would not be implemented until the spring, ensuring

that UNPROFOR troops remain through the winter, and giving diplomatic efforts more time to achieve a political settlement.

- We were especially interested in hearing President Yeltsin's perspective on the Belgrade-Pale split, which we must take into account when going forward with any new policy.
- Reports we have received from Ambassador Thomas, our negotiator for former Yugoslavia, and other Contact Group representatives have reinforced our view that the split between Milosevic and Karadzic is real.
- Real test will be the influence it has on obtaining a Bosnian Serb acceptance.

Pressure on the Bosnian government to agree to a delay in lifting the arms embargo

- We have not put pressure on the Bosnian government to agree to a delay in lifting the arms embargo. Starting several weeks ago, Bosnian leaders began expressing interest in possible delay of implementation of a lifting of the embargo.
- These concerns arose from their questions about the consequences of the departure of UNPROFOR and their hope that recent progress in the search for a negotiated peace could be given a chance to bear fruit. We have held several discussions with them on this point, including my talk with President Izetbegovic.
- This led to the proposal for delayed implementation of a UN resolution lifting the arms embargo.

How easing sanctions on Serbia will bring about a Bosnian Serb acceptance.

- It's important to understand the resolutions.
- One tightens sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, making clear they are paying a price for rejecting international efforts to end the Bosnia conflict.
- This is a very important step, backed by President Yeltsin and the other Contact Group members, and I'm sorry this resolution has gotten so little media attention.

- The sanctions-easing resolution is focused on Serbia itself, rather than Serbs in Bosnia. It suspends lesser sanctions like passenger air flights and sports and cultural contacts for 100 days.
- Its aim is to provide positive reinforcement for Milosevic's decision to cut off the Bosnian Serbs with a border closure verified by international teams.
- General reports that Yugoslavia is implementing its decision to stop all but humanitarian goods from crossing the border.
- It will be subject to reviews at 30-day intervals and rescinded at any time if the border closure is not effective.
- We are not prepared to provide any further sanctions relief unless Milosevic takes additional, concrete steps to promote the achievement of a political settlement.

PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

BOSNIA

- Bosnia is a good example of how we and the Russians are cooperating on a regional crisis area.
- President Yeltsin and I spent a fair amount of time discussing Bosnia to ensure we keep our efforts coordinated and on track.
- At Naples, we both endorsed the contact group process -- including a commitment to incentives and disincentives to induce the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group map.
- With regard to the lifting of the arms embargo, the intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs has left us with little flexibility. Time and our patience are running out.
- President Yeltsin and I discussed all of this, and pledged to intensify our efforts to bring the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group map.



UNCLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

FAX COVER SHEET

SV —
3/26/94 Leon asked for
a definition of what we
would expect the Serbs
to recognize if we
issued sanctions for borders
STATE provided the
ATTACHED. (u) 9/26

TO: Don Kemick

FAX NO: 456-9150

TEL NO: 456-9151

FROM: Sue Bremner

FAX NO: 647-0555

TEL NO: 736-7478

SUBJECT: Border Recognition Issue.

This is what "Serbia" would have to
say to satisfy is that it has recognized
Bosnia and Croatia.

This transmission consists of a Cover Sheet plus 1
Page(s)

UNCLASSIFIED

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) recognizes the Republic of Croatia as an independent state, the international borders of which are the republic borders within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as of January 1, 1991.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) recognizes Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state, the international borders of which are the republic borders within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as of January 1, 1991.

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CONTACT GROUP AGREEMENT ON SERBIAN SANCTIONS

-- The UNSC has agreed three resolutions on Serbian sanctions which were worked out in the Contact Group. They are:

a. A resolution which notes that in response to Belgrade's acceptance of monitors on its border to Bosnia, a limited number of sanctions will be suspended temporarily. The steps include allowing passenger aircraft to land and take off from Belgrade and one other FRY airport and loosening of sport and cultural contacts.

These alleviations will run for 100 days, with thirty day reviews. They must be extended after 100 days. In addition, if at any time during the 100 period, the border monitors decide that the blockade is not being maintained, the sanctions will be reimposed.

b. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will be tightened. In particular, financial and other service transactions are limited more severely.

c. An prior resolution tightening sanctions on Belgrade has been agreed. It will be held in abeyance, depending on Serbian behavior. However, an exchange of letters among members of the Contact Group confirms that if Milosevic doesn't live up to his promises, this resolution will be reintroduced.

These mild alleviations are in the interest of the peace process. By holding out the prospect of better relations, they support Milosevic's effort to separate himself from Karadzic, thus driving a wedge between Belgrade and Pale. The improvements are minor and will not ease Serbia's severe economic problems. They can be rescinded at any time.

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Sep 19, 94 22:31

P.14



THE SECRETARY GENERAL

(2)

19 September 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to convey the attached report addressed to me on 19 September 1994 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, dealing with the establishment of an ICFY Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Boutros Boutros-Ghali", is located below the typed name.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

His Excellency
Sr. Don Juan Antonio Yañez-Barnuevo
President of the Security Council
New York

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REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE ICFY STEERING COMMITTEE
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS OF AN
"ICFY MISSION TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)"

INTRODUCTION

1. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in its third year. Successive blue-prints for peace have been drawn up with the parties and then subsequently repudiated by one side or the other: the Carrington-Cutiliero Plan; the Vance-Owen Plan; "the Invincible Package"; the European Union Action Plan. In January-February 1994, the parties agreed in talks held under the auspices of the Co-chairmen of the ICFY Steering Committee, on a constitutional framework, modalities for the implementation and monitoring of a cessation of hostilities, and on the greater part of a map for the allocation of territory. However, disagreement persisted on, at most, two percent of territory. Various methods were suggested by the Co-Chairmen to no avail, to overcome the impasse on this small percentage of territory. They included arbitration under the auspices of the Security Council.

CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL

2. In the light of this experience with successive peace plans, consultations took place involving the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and governments with influence on the parties. This led to the signing of the Washington Accords for the establishment of the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the establishment of a Contact Group consisting of five countries, namely France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, working with the ICFY. The Contact Group was guided in its work by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, by declarations adopted by Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group countries meeting in Geneva on 13 May and on 5 and 30 July, by the provisions of the European Union Action Plan, and by the previous efforts of the ICFY.

3. The Contact Group drew up a map for the allocation of territory between the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity and submitted it to the two sides on 6 July. The map allocated 51% to the Bosniac-Croat Federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serb entity. The Contact Group, reinforced by the support of the United Nations Security Council and the Council of Ministers of the European Union, as well as by governments and organizations world-wide, reinforced the parties that the proposed map would have to be accepted as presented - unless the parties could agree amongst themselves on changes. At the end of July, the Bosniac-Croat Federation accepted the proposed map. The Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) also accepted the map. Leaders of the

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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) urged the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group map. To date the Bosnian Serb leadership has not done so.

4. The Contact Group countries had made it quite clear from the outset that there would be incentives for acceptance of its proposal and disincentives for rejection.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA'S CLOSURE OF ITS BORDER WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS

5. On 4 August 1994, the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to come into effect the same day:

- "To break off political and economic relations with the Republica Srpska"
- "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the Republica Srpska (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
- "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the Republica Srpska, except food, clothing and medicine."

FOLLOW-UP BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN

6. At the request of the Secretary-General, the United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee, Mr. Stoltenberg, visited Belgrade and Pale from 12-14 August. He discussed with President Milosevic the implementation of the measures announced for the closure of the border and their verification. Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg followed up by visiting Belgrade, Podgorica and Zagreb from 4-6 September.

7. The Co-Chairmen discussed the border closure at length with President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic in Belgrade on 4 September, and with President Bulatovic in Podgorica on 5 September. On 5 September, the day after the Co-Chairmen's conversation in Belgrade, Foreign Minister Jovanovic sent the Co-Chairmen a letter recalling a proposal that had been made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the effect that representatives of international humanitarian organizations, in conjunction with representatives of the local Red Cross, could "establish joint controls" at places where humanitarian assistance "is organized and despatched from". Foreign Minister Jovanovic requested the Co-Chairmen to "proposed ... relevant humanitarian organizations", to work in

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conjunction with the local Red Cross, to establish joint controls of the type mentioned.

8. At the Co-Chairmen's request, a member of their staff, Mr. Pellnas, had detailed technical discussions in Belgrade on 4 September with the Head of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and on 5 September in Podgorica with the Deputy Interior Minister of Montenegro. In the light of the report they received, the Co-Chairmen decided to explore the possibility of sending to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and ICFY Mission composed of personnel provided through national humanitarian organizations who would control the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance at designated crossing points and who would have freedom of access elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It would report to the Co-Chairmen and through them, to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Presidency of the European Union, on the implementation of the border closure.

9. From the preparatory work done by Mr. Pellnas it was concluded that an ICFY Mission could aim initially for 135 international members. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) offered to provide free 65 drivers and also offered 7 cars to start with. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) also said it would arrange for 65 interpreters to be paid by the Mission. The Mission Coordinator would be Mr. Bo Pellnas (Sweden), acting in a civilian capacity. Its financing would come from voluntary contributions and countries would be expected to pay for the persons they sent.

10. The Co-Chairmen kept the Contact Group, which was then meeting in Berlin, fully briefed on these developments. The Contact Group welcomed and supported the efforts of the Co-Chairmen.

11. The Co-Chairmen immediately sounded out the Nordic countries and obtained commitments they would supply 60 persons to be in Belgrade within one week. They also obtained definite promises of \$200,000 start-up money from two of the Nordic countries.

12. In view of these developments the Co-Chairmen, on 8 September, informed Mr. Jovanovic, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), that they were ready to set up an ICFY Mission along the lines discussed with President Milosevic, President Bulatovic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic on 4-5 September. The Co-Chairmen noted that Mr. Pellnas had worked out a number of details about the proposed ICFY Mission in meetings with Mr. Kertes, the Head of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and

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with Mr. Bojevic, the Deputy Interior Minister of Montenegro. The Co-Chairmen added that Mr. Pellnas would consult with other relevant humanitarian organizations and other countries. They further informed the Foreign Minister that the Nordic countries were ready to put some people in quickly. The Co-Chairmen said they hoped to be able to provide more details early in the following week, by which time Mr. Pellnas would hopefully be in a position to go to Belgrade and to discuss the matter in more detail.

13. At the request of the Co-Chairmen, Mr. Pellnas arrived in Belgrade on Wednesday, 14 September accompanied by seven persons from France, Germany, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America. Mr. Pellnas immediately met with representatives of the Yugoslav authorities. Meetings continued the following day. The Yugoslav authorities agreed that all traffic would be stopped between 1900 hours and 0600 hours on all crossings except the two used for humanitarian traffic. All ferry traffic would also be stopped. Moreover, the number of international staff assigned to the ICFY Mission could be raised to 200.

14. Mr. Pellnas was assured by the Yugoslav authorities of full access to all parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). They gave Mr. Pellnas a formal commitment to provide the ICFY Mission with sufficient helicopter resources. They accepted the establishment of a radio communication net as requested by Mr. Pellnas. They also agreed to Mr. Pellnas' request that the drivers provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should be police officers.

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE MISSION

15. On Friday, 16 September, Mr. Pellnas saw the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and submitted to him, on behalf of the Co-Chairmen, the following arrangements for the establishment of the ICFY Mission:

- "1. The Coordinator of the Mission is to be a member of the ICFY staff, Mr. Bo Pellnas, answerable to us as Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of ICFY. The Mission will consist of such international civilian staff made available to ICFY whom we select after discussion with your Government, and those of Serbia and Montenegro.
2. The Mission will be organized out of Belgrade, initially from the Norwegian Embassy, and will have three sections in the field: one in Montenegro and two in Serbia. Each section will initially be organized

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into teams of four persons: two international staff, one local interpreter to be said by the Mission, and one local driver to be supplied and paid by your Government. It may be necessary to move teams quickly from one section to another as the Mission requires and for this purpose the helicopters which your Government has agreed to provide will be helpful.

3. International staff of the Mission, who will carry ICFY certificates, will have the status of members of a diplomatic mission. Property and premises, including temporary ones, established by the Mission for its Members shall not be seized or interfered with.
4. Teams and members of the Mission will be granted full freedom of movement. Their movements and their right to remain in any place shall not be subject to any requirement of prior notice or authorization.
5. Taking into account that the responsibility of controlling the crossings remains with your Government, members of the Mission will be enabled: to work with representatives of the Yugoslav Red Cross at places from which any humanitarian assistance is organized or despatched; to work alongside customs officers; to look into any vehicles crossing, and to have examined any item conveyed by individuals or vehicles across the border which they suspect might not be classified as purely humanitarian. For this purpose the Members of the Mission are to have the possibility of examining customs, commercial, transport and related documentation, access to facilities where goods are loaded or, if inspection during loading is not feasible, the right to require unloading of vehicles, and the assistance in specific cases of your authorities in carrying out examinations.
6. The Government is to ensure the security and safety of members of the Mission, without thereby interferring with their movement and work.
7. The Mission will be authorized to maintain communications between their teams, their sections, their Belgrade offices and Geneva, by communication satellites as well as by radio transmitters.

If the abovementioned conditions forming the basis for our proposals in this letter no longer exist, we reserve our right as Co-Chairmen to withdraw the Mission at any time we determine."

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16. On Saturday, 17 September, Foreign Minister Jovanovic formally transmitted to the Co-Chairmen, through Mr. Pellnas, his Government's "full acceptance" of the abovementioned arrangements proposed by the Co-Chairmen. The ICFY Mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was thus formally established as of 17 September 1994.

MISSION CONCEPT

17. The Mission is being organized with personnel provided through national humanitarian organizations. It will have three sections working in the field, which will be given resources corresponding to the number of crossing within their area of responsibility, it being understood that it would be possible to carry out a quick change of resources between the sections, in order to achieve a concentrated presence in areas as needed.

18. The sections will be organized into groups of four teams, each team consisting of two international members, an interpreter, a driver and a car. The interpreter and the driver will be provided by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

19. The Mission will exercise its right to go wherever it wishes, without any form of preannouncement, to follow the work of customs officers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and to actually look into vehicles crossing the border.

COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS

20. Following the initial party of eight that assembled in Belgrade on 14 September, a second contingent of nineteen persons arrived in Belgrade on Friday, 16 September, coming from Norway and the United Kingdom. A third contingent of ten, coming from France, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom will arrive on Monday, 19 September. A further contingent of fifteen persons coming from Finland will arrive on Tuesday, 20 September. As of Tuesday, 20 September, 52 international members of the Mission will thus have arrived in Belgrade. The Mission has already assembled some local drivers, local interpreters and vehicles provided by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In addition the Government is making helicopters available for use of the Mission.

21. Mr. Pellnas has had extensive discussions in Belgrade with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as well as with Serbian and Montenegrin authorities. A number of meetings have been held with Mr. Kertes, Head of

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Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

22. On 17 September, Mr. Pellnas flew to Podgorica for a meeting with the Montenegrin authorities. As agreed in the talks with Mr. Kertes, a helicopter was provided by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Mr. Pellnas had a meeting in Podgorica with Mr. Bosko Bojevic, the Deputy Interior Minister. Mr. Pellnas briefed him on what had been agreed during his talks in Belgrade and asked for his support of the Mission in Montenegro. Mr. Bojevic made a very firm commitment to Mr. Pellnas, promising his Government's full cooperation and support. He also promised to take every possible step to ensure the safety and security of the members of the ICFY Mission. Mr. Bojevic informed Mr. Pellnas about actions that had been taken against two private businessmen who had been caught smuggling fuel into Bosnia and Herzegovina. He said that both had been sent to prison. The seized vehicles and fuel had been sold and the proceeds given to the Montenegrin Red Cross.

23. On 16 September, the ICFY Mission sent out its first reconnaissance team of two members, who visited the border crossings between Zvornik and Kotroman and also made a visit to Pripolje, which is to be the base for one of the three field sections within the ICFY Mission. The team had complete freedom of movement and thus arrived unannounced at the crossings. They saw very little traffic south of Zvornik and reported that the crossings appeared to be seriously controlled. They saw all crossing cars being checked. They observed no trucks at any of the crossing points. The team also reported that the border now has all the signs of a national border, with flags, barriers and, at places, even some military defensive positions.

24. On 17 September, the ICFY Mission sent out a team to Pripolje to start preparations in an area presently judged to have the highest priority. On 18 September, the Mission established a presence in Niksic with one team while another team started working at the packing centre for humanitarian aid in Belgrade. As soon as the necessary logistical arrangements are in place, the remaining teams will be deployed to reinforce the Pripolje and Niksic centres and also to commence operations from Banja Koviljaca (between Loznica and Zvornik).

25. Out of the ten members arriving on Monday, 19 September the core of a headquarters will be organized and the commanders of the three Field Section Centres will be chosen and sent out. The 15 Finnish members due to arrive on Tuesday, 20 September will be put at the disposal of the three Section Commanders.

26. Further meetings between the Federal Customs authorities and the experts supporting the ICFY Mission will be held on Monday 19 September in order to further develop working procedures.

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OBSERVATIONS

27. Mr. Pellinas has reported to the Co-Chairmen that the Federal Government and the Federal authorities have fully co-operated with the ICFY Mission and have sought in every way to facilitate its work. The teams sent out by the ICFY Mission have had complete freedom of movement.

28. The ICFY Mission's first impressions from the border areas visited coincide with reports it has received from visitors from other international organizations and seem to verify that the Federal Government is taking every action to seal off the border effectively between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1994/1067
17 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 908 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 908 (1994), the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an additional period terminating on 30 September 1994. The present report is intended to assist the Council in its deliberations on the renewal of the mandate of UNPROFOR and is complementary to the comprehensive analysis of the mandate of UNPROFOR already submitted in my report of 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300). It provides an account of recent developments in the area that have affected the environment in which UNPROFOR has to operate.

II. STRUCTURE OF UNPROFOR

2. UNPROFOR is headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information and administrative components. Its headquarters is in Zagreb, Croatia. As of 16 September 1994, the strength of the military component, commanded by the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Bertrand de Lapresle of France, amounted to 38,582, including 624 United Nations military observers from 32 countries. There are 641 civilian police, 1,870 international civilian staff (including 1,353 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 2,188 local staff. UNPROFOR is thus the largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations. It is divided into three operational commands: UNPROFOR (Croatia) led by Major General Ghazi Tayyeb of Jordan, UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) led by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and UNPROFOR (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) led by Brigadier General Trygve Tellefsen of Norway.

III. CROATIA

3. In the period under review, UNPROFOR's activities in Croatia have been focused on the monitoring of the general cease-fire agreement signed in Zagreb on 29 March 1994 by the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) (see S/1994/367, annex). The agreement constitutes a major achievement that has significantly reduced active

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hostilities between the conflicting sides in Croatia. While the Croats quickly implemented the agreement, the Serbs took a longer time to implement key provisions of it. By the end of May, however, UNPROFOR reported almost total compliance, characterized, inter alia, by a general cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces beyond fixed lines of separation and the placement of heavy weapons in agreed storage sites. UNPROFOR has assumed exclusive control over the zone of separation, which covers an area of over 1,300 square kilometres. Since 29 March, the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) has conducted over 6,000 patrols in the zone of separation.

4. The implementation of the cease-fire agreement raised expectations that the parties would enter into comprehensive discussions on issues of mutual economic benefit, followed by talks on a final political settlement, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The opening of economic negotiations was scheduled to take place in mid-April. However, during the months of April and May, the local Serb authorities in Knin issued a number of statements that appeared to close the door on political reconciliation. They announced their intention to pursue full integration with other Serb areas, thus setting back hopes for an early settlement with Croatia, and stipulated unrealistic preconditions for talks. It proved impossible to open negotiations at that stage. Renewed efforts were made in June. However, disagreement over modalities for the negotiations led to the cancellation of talks scheduled for 15 and 17 June.

5. While the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia has continued to lead efforts to start the economic negotiations and define an acceptable agenda, UNPROFOR has focused primarily on strengthening compliance with the cease-fire agreement, in order to maintain a climate conducive to peace. These efforts have faced several setbacks involving a number of incidents in the UNPAs. In Sector West, despite assurances to the contrary, Croatia has, since mid-May, maintained between 300 to 500 "special police" in positions close to the former contact line. Incursions by local Serb forces across the contact line have also led to the death of two Croatian soldiers and one civilian. In Sector South, the Croatian side appeared to expect that water facilities on the Serb side would come under UNPROFOR control and management, without the need for Serb agreement; UNPROFOR, however, can function effectively only with the consent and cooperation of the parties. There has also been a series of violent incidents, including the destruction by explosives of an UNCIVPOL station and an incursion into the zone of separation by 100 Serb soldiers, of whom a small number remain.

6. In an already charged atmosphere, the Association of Displaced Persons of Croatia in early July imposed a blockade on all the crossing-points into or within the UNPAs, in order to draw attention to their plight and apply pressure on UNPROFOR to expedite their return to their homes in the Protected Areas. The Croatian Government maintained that it was not in a position to take decisive action to lift the blockades. As outlined in my letter to the President of the Council of 26 July 1994 (S/1994/888), the resultant restrictions on UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandate, particularly on the Croatian side of the zone of separation, were a serious violation of the terms of the cease-fire agreement and gravely disrupted UNPROFOR's ability to discharge its duties, in particular

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its monitoring responsibilities. There were also major disruptions to UNPROFOR's logistics operations and scheduled troop rotations.

7. Senior military and civil affairs officials from UNPROFOR embarked on a series of high-level discussions with the Croatian authorities to secure the latter's full adherence to the cease-fire agreement. Following the Security Council's presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/44) of 11 August, the blockade was eventually lifted on 19 August. However, Croatian police moved the location of the Lipik crossing-point in Sector West closer towards Serb positions, in disregard of the cease-fire agreement, which freezes all tactical positions within 10 kilometres of the contact line. In these circumstances, UNPROFOR is not prepared to use the crossing-point and continues to insist on its return to its original position.

8. Although 17 of the 19 crossing-points are now in use, tensions persist on this issue. During the blockades, a number of public statements made by Croatian leaders referred to the possibility of having to resort to military action to reintegrate the UNPAs if progress could not be achieved peacefully. This fostered Serb fears of a Croatian attack, and resulted in a withdrawal of numerous Serb heavy weapons from storage sites.

9. Despite these setbacks and violations, both sides continue to express support for the cease-fire agreement, and UNPROFOR has intensified its efforts to restore full compliance with its provisions. Following mediation by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, senior officials from the Croatian Government and local Serb authorities were brought together for discussions in Knin on 5 August. Committing themselves to continuing the negotiating process, they agreed to establish eight expert groups to prepare for future negotiation on specific economic areas. During subsequent contacts between the International Conference and officials from the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities, as well as between my Special Representative and the latter, agreement was reached to begin negotiations on the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway. A compromise proposal was presented by the International Conference, which has proved to be unacceptable to the Croatian Government. It has therefore not yet been possible to open direct negotiations on this issue.

10. The Prevlaka Peninsula, which was demilitarized under UNPROFOR supervision following the adoption of Security Council resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, with the creation of a "blue zone" that only UNPROFOR personnel may enter, is of considerable strategic importance to both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia. If UNPROFOR was to withdraw before a final political settlement is reached, there is a risk that hostilities would resume in the area. As UNPROFOR's presence continues to be required, I have requested my Special Representative, in co-operation with the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference, to lend his good offices to resolve the remaining difficulties in coordination, as appropriate, with the local authorities.

11. By its resolution 908 (1994), the Council authorized the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia. Discussions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and UNPROFOR are continuing on technical aspects of

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this issue. In the meantime, the North Atlantic Council has, in principle, authorized close air support in the event of attacks from Croatian territory against the "safe area" of Bihać.

IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

12. While significant progress has been made in stabilizing the military situation in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, events in recent months have demonstrated the fragility of the peace on the ground. Military restraint by the warring parties in some areas was undermined by aggressive acts in others, resulting in a marked variation in progress towards normalization of life in different parts of the country. The continuation of warfare in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, should not be allowed to obscure the largely successful peace-keeping work carried out by the Force. UNPROFOR has been a significant factor in facilitating the improvement of the population's living conditions through, for example, its promotion of local cease-fires, its negotiation and implementation of agreements on a variety of issues ranging from the release of prisoners to the repair and improvement of public services and its assistance in the evacuation of the wounded and sick.

13. Following the signature on 23 February 1994 of a cease-fire agreement between the Bosnian government army and the Bosnian Croat forces (see S/1994/216), as well as the agreement subsequently reached in Washington on 10 May 1994 on the creation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation, UNPROFOR has been closely involved in the implementation of all its military aspects, bringing a large degree of stability and peace to central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was instrumental in achieving a breakthrough in an agreement on freedom of movement in the Mostar area, which was implemented on 23 May, and resulted in a rapid improvement in the quality of life for residents on the eastern bank of the Neretva River. UNPROFOR has also played a pivotal role in monitoring the demilitarization of Mostar, a precondition for the establishment of the European Union administration in that city on 23 July 1994. In central Bosnia, UNPROFOR has also been involved, from an early stage, in negotiations on freedom of movement both for the population and for commercial traffic. While freedom of movement is not complete, some commercial convoys, under the security provided by UNPROFOR's presence, have been able to move from the coast to southern, central and northern Bosnia. Some infrastructural problems have been overcome, although economic rehabilitation has barely begun.

14. Shortly after the last renewal of its mandate, UNPROFOR was confronted with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Gorazde (see S/1994/600), which resulted in the first use of close air support against Serb ground targets on 10 and 11 April 1994. The crisis in Gorazde led me to request additional support from NATO, which in turn declared an exclusion zone around Gorazde on 22 April 1994. On the same date, an agreement was reached in Belgrade between Bosnian-Serb leaders and my Special Representative, facilitated by President Milosovic of Serbia, that brought the Bosnian-Serb offensive to an end, provided for the immediate deployment of UNPROFOR military and civilian personnel, established a cease-fire, which has been largely respected, and required the Bosnian-Serb forces to withdraw from a 3-kilometre area from the centre of Gorazde town as

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well as to redeploy all their heavy weapons outside a 20-kilometre circle from the same point.

15. In late April 1994 tensions mounted in and around the strategically important Posavina corridor, with frequent artillery, mortar and rocket exchanges affecting the Brcko, Tuzla and Orasje areas. In response, UNPROFOR mediated between the parties and eventually agreed with the Bosnian Serbs, on 5 May 1994, that a team of 16 United Nations military observers would be deployed in and around Brcko. That deployment was immediately carried out and UNPROFOR's presence in the area has significantly contributed to reducing tension and making an offensive by either side less likely.

16. After several weeks of intensive negotiations, UNPROFOR mediated the signing on 17 March 1994 of an agreement between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian-Serb party on freedom of movement in the Sarajevo area. As a result, two routes across Sarajevo airport, one route from Sarajevo to Visoko and the bridge at Grbavica were reopened on 23 March 1994 for civilian traffic and humanitarian goods. From that date until 26 July 1994, when the Bosnian Serbs suspended the agreement on the airport routes, some 60,000 persons and over 12,000 vehicles used the Sarajevo-Butmir route, while nearly 100,000 civilians and 19,500 vehicles used the route linking two Serb suburbs. The other two routes remain open, with the Grbavica bridge used over the same period by over 6,500 persons and the Sarajevo-Visoko route by 11,500. UNPROFOR has been actively negotiating the reopening of the routes across the airport that had brought freedom of movement and a major improvement of living conditions, including the near-disappearance of black-marketeering, to all citizens of Sarajevo.

17. While UNPROFOR convoys into Sarajevo have not been seriously affected, UNPROFOR and humanitarian flights into the city have been targeted with increasing frequency, for the most part by the Bosnian-Serb side, resulting in one death and several severe injuries to UNPROFOR personnel. Despite some setbacks in recent weeks, UNPROFOR successfully negotiated an anti-sniping agreement in Sarajevo on 14 August 1994. The agreement by and large continues to hold and was instrumental in permitting a resumption of the city's tramway service, which had been suspended because of sniping. A similar anti-sniping agreement was concluded in Gorazde on 28 August 1994, which also appears to be holding well.

18. The Special Coordinator for Sarajevo, appointed pursuant to resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994, began operations in Sarajevo on 16 April. He has established a coordination committee, which has become the focal point for restoration activities by donor Governments, as well as international and non-governmental organisations. Although the situation in Sarajevo has not allowed rapid implementation of the projects identified in the plan of action, cooperation with the local authorities has been proceeding well, including with the Serb side, which has shown a willingness to cooperate on technical matters. The first meeting of the Committee of Donors is scheduled to be held on 20 September in Vienna. It is hoped that the concerted efforts of the United Nations and the international community, coupled with the undertakings of the Bosnian Government and the cooperation of local authorities, will make it

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possible for conditions of life in Sarajevo to be substantially improved before the coming winter.

19. Despite the progress made in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hostilities erupted along many parts of the confrontation line between government and Serb forces after an initial period of calm following the Gorazde crisis. After the adoption of resolution 913 (1994) of 22 April 1994 and the Council's presidential statement of 1 June 1994, UNPROFOR actively pursued the conclusion of a comprehensive cessation of hostilities as the only viable and durable alternative to the partial and local military solutions described above. However, on 8 June 1994 it managed to obtain only the agreement of the government and Bosnian-Serb sides to a one-month cessation of offensive action and provocative activities, as well as to the immediate release, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of prisoners-of-war and detainees and the exchange of information on persons whose whereabouts are unknown. While this agreement was still in effect, government forces attempted to capture dominating terrain or to secure routes in the areas of Ozren and Travnik. At the same time, Bosnian-Serb elements continued to expel Muslim civilians from the Banja Luka and Bijeljina areas and imposed new restrictions on the movement of convoys of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The agreement, which was renewed for an additional month in July, lapsed on 8 August 1994.

20. In the last two months of the mandate period, government forces have defeated the forces of the self-declared "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia" in the Bihac area, resulting in an exodus of an estimated 25,000 refugees to the United Nations Protected Area of Sector North in Croatia. UNPROFOR extended full logistical and medical support to UNHCR and has been actively involved in creating conditions that would make the repatriation of refugees to the Velika Kladusa area possible. Meanwhile, government forces have also resumed operations in the Ozren and Travnik areas and advanced south from the areas of Bresa and Dastanko. All these activities have been met by heavy Bosnian-Serb shelling and local counter-attacks at many points along the confrontation line. Although there has been no significant change to the confrontation line throughout this period and no wide-ranging and sustained general offensive by either side, the shifting pattern of localized attacks and counter-attacks has resulted in restrictions by both sides on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement. UNPROFOR made several unavailing attempts to persuade both sides to seek a negotiated rather than a military solution. The continued military activity has also undermined UNPROFOR's efforts to achieve a general cessation of hostilities agreement, as called for in the Council's presidential statement of 30 June.

21. Serious violations of human rights have persisted and UNPROFOR has continued to highlight and condemn strongly the incidence of torture, killings and expulsions of minorities within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Efforts continue to ensure that the treatment of minorities in Serb-held areas fully complies with international norms and standards. UNPROFOR persists in its attempts to visit and establish a presence in Serb-controlled areas, particularly in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, which are the scenes of continued "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnian-Serb forces. In this connection, I welcome the Council's presidential statement of 2 September condemning the practice of ethnic cleansing wherever it occurs and by whomever it is committed.

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22. The cease-fire agreement between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs has greatly improved conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Central Bosnia. However, since the main prewar road communications with Tuzla continue to be interrupted by the line of confrontation, that city can be reached only by secondary roads through mountainous territory. With winter approaching, these roads will again become a challenge to UNHCR's and UNPROFOR's logistical capabilities. UNPROFOR continues to negotiate for the opening of the Tuzla airport to humanitarian flights but, despite repeated attempts to reconcile the positions of the government and Bosnian-Serb sides, this has yet to be achieved.

V. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

23. The military situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has remained relatively calm and stable. Few border violations by military or police patrols have been observed along the border with Albania. However, since April there has been a rise in the frequency of encounters between patrols from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia along their common border. The majority of these encounters have been non-confrontational, indicating that neither party seems to wish to provoke conflict. Because of the continued non-recognition of the border by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), however, these incidents may recur with increasing frequency. While both sides have nominated commissions to address the issue, no date has been set for the start of bilateral discussions. Because of the threat to stability arising from unresolved border issues, the establishment of an international border commission is clearly needed.

24. The most serious difficulties experienced by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the past six months have been economic. Social stability has been endangered by rising unemployment and a declining economy resulting, inter alia, from the effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece on 17 February 1994 and of the United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), formerly the country's primary trading partners. Internal political tensions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have also increased. In order to establish accurate estimates of the ethnic composition of the population, the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia conducted a nationwide population census from 25 June to 1 July 1994. The census was financed, partly organized and monitored by the Council of Europe and the European Union, with assistance from other bodies including the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and civilian components of UNPROFOR. Official results, as well as an expert assessment of the accuracy of the census, are expected in mid-October 1994, shortly before the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections.

25. Given the complex interrelation of external and internal factors contributing to economic and political uncertainty, and rising social tensions, the Security Council, in resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994, encouraged my Special Representative, in cooperation with the authorities of the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to

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contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic. In line with this broadened political mandate, my Special Representative has focused on practical ways of assisting the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under these difficult conditions. The focus of UNPROFOR's political work, in line with the efforts of the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia, has been on strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring human rights. UNPROFOR's military component has successfully mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides, and in early July succeeded in establishing an UNPROFOR observation post at Chupino Brdo on the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In all these activities, UNPROFOR has maintained close coordination with other international bodies, including the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and CSCE.

VI. MINE-CLEARING ACTIVITIES BY UNPROFOR

26. The Washington Agreement on the Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1 March 1994 (S/1994/255, Annex), and the cease-fire agreement in Croatia of 29 March 1994 (S/1994/367, annex 1), have opened the way for UNPROFOR to become more active in other humanitarian and confidence-building measures in its area of operation. An important obstacle to its work, and to progress towards normalcy in these areas, has been the presence of mines.

27. Under its present mandate, UNPROFOR has no specific role to play in mine clearance for humanitarian purposes. Nor would it be appropriate for UNPROFOR to take upon itself this dangerous task, which should be the responsibility of the parties themselves. However, by its presence on the ground, particularly within the zone of separation in Croatia, which is under its exclusive control, UNPROFOR has been best placed to assist in monitoring the efforts of the parties in mine-clearance activities. This role has helped to develop confidence-building measures between the parties.

28. UNPROFOR's activities in this area cover mine-awareness programmes to assist humanitarian agencies in preparing their programmes with local authorities; gathering of mine information and records from the parties for dissemination to humanitarian agencies and local authorities as appropriate; and coordination and monitoring of mine clearance by the parties and related activities by other international and non-governmental organizations. In carrying out these activities, together with their normal operational duties, UNPROFOR units have sustained mine casualties, many of which could have been avoided had mine-protected vehicles been available.

29. The Security Council may wish to endorse the activities undertaken by UNPROFOR in relation to mine-clearance in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and support the acquisition of a small number of protected vehicles for use in areas of mine hazard.

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VII. PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

30. In its first two years of operation UNPROFOR, like other United Nations peace-keeping operations, has become conscious of the lack of objective and accurate information in the mission area as well as of the harmful consequences of propaganda and disinformation about its role. With the establishment of a Separate Division of Information in February 1994, UNPROFOR has attempted to overcome this deficiency. Public information activities have been focused on informing the population in the mission area about UNPROFOR's mission, mandate and activities, with a view to increasing public understanding and support of its efforts. The Division now consists of four production units - television, radio, publications and print production and promotion - and includes offices in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Skopje, Belgrade and each of the four United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia.

31. In recent months, in accordance with paragraph 55 of General Assembly resolution 48/42, there has been a considerable expansion of the Division's public information programmes in local languages and a number of new initiatives have been launched. Currently, UNPROFOR television programmes in local languages are broadcast on national television stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is hoped that these programmes will also be broadcast on Croatian national television in the near future. Publications, posters, pamphlets and booklets about UNPROFOR and its mission are produced in the local languages and distributed throughout the mission area. In addition, production of taped radio programmes has begun, and UNPROFOR has a daily 20-minute radio programme on a local station in Sarajevo.

32. While these activities are effective in reaching some audiences in the mission area, UNPROFOR currently lacks an independent means of reaching mass audiences on a daily basis without restriction, in order to provide accurate and impartial information and to promote public understanding of the mission, as well as to address issues of current interest. In a peace-keeping operation of the size and complexity of UNPROFOR, radio is clearly the most practical, efficient and cost-effective method of realizing this important objective. Accordingly, UNPROFOR plans to establish an independent UNPROFOR radio station that would give three quarters of the population of the mission area unhindered access to impartial, factual and timely information, thereby increasing public understanding and support for UNPROFOR's peace-making efforts in the former Yugoslavia. Provisions have already been made in the recent UNPROFOR budget proposal and have been approved by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, subject to a specific authorization by the Council. The Security Council is accordingly invited to endorse UNPROFOR's public information policy and programmes, including the establishment of the UNPROFOR radio station.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. This section will be issued as an addendum to the present report.

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IX. OBSERVATIONS

34. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are closely interrelated and have a direct impact on UNPROFOR's operations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In this context, the work of the Contact Group, which emerged in April of this year and involves five major Powers working with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, could be of great significance for UNPROFOR's future. The Contact Group's proposals for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as is well known, have been accepted by all the parties with the exception of the Bosnian Serbs, who remain adamantly opposed to them. As members of the Security Council are aware, I addressed a letter on 24 July 1994 to the President of the Council, which expressed my views on the possible consequences for UNPROFOR of acceptance by all the parties, or the continued non-acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs, of the Contact Group's peace proposals for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

35. With regard to Croatia, and as outlined in my report to the Security Council on 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300), there are four problem areas in UNPROFOR's mandate which require reassessment: the demilitarization of the UNPAs; the restoration of Croatian authority in the "pink zones"; the establishment of border controls; and assistance for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. All four require either enforcement or the consent of both parties for their implementation. UNPROFOR has neither the means nor the mandate for enforcement action of this nature, and the cooperation of the parties has been elusive.

36. While both sides expressed a willingness in May 1994 to enter into negotiations on the further demilitarisation of the areas around the zone of separation, discussions have not yet begun. The deep sense of mistrust that still prevails among the Serbs precludes the possibility of the UNPAs being demilitarized in the near future. Similarly, the return to Croatian authority of the "pink zones", as required by Security Council resolution 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992, has been consistently rejected by the Serbs. It should be noted that, in establishing a zone of separation, the current cease-fire agreement has the de facto effect of suspending action on the status of the "pink zones" until further progress is achieved within the framework of that agreement. My report to the Council of 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) makes clear in paragraphs 13 and 14 that the Serbs' continuing rejection of Security Council resolution 769 (1992) is very much linked to their disagreement with the provisions entailed in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), under which de facto sanctions have been imposed on the UNPAs by subjecting the import, export and transshipment of goods to, from or through the UNPAs to explicit Croatian government approval. With no indication that the Serbs are reconsidering their opposition to this trade and border control, UNPROFOR remains unable to implement Security Council resolution 769 (1992). I should like to make clear to the Council that UNPROFOR will be in no position to implement resolutions 762 (1992) and 769 (1992) until there is a significant change in the attitude of the local Serbs and that it cannot, therefore, accede to the demands of the Government of Croatia that it take on responsibilities which it is clearly unable to fulfil.

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37. Despite the inability of UNPROFOR to achieve important parts of its mandate in Croatia, the successful implementation of the cease-fire agreement has opened the possibility for some progress. It has dramatically reduced the number of war casualties and has allowed for increasing normalization of life, including improved economic prospects, particularly for tourism. However, despite this success, UNPROFOR continues to be severely criticized by the Croatian Government and media for its inability to fulfil its entire mandate, and to be threatened with unrealistic deadlines to fulfil tasks which, without the political will of both sides, cannot contribute to long-term stability. While the recriminations directed against UNPROFOR may be partly related to the Croatian political process, they also reflect certain incompatibilities in the Force's mandate, which have made it impossible to achieve the implementation of various tasks within a limited time-frame. The resultant gap between Croatian expectations of what the United Nations presence can deliver, and what UNPROFOR is actually capable of achieving in present circumstances, has become increasingly difficult to bridge.

38. Progress in Croatia has been slow and has proved insufficient to moderate understandable Croatian impatience for a quick solution to the problem of reintegration of the UNPAs into Croatia. Resort to a military option would have incalculable consequences, and would be unlikely to lead to a durable peace. Moreover, all efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict have not yet been exhausted. At this stage, however, the Croatian Government is not willing to negotiate on economic issues without simultaneously negotiating the political settlement. The local Serbs, on the other hand, are not ready to negotiate a political settlement without first having negotiated a number of economic confidence-building measures.

39. Assistance in the creation of conditions that would permit the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes in or near the UNPAs continues to be of the highest priority for UNPROFOR. In my report of 15 February 1992 (S/23592), I informed the Council that I had asked that UNHCR assume responsibility for designing and implementing a scheme for the return of refugees and displaced persons. This was clearly predicated on a peaceful resolution of the underlying causes of displacement. With UNHCR assistance, several thousands of displaced persons have been able to return to their homes in the Dubrovnik, Sibenik and Zadar hinterlands. Return to more sensitive areas depends not only on the cease-fire but also on a political settlement, which alone would provide the conditions for a large-scale return in safety and dignity. Nevertheless, discussions are taking place among UNHCR, UNPROFOR and both parties on the implementation of a pilot project for voluntary return to a few selected villages in or near the zone of separation.

40. In considering the various options for UNPROFOR's presence in Croatia, I remain alert to the possibility that the situation on the ground could be frozen in a stalemate in which UNPROFOR's continued presence contributed only to the maintenance of an unsatisfactory status quo. I have no wish to recommend the indefinite prolongation of a peace-keeping presence if it is widely judged to be unable to carry out its mandate. I am also conscious that UNPROFOR's presence, and its ability to carry out its mandate, will depend on the will of the Croatian Government to continue to facilitate its work. (In this connection, I must stress once again the importance of the Government finalizing a status-of-

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forces agreement with UNPROFOR without further delay.) However, in the present circumstances it is of the greatest importance to secure continued respect for the cease-fire agreement, which has now held for nearly six months. At the same time, further efforts will have to be made in order to create a basis for the reopening of negotiations. These are tasks which require the continued presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia. In any case, in the present fluid and uncertain situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am concerned that a recommendation for a precipitate withdrawal from Croatia could jeopardize hopes for progress both there and in the former Yugoslavia as a whole.

41. With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, experience gained over the last six months has enhanced mutual understanding, joint planning and cooperation between UNPROFOR and NATO, and the successful deployment of long-awaited additional forces has enabled UNPROFOR to improve its ability to seize opportunities for progress. Nevertheless, the possibility of a further exacerbation and intensification of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has highlighted UNPROFOR's limitations, and underlined a number of areas of concern. First, the constraints on UNPROFOR's ability to perform its responsibilities in the safe areas, outlined in my report of 8 May 1994 pursuant to resolution 844 (S/1994/S55), remain largely unchanged. Secondly, the exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde, although highly successful in protecting the civilian population from mortar, artillery and tank fire, are expensive in manpower and difficult to enforce and cannot be maintained indefinitely in the absence of a comprehensive cessation of hostilities or, as a minimum, the demilitarization of those areas. This latter solution is now being pursued by UNPROFOR for Sarajevo. It is possible for any side to hide weapons, and UNPROFOR personnel, who are widely dispersed at weapons collection points, are vulnerable to any determined effort to remove weapons or take hostages. Thirdly, the supervision and enforcement of weapons exclusion zones places additional strains on UNPROFOR as an impartial force. All these difficulties are inherent in UNPROFOR's nature as a highly dispersed and lightly armed peace-keeping force that is not mandated, equipped, trained or deployed to be a combatant.

42. In addition to these limitations on its capabilities, UNPROFOR has continued to experience serious restrictions on its freedom of movement imposed by all sides, and especially by the Bosnian Serbs. While conducting operations in the Ozren area, and around Brezand Dastanske, Government forces have denied access to UNPROFOR patrols and, during the same period, the Serbs have significantly and frequently restricted convoy movements and patrolling throughout areas under their control, especially within the exclusion zones. Particularly serious have been actions by both sides that have led to the repeated closure of the Sarajevo airport. In the absence of improved relations between the Government and the Serb party, these difficulties will continue and may intensify. In particular, the pursuit by either side of military objectives, however limited or localized, is incompatible with the nature and purposes of UNPROFOR's deployment.

43. In the circumstances, I am conscious that some Member States may have come to believe that the strategy so far pursued by the international community, involving the deployment of a peace-keeping force dependant upon the active cooperation of the parties, is no longer adequate to serve the objectives proclaimed in the resolutions of the Security Council. However, the use of

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"disincentives" such as the general imposition and stricter enforcement of exclusion zones around the safe areas in order to influence the outcome of the conflict, or the lifting of the arms embargo in favour of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would change the nature of the United Nations presence in the area and imply unacceptable risks to UNPROFOR. The former action would place UNPROFOR unambiguously on one side of an ongoing conflict. The latter step would be tantamount to fanning the flames that the United Nations is deployed to extinguish. In both cases the result would be a fundamental shift from the logic of peace-keeping to the logic of war and would require the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

44. My position is not only one of peace-keeping principle. The Council is aware that the decisions of Member States to provide troops to UNPROFOR were based on the existing Security Council resolutions and on the assumption that the mandate of the Force would be implemented as a peace-keeping operation. Any attempt to redefine radically the conditions in which UNPROFOR's mandate is implemented and which could have implications for the security of its personnel may, therefore, lead the contributing States to exercise their sovereign right to terminate their contribution to the Force. Although some troop-contributing nations have expressed their willingness to continue their participation even in changed circumstances, I do not believe it to be in the interests of the United Nations for a peace-keeping force to be converted into one which, by mandate and composition, becomes a party to the conflict it was originally deployed to help the parties to bring to an end.

I have therefore directed that plans be finalized for a withdrawal at short notice. It is my judgement that, should this withdrawal become necessary, it would take place under extremely difficult conditions and might therefore require an early decision by the Security Council. A 60-day period of preparation would be the minimum necessary in order to arrange for the withdrawing troops to be adequately protected. In a number of foreseeable circumstances, this could be achieved only by the temporary introduction of a significant number of highly combat-capable ground forces provided by Member States outside the United Nations framework.

46. The Council should also be aware that any decision that would necessitate the withdrawal of UNPROFOR will have immediate implications for the Force's ability to implement its existing mandates. In particular, during its preparations for withdrawal, UNPROFOR would no longer be able to protect and support the civilian populations of the three outlying "safe areas", Srebrenica, Tuzla and Gorazde. Nor would UNPROFOR any longer be in a position to execute the ground-monitoring functions that are an integral part of the arrangements for the weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde.

47. Any consideration of decisions leading to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR has, however, to be weighed against the tasks that are currently being implemented successfully by UNPROFOR. In measuring the value of its continuing presence, it is necessary to consider what the costs would be if these tasks were to be abandoned. In the absence of an overall political settlement acceptable to all of the parties, UNPROFOR's current presence and activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain invaluable. UNPROFOR continues to play an essential and effective role as an impartial force, and represents, in a society faced with

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the challenges of reconciliation and restoration, the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations. Its usefulness in supporting humanitarian activities, facilitating local cease-fires and disengagements and fostering reconciliation and cooperation between communities argues in favour of a further renewal of its mandate.

48. At this stage, therefore, and barring any other developments in the situation on the ground, I do not recommend the withdrawal of the Force. Its current tasks are being effectively pursued. Its role in escorting humanitarian relief convoys has been greatly reduced in the reporting period. Increasingly secure movement has been possible throughout the contiguous territory controlled by the Federation. UNPROFOR will continue to have a vital role in support of UNHCR in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in this territory, including reconnaissance, road repair and maintenance and direct transport. I should like to stress, however, that security problems remain in relation to land access to Sarajevo and the safe areas, and UNPROFOR's assistance is essential for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to these enclaves, although the Force alone cannot ensure access. Even with UNPROFOR support, grave difficulties are foreseen for the humanitarian assistance programme unless progress is made towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. If land access to the safe areas is denied by the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, some assistance could continue to be delivered by air drops. However, this will not be adequate for Sarajevo, where the airlift can effectively be halted by a single shell or even a single armed individual.

49. The continued harassment of minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs, has underlined the need for a more comprehensive mandate for UNCIVPOL. Currently, civilian police have a limited mandate to operate in Srebrenica, Tuzla and Mostar, an unofficial agreement to operate in Sarajevo and Gorazde, and no formal mandate to operate in other areas, including Velika Kladusa. It is my view that UNCIVPOL, under the supervision of the Head of Civil Affairs, should be given a mandate to operate throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council may, therefore, wish to consider providing UNPROFOR with a uniform UNCIVPOL mandate for the whole mission area, similar to that already mandated for Croatia in resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992. It is my hope that UNPROFOR could promote, as is already the case in some areas, the protection of human rights in the difficult period ahead, not least in the transitional phase leading to the consolidation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would be a crucial role in the context of the return of refugees and displaced persons in safety and dignity.

50. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR's presence has demonstrated the value of preventive deployment. But its mission can be judged effective only if it ends successfully. That success will depend on external developments which UNPROFOR does not control. Unresolved disputes between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over its name, state symbols, and constitution have blocked the latter's full membership in international organizations, while external threats to its economic stability and border security persist, including through the continuing economic blockade by Greece and the non-recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's international

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borders. In this context, I appeal to the Governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to resume urgently their negotiations under the auspices of my Special Representative, Mr. Cyrus Vance, in order to reach agreement on issues of dispute. I would also take this opportunity to remind the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the necessity to conclude without further delay a status-of-forces agreement with UNPROFOR.

51. At this time of severe financial constraints for the United Nations, I am fully conscious of the high costs of UNPROFOR, which accounts for a substantial portion of the Organization's peace-keeping expenditures. I continue to examine ways in which to reduce costs, which in turn will require a firm expectation by the international community that the parties to the conflict cooperate with the United Nations, negotiate with each other in good faith, honour and sustain mutual agreements and agree to take up as soon as possible their full responsibilities for fostering mutual recognition and normalization, including preserving the rights and welfare of all citizens.

52. I therefore recommend to the Security Council the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate for a period of six months, and propose to report further to the Council as necessary on progress towards implementation of the mandate, in the light of developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of UNPROFOR.

53. I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Bertrand de Lapresle, and to the brave men and women of UNPROFOR for their remarkable courage and dedication in the performance of their duties. I should also like to express my gratitude to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen, for their unremitting efforts for peace, and to NATO for its close collaboration with, and support of, UNPROFOR.

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