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Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the Secretary of State from Toby Gati. Subject: Bosnia: Anticipating Serb Reactions. (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Page 19-22 of unknown document on Bosnia. (4 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
003. talking points	Points for the Third Contact Group Ministerial. (4 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2648

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
(Geneva, Switzerland)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

July 5, 1994

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER,
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI KOZYREV,
U.K. FOREIGN SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD,
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER KLAUS KINKEL,
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER ALAIN JUPPE,
GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREAS PAPOULIAS,
EU COMMISSIONER HANS VAN DEN BROEK

Russian Mission to the United Nations
Geneva, Switzerland
July 5, 1994

MINISTER KOZYREV: First of all, I am glad to welcome in the Russian Mission my esteemed colleagues and ministers of foreign affairs of Great Britain, Germany, U.S., France, and Greece; and the commissioner of the Commission of the European Union.

The world is at a turning point. The passions around Bosnia can lead to an international confrontation. Recognizing our responsibility for the future of our states and for the community of nations, we have chosen the only alternative possible--joint action, a common front, against those whom war seems to have deprived of common sense.

We have mapped out what we could call a peaceful ultimatum, which we are proposing to the parties in the conflict. In essence, this is the first such effort to force a compromise and peace. In practical terms, we jointly have agreed and approved the preliminary work of the Contact Group, after the meetings which they had with the parties in accordance with the instructions formulated at the last meeting in Geneva between the ministers.

We have agreed to the territorial proposals prepared by the Contact Group and have asked the contact group to present it to the representatives of the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs. These efforts are energetically supported by our governments as a reasonable basis for a quick political settlement. We call upon the sides to examine this proposal in a positive light and to give their response within a two-week period.

The proposal could be part of the settlement which proposes to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single unit within its

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internationally recognized borders, and envisioning constitutional arrangements which will determine the relations between the Bosnian, Croatian and Bosnian Serb formations. We again firmly support the actions of the settlement which would permit refugees and displaced persons to freely return to their places of initial residence. Our proposal opens significant possibilities which might not come up again.

All of us here are united by the faith that the war can be brought to an end right now. We consider that if this will not take place, the consequences will be very serious. However, in case there is peace, the international community is prepared to go through the process of settlement in re-establishing Bosnia. We call upon the Bosnian sides to quickly and positively reply to our proposal.

Tomorrow, the Contact Group will give these proposals to the ministers of the parties. Without going into the details, there are important incentives in order that these parties adopt the proposed map. For the Bosnian government, we are prepared to assist them in their territorial regulation and re-establishment of the territory. For the Serbs, the sanctions will be lifted temporarily if they draw back to the lines noted on the map. If the sides do not agree, they will meet additional pressures. Specifically, the existing resolution of the U.N. will be strictly abided by. The necessary planning is taking place. As an extreme measure, the decision of the Security Council about removing the embargo on arms supplies may be inevitable. This would have consequences for the presence of the U.N. troops.

Meanwhile, the sides must have a cease-fire and not engage in military activity. We have agreed to have our next meeting before the end of July. We also have discussed, in a broader plan, the situation in former Yugoslavia, and we call upon mutual recognition between all the states within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, and we call upon immediate initiation of negotiations once again among the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian units. Such is the agreed-upon position of the ministers present here. I want to thank my colleagues for the difficult but constructive and businesslike work carried out today. I want, once again, to thank the Contact Group, and also the co-chairmen, Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg, who have made their contributions to this work. And I think my colleagues might want to express their additional considerations, please.

SECRETARY HURD: I need not add much to what Andrei Kozyrev has said on behalf of us all. Many people have tried to make peace from outside in Bosnia during these last two years. And one thing which has handicapped them is that, although all these efforts were genuine, they were divided. There were differences. There were differences in the nature of the effort; differences in the plans put forward. The new point today is that all of us, the countries of the European Union, the United States of America and Russia,

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have agreed not just a general plan, not just a percentage of territory but a united and detailed approach based on a particular, precise map, which tomorrow the Contact Group representing us all will present to the parties.

And we have also agreed, as Andrei Kozyrev said, on the incentives and the disincentives which would apply to both parties--the sticks and the carrots. And the choice then passes, as it has always passed, to those who are actually doing the fighting. One can just say this now, about the choice: In Bosnia today there is a sort of half-peace, fragile, uneasy, partial, but better, particularly in Sarajevo and in central Bosnia, than what was happening a year ago.

The choice now for Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, is not between that half-peace and the total peace which we are suggesting. The choice before them is a choice between the kind of peace we are suggesting and a relapse into war, a relapse into complete war--the undoing of the partial achievements of the past few months, and going back to the savagery of rule by the sniper, rule by heavy artillery.

That is the choice, and we all hope that it's a choice they will weigh very carefully during these next two weeks. And it's because the choice is as serious as that, the risks of an even more cruel war and a spreading war are so great, that we have come together and that we will continue through the Contact Group and ourselves, to do everything we can to turn this into a true peace.

MINISTER KINKEL: I want to thank Andrei Kozyrev. I think we have reason to thank the Contact Group and the two co-chairmen. This plan is our joint plan. This is important. The peaceful process has entered a decisive stage. The parties to the conflict are being proposed a concept which is supported by the UN, the EC, Russia and the United States.

This opens a great chance for attaining peace, and the parties to the conflict have a chance to use this plan. And it must be clear to them that their refusal to accept this plan will hardly be accepted well by the international society. Now they have a chance to reply within two weeks, and there is a proposal, from the point of view of the map, and if they accept this, they can count on international support. If they are not prepared for this, then they will encounter with the decisiveness of the community of nations. I, as the chairman of the EC, call upon the representatives of the parties to the conflict to be responsible for the fate of people--because we are talking about the fate of people. The EC is prepared to receive a positive answer and to react in a positive way to this. It is up to the parties to the conflict. I repeat again, they must think about the fact that we are talking about people, and first of all, we must help them.

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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: What's been done here today is a very important step in the search for peace and for a brighter future for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What's led up to today's step has been a number of actions that we have taken that provide the way for this. The establishment and maintenance of Sarajevo as an exclusion zone. The no-fly zone. The work that we have done to promote a confederation between the Bosnians and the Croats in Bosnia. And the cease-fire, which has been fragile but nevertheless largely effective.

One of the key features, of the proposal that we are presenting today is that it preserves the state of Bosnia as a single state within internationally recognized borders. There has been some confusion about this, but I think it's very important to understand that the proposal being presented is for a single state within recognized borders--that's the determination we had on May 8, and that's what we are carrying forward here today.

A second key feature is that the proposal that's being presented provides for a reasonable, viable degree of territory, amount of territory, for the Bosnians. And I think that it's essential that the proposal be understood in those terms. It's reasonable from the standpoint of the federation, of the Bosnians and the Croats, and it's reasonable from the standpoint of the Serbs as well. As has been said, we discussed in some detail today the consequences that would ensue if one party accepts and the other doesn't. In particular, we discussed the consequences that would ensue if the Bosnian government accepts the proposal and the Serbs do not. There are a number of steps that will be taken in that respect, and the parties will be told of those.

It would be a mistake of truly historic proportions for either party to feel that they can serve their people well by rejecting this proposal. Such a rejection could lead only to further suffering, further bloodshed, further tragedy, in that country. We urge them to give the gravest consideration to this proposal, as the best and most humane solution. Thanks to Andrei Kozyrev for serving as host, and to all my colleagues for assisting in this united, important endeavor.

FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE: Today in Geneva an important event has taken place. I hope that this is a decisive event. You know that France wanted this for many months. We're talking about the fact that for the first time the U.S., the Russian Federation, and the European Union, are making a common proposal to the parties. A proposal which refers both to the territorial aspects as well as institutional aspects of a common settlement. And it is in this regard that we have a new element. The Contact Group has worked well; on the basis of the proposals of the contact group, we could reach an agreement which is a turning point in the resolution of this issue.

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I would like to also stress that the draft of the overall settlement which we have worked out is in accordance with those principles which we have determined specifically. The principles in accord with the action of the European Union, which we presented a half-year ago. And in that regard, Bosnia-Herzegovina must remain one state within internationally recognized borders, and the territorial settlement within this state must be balanced. This is what is indicated in the map which will be given to the parties, and I must think that the proposal which is being made is acceptable to both parties in Bosnia.

A third point that I think is very important to mention is that our countries are prepared to take upon themselves the responsibility in order to get the agreement of the sides to take upon themselves the responsibility to take the necessary measures of encouragement, both positive incentives and disincentives. The Contact Group has been instructed to make specific proposals in this area, and to give a clear signal to all parties of the conflict, we are prepared to participate in the implementation of the settlement if both parties agree. If not, then we are prepared to examine measures in order to get agreement to carry out all the resolutions of the Security Council.

Is everything resolved? No, obviously, much has not been resolved, and we are now oscillating between war and peace. If we want to get the best chance for peace, I think we have to abide by two conditions. That is, have a close unity among ourselves, unity of action. Our points of view have gotten very close. We agree that peace is close. We cannot lose the rhythm of our meetings. We cannot lose the impulse that we have, and the sides must give their reply within two weeks. The time period is given to the parties in order to react to our proposal, and it's important that we also meet before the end of July in order to get the results on the basis of the answer that we are given.

I also want to conclude by thanking the diplomats who worked in the Contact Group; they have done good work. And to thank Andrei Kozyrev for his hospitality which he afforded to us in the Russian Mission.

MINISTER PAPOULIAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should think that what Mr. Kozyrev has just said expresses our common will and our resolution to give an end to the war, to the tragedy that's taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is, in my opinion, a decisive moment, and the proposal that we are making is a decisive one. Our firmness should bring about the results that we all expect it to bring. As foreign minister of a Balkan state, I would also like to express my concern that if this great opportunity is lost now, then the war in Bosnian-Herzegovina may become a global war in the Balkans. So I would like to say that our resolution is that this war should end, and it should end now.

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QUESTION: (THROUGH INTERPRETER) I would like to ask the Foreign Minister of Russia -- Andrei Vladimirovich, what do you predict will be the reaction to the Geneva plan proposed by the ministers, a peaceful ultimatum, as you have called it--the reaction in Russia as a whole, and specifically in the Duma?

MINISTER KOZYREV: (THROUGH INTERPRETER) I think that all those present here, all the ministers present, are under a great deal of pressure of public opinion. Many of them are under pressure from their parliaments, and the pressure sometimes comes with opposite vectors. So that's why we needed special courage, both on behalf of the ministers and on behalf of the governments represented here, in order to work out a joint approach.

I think that, also in Russia, there will be a very difficult and not one-sided reaction. At the same time, I am very happy, and in this case I am saying happy and I feel this in regard to the fact that the committees on international affairs of the Duma and of the federation council--that is, both the lower and upper chamber--of our parliament have adopted today a statement which I am very glad to cite. That is, the committees appeal to all the parties to the conflict, the Bosnia conflict, with a call to put an end to the fratricidal conflict and to show during this important moment reason, to find within themselves the strength to surmount the logic of war and to throw away mutual hatred, in the interests of their people. And to meet each other's interests with the balanced proposal of the international community directed at re-establishing a fair and just peace in this region. I think that such a statement is essentially a success of the policy of strengthening the Russian government, of the policy of national unity carried out by President Yeltsin.

Such an approach speaks for the responsibility of our parliamentarians and their very good basic approach to international problems. I must say this also coincides with my mandate as a deputy of the state Duma, and I am simply proud of this decision.

QUESTION: Secretary Christopher, Mr. Secretary, if the Serbs reject this proposal, what, in your view, is the likelihood that the arms embargo on Bosnia would be lifted--first question. And, second question, in your meeting with Prime Minister Silajdzic today, what assurances, if any, were you able to give on the sending of U.S. troops to Bosnia in the event of a peace agreement? In other words, to enforce and police the peace accord.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The statement that Foreign Minister Kozyrev read with respect to the arms embargo indicates that, if the Serbs do not accept and the other parties do, then the lifting of the arms embargo may become an almost-irresistible option. I think all of us here at the table understand that, as a last resort, and at

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the end of the day, the lifting of the arms embargo is a very strong possibility.

I believe that that's common ground, that that should be understood by all the parties. In my meeting today with Prime Minister Silajdzic, we did not discuss in detail the implementation of any agreement that is reached. But of course it's been our common ground for some time that the United States and the other parties would assist in the implementation of a peace agreement if one can be reached. Of course, always in accord with our constitutional processes.

What I did have an opportunity to discuss with the Prime Minister today was the commitment of this group to the maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single entity, a state, a unified state with internationally recognized borders. And that's an important concept for him and for the people of Bosnia. We had a good joint meeting between the federation representatives and the United States team, and I think that they have an understanding of our deep commitment to try to assist them in finding a peaceful resolution of this conflict.

QUESTION: A question for Minister Kozyrev, please. Sir, in your reading of the statement by the Contact Group there was no mention of the threat of air strikes. Does this mean that the possibility of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs has now been rejected by the Contact Group?

MINISTER KOZYREV: Well, I think it is left that there is nothing particularly new in this set of agreements which we have reached, on that issue, on the issue of air strikes.

QUESTION: (THROUGH INTERPRETER) A question to the Foreign Minister. Sir, does France intend to take out its troops by the end of the year, or is there a date set for the removal of the forces if there's no agreement?

MINISTER JUPPE: (THROUGH INTERPRETER) The government has expressed itself several times on this accord. If there is a peaceful agreement within the next few days, and I would like to think that this will take place, we are prepared to offer additional assistance to implement this agreement. If those efforts that we carry out do not give results, and if the parties will refuse to accept these proposals, then, as we said, in accordance with the agreement between our partners, we will make the necessary conclusions at the necessary time.

QUESTION: (Asking Secretary Christopher to respond to previous question to Minister Kozyrev.)

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SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I was going to add, in connection with that, that we have discussed a number of consequences that might take place if one party accepts and the other party does not, particularly if the Bosnian government accepts and the Serbs do not. Those have not all been spelled out, but they certainly do include the importance of the exclusion zones, the possible expansion of exclusion zones, and the maintenance of the option of air power in order to insure that those exclusion zones, once they are declared, are maintained weapon-free.

So Foreign Minister Kozyrev was correct in saying that there is no new doctrine there, but there is the emphasis of the prior doctrine and the importance of exclusion zones as a way to insure that there are consequences if one party agrees and the other party does not.

QUESTION: Secretary Christopher, in the past the United States has resisted sending any kinds of ground forces to Bosnia. If there is an agreement, would the United States send soldiers there to help enforce the peace? And a second question is, if there is an agreement, would the lifting of sanctions against Serbia be gradual or would you lift them all at once, and is there any way of putting them back on once you have lifted them?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: On the first question, the United States has long indicated that if there is a viable peace agreement, the United States would assist others, through NATO, in the implementation of that agreement. There's nothing new here; we have said that before.

But I think it's important to say again today to the Bosnian government, that if they agree to this proposal, not only will we assist in implementation in accordance with our constitutional principles, but we and the others at the table will be prepared to assist in the reconstruction of Bosnia--a very important point.

What was the second part of your question, please?

QUESTION: ...specifically, whether the constitutional principles means putting soldiers in Bosnia. And the second question was whether the trade sanctions, the sanctions against Serbia, would be lifted gradually or all at once?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, with respect to the assisting in the implementation, it has long been contemplated that that would involve U.S. troops as well as other U.S. military forces--as I say, in accordance with our constitutional principles. With respect to the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia, the understanding of the group at the table is that that would be gradual, and would be dependent upon the degree of their withdrawal to the positions set forth in the proposal being made here. There would be no sudden lifting, but what is held out to the Serbs is the prospect of a gradual lifting, to use your word, in relation to

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the degree of their withdrawal and the degree of their compliance. And on the fragment of your question, there is no analytical reason why sanctions couldn't be reimposed if they were taken off and there were violations.

QUESTION: A question to Mr. Juppe and Mr. Hurd--to re-phrase a question asked earlier: Under what circumstances could the French and British government decide to withdraw their forces from Bosnia?

SECRETARY HURD: I think both governments, and indeed the other troop contributors to UNPROFOR, set themselves a very simple test. Are our troops reasonably secure? That's to say, are the risks to them outweighed by the good which they do?--first question.

And secondly, is there a prospect that they will continue to do useful work?--second question. And up to now, we have answered in a way which has enabled us to keep our troops there. We keep in very close touch with all the troop contributors, particularly, perhaps, with the French, because the French and the British are the chief troop contributors numerically. I agree with what Alain Juppe said earlier, that we would need in practice to act together. One could conceive of circumstances when it was no longer possible to answer both my questions positively.

We have mentioned--there was an earlier question about the lifting of the arms embargo. That policy, as indeed we say here, could have consequences--would have consequences--for the presence of UNPROFOR. That is one possible circumstance where the troops might have to be withdrawn. It might become, as Warren Christopher said, an unavoidable situation; pressure might become unavoidable. And that is something which all parties have to take seriously into account.

MINISTER JUPPE: (THROUGH INTERPRETER) I would like to return to what I have already said. I have already stressed that if those efforts that we undertake in order to help in the peaceful settlement, of course there might come a moment where we have to draw conclusions. And if at one moment or the other the lifting of the embargo on arms becomes inevitable, of course there are differences here--France has stressed this--between lifting the embargo and keeping our blue helmets in place. This position is well known, and I have nothing to add here.

QUESTION: I wanted to know whether you have fixed a date for "Geneva-Three" for your return to Geneva? Whether you would meet in any case, even if the plan is rejected by one or the other parties. And would it be a signing ceremony, the next meeting here in Geneva at the end of the month, if it's accepted?

MINISTER KOZYREV: I can try to reply. I think that we clearly have

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indicated that we expect within two weeks a reply from the parties. And of course we expect a responsible approach and we have stated clearly that by the end of the month we will meet in order to evaluate the situation. And I hope that this meeting will be one in which the sides have adopted the peace proposals that we have presented, and to develop those positive incentives that we have mentioned. Let us hope for the best, and let us meet again at the end of the month here, in order that we note the coming of peace to Bosnia.

Thank you.

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