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Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Decision Sheet for 7/27 Principals Meeting on Bosnia. (1 page)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Bosnia/Herzegovina. (5 pages)	07/23/1994	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Modified Draft Easing Resolution. (6 pages)	07/25/1994	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Measures to Assist the Bosnian Federation. (5 pages)	07/20/1994	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Strategy. (4 pages)	07/19/1994	P1/b(1)
006. draft	Annexes I and II of PDD-25. (3 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
007. draft	Paper on Entry Conditions for NATO Implementation. (3 pages)	07/19/1994	P1/b(1)
008. draft	Incentives/Disincentives. (5 pages)	07/04/1994	P1/b(1)
009. draft	Paper: Common Understanding on Incentives and Disincentives. (4 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)
010. note	From Anthony Lake to Roderic Lyne. (1 page)	07/30/1994	P1/b(1)
011. talking points	For the Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev. (3 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
012. cable	re: Message from President Clinton to Prime Minister John Major. (2 pages)	07/30/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Sandy —
for copy
(10)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

Dear Senator Mitchell:

I am writing to reaffirm the Administration's support for lifting the international arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991. It has been our long-held view that the arms embargo has unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victim in this conflict and that the Security Council should act to remedy this injustice. At the same time, as you know, there has been no international consensus to take this step and acting unilaterally to lift the embargo would have grave policy implications that we would all have to be prepared to live with, were we to take this course.

That said, in recent days the efforts of the Contact Group have helped to move us significantly closer to an international consensus for lifting the embargo in the event the Bosnian Serbs remain the obstacle to a peace settlement. While there are still some very minor refinements to be made, they will be ironed out early next week, and the peace proposal will be reviewed by foreign ministers in Geneva on July 5 and presented to the parties very shortly afterward as a reasonable basis for a peaceful settlement. Along with this proposal, it is expected that the parties will be presented with a package of incentives and disincentives designed to maximize the chances of their accepting the proposed compromise.

This package embodies a phased approach that seeks to steadily escalate pressure on the Serbs to agree to the major territorial concessions required by the Contact Group proposal. Due to our very strong insistence, this package includes lifting the arms embargo as one of the possible consequences of a Bosnian Serb rejection of the territorial proposal. In this regard, if we determine after consulting with our Allies and Russia that the Contact Group negotiations have not produced the results we seek, you can be sure that we will take the lead in pressing for implementation of this part of the incentives package. To this end, we would take immediate steps to propose or support a resolution at the


The Honorable
George J. Mitchell,
United States Senate.

-2-

United Nations Security Council to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further, if the Security Council for some reason fails to pass such a resolution, the Administration would consult with Congress immediately thereafter regarding possible further action, including unilateral termination of the arms embargo as called for in the Mitchell amendment to S.2042 of May 12, 1994.

I hope this clarification of the Administration's intentions regarding the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia is helpful to you as the Senate considers the implications of unilateral action on the Bosnian arms embargo. The Administration strongly prefers the alternative you have introduced with Senators Nunn, Warner, Kassebaum and Robb to that introduced by Senator Dole and others.

Sincerely,



Strobe Talbott
Acting Secretary

Vershbow, Alexander R.

From: Kerrick, Donald L.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Cc: Kerrick, Donald L.
Subject: Approved Bosnia Points
Date: Wednesday, July 27, 1994 2:14PM

Jonathan; Sandy: These are cleared by Tony Lake.

From: Millison, Cathy L.
To: Kerrick, Donald L.
Cc: Maxfield, Nancy H.; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Date: Wednesday, July 27, 1994 2:03PM

Bosnia Themes

- The United States remains firmly committed to the Contact Group's efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia. The Bosnian Government has accepted the proposal and the Bosnian Serbs have rejected. Our position is clear: there will be consequences if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the proposal.
- Secretary Christopher is meeting this Saturday with other Contact Group Foreign Ministers to discuss next steps. These consequences could include a further tightening of economic and trade sanctions against Serbia, stricter enforcement by NATO aircraft of existing exclusion zones, and extension of exclusion zones to other safe areas. As our allies have agreed, if these measures fail, pressures for a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo could be irresistible.
- Representatives of the Russian Government have been in serious discussions this week with the Government in Belgrade in an effort to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to settle and end the recent provocations that we have seen in Bosnia. We are hopeful the Bosnian Serbs will reconsider and accept the proposal before Saturday's meeting of Ministers.
- We are very concerned about the recent Serb violations in Bosnia and will press for implementation of NATO's decisions on enforcement of exclusion zones

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7/19 FINAL
TEXTINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: BOSNIA - NEXT STEPS

The Contact Group initiative is entering a decisive phase, and important decisions loom on military measures that could strain our relations with key Allies and the Russians. The Bosnian Serbs' answer will not be known until they meet with the Contact Group Wednesday afternoon in Geneva. But most indicators point to a conditional "yes."

- Some of the Serb conditions may be negotiable (e.g. new territorial trade-offs, provisions that permit them to establish the same links to Serbia as the Muslims and Croats will have with Croatia). These could be the subject of further talks between the parties and with the Contact Group prior to the next Foreign Ministers' meeting on July 30.
- But at least one Serb condition is likely to be a killer amendment: a constitutional provision establishing a right for the Serbs to secede after two years following a referendum. This is a non-starter for us and for the Bosnian Government: it would make the agreement a way-station on the road to the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the establishment of a Greater Serbia. Our goal from the start has been to get a reasonable deal for the Bosnian Government, which means preserving Bosnia as a single union, albeit a loose confederation.

Serb efforts to insert a right of secession will likely be viewed sympathetically by the Russians, and perhaps by the French and British, who have always been inclined to impose a settlement on the Muslims. We will need to hold firm, citing our partners' previous commitment to Bosnia's territorial integrity and the need for the international community not to legitimize the change of borders by force. The Serbs' right to establish practical links with Serbia is the most we can offer.

The Russians may press for a more generous, front-loaded approach to sanctions relief as a sweetener for the Serbs. In recent days, they have backed away from their earlier agreement in the Contact Group that UN sanctions should not be suspended until the Serbs withdraw to the lines on the proposed map. Here too, we will have to hold the line, since it will be hard to reestablish tight enforcement of the sanctions regime once its main elements are suspended.

July 30 Ministerial: Moment of Truth?

If the Serbs have, against all expectations, agreed to the plan by the time of the July 30 Ministerial, we will face the decision on whether to participate in implementation of a settlement.

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 5/4/2014 10/1/2013

2010-6533-M

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Immediate Congressional consultations will be needed to explain the conditions of our deployment and our exit strategy; we will probably need a supplemental to fund it. Urgent decisions will be required at NATO on command and control, and we will need to rapidly engage the Russians and other non-NATO participants in Alliance planning. Most importantly, however, you will need to make a strong case to the American people on why it is in our interest to commit as many as 20,000 U.S. troops to implement this settlement.

The greatest difficulties will come in the more likely scenario in which the Serbs have rejected the plan or refused to drop their unacceptable conditions. At that point, we will want to move decisively to begin implementation of the "disincentives" agreed earlier: tightening of economic sanctions; extension of exclusion zones to the other safe areas; and stricter enforcement of the exclusion zones by NATO aircraft. While tightening sanctions is not likely to be opposed by our Contact Group partners, our Allies are already showing some hesitation about following through on the air strike threats, citing the limited effectiveness of air power and the risks of Serb retaliation against UNPROFOR. They and the Russians may seek to defer decisions and prolong negotiations past July 30.

After July 30

Some delay may be acceptable and, in fact, desirable if it keeps the international community united and enables us to arrive at a final settlement. But at some point, we will need to tell the Allies and the Russians that our credibility is on the line and remind them of the irresistible pressures we will face to lift the arms embargo if the Contact Group fails to make good on its previous warnings.

Of course, implementing decisions to extend and more strictly enforce the exclusion zones will, in fact, increase the risks for UNPROFOR and could lead to renewed frictions between NATO and the UN. Nevertheless, without a credible threat of increased military pressure, there is virtually no chance the Serbs will accept the Contact Group plan. Our Allies admit that UNPROFOR's role is becoming increasingly untenable in any event, and thus we should be able to drag them along. The Russians will require even more delicate handling than during the Gorazde decisions in April.

The implementation of the exclusion zones will likely be carried out in stages over a period of 4-6 weeks. If the Serbs have still not relented and agreed to the peace plan, our Contact Group partners have agreed that a UNSC decision to lift the arms embargo "could be unavoidable." Whether they, in fact, agree will likely turn on how seriously they view Congressional pressures on us to lift unilaterally. However the embargo is lifted, we will take on an expanded role in the air in defending the Bosnian Government against expected Serb escalation.

The remainder of the summer, in short, promises to be active on the Bosnia front, even as matters come to a head on Haiti and other crises.

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July 20, 1994

6

RE-ENERGIZING THE KRAJINA TALKS

Prior to Gorazde, the negotiating process on Krajina seemed to be on target. Milosevic was pressing Knin hard to compose its differences with Zagreb. On March 30 ICFY Representatives Eide and Ahrens, Ambassador Galbraith and Russian Ambassador Kerestevic brokered a comprehensive cease-fire agreement. A second phase of talks aimed at negotiating economic confidence-building measures had been planned, and it looked like both sides were serious about moving step-by-step toward a third phase involving a political settlement. All this changed in the wake of the Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde, which apparently convinced the Krajina Serbs they could stall with impunity until they could gauge the international response and the direction Bosnia peace talks were likely to take.

Although the Contact Group's efforts revived the negotiating process in Bosnia, talks on Krajina remain stalled. In July, however, Zagreb and Belgrade exchanged notes on furthering their dialogue, professing their commitment to talks on economic CBMs but setting no date for their resumption. The Serbs also recently signalled their interest in a Milosevic-Tudjman meeting, ostensibly to help move the process forward. But Tudjman has responded that there must be mutual recognition between Croatia and the "FRY" before a meeting with Milosevic can take place.

Developing Concrete Political Autonomy Proposals

As we make progress toward a Bosnia settlement, we need to be prepared to intensify our efforts to seriously address the Krajina problem. A Bosnia settlement would address many of the key issues that also need to be overcome concerning Krajina, i.e., mutual recognition, recognition of existing borders, and granting a special relationship for Serbs with Belgrade short of allowing a Greater Serbia. Since we might need to move quickly to capitalize on the momentum from a Bosnia deal, we should begin now to work to develop precise arrangements for meaningful autonomy for the Krajina Serbs. This will not only help us be prepared to move forward quickly when the opportunity arises, it will also underscore to Zagreb that we have not forgotten the Krajina, thus reducing pressures on the Croat leadership to seek to regain the UNPA's militarily.

In seeking to move the negotiating process sharply forward, we should consider adopting an approach similar to the one we are now pursuing in Bosnia. This would involve having the international community put together proposed agreements in the two key areas essential to an overall settlement-- confidence-building measures and a political settlement-- and then give the parties a consequences package of incentives and disincentives beyond what is already in place for Bosnia to induce them to accept them.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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VZ 10/1/2013

Maintaining the Ad Hoc ICFY/U.S./Russia Negotiating Framework

To date, the Croatian leadership has been impressed with the U.S. role within the Contact Group, and believes that only the United States can act as an honest broker in the negotiations with Knin. Rather than hand this task to a new Contact Group, which would introduce complications about who should represent the EU, we should rely on the existing ICFY/U.S./Russia framework. So far, the Russians have played a constructive role in the Zagreb-Knin talks and could be instrumental in getting Belgrade to press the Krajina Serbs to arrive at a settlement. If necessary, the Contact Group could be brought in at a later date if deemed necessary to lend additional weight to this effort.

The ICFY team, which ideally would reconvene in late July or early August, would be charged with developing proposals on the two tracks. Once agreed, the proposals could be discussed with the Croatian government prior to raising them with Knin. The Croats, specifically Tudjman, appear ready to accept --and in fact would welcome-- such an approach. We are already considering possible elements of a political settlement and could send the two constitutional experts who worked on the Federation agreement to Zagreb to assist the ICFY/U.S./Russia team.

Confidence-Building Measures/Incentives Package

Among the confidence-building measures likely to be included in an economic reintegration package are the reopening of road, rail, river, and air links; the restoration of energy and water facilities and supplies; the resumption of commercial trade activities; the restoration of post and telecommunications links; and the cessation of extraction and removal of oil and other natural resources from Sector East and other UNPAs without permission of the Croatian government.

If necessary, we could also follow the Bosnia precedent and develop an incentives and disincentives package to motivate the parties to accept the proposals. While Croatia is anxious to finalize an agreement, the Krajina Serbs are not. Milosevic remains the key to delivering the Krajina Serbs. There is good reason to believe he would be prepared to press forward with a Krajina settlement once a Bosnia settlement has been reached, particularly if credible sanctions remain linked to Krajina, as both we and the EU propose.

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. draft	Incentives/Disincentives. (5 pages)	07/04/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. draft	Paper: Common Understanding on Incentives and Disincentives. (4 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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Contact Group's Peace Plan Compared to Areas of Control, July 1994



TIME OF TRANSMISSION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINERELEASER: MurphyDTG: 300340ZJUL94

MESSAGE NO. 52 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 1
FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION VERSHBOW MESSAGE

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>AMEMBASSY</u>	<u>AMBASSADOR OR</u>		
<u>GENEVA</u>	<u>CHARGE</u>		

REMARKS:

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE,
PLEASE DELIVER EYES ONLY TO SANDY VERSHBOW
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 6/17/14

2013-0657-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. note	From Anthony Lake to Roderic Lyne. (1 page)	07/30/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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011. talking points	For the Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev. (3 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
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GENEVA, Switzerland (AP) - Secretary of State Warren Christopher expressed impatience Friday with the United Nations' response to the latest attacks by Bosnian Serbs.

"I would hope the United Nations and NATO would respond more effectively to provocations than they have this week," Christopher said during a flight to Geneva, where he will hold a strategy session on Bosnia with the foreign ministers of England, France, Germany and Russia.

On the eve of the meeting, it was clear there was no consensus on what steps to take to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept a peace proposal that would give them 49 percent of the former Yugoslav republic.

After two years of fighting, the Serbs control 70 percent of Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats control the remainder. The peace plan would give a Muslim-Croat federation control of 51 percent of Bosnia.

The United States wants its allies to endorse tightening economic sanctions against the Serbs and expansion of areas declared off limits to military activity by any of the parties.

But the British and the Russians are balking at taking stronger steps.

"I don't want to predict the outcome of the meeting," said Christopher.

"It's important to maintain the unity of the contact group and not forfeit the progress," he said, referring to the five nations that have tried to find a way to end the fighting in Bosnia. "We'll be working hard to try to find steps that will help us reach the goal of having the Serbs accept the plan as a first step toward a peace settlement."

The allies are least enthusiastic about U.S. calls for supplying arms to the Bosnian Muslims.

The best Christopher has been able to achieve so far has been a statement that if the Serbs don't agree to the peace plan, lifting the arms embargo could be "unavoidable."

Within the past week, the Serbs have cut off civilian access to Sarajevo, shelled Gorazde and fired on a U.N. convoy. Despite those provocations, U.N. officials did not call for NATO air strikes.

Christopher sounded clearly annoyed by the tepid response.

"There needs to be more effective response to the provocation and that is one of the points I am going to be making" in the foreign ministers' meeting, he said.

Christopher emphasized the need for unity, and negotiators from the five countries were trying to resolve differences over how to deal with the Serbs.

He conceded that countries with peacekeeping troops in Bosnia were understandably concerned about moving toward tougher military measures.

A senior administration official involved in the negotiations said the Russians were balking at tougher enforcement of economic sanctions against the Serbs, while the British were the most concerned about expanding the exclusionary zones.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the official said any tougher military action would have to be preceded by redeployment or withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeepers.

The official described the negotiations among the five nations as at a

difficult stage that could result in the United States going its own way and unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims.

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BC-YUGOSLAVIA-CHRISTOPHER

U.S. AIMS FOR ALLIED UNITY ON BOSNIA

By Carol Giacomo

GENEVA (Reuter) - Secretary of State Warren Christopher said he was working to maintain unity with Russia and European allies whose differences over tactics could further undermine their embattled Bosnia peace plan.

U.S. officials said they expected foreign ministers from Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States to agree Saturday to tighten sanctions on Bosnia's Serbs for rejecting a peace plan the ministers put forward July 5.

But it was unclear if the ministers would invoke two other threatened penalties -- extending and more strictly enforcing exclusion zones in Bosnia and ultimately lifting a U.N. arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims, who have accepted the plan.

France has signalled opposition to lifting the arms embargo while Britain and Russia have raised objections to wider enforcement of exclusion zones, which could involve NATO military action.

"I don't want to predict the outcome of the meeting," Christopher told reporters traveling with him to Geneva from Washington.

"I think it's important that we maintain the unity of the contact group (the collective name for the countries working on the peace plan) and more importantly, the progress that the contact group has achieved."

Christopher signaled unhappiness with a tepid response to recent Bosnian Serb attacks, including one on a U.N. convoy that killed a British soldier.

"I would hope that the United Nations and NATO respond more effectively to the provocation than they have this week," he said.

Christopher, who talked by telephone with the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Russia ahead of the meeting, said they all agreed they wanted to stay united in purpose.

But he said this is not yet achieved.

"We will be trying to decide tomorrow on a package of consequences," he said. "The one thing that's common ground between us ministers is the importance of maintaining the solidarity of the contact group."

Christopher, who told Congress Thursday the international community must be prepared to act against the Bosnian Serbs, insisted that his emphasis on contact group unity did not mean settling for the lowest common denominator.

But privately U.S. officials expressed doubts about what might emerge from the Geneva meeting and how it might affect the credibility of NATO and U.S. leadership.

Christopher and other officials indicated that they sympathized with Russia's insistence that any penalties meted out would allow the Serbs to change their mind about the peace plan, which would give 51 percent of Bosnia to Muslims and Croats and 49 percent to the Serbs.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. cable	re: Message from President Clinton to Prime Minister John Major. (2 pages)	07/30/1994	P1/b(1)

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