

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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851

Row:

34

Section:

1

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10

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2

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Engaging the Italians. (2 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: 7/28 Geneva Contact Group. (4 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Communique for the July 30 Geneva Ministerial. (2 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For the Secretary of State from Steve Pifer. Subject: Geneva Bilateral with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. (6 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: July 27 Contact Group Meeting on Serbian Sanctions. (3 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Croatian President's Letter to President Clinton. (4 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1)
007. draft	Background on Bosnia. (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: Letter to Foreign Ministers on July 30 Geneva Ministerial. (3 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Secretary's Letter to Hurd on July 30 Geneva Ministerial. (2 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1)
010a. memo	For Director, International Military Staff. Subject: Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [NATO] (2 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)
010b. memo	For Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces South. Subject: Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [NATO] (3 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2646

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010c. paper	Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [NATO] (14 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

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Photo Op

Before sitting down with Foreign Minister Kozyrev to review major issues, I want to stress three things.

First, the announcement which was made in Moscow last Tuesday -- that Presidents Yeltsin and Meri had reached agreement on the departure of Russian forces from Estonia by August 31 -- was historic. The agreement reflects the new face which democratic Russia presents to the world. I believe Russia will be strengthened by mutually respectful relationships with its neighbors.

Second, I would note that we and the Russians, and Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I, have come a long way together over the past eighteen months in our efforts to deal with the war in former Yugoslavia. The settlement plan which we and the Russians endorsed, together with the other Contact Group members, demonstrated that the U.S. and Russia, like the U.S. and other European powers, share common objectives.

Third, the Foreign Minister and I will begin today the process of planning for President Yeltsin's September 27-28 State Visit to Washington. It will be President Yeltsin's first visit to the U.S. during the Clinton administration. The holding of a Summit reflects the need for regular, face-to-face reviews of bilateral and global issues by the two Presidents. We believe the coming Summit will demonstrate the practical advantages and real vitality of the partnership between the U.S. and Russia.

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20891

July 27, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(DK)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, July 27, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 27, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 5/22/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security

AMB RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
July 27, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/22/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals CommitteeDATE: July 27, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:22am - 12:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIADirector James Woolsey
Norman SchindlerOVP

Leon Fuerth

JCSGEN John Shalikashvili
LTG Michael Ryan
LTG Wesley ClarkStateSecretary Warren Christopher
David Gergen
Peter Tarnoff
Ambassador Charles RedmanWhite HouseLeon Panetta
Samuel Berger
Nancy SoderbergDODSecretary William Perry
Walter SlocombeNSC

Don Kerrick

USUN

Ambassador Albright

Summary of Conclusions

1. Secretary Christopher will seek Contact Group Ministers' support at the July 30 meeting for the full range of consequences: sanctions tightening, and extension and enforcement of exclusion zones. Recognizing Contact Group consensus on all measures is unlikely, Secretary Christopher will insist on strict enforcement of existing zones and support urgent planning for extension of exclusion zones to other safe areas, which could be implemented in phases. There can be no extension without agreement to strictly enforce existing zones. A strong marker will be laid down that if there are no agreed serious consequences, we will move sooner rather than later to multilaterally lift the arms embargo, and failing that, there will be irresistible pressures to lift unilaterally. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

RZ 5/9/2014

2010-0533 M

2. Leon Fuerth will develop a strategy to increase high-level U.S. pressure on the British to accede to our view concerning tightening of economic sanctions, specifically dealing with closing down offshore "FRY" enterprises. (S)
3. Leon Fuerth and Ambassador Redman will spearhead an effort to urgently develop a strategy to separate Milosevic from the Bosnian Serbs. (S)
4. In view of recent Bosnian Serb provocations, the Principals agreed to press for implementation of existing NATO decisions on enforcement of exclusion zones. (S)
5. The IWG will urgently examine two scenarios for lifting the arms embargo: (1) Arms embargo is lifted with no follow-on U.S. requirement to support the Bosnian Government; and (2) arms embargo is lifted with a presumption that external support will be required. The analysis will include a review of UNPROFOR with a view to the creation of an UNPROFOR II with appropriate mandates. (S)

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THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

24 July 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to refer to the current efforts of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, working together as "the Contact Group", to obtain the agreement of the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to their proposals for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in that Republic.

I believe that the Contact Group's recent presentation of its proposals to the parties represents a turning point in the international community's efforts, for more than three years, to help control and resolve the various conflicts which have erupted in the Former Yugoslavia. The parties' acceptance of the Contact Group's proposals would have profound implications for the United Nations' effort there. So would their rejection of them. The purpose of this letter is to inform you, and through you the Members of the Security Council, of the recommendations which I would expect to present to the Council in each of these two eventualities.

I. The emergence of the Contact Group

The emergence of the Contact Group as the principal mediator in Bosnia and Herzegovina is, in my judgement, an event of considerable significance. This combination of five major powers, working with the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the

His Excellency
Mr. Jamsheed K. A. Marker
President of the Security Council
New York

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Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) who are appointed respectively by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President-in-Office of the European Union, has produced a group with unusual political weight. Its members also dispose of human and material resources on a scale which the United Nations cannot begin to match. This Group is thus particularly well-placed both to help the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina reach agreement on a negotiated settlement of their conflict and to help ensure implementation of what has been negotiated through its mediation.

II. If the parties accept the Contact Group's proposals ...

It will be recalled that in September 1993 I prepared a "non-paper" which examined how the international community could best support implementation of the draft Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina which was then under discussion with the parties. Copies of the non-paper were handed to the Foreign Ministers of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council at my annual meeting with them on 30 September 1993. On the following day it was made available to the other members of the Security Council and to the countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR.

The non-paper stated that UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) estimated that the military aspects of implementation would require a Force of approximately 60,000 all ranks and that, because of the parties' record of non-cooperation with previous United Nations and European Community (as it then was) efforts, the Force would have to operate under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was further estimated that as many as 2,900 police officers would be required, as well as several hundred international professional staff. The cost of the operation would probably be in the range of \$4-5 billion per annum.

The non-paper went on to discuss the difficulties which the Organization had recently encountered in obtaining military, police and civilian personnel for its peace-keeping operations; the limitations on the Secretariat's capacity to manage operations on the scale currently deployed; and the failure of Member States to pay on time their assessed contributions for peace-keeping.

Against this background, the non-paper presented the Security Council with three broad options for organizing an operation to support implementation of

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the Peace Agreement. The first option would be a normal United Nations field operation. The second would be for NATO to carry out the military functions and the United Nations the police and civilian functions. The third would be for the Security Council to authorize interested Member States and regional organizations to form an ad hoc unified task force.

The non-paper concluded that the first option was not viable because the necessary personnel and finance would not be available and the Organization did not have the capacity to command, control and manage an operation on the scale envisaged. The present proposals of the Contact Group are different in some respects from the draft Peace Agreement which was under discussion in September 1993. But the considerations which led to the conclusion that the first option was not viable have all acquired added force during the ten months that have intervened.

It has become increasingly difficult to find Member States willing and able to contribute adequately equipped troops to the Organization's peace-keeping operations, as has been made only too evident in Rwanda and indeed in Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. The same is true of police and international civilian personnel. This problem is accentuated by the fact that, even though the operation would be mounted with the consent of the parties, it would have to be under Chapter VII of the Charter for the reason already explained. It is also relevant that the United States, whose participation in the operation would be essential to give it the necessary political authority and military muscle, has made it clear that it would not be willing to place its troops under United Nations command.

Although some progress has been made in strengthening the Organization's capacity to manage peace-keeping operations, the Secretariat is not yet at the point where it would be able to plan, mount, deploy, supply and exercise effective command and control over an operation of the magnitude envisaged (two to three times larger than the current UNPROFOR deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

As for finance, the current arrears on the peace-keeping accounts are nearly thirty per cent higher than they were last September. This makes it even more difficult to believe that assessment of Member States would produce sufficient resources to finance the operation envisaged.

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I am accordingly reinforced in the view that the non-paper was correct in concluding that a normal United Nations operation would not be a viable option for providing the necessary international support for implementation of a peace settlement.

As regards the second option (which was that the Security Council would request NATO to carry out the military tasks; with the United Nations performing the police and other civilian tasks), the non-paper identified a number of questions which would have to be answered if this concept was to be viable. Since then, further contingency planning between UNPROFOR and NATO has brought to the surface a number of difficulties which in my view militate strongly against this concept. These include, especially, the questions of how some degree of United Nations political control could be exercised over the Force in the field and how adequate coordination could be effected between the military elements which would be under NATO command and the police and civilian elements which would be under United Nations command.

As regards the last point, some valuable lessons have been learnt in recent months as a result of actual experience in coordinating the use of NATO air power in support of UNPROFOR. I greatly appreciate NATO's provision of such support. But it has shown how complex and politically sensitive such coordination can be, even for activities infinitely smaller in scale than those that would be undertaken by a NATO force of up to 60,000 military personnel, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter in a theatre where several thousand United Nations police and civilian personnel would be deployed in small groups and thus vulnerable to retaliation.

It must also be mentioned that on a number of occasions the Russian Federation has expressed to me reservations about NATO participation in implementation of a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina unless NATO forces were under the command and control of the Security Council exercised by the Secretary-General through his Special Representative.

The third option discussed in the non-paper was for the Security Council to authorize interested Member States and regional organizations to form an ad hoc unified task force which would undertake all the military, police and civilian functions required to support implementation of the Peace Agreement. It remains my view that this is the most, perhaps the

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only, viable option. That view has been reinforced by the emergence of the Contact Group as the principal mediator in a political process in which the United Nations and the ICFY are playing a considerably less prominent role than was previously the case. This makes it logical for the countries of the Contact Group, with all the political weight and the readily deployable human and material resources which they possess, to assume responsibility for implementing what they have negotiated.

Because of the close inter-relationship between the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, and between those conflicts and potential problem areas in Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), it would be necessary for the group of Member States which assumed responsibility for implementing the settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be entrusted by the Security Council with the mandates currently given to UNPROFOR in Croatia and the FYROM. With the establishment of the task force, UNPROFOR would be discontinued after an appropriate hand-over period.

The task force's mandate would thus embrace all the functions required for implementation both of the Contact Group's proposals and of Security Council resolutions relevant to UNPROFOR's mandate. The transition from UNPROFOR to the task force would have to be carefully planned and executed. I would be ready to work with the Contact Group in encouraging Governments to contribute troops to the task force, both Governments who were already contributing to UNPROFOR and Governments which do not at present have troops in that Force.

If the parties accept the Contact Group's proposals, it would accordingly be my intention to recommend to the Security Council that it authorize the members of the Contact Group, working as appropriate with regional organizations or arrangements, to create an International Task Force (ITF) to implement the negotiated settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to assume all the responsibilities currently entrusted to UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia. The countries participating in the ITF would agree amongst themselves on its financial, logistical and administrative arrangements. The establishment of a United Nations Trust Fund for Member States which wished to support the ITF financially would be a possible option.

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The Security Council would wish to consider what arrangements would be appropriate to ensure that it was kept adequately informed about the operations which the ITF would carry out under the mandate given to it by the Security Council.

III. If the parties do not accept the Contact Group's proposals...

I understand that the Contact Group has discussed additional measures ("disincentives"), some of them involving enforcement action, which it would ask the Security Council to authorize if the parties do not accept its proposals. Such measures would have severe consequences for the viability of UNPROFOR's present operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and indeed in Croatia, if the actions of the Contact Group, endorsed by the Security Council, caused either party to view UNPROFOR as hostile to its interests and war aims.

The Force is deployed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina with a mandate which combines peace-keeping and the protection of humanitarian activities. It is deployed in a variety of widely dispersed locations and this makes it vulnerable to hostile action from the more numerous and often better equipped combat forces of the parties. Its ability to perform its mandate depends on daily contact with all the parties and on their cooperation. Its support personnel include unarmed civilians (administrative, police and civil affairs staff) and unarmed military observers, who are dispersed in small numbers throughout its area of operations. Its bases and supply lines can easily be - and frequently are - interdicted or attacked. In short, UNPROFOR is deployed to work with the parties in a transparent and impartial mode; it is not a combat force and is not equipped or deployed to take offensive action against any of the parties.

I understand that the proposed disincentives may include military enforcement actions, including the control of borders without the consent of the parties concerned or enforcement from the air of expanded or additional exclusion zones. Such actions would deliberately impinge on the basic military interests of one of the parties and would therefore be likely to be militarily resisted. In such circumstances it is very doubtful whether it would be possible to maintain the deployment of UNPROFOR in the areas concerned or in other areas controlled by the party against which the disincentives were directed. For the reasons already

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indicated it would not be possible for UNPROFOR to take such enforcement action itself and it would be ill-prepared to protect itself against a hostile reaction from the party concerned. It must be remembered that even enforcement by air power alone would require UNPROFOR personnel to be present on the ground for observation, site verification and target direction, which means that they would be intermingled with the targets and thus highly vulnerable to retaliation.

UNPROFOR's deployment would also become untenable if the disincentives were to include lifting of the arms embargo on one party but its continued imposition on the other. This would inevitably be seen by the second party as hostile action against it by the United Nations and would in any case fan the very flames which UNPROFOR has been deployed to extinguish.

Given these considerations, and in order to ensure that UNPROFOR's presence did not impede the disincentives if the international community decided to impose them, I would have no alternative but to recommend the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The modalities of withdrawal, including its timing in relation to the introduction of the disincentives, would need to be carefully studied before decisions were taken by the Security Council. Withdrawal of UNPROFOR would also have implications for the ability of the United Nations and others to maintain humanitarian operations in the areas affected.

IV. Continuing United Nations commitment to the Former Yugoslavia

The preceding sections of this letter describe the recommendations which I expect to make to the Security Council when the outcome of the present phase of the Contact Group's efforts is known. I would like to emphasise that they relate only to the military and political aspects of the current operations of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia. They reflect my conviction of the need to respect three necessities: the necessity for unity of command; the necessity not to entrust enforcement action to a mission which also has a peace-keeping mandate requiring impartiality and the cooperation of the parties; and the necessity not to ask the organization to undertake activities for which it does not have the capacity.


But this is not to say that the United Nations should disengage completely from the Former Yugoslavia.

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I am equally convinced that there are activities which the Organization should continue to undertake in that area. It should continue to provide humanitarian relief in cooperation with other international agencies and non-governmental organizations. Its assistance in the return of refugees following the conclusion of a peace agreement will be particularly important in this context. It should continue to make every effort to bring to trial those guilty of war crimes, through the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. It should also play a full part in international efforts to assist the economic and social rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Member States which have been in conflict and of their neighbours which have been affected by those conflicts. The appointment of a United Nations Special Coordinator for Sarajevo is an example of the kind of contribution which the Organization can make in this context. I pledge my continued support for a major United Nations effort in all these fields.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. memo	For Director, International Military Staff. Subject: Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [NATO] (2 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2646

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010b. memo	For Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces South. Subject: Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [NATO] (3 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [2]

2013-0687-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010c. paper	Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [NATO] (14 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 30, 1994 (Contact Group Ministerial) [2]

2013-0687-F

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