

# FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

851

Row:

34

Section:

1

Shelf:

10

Position:

2

Stack:

V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001a. memo               | For Anthony Lake from Donald Kerrick. Subject: Joint Staff Thinking on a Balkan Strategy. Record ID: 9405221. (1 page)                                       | 06/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 001b. paper              | Balkan Regional Stability Strategy. (3 pages)                                                                                                                | 06/15/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002a. memo               | For Anthony Lake from Donald Kerrick. Subject: Where We Are on Bosnia Negotiations. Record ID: 9405306. (1 page)                                             | 06/30/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002b. draft              | Resolution on Bosnia: Contact Group Meeting in Paris, June 28, 1994. (3 pages)                                                                               | 06/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002c. draft              | Non-Paper. (5 pages)                                                                                                                                         | 06/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003. paper               | The "Yes, But" Scenario. (4 pages)                                                                                                                           | 06/1994    | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. paper               | Some Implications of an UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia. [CIA Act] [partial] (3 pages)                                                                       | 01/26/1994 | P3/b(3)     |
| 005a. table              | Incentives/Disincentives. (1 page)                                                                                                                           | 06/1994    | P1/b(1)     |
| 005b. paper              | Military Implications Arising from a Serb Rejection of the Contact Group's Proposal. (3 pages)                                                               | 06/23/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 006. memo                | To Toby Gati from William Hill. Subject: The Conflict in Former Yugoslavia: An Assessment. (7 pages)                                                         | 06/15/1994 | P1/b(1)     |
| 007. memo                | For the Secretary of State from Conrad Harper, Wendy Sherman, and Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Strategy for Dealing with Congressional Pressures. (11 pages) | 06/11/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 008. memcon              | United States and France Meet at Quai d'Orsay, June 20, 1994. (4 pages) | 06/20/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001a. memo               | For Anthony Lake from Donald Kerrick. Subject: Joint Staff Thinking on a Balkan Strategy. Record ID: 9405221. (1 page) | 06/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                 | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001b. paper              | Balkan Regional Stability Strategy. (3 pages) | 06/15/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Sandy - This was  
given to Mitchell and  
Woolstone only. While  
undecided, we are  
holding the text to a  
very few people, to  
minimize potential pro-  
blems with contact  
group partners.

Dick

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1994

Dear Senator Mitchell:

I am writing to reaffirm the Administration's support for lifting the international arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991. It has been our long-held view that the arms embargo has unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victim in this conflict and that the Security Council should act to remedy this injustice. At the same time, as you know, there has been no international consensus to take this step and acting unilaterally to lift the embargo would have grave policy implications that we would all have to be prepared to live with, were we to take this course.

That said, in recent days the efforts of the Contact Group have helped to move us significantly closer to an international consensus for lifting the embargo in the event the Bosnian Serbs remain the obstacle to a peace settlement. While there are still some very minor refinements to be made, they will be ironed out early next week, and the peace proposal will be reviewed by foreign ministers in Geneva on July 5 and presented to the parties very shortly afterward as a reasonable basis for a peaceful settlement. Along with this proposal, it is expected that the parties will be presented with a package of incentives and disincentives designed to maximize the chances of their accepting the proposed compromise.


This package embodies a phased approach that seeks to steadily escalate pressure on the Serbs to agree to the major territorial concessions required by the Contact Group proposal. Due to our very strong insistence, this package includes lifting the arms embargo as one of the possible consequences of a Bosnian Serb rejection of the territorial proposal. In this regard, if we determine after consulting with our Allies and Russia that the Contact Group negotiations have not produced the results we seek, you can be sure that we will take the lead in pressing for implementation of this part of the incentives package. To this end, we would take immediate steps to propose or support a resolution at the

The Honorable  
George J. Mitchell,  
United States Senate.

United Nations Security Council to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further, if the Security Council for some reason fails to pass such a resolution, the Administration would consult with Congress immediately thereafter regarding possible further action, including unilateral termination of the arms embargo as called for in the Mitchell amendment to S.2042 of May 12, 1994. ]

I hope this clarification of the Administration's intentions regarding the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia is helpful to you as the Senate considers the implications of unilateral action on the Bosnian arms embargo. The Administration strongly prefers the alternative you have introduced with Senators Nunn, Warner, Kassebaum and Robb to that introduced by Senator Dole and others.

Sincerely,



Strobe Talbott  
Acting Secretary

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                    | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002a. memo               | For Anthony Lake from Donald Kerrick. Subject: Where We Are on Bosnia Negotiations. Record ID: 9405306. (1 page) | 06/30/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002b. draft              | Resolution on Bosnia: Contact Group Meeting in Paris, June 28, 1994. (3 pages) | 06/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE        | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002c. draft              | Non-Paper. (5 pages) | 06/28/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/28

Sandy -

Talking points for  
President to use in event  
he decides to weigh-in  
on Hill (Senate) on  
arms embargo. ... Points  
have evolved over last  
several weeks. Started  
with state dept, updated  
today by our legis Affairs  
folks.

Jon

## TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS ON BOSNIA

- As the Senate considers the DOD bill this week, there is very important choice between the Dole amendment to lift the Bosnian arms embargo unilaterally and the Nunn/Mitchell/Warner substitute which sets out a multilateral approach to the arms embargo and which I would urge you to support instead.
- Lifting the UN arms embargo against Bosnia unilaterally could seriously undermine prospects for peace.
- A signal of U.S. willingness to act unilaterally would be particularly damaging now, as the current cease-fire is generally holding and a territorial compromise the government may be able to accept is taking shape.
- Contact Group meetings have emphasized that progress can only be achieved through common action with our Allies and the Russians. Negotiations are now at a critical juncture. Lifting the embargo now would bring to a halt the momentum of our unified position toward a settlement.
- The UK and France, both of which have troops on the ground in UNPROFOR, oppose lifting the embargo because they fear it would intensify the ground conflict and put their troops in danger. Russia also opposes unilateral lifting.
- If we were to proceed down a track that they oppose, they might well pursue their own preferred course of putting more pressure on the Bosnian government to settle and offering the Serbs an early lifting of sanctions.
- Unilateral U.S. action could also lead to an escalation in the fighting and Serb attacks on UNPROFOR.
- Troop contributors would likely pull out of UNPROFOR, leaving Muslims at the mercy of Bosnian Serbs. Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves are completely surrounded by Serb forces. Sarajevo in particular might quickly face a choice between starvation and capitulation.
- We could be forced to conduct a major air campaign -- without the support of our NATO allies -- to save Sarajevo and defend ~~de~~ the Bosnians until they acquire additional arms. ✓
- The likelihood of greater American military involvement in Bosnia would thus be increased, not decreased.
- In addition, lifting the embargo unilaterally would set a precedent that individual nations can decide for themselves whether UN resolutions are valid or not. Our efforts to enforce UN resolutions on Libya, Iraq and North Korea would be set back if we violate mandatory resolutions ourselves.
- It would also give a green light to front-line states and others eager to resume trade with Serbia. For example, in reaction to Congressional action, the Russian Duma has voted for unilateral lifting of sanctions against Serbia. Without sanctions, we would lose our leverage on Milosevic.
- I, therefore, ask you to vote no on Dole and yes on Nunn.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                      | DATE    | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| 003. paper               | The "Yes, But" Scenario. (4 pages) | 06/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

06-22-94 06:51PM FROM DPC

TO 96479667

P002/004

06-22-94 06:32AM FROM SENATE ARMD SERV COM TO 45651

P002/004

(a) Purpose: To express the sense of Congress concerning the international efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(b) Statements. The Congress makes the following statements of support:

(1) The Congress supports the use of international sanctions in the form of arms and economic embargoes imposed by the United Nations Security Council in appropriate circumstances.

(2) The Congress supports the imposition of an arms and economic embargo on the Government of Iraq by United Nations Security Council resolution 661 of August 6, 1990 to bring about compliance with a number of conditions, including in particular an end to Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

(3) The Congress supports the imposition of an arms and petroleum embargo on Haiti by United Nations Security Council resolution 875 of October 16, 1993 to bring about compliance with the Governors Island Agreement.

(4) The Congress supports the imposition of an arms and civil aircraft embargo on Libya pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution --- of March 31, 1992 in order to convince Libya to renounce terrorism.

(c) Findings. The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States took the lead in the United Nations Security Council to impose international sanctions in the form of arms and economic embargoes on Iraq, Haiti, and Libya.

(2) The security of the Republic of Korea with whom the United States has a mutual defense treaty and on whose territory there are more than 38,000 members of the United States Armed Forces is a vital interest of the United States.

(3) The imposition of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council on North Korea, which would require the affirmative vote or abstention of China, Russia, Britain, and France, may be essential to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons development program and to end a nuclear threat to the Republic of Korea and Southeast Asia.

(4) The effective enforcement of sanctions on North Korea, once imposed by the United Nations Security Council, would require the cooperation of China, Russia, and Japan as well as other allies, including Britain and France, both permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

(5) The United States voted for the international arms embargo imposed by United Nations Security Council resolution 713 of September 25, 1991 that was imposed on Yugoslavia.

06-22-94 06:51PM FROM DPC

TO 96479657

P003/004

06-22-94 06:32AM FROM SENATE ARMD SERV COM TO 45651

P003/004

2

(6) The imposition of the United Nations arms embargo on September 25, 1991 has not served to end the conflict in Bosnia Hercegovina, has provided a battlefield advantage to the Bosnian Serbs, who possess artillery, tanks, and other weapons left behind by the former Yugoslav Army or provided by Serbia and Montenegro, and has deprived the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina from acquiring the adequate means of defending itself and its citizens.

(7) For the first time the so-called "contact group" composed of representatives of the United States, Russia, France and Britain is moving toward a unified position of using an incentives and disincentives "carrot and stick" strategy to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

(8) Although lifting the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the United Nations Security Council is long overdue, the unilateral lifting of the embargo by the United States would lead to the following consequences:

- a. disruption of the ongoing effort by the "contact group";
- b. conflict with United States efforts in the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea, should that become necessary;
- c. serious damage to the NATO alliance;
- d. loss of cooperation by other nations in the enforcement of sanctions, including the sanctions on Iraq, previously imposed by the United Nations Security Council; and
- e. damage to the authority and responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(d) It is the sense of the Congress-

That the United States should work with the NATO Member nations and the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to endorse the efforts of the contact group to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia Hercegovina, including the following:

- a. as part of a peaceful settlement, the lifting of the United Nations arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina so that it can exercise the inherent right of a sovereign state to self-defense.

06/22/94 18:18 202 647 9667  
06-22-94 06:51PM FROM DPC

STATE LEG AFF. →→→ EUR/SA  
TO 96479657

P004/004

003/003

06-22-94 06:32AM FROM SENATE ARMD SERV COM TO 45651

P004/004

3

b. if the Bosnian Serbs, as the contact group's peace proposal is being considered and discussed, attack the safe areas designated by the United Nations Security Council, the partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the provision to that Government of weapons and equipment appropriate and necessary to defend those safe areas.

c. if the Bosnian Serbs do not respond constructively to the peace proposal of the contact group, the immediate lifting of the United Nations arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina (and the orderly withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force and humanitarian relief personnel).

(a) Policy-

The Congress authorizes the President, upon the termination of the United Nations arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina, to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, of an aggregate value of not more than \$50,000,000, in order to provide assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina so that it may exercise its inherent right of self-defense. Such assistance shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINAWHAT IS THE U.S. INTEREST?

- o While the Bosnia conflict does not pose an immediate threat to our security or warrant unilateral U.S. involvement, we do have interests involved which demand that we lead the way to a workable peace agreement, if one can be achieved, and to help enforce it. Our interests include:
  - preventing the spread of the fighting into a broader European war that could threaten both Allies and the stability of newly democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe, and lead to serious rifts with Russia;
  - proving that NATO can still be a credible force for peace in the post-Cold War era, in this first ever involvement of NATO outside a NATO country;
  - stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict and helping to stop the slaughter of innocents.

WHAT ARE WE DOING?Politically...

- o The Contact Group we established (composed of U.S. , Russian, EU, and UN representatives) is now finalizing a reasonable territorial compromise that can be presented to the parties as the best hope for a durable peace.
- o In May, we hosted the benchmark Geneva Ministerial Conference on Bosnia. This ministerial set out agreed principles and parameters that should guide a Bosnia settlement; served as a demonstration of international unity and resolve; and tasked the Contact Group to undertake substantive preparations that could help pave the way toward a settlement.
- o In February and March, we brokered a Federation agreement between two of the three parties to the conflict (the Bosnian government and members of the Bosnian Croat minority).
  - ! -- The Federation Agreement has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, reopened humanitarian convoy routes, facilitated an overall negotiated settlement, and positively affected the strategic balance in the region.
- o Working with and through the UN Security Council, we are helping to maintain one of the most thorough sanctions regimes in history on Serbia.

- o We are committed to seeing that those responsible for war crimes are brought to justice.

Strategically...

- o We have taken a leadership role in all key NATO decisions on the Bosnian crisis. Specifically, we led the way on:
  - the June 10, 1993 decision to provide close air support to UNPROFOR troops under attack;
  - the August 9, 1993 decision to threaten the use of air power in the event of Serb strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas;
  - the February 9, 1994 decision to establish an exclusion zone around Sarajevo;
  - the April 22, 1994 decision to establish an exclusion zone around Gorazde.
- o We have deployed troops to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the UNPROFOR force in the area to prevent spillover of the conflict.
- o We have warned Milosevic that we will respond in the event of Serb-inspired violence in Kosovo.
- o We have indicated our willingness, under certain conditions, to help implement a final peace settlement in Bosnia.

On the humanitarian front...

- o We have provided the largest quantity of humanitarian assistance to the region of any nation.
- o To date, the U.S. Government has contributed over \$530 million in humanitarian assistance since our efforts to assist the former Yugoslavia began in FY 1991. The U.S. is the major single-nation food donor, has performed over three-quarters of all airdrops, and has transported over 30,000 metric tons of aid by airlift to Sarajevo.
- o We also participate in a medical evacuation program which has brought 264 patients (204 adults and 60 children) with 152 family members to the United States, and have admitted over 5000 Bosnians as part of our refugee resettlement program.
- o On the other hand, we recognize that Bosnia is a first and foremost a European problem on which our European allies have quite properly taken the lead. Our negotiating initiative is based on earlier EU efforts to reinvigorate the settlement process and produce a final settlement.

Is aid getting through? What are humanitarian conditions like?

- o Since the Federation Agreement was signed in March, humanitarian conditions have improved in much of the areas controlled by the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. Relief convoys are reaching territory held by the government and the Bosnian Croats from the Croatian coast with only minor difficulties.
- o Conditions are less stable in isolated areas. Although fairly well-supplied now, access to Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves (Goražde, Srebrenica and Žepa) is controlled by the Bosnian Serbs who can and do periodically prevent aid from getting through as they did during their assault upon Goražde in April. As of May 10, Goražde, Srebrenica and Žepa were estimated to have a three-week supply of food and supplies.
- o All areas of Bosnia appear to have sufficient food to meet basic subsistence needs.
- o Relief efforts by air are also coordinated by UNHCR. Airlift operations continue to Sarajevo. Airdrops have been scaled down due to the the increasing availability of relief commodities delivered by road to nearly all areas and are currently being conducted on an as-needed basis.
- o Work continues on the repair of public utilities in Sarajevo, and nearly all of the city's residents now receive water, electricity and natural gas for several hours each day.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004. paper               | Some Implications of an UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia. [CIA Act] [partial] (3 pages) | 01/26/1994 | P3/b(3)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2641

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force  
26 January 1994

**Some Implications of an UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia**

An UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia would have an immediate and negative impact on the well-being of hundreds of thousands of people in Muslim controlled areas. The discipline and cohesion of the Muslim forces also would be affected. Any impact on the level and intensity of fighting and the readiness of the combatants to accept a negotiated settlement, however, would depend on a number of other variables as well.

- The airlifts and relief convoys on which the Muslims depend to meet their food and medical supply needs--some 80 percent of total needs in Sarajevo and virtually everything in the eastern enclaves--will quickly grind to a halt. Without the protection of UNPROFOR forces, both aircraft using the Sarajevo airport and land convoys would face an unacceptable level of risk.
- Air drop operations conceivably could continue, but even expanded airdrops could not replace ground deliveries; the UN estimates that only half of airdropped supplies reach the intended recipients.
- Civilian populations would be most severely impacted. Military units have always taken the first and largest slice of relief deliveries, and this practice is unlikely to change as long as fighting continues. [004]
- One obvious consequence of increasing desperation among the 2.7 million Bosnians in need of assistance would be an increase in incidents of violence--such as yesterday's attack on Bosnian policemen by Muslim rioters and the subsequent looting of a relief convoy.
- We also would see an increase in the number of refugees on the road as hunger took hold. They would fall victim in increasing numbers to hunger, disease, and hardship. Precise forecasts are difficult, but additional deaths in the tens of thousands are very likely (some 5-10 thousand died as a result of war-related shortages last year).

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

WZ

10/1/2013

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

- In the end, tens of thousands of additional refugees could be added to the army of the displaced in other and equally burdened Bosnian localities or to the pool of unwanted and increasingly resented Balkan refugees in Europe.

The Bosnian military would be less directly impacted, but over time its position and fighting capabilities would be weakened.

- Military commanders would face a difficult choice between feeding their soldiers at the expense of a starving population or cutting the rations of their troops and risking the discipline and cohesion of their units.
- The net effect would be a significant tightening of the siege the Serbs have imposed on Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, and other urban areas controlled by the Muslims.
- Both Belgrade and Zagreb would see the disappearance of UNPROFOR as an opportunity to increase military support of their factions in Bosnia, but both would be wary of actions so blatant as to provoke more direct Western involvement.

[004]

The prospect of increasing unrest and growing military weakness as a result of an UNPROFOR pullout might make the Muslims more amenable to the idea of a negotiated settlement. Initially, however, it would be more likely to increase Sarajevo's interest in a genuine rapprochement with the Croats and joint military operations against the Serbs. Peace, however, would not be brought any nearer by such a development.

- For their part, the Serbs, who have been willing to accept a settlement leaving the Muslims in control of a third of Bosnia, might be provoked to try for more.
- In this case, an UNPROFOR withdrawal might culminate in a major escalation of the conflict and the scale of human suffering.

The effect of an UNPROFOR withdrawal on the willingness of the Allies to consider other options--such as "lift and strike"--is another variable.

- The risk an expanded conflict would pose to their forces on the ground always been one of the major European objections to lift and strike. Their

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

departure might lead at least some governments to drop their reservations.

-- Even if the arms embargo is not lifted, Islamic governments will come under increasing pressure to help the beleaguered Muslims.

[004]

3  
(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                      | DATE    | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| 005a. table              | Incentives/Disincentives. (1 page) | 06/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                  | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 005b. paper              | Military Implications Arising from a Serb Rejection of the Contact Group's Proposal. (3 pages) | 06/23/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                        | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 006. memo                | To Toby Gati from William Hill. Subject: The Conflict in Former Yugoslavia: An Assessment. (7 pages) | 06/15/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2641

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 007. memo                | For the Secretary of State from Conrad Harper, Wendy Sherman, and Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Strategy for Dealing with Congressional Pressures. (11 pages) | 06/11/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2641

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

the horrible bloodshed in Bosnia. Today, especially in light of the recently announced ceasefire, we must not act rashly or unilaterally.

Nonetheless, I understand the frustration and desire we all share to act to end the slaughter in Bosnia. But our job to act responsibly, looking at the unintended consequences of our actions as well as the results we hope for.

We must pass the Hamilton amendment and defeat the McCloskey-Gilman amendment. To act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo will have a number of negative results—it will prolong and intensify the war; it will Americanize the war in various ways: The U.S. will become responsible for rescuing and protecting UNPROFOR, the U.N. force now on the ground in Bosnia; we, as a nation, will become responsible for Bosnia's fate, potentially encouraging the Serbs to overrun the eastern enclaves and other isolated Bosnian outposts. At that point, only massive U.S. bombing or the threat of invasion could counter or prevent the Serb attack; American troops would be drawn into the war through the delivery of weapons, the need to keep supply lines open, and to train the Bosnians and, then, to protect our advisors; finally, the United States would then need to fill the gaps, providing relief to the Bosnians after a probable U.N. pullout.

Mr. Chairman, this is the kind of vote that puts our hearts and our heads in competition. We all feel in our hearts the need to act to stop the bloodshed, the warfare, and the starvation. But we need to listen to our heads, to move toward the same goals but to do it in a way that won't cause more harm, more bloodshed, or more starvation. Vote for the Hamilton amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. FIELDS of Louisiana). All time has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to consider the amendments printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520 relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shall be considered in the following order: (1) By Representative McCLOSKEY, GILMAN, BONIOR, or HOYER; and (2) by Representative HAMILTON.

If more than one of the amendments is adopted, only the last to be adopted shall be considered as finally adopted and reported to the House.

It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520.

#### AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MCCLOSKEY

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. McCloskey: Page 308, after line 24, insert the following new title:

#### TITLE XII—BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE

##### SEC. 1201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1994".

##### SEC. 1202. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-

236), the Congress has found that continued application of an international arms embargo to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and therefore is inconsistent with international law.

(2) Before deploying United States Armed Forces to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to enforce United Nations mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States should seek to permit the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to obtain the means necessary to exercise its inherent right of self-defense.

##### SEC. 1203. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

(a) TERMINATION.—The President shall terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(b) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term "United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the application to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of—

(1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (56 F.R. 33322) under the heading "Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia"; and

(2) any similar policy being applied by the United States Government as of the date of receipt of the request described in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services to the former Yugoslavia.

##### SEC. 1204. PROVISION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

(a) POLICY.—The President should provide appropriate military assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE.—

(1) DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY.—If the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests United States assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the President is authorized to direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training in order to provide assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such assistance shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine.

(2) LIMITATION ON VALUE OF TRANSFERS.—The aggregate value (as defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under this subsection may not exceed \$200,000,000.

(3) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZATION.—The authority provided to the President in paragraph (1) expires at the end of fiscal year 1995.

(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIVITIES.—Members of the United States Armed Forces who perform defense services or provide military education and training outside the United States under this subsection may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising that may engage them in combat activities.

(5) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Within 60 days after any exercise of the authority of paragraph (1) and every 60 days thereafter, the

President shall report in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate concerning the defense articles, defense services, and military education and training being provided and the use made of such articles, services, and education and training.

(6) REIMBURSEMENT.—(A) Defense articles, defense services, and military education and training provided under this subsection shall be made available without reimbursement to the Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (B).

(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the applicable appropriation, fund, or account for the value (as defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, or military education and training provided under this subsection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of Tuesday, May 24, 1994, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by my colleague.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], a real battler for justice as to the Bosnians and the Balkans.

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, nobody has fought harder on this issue than the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].

Mr. Chairman, we are about to make an important decision in voting on the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. It is more than a vote on whether we will or will not lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a vote on whether we will act according to important international principles, the right to self-defense. It is a vote on whether we will ensure that countries are not rewarded for violating international principles through forceful changing of borders, aggression, and, yes, genocide.

Let us not stand silent, let us not dissemble, let us not say as the gentleman from New Mexico has said, that it is not now time. That is what we said in the thirties: It is not time to confront aggression, it is not time to stand up for principles, it is not time to say enough of killing, enough of taking property by force, enough of ethnic cleansing, enough.

This is a vote on principle. It is not some slick foreign policy "let's deal." We have been trying to deal with the Europeans for 2 years, and they have not acted. It was the policy of the Bush administration to say that we will, in fact, have the Europeans take the lead. That, my friends, was 2½ million refu-

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 008. memcon              | United States and France Meet at Quai d'Orsay, June 20, 1994. (4 pages) | 06/20/1994 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 851

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia - July 1994: Not the Latest [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2641

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]