

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 1994 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Jim Cunningham, Richard Erdman, Dr. Joe Kruzel, et al. from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Bosnia Working Group Meeting. (2 pages)	07/14/1994	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Funding of a NATO Bosnia Peace Implementation Operation. (10 pages)	03/31/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Alexander Vershbow from Don Kerrick. Subject: Bosnia Meeting. (1 page)	07/14/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	DJ-5 Meeting with Ambassador Redman. (2 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)
003c. table	Unresolved Bosnia Issues. (3 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	Issue Paper. (5 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)
004. email	White House Situation Room to Kathleen Witowsky, Alexander Vershbow, VAX_MAIL, and Don Kerrick. Subject: July 11 NAC. (9 pages)	07/12/1994	P1/b(1)
005. table	Assessment Tables. [NATO] (4 pages)	02/28/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: The Way Ahead on Former Yugoslavia. (3 pages)	07/12/1994	P1/b(1)
007. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Points for Telephone Call to Congressman McClosky. Record ID: 9405783. (2 pages)	07/18/1994	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2639

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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TAB A

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003b. paper	DJ-5 Meeting with Ambassador Redman. (2 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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TAB B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. table	Unresolved Bosnia Issues. (3 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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003d. paper	Issue Paper. (5 pages)	07/13/1994	P1/b(1)

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Susan

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS
(EUR/RPM)

FROM: John Winant Telephone: (202) 736-7296
Unclassified Fax: (202) 647-1369

TO: Susan Rice NSC Staff ext. 5-7310

SUBJECT: Funding NATO Implementation of a UNPP in Bosnia

REMARKS:

Susan -

Don't know whether you've already seen this. It is based on an oral presentation given by the I.S. on possible funding options, and can serve as a basis for the work of the WG we discussed last week.

USNATO would like guidance for tomorrow, but I think that's impossible at this stage. However, I would like to send them some informal comments on this paper tonight so they'll know the direction of our thinking.

Please call, or fax me any comments you would like included. Thanks.

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET): 18
SENT: 2/28/94

SERPMP 4635(c)

IMPLEMENTING A UNITED NATIONS PEACE PLAN

Possible Funding Scenarios

A range of scenarios can be thought of.

Traditionally one thinks of the UN when talking peace operations.

In reality, many peace-like operations have been handled on a bilateral/multilateral basis outside the UN framework with the nations involved picking up the costs.

More recently, NATO's role in conducting - and funding - peace operations has been under discussion.

Let's quickly overview some aspects of each of these 3 scenarios and look at their usefulness in handling an operation the size of a UNPP for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2/18

Possible funding scenarios**Costs fall where they lie**

From a narrow financial point of view this is the easiest solution.

It's also quite appropriate and possible for small scale operations where costs are easy to absorb.

It's application in pure form to a major peace operation would lead to big problems :

- It's unjust in that troop contributors (shouldering the burden and the risks) end up paying as well
- because of that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the necessary commitments
- international solidarity is lost
- several of the potential troop contributors are automatically excluded
- organizationally/logistically it would turn a major operation into a nightmare.

3/18

Possible funding scenarios

- the UN approach

Initially peace operations were funded out of the UN's regular budget.

For many years, most operations have been funded out of assessments for peacekeeping where

- the permanent 5 pay 20% above their regular budget contribution;
- developed countries pay at the same percentage as for their regular contribution;
- the developing countries pay 1/3 of their regular budget percentage;
- third world nations pay 1/10 of their regular budget percentage.

See VIEWGRAPH 4

Voluntary contributions and special arrangements have also been used on occasion.

4/18

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Possible funding scenarios**The UN Approach (Cont'd)**

The approach just described is under review.

Especially equipment reimbursement rates are most likely to be reduced.

The main advantages of the UN approach are

- the use of well-established rules and procedures;
- clear lines of authority;
- wide international solidarity.

Disadvantages include

- not tried out with major operations
- UN resources are overstretched as they are

In practice, troop contributing nations carry the can and even end up paying twice : their own troops and their UN assessment.

9/18

20 FEB 1994 17:00

U.C. MISSION TO NATO

33 2 243 0000 P.10

• The current situation in FRY

The current situation is a mixture of the above scenarios

- UN pays UN Staff
 - Military observers
 - Various elements of logistics, transport, accommodation, etc.
 - Standard rates (when funds are available)
- NATO pays Communications equipment
 - B-H Command HQ elements
 - AWACS flying hours
 - AFSOUTH planning staff
- NATO nations pay Sharp guard
 - Deny flight
 - Troops
 - pending Transport
 - reimbursement Equipment
 - Logistics
- EC/EU
- WEU
- CSCE
- UNHCR
- NGOs

10/18

28-FEB-1994 17:00

U.S. MISSION TO NATO

32 2 242 0696 P.19

Amounts Involved

• the Initial UNPROFOR budget

490 Million US \$ per year

based on 7420 military personnel

current strength : 29128

• NATO support to the UNPP

1082 Million US \$ for Initial year

not including personnel expenditure

not including equipment depreciation

• UNPP for Bosnia-Herzegovina (PO(93)87(Rev.))

8275 Million US \$ for 3 Division option

6160 Million US \$ for 2 Division option

4060 Million US \$ for 1 Division option

3060 Million US \$ for "light" Division option

all options including air support and
multinational logistic command

• what are the total costs

no one knows

our estimate : 2-3 billion US \$ per year currently

UNPP full scale : 10 - 20 billion US \$ per year?

11/18

28-FEB-1994 17101

U.S. MISSION TO NATO

32 2 242 0696 P. 20

Building a hybrid scenario

- why does a hybrid scenario appear inevitable?
 - * because of the level of costs involved
 - * because of the involvement of many parties
 - * because of the mixture between military and civilian elements
 - * because of the thorny aspects of political authority and military command

No single entity is capable, or indeed willing, to take on total responsibility for the entire operation !

12/18

28-FEB-1994 17:01

U.S. MISSION TO NATO

32 2 242 0696 P.21

Building a hybrid scenario

- conditions to be fulfilled :

the scenario must

- * be politically acceptable
 - under UN authority
 - under unified NATO command
- * allow for the involvement of non-NATO Nations
- * be able to cope with military and civilian requirements
- * allow for the inflow of funds from third parties
- * allow for logistic support through a multinational logistic command concept
- * avoid unnecessary transfers of funds
- * be financially flexible and workable

13/18

20 FEB 1994 17:02

U.S. MISSION TO NATO

12 2 242 0000 P. 22

Building a hybrid scenario

- elements to be considered for a hybrid scenario :
 - * limit "accountable" cost items to mission specific costs
 - i.e. exclude from the cost of the operation such elements as
 - staff salaries to be paid anyhow
 - "normal" AWACS flying hours
 - fleet operations
 - normal running costs of existing HQs
 - normal write-off costs for military equipment
 - routine flying hours

14/18

28-FEB-1994 17:02

U.S. MISSION TO NATO

32 2 242 0696 P.23

Building a hybrid scenario

- elements to be considered for a hybrid scenario(cont'd)
 - establish clear dividing lines on financial responsibilities between UN, NATO and other entities.

I.e. In what framework will

- NATO military activities
- NATO-nations' military activities
- non-NATO nations' military activities
- humanitarian aid
- nation building

be funded.

15/18

20 FEB 1994 17:03

U.C. MISSION TO NATO

32 2 242 0000 P.24

Building a hybrid scenario**• elements to be considered for a hybrid scenario(cont'd)**

- Each organisation to follow its own internal budget and accounting rules for handling expenditure within its own sphere of financial responsibility

e.g. NATO could follow existing procedures and cost sharing arrangements for those elements of the operation that would normally fall within one of the common-funded budgets; ad-hoc arrangements would of course need to be developed for the remainder.

- Billing to be limited to activities performed for other entities within their sphere of financial responsibility

e.g. providing fuel in the framework of the integrated logistic concept, to an NGO

- Amount for troop, equipment and logistic contributions as "contributions in kind".

16/18

28-FEB-1994 17:03

U.S. MISSION TO NATO

32 2 242 0696 P.25

Building a hybrid scenario

- elements to be considered for a hybrid scenario (cont'd)
 - Consider excess contributions within one framework as valid contributions due in another framework
 - e.g. large troop contributions by one of the smaller NATO-Nations would quickly bring that Nation over its dues within the NATO environment; this "over-contribution" could be taken into account in settling its UN dues under the UN scale of assessment; conversely, the financial contribution due within the NATO framework by a Nation with limited contributions in kind, could be transferred to the UN to offset the shortfall in financial contributions, within the UN framework, by that other Nation.
 - A clearing house will be needed to oversee these financial transfers and to handle coordination problems. This clearing house would not, however, need to be involved in any detailed accounting activities.
 - "Third" party funds to be used for nation building activities, humanitarian aspects, payment of non-NATO troops, etc..
 - i.e. these "third" parties would not have to be seen to contribute to the reimbursement of NATO-troops.

17/19

Building a hybrid scenario**Conclusions**

- An arrangement along the above lines would make it possible to have an operation under UN authority but under NATO command to which a range of other nations and organisations could contribute without being locked into a complicated centralised accounting arrangement.
- Such an arrangement would, of course, need to be discussed and agreed with the UN.
- Equally, the elements brought forward need further elaboration and discussion.

18/18

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: The Way Ahead on Former Yugoslavia. (3 pages)	07/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2639

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

*Saracvic → Redman
7/14*

1

TRANSLATION

Having in mind the most recent development of events on the international scene, and in joint efforts directed toward expediting the peace process and resolving the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia,

President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman

President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević

are in agreement that it is critical to intensify the already-initiated process of normalization in Croat-Serb relations, to specify the Geneva Agreement of January 19, and to apply joint efforts to expediting the process of normalization in Croat-Serb relations.

1

President Tudjman and President Milošević both wholeheartedly support the decisions of the Contact Group and of the Napulja meeting of the G-7 and the Russian Federation on the need to find a means for creating a lasting and stable peace on the territories of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the basis of international recognition, within their internationally recognized borders, of the states which emerged from the territory of former Yugoslavia. Both Presidents believe that the mutual recognition of states within their internationally recognized borders is the prerequisite for the resolution of all outstanding intra-state issues, including that of borders.

11

Having in mind that peace is of the highest priority to the Croatian and the Serbian nation, and is the condition for the resolution of all outstanding issues, President Tudjman and President Milošević express their joint belief that further progress in Croat-Serb relations is politically beneficial.

Both presidents evaluate positively the results thus far achieved in the realization of the Joint statement signed in January in Geneva, believing that this process must conform with mutual interests, as well as with the positions of the international community.

Both Presidents agree that there is currently a standstill in the process of normalization in the overall Croat-Serb relations; therefore, in order to achieve the speediest possible normalization of the situation upon the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia as well as the normalization of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, they believe the following steps are of priority:

- 1) immediate enabling and opening of all types of traffic and communication (internal and international): train, highway, river, air, postal, telecommunications and naval;
- 2) connection of electro-energy systems, opening of oil pipeline and connection of gas system;
- 3) creation of concrete conditions for the resolution of open economic and legal issues (property, pensions, status and similar issues between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia);
- 4) renewal of economic and trade relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- 5) return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and assistance in voluntary relocations.

III

President Tudjman and President Milošević evaluate highly the results of the Cease-fire agreement of March 29, 1994, and call on the parties to continue to abstain from hostilities, as a vital condition for the resolution of all open issues enumerated above. The cessation of hostilities will enable speedy progress to be made in the full normalization of Croat-Serb relations.

Based on the results of the Agreement, and judging that the reasons given for the halt in the negotiating process are without foundation, the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, undertakes the responsibility to actively negotiate between the representatives of the Republic of Croatia and local Serbian officials within the UNPA areas in order to successfully expedite the expected normalization of relations, having as the goals the reintegration of the UNPA territories into the overall systems of the Republic of Croatia and the guarantee of civil and national rights of the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia, in conformity with all accepted standards of the international conventions.

Having in mind their firm conviction that the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia should be resolved peacefully, the Presidents agree on the necessity for mutual recognition between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Mutual recognition will occur within a period of eight days through an exchange of notes from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Immediately thereafter, diplomatic relations will be established on the Embassy level.

After mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic ties, meetings between intra-state commissions working on improving mutual relations will follow.

On

President of the Republic of Croatia

President of the Republic of

Serbia

Dr. Franjo Tudjman

Slobodan Milošević

Witness to the agreement

President of the Russian Federation
Boris Yeltsin

In agreement with the proposal for this Agreement:

President of the Republic of Croatia

President of the Republic of
Serbia

Dr. Franjo Tudjman

Slobodan Milošević

Zagreb, July 14, 1994

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Points for Telephone Call to Congressman McClosky. Record ID: 9405783. (2 pages)	07/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1994 [3]

2013-0687-F

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
FRANK McCLOSKEY

6TH DISTRICT INDIANA

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MILITARY ACQUISITION
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
AND FACILITIESPOST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
COMMITTEECRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICE
CENSUS, STATISTICS AND
FISCAL AFFAIRS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE



→ Kervick

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-1408

July 11, 1994

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

TL-
CONG McCLOSKEY
CALLED RE BOSNIA

at 11:25 AM

011-000 0000

→ URGENT STAFFING
ADJ. CL. TONY LAK

Dear Mr. President:

I want to convey to you the sense of urgency that I personally heard from President Alija Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Harris Silajdzic in Sarajevo this morning. Both said that war between Croatia and the Bosnian government may erupt before the contact group meets again on July 19. They asked me to prevail upon you for your help in keeping together the Bosnian and Croatian alliance that you engineered early this year.

Yesterday, the HDZ convention in Mostar chose Dario Kordic to replace Mate Boban, and elected Ante Markovic as HDZ party secretary. Both President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic consider this Zagreb staged election as an overt act of open hostility towards the Bosnian Government.

President Izetbegovic asked me to prevail upon you to phone Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and direct his attention to the seriousness with which his government views the election of an ultra-nationalist and an accused war criminal to head his own HDZ party in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Mr. President, I would not be writing this to you if I did not feel your personal intervention is needed in order to pull this fragile alliance back from the brink of chaos.

Sincerely,

Frank McCloskey
Member of Congress

FM/

cc: National Security Advisor Anthony Lake
Secretary of State Warren Christopher



→ Vershbow

FRANK McCLOSKEY
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
8TH DISTRICT, INDIANA
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

July 15, 1994

Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. ~~Lake~~ *Tony*

The current status of Croatian-Bosnian relations in Bosnia is reaching critical mass but the United States can do something about it. If you would care to talk with me about the situation and about taking the necessary steps to help, I'm at 225-4636.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Frank".

Frank McCloskey, M.C.

H6744

bargo there, and the pictures of people drowned and in overturned boats of people trying to flee the economic mess with the incentive to come out and maybe get some kind of passage to the United States. If they can just get that leaky boat out to a Coast Guard cutter.

The Clinton administration is over-looking a very good possibility, they are missing a lot, of dealing with moderates who don't want us to invade, and don't want the embargo. But these are elected members of the Haitian parliament. They are members of the Chamber of Deputies, Senators. They want our help and rapprochement. They want help building peace among the warring factions in Haiti, and they want our help to bring relief to the dismal quality of life that we have helped make in Haiti.

I think that that is a very productive course we ought to pursue. It sure beats sending the Marines to Haiti. We have had a proposal by Senator DOLE for fact finding. We have resolution by our colleague, CHRIS SMITH, that we should swap interparliamentary visits and reopen negotiations. We have the safe haven proposals in Haiti, using the Ile de la Gonave or some other place for the type of relief people are asking for and trying to find.

How much better are those proposals than sending the Marines, to do what? Defeat the Haitian army? Remove Cedras. If you remove Cedras, then what? I think the message is clear. We gain nothing but trouble by invasion; we gain a lot if we pursue a course of negotiation; and I urge the President not to invade Haiti.

□ 2050

BOSNIAN UPDATE

THE SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FRIST). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. McCLOSKEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I have just returned from Bosnia where I traveled with the United States Ambassador and the Bosnian Vice President to some of the towns that have suffered most in this war. Right now is a critical time as to hopes for peace in the Bosnian conflict.

The beleaguered Bosnian Government has just announced its approval of the 51-to-49 percent partition plan to carve up this sovereign country between the Bosnian-Croatian alliance and Serb irredentist thugs.

President Izetbegovic said that he did not want to sign the document, but that other alternatives were worse. These worse alternatives include ongoing war, with the British and French pulling out of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. This would be without West era military support for Bosnia or a lifting of the arms embargo.

President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Haris Silajdic are insistent

that the borders of a sovereign Bosnia remain intact.

To this end, and for the peace and security of the Bosnian people, it is obvious that peacekeeping troops will need to be placed not only where populations intersect, but also on the borders between Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro.

Most Bosnian Serb statements indicate opposition to returning ill-gotten lands. And the irredentist Bosnian Serbs seem adamantly opposed to a sovereign Bosnia.

Despite the urging of President Slobodan Milosovic—a war criminal posturing as a peacemaker—the Bosnian Serb parliament may very well refuse the plan this Monday.

If and when they do refuse the plan, should there be any question but that the arms embargo crippling Bosnia's self-defense be lifted with significant aerial support committed from the West to avert an ongoing, one-sided bloodbath?

Think of the splendid basic logic of the British mandate to the warring parties. Britain tells all parties to agree to the plan, or it will pull out with no lifting of the arms embargo or other increased support for the Bosnians. Why should the Bosnian Serbs disagree with a British green light to gear up their killing machine?

If the Serbs do not sign on, the feckless West would only become more craven by doing a Pontius Pilate hand wash and then getting out.

It continues to startle me that the West has approached blithe acceptance of the right of the Bosnian Serbs to rain down shells on an innocent population—as the Serbs rape, maim and loot as well. For the United Nations to tell the people of Vozdaze that the siege was not all that bad is an abomination.

And while brutal ethnic cleansing—and we may say the word genocide—continues in the Serb-held areas such as Banja Luka and Prijedor—we blithely expedite the parties to the signing table. Let us hope for peace but this particular peace will be with Serb gains and even rewards from the West.

What can we expect from the tender mercies of the Serbs in Kosovo where daily life for millions of Albanians is a dismal existence in prison-like conditions? What can we expect in the Sandjak region in Serbia and Montenegro where all the democratic Moslem leadership has been jailed? What can we predict for little isolated Macedonia? When will exiled Croats be permitted to return to their UNPROFOR Serb controlled communities in the Krajina?

Having just returned from Mostar, Vitez, and Sarajevo, I reluctantly report the Bosnian-Croatian alliance, a singular achievement of the Clinton administration, is in peril.

When I was Mostar several months ago immediately after the horrible Croatian siege of Moslem east Mostar, its people had just emerged stunned,

ravaged and maimed after months of shelling and various atrocities.

That breakdown of the previous Bosnian-Croatian alliance can be significantly attributed to the West's dismal stupidity in allowing Serb invasion and land grabs in no way detracts from the guilt of various Croats in and out of Bosnia for perpetrating that siege, the concentration camps, the atrocities, and ethnic cleansing.

But in April, the poor people of east Mostar were drinking untreated, chemically contaminated water from the Neretva River. They in essence had no electricity, and their medical treatment—what little they had, despite the efforts of a few valiant doctors—bordered on medieval.

This last week when I visited Mostar again, things had not gotten much better. In those 3 months since April, the E.C. Administrator Hans Koschnik still had not arrived. He did show up last Sunday to meet with leaders in both communities.

Other than the regular U.N. food aid and a few basic humanitarian supplies, progress in Mostar has been at a near standstill.

Given the fact that forced expulsions of Moslems by gangsters in west Mostar still are going on with little or no law enforcement followup from west Mostar Croatian authorities, make this all the more tragic.

Five Moslem families in east Mostar told me they were forcibly expelled from their homes in the last month. Some were beaten. Some were witness to murder.

But still it goes on with no investigatory followup to speak of. The victims and the east Mostar authorities told me that they have abundant evidence against these particular criminals. This cannot go on.

President Zubak of the Bosnian-Croatian alliance and General Roso, Bosnian Croatian Defense Organization Commander, and perhaps most importantly, Croatian Defense Minister Susak told me that these crimes in Mostar would stop. If they do not, the Bosnian-Croatian alliance will be short-lived indeed.

Another internal threat to the Bosnian-Croatian alliance and all our hopes for peace emerged last weekend when elections of the Bosnian branch of the Croatian Democratic Union Party resulted in the elevation of two Croatian leaders quite unacceptable to Moslems in the region.

One of the men is said by the Moslems and others quite knowledgeable to be a war criminal, the other is reputed to be a radical Croatian ultra-nationalist.

Without more enlightened leadership from Zagreb and a firmer grasp of the situation on the ground by the United States, our hopes for peace will be dashed with ongoing war beyond belief and reason.

R.H. Administrator Koschnik said he will be operating by July 24 in Mostar. Some 60 million Deutsche marks are

July 14, 1994

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

H5745

said to be headed to Mostar and the immediate area. Every bit of that will be needed, and more.

Similarly, the people of Vitebsk, Croats and Moslems—and Bosnians in other areas need help now. The United States must be more active and visible around Mostar and elsewhere immediately if it is to save the alliance that we fostered between Croats and Moslems.

Many Americans, including some of our highest officials, do not realize the almost transcendent effect of American participation and visibility in the midst of this continuing tragedy.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. BURTON of Indiana addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereinafter in the Extension of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BROWN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. BROWN of Ohio addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereinafter in the Extension of Remarks.]

EMPLOYER MANDATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. KIM) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KIM. Mr. Speaker, this morning the Small Business Committee spoke for the first time on the issue of employer mandates.

At the markup of the Small Business Administration reauthorization bill, I offered an amendment expressing the sense of Congress that employer mandates would be destructive to small business and that employer mandates should not be included in any health care reform legislation.

Unfortunately, this amendment was narrowly defeated by a vote of 21 to 24, with all Republicans and only 3 Democrats voting to eliminate these job-killing employer mandates in national health care reform.

I am deeply disturbed that the Small Business Committee voted to support employer mandates, especially when all of the evidence demonstrates that mandates will be extremely destructive to small businesses.

A recent study by the CONRAD corporation, for example, predicted that nearly a million jobs would be lost due to employer mandates, with almost half—470,000 to be exact—coming from small businesses. Even more disturbingly, most of those losses will come at the expense of lower income women, minorities and families. Another study predicts that employer mandates would cost small businesses an extra \$29 billion a year.

But we don't have to rely on academic studies to understand the economic carnage that would be caused by employer mandates—all we have to do is listen to the small business owners we are supposed to be representing.

Several months ago I held a health care town hall meeting for small business owners and employees in my district. At that meeting, which was attended by about 100 business people, small business owner after small business owner told me that employer mandates, as proposed by the President, would pose a serious threat to the survival of their businesses.

One owner, who runs several restaurants in my district, testified that "if the Clinton plan were enacted as it stands now, my problems as a small business owner would go away because we simply would not survive. We would have to close." If that small restaurant chain closes, hundreds of employees will lose their jobs. Most small businesses across this country are operating on razor thin margins as it is and they simply can not afford the additional burden of health insurance—not at a time when they are finding it difficult just to keep their doors open, to put it simply—too many of these small companies would be forced to close their doors. That is the tragic end result of employer mandates—the loss of precious American jobs.

But it is not just small business owners in my district who are worried about employer mandates. Over the last 2 months, the White House has sponsored seven different small business conferences, attended by the owners and employees of small businesses, in seven different States. In 6 out of 7 of those State conferences, held in Delaware, New Hampshire, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Montana, and Idaho, small business owners voted unanimously to reject employer mandates.

The overwhelming opposition of the small business community to employer mandates is easy to understand: Most small businesses simply cannot afford to pay for their employees' health insurance and still stay in business. The fact is that you cannot increase the payroll costs of small businesses by 3.5 to 7.3 percent and expect to continue to provide jobs and fuel economic growth.

My point is simple: Employer mandates are a bad idea and millions of the owners and employees of small businesses are frightened.

However, the Small Business Committee, by voting to support employer mandates, chose to ignore the views of the small business as it is supposed to represent. It seems that many members of the Committee are more interested in "feeling the party line" than in doing what is right for America's small businesses.

I want to assure the small business owners of this country, that I will not be discouraged by this temporary defeat and will continue to fight to defeat this job-killing proposal.

I am submitting the record from today's Small Business Committee vote into the RECORD.

Small Business Committee voted 19-24 on Kim amendment to Title I of the Small Business Administration Reauthorization which would prohibit the use of funds by the Small Business Administration to promote employer mandates in health care reform legislation.

Ayes: Meyers, Combest, Baker, Hefley, Machtley, Ramstad, Sam Johnson, Zeliff, Collins (CA), McCluskey, Huntington, Talent, Knollenberg, Dickey, Kim, Manzullo, Torkildsen, Portman, and Sarbanes.
Noes: LaFalce, Smith (IA), Skelton, Mazzoli, Wyden, Stitsky, Blumenthal, Flake, Posner, Clayton, Meehan, Danner, Strickland, Velazquez, Fields, Margolis-Moravitsky, Tucker, Klink, Roybal-Allard, Hilliard, Lancaster, and Andrews.

Not voting: Choyers, Waters, Thompson

Small Business Committee voted 21-24 on Kim amendment to Title VII of the Small Business Administration Reauthorization which would express the sense of Congress that employer mandates would be destructive to small businesses and that employer mandates should not be included in any health care reform legislation.

Ayes: Meyers, Combest, Baker, Hefley, Machtley, Ramstad, Sam Johnson, Zeliff, Collins (CA), McCluskey, Huntington, Talent, Knollenberg, Dickey, Kim, Manzullo, Torkildsen, Portman, Skelton, Sarbanes, and Lancaster.

Noes: LaFalce, Smith (IA), Mazzoli, Wyden, Stitsky, Blumenthal, Flake, Posner, Clayton, Choyers, Meehan, Danner, Strickland, Velazquez, Fields, Margolis-Moravitsky, Tucker, Klink, Roybal-Allard, Hilliard, Andrews, Waters, and Thompson.

2100

REASONS FOR POOR MORALE IN THE U.S. MILITARY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FROST). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. DORNAN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, last June 30 I sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense asking him to please, as the senior administration official, convey to Mr. Clinton some thoughts on why the morale is so bad in the U.S. military. This morning during a 1-minute I said that I would list 11 or 12 things, and when my staff reminded me of this letter, and it is now only 14 days old, I decided I would simply read the letter, let it speak for itself, and hope that this Nation will understand why this is not a President that can get men, and now women, into combat in Haiti when there are no vital U.S. interests at stake.

I wrote, and I will choose to make my own letter public, which it has not been for 2 weeks, to the Honorable William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense.

"Dear Mr. Secretary:
"As an elected Representative who has the utmost admiration for the uniformed men and women of our great Nation, I am personally outraged at the continued demeaning treatment of members of the military by the President and his administration.

4 REUTERS 07-14-94 09:09 AET 110 LINES
BC-YUGOSLAVIA-MOSTAR (SCHEDULED FEATURE)
ETHNIC CLEANSING UNDERMINES CROAT-MUSLIM FEDERATION

By Davor Hulec

MOSTAR, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Reuter) - Continued expulsions of minority Muslims from the Croat-held part of Mostar are tearing at the fabric of a new Bosnian federation grouping the two former foes, according to international observers.

U.N. relief workers say civil order in the part of the divided town held by Bosnian Croats is on the brink of collapse with remaining Muslims the principal target of evictions and maltreatment by armed gangs in military uniform.

Separatist Bosnian Croats laid siege to the mainly Muslim east side of Mostar during almost a year of vicious war with the Muslim-led Bosnian government army for communally mixed territory in south and central Bosnia.

Bosnian Croat forces expelled thousands of minority Muslims from Mostar's west side and blew up the historic 16th-century Ottoman stone bridge over the front-line Neretva river before the fighting ended in March.

To avert threatened U.N. sanctions, the Croatia-backed Bosnian Croats accepted a cease-fire and federation with Muslims on the 30 percent of Bosnia not held by breakaway Serb forces.

But diplomats say hard-line nationalists in a Bosnian Croat warlord oligarchy, keen to preserve black-market fiefdoms, have resisted the implementation of federal authority in the Croat-dominated Herzegovina region around Mostar.

Local representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees say 90 Muslims were evicted from apartments in the Croat part of Mostar and a number of others had been murdered or mistreated or had disappeared since April.

"It's a total breakdown of law and order (on the Croat-held west bank)," regional UNHCR director Jerrie Hulme told Reuters. "We are very worried about the rights of the minorities there."

A case study in the "ethnic cleansing" of Muslims that seems to continue despite the Muslim-Croat peace accord would be Hasan and Zejna Ljevano, a couple thrown out of their apartment on the Neretva's west bank July 7.

More confused than shocked, the Ljevnos, both 58, told their grimly familiar story in a local police station.

Two young men in uniform came to their flat, took a good look around, shoved them into a car and drove them to the truce line at the river. They had to run to the Muslim side across a bridge over a dam with guns pointed at their backs.

"It was all over in a half hour," said Zejna.

Ten months of relentless Croat bombardment killed 1,700 of the 50,000-odd people crammed into the medieval Ottoman warrens of east Mostar. The survivors are still deprived of running water and electricity.

The new federal state granted wide autonomy to a number of ethnically based cantons and a confederal link with Croatia for economic purposes, especially access to the sea.

But Mostar was excluded from the cantonal system because the two sides could not agree on power-sharing in the city of 120,000, which Croats wanted as capital of their own mini-state.

Instead, Mostar was made a European Union protectorate for two years. But the new EU administrator has delayed his arrival, objecting to the sway of Croat mafia in west Mostar and the reluctance of both sides to demilitarize the city.

U.S. Congressman Frank McCloskey visited the city on July 8 after reports of further ethnic abuses and mediated talks on how to proceed with the peace process. He warned that a revival of ethnic violence could shatter the federation's prospects.

"If these criminals are not brought to justice and arrested and tried, the basic hopes for the Bosnian-Croatian alliance will rot at the core of it," McCloskey told reporters.

He appealed to the federation's Croat president, Kresimir Zubak, to reinforce law and order in the Croat part of the town as a priority for Croat-Muslim reconciliation.

"The names of these people (preying on Muslims) are well known and there are plenty of witnesses, so I assume the authorities on the west side would follow up," McCloskey said.

Police in the Bosnian government east of the city have gathered evidence of abuses to which Muslims living in or traveling through western Herzegovina have been exposed.

The local security chief of Kosnian government police, who asked not to be named, said his force had forensic proof of at least six murders of Muslims during May and June alone.

Some victims were found floating in the Neretva. Some of the bodies were exchanged, and for some of the killings there are eyewitness reports. There is circumstantial evidence that another 16 Muslims were murdered, he said.

Bosnian police said even in cases where the perpetrators were identified, Croat police failed to launch investigations and take legal action on various pretexts.

"They say they don't have enough people in the civil police to clamp down on crime," a police source said. "But we think these groups are connected with the political leadership."

Zubak, who replaced rightist hardliner Mate Boban earlier this year as leader of Bosnian Croats, insisted that cases cited by McCloskey were isolated incidents typical of a postwar period which should not block Croat-Muslim normalization.

"We want to undertake all measures on territory under our control so the security situation reaches a higher standard. But we don't have enough people to undertake that task," Zubak said after his first visit to eastern Mostar.

Even those who do not doubt Zubak's determination to re-impose civil order and repair the image of Croats in the West concede that he faces a steep uphill challenge.

"Zubak (from central Bosnia) lacks a power base in Herzegovina. He does not count for much here, unless outside factors, including the EU, give him more weight," said a Western observer.

An important task in Mostar will be to ensure repatriation of refugees. But that will not be easy in a region where ethnic cleansing was not a mere by-product but the very goal of war.

REUTERS

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25c

In Bosnian Towns, No War—but No Peace—Between Muslims and Croats

By John Penderel
 Washington Post Foreign Service

PIROTA, Bosnia—Finka and Ivo Bosniak got a rude surprise when they returned home last month to this mostly Muslim region after more than a year of roaming from village to village as refugees in Croatia. The top floor of their three-story house was occupied by Muslim newlyweds, the bottom by a Muslim family of six.

The couple upstairs, refugees from Serb "ethnic cleansing" in Banja Luka to the north, had appropriated their refrigerator. The family below, tossed out of their home by Croat guerrillas in Vitez to the east, had soaked their pass and pass. The kids were picking their overripe grapes and plums, driving Finka to distraction.

The Bosniaks, an elderly Croat couple, had nowhere else to go, so they moved back into their home, occupying the middle floor. Last week the local Muslim authorities gave the Bosniaks until Sunday to get out of town—a violation of the peace agreement between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats that the United States brokered last spring.

The Bosniaks refuse to go. "They'll have to cut our throats," said Finka. "Maybe that's what they want."

The daily soap opera that unfolds in house No. 80 in this hillside village just south of the central Bosnian city of Travnik is an example of how the Muslim-Croat pact remains largely unimplemented four months after the Clinton administration negotiated it. The U.S. initiative ended what had been a year of warfare between Bosnia's Croats and Muslims—but failed to bring any real reconciliation.

The Bosniaks' once trim white house by a gurgling brook provides a metaphor for Bosnia. Unable to find enough space to live separately, the peoples of this mountainous land are doomed to live as one.

The Croat-Muslim coexistence here in central Bosnia is bitter. In the Bosniaks' house, each day is disrupted by arguments over cutlery, a gusty rooster, grapes, loud children and blaring rock music.

And if anything, peacemaking between the Croats and Muslims has been easier than can be the current international effort to forge a peace between them and Bosnia's Serbs. The plan, negotiated by the United States, Russia and major West European powers, was presented to the Muslim and Serb factions last week. On Wednesday they are supposed to present their response.

One of the lessons the Croat-Muslim accord has taught U.N. officials is that even with a deal, nothing is assured. In order for any peace plan to be carried out fully, U.N. officials in this region say, all the parties must be kept under continual pressure.

In central Bosnia, this is not happening.

In the months after the United States won the Muslim-Croat accord, its only major diplomatic success in Bosnia's 27-month-old war, the two groups have been left alone to

resume their shattered lives and reconstruct some semblance of trust following one of the most brutal chapters in Europe's bloodiest conflict since World War II.

The lightly armed U.N. force here has essentially been given the task of implementing the U.S. plan. But it has neither the military power nor the expertise to do so.

While the United States promised to help Muslims and Croats bring peace to the region, little has been done so far, according to U.S. diplomats. A plan to bring in teams from the U.S. Agency for International Development has yet to be realized because of

"Unless we engage more on the ground, this thing could collapse."

— a U.S. diplomat

concerns about safety, although this area has not seen any fighting since February. In the southwestern city of Mostar, the building of a bridge to reconnect the Muslim-controlled east bank with the Croat-held west has yet to be approved. U.N. officials say they have gotten suggestions that the United States might send teams specializing in conflict resolution to central Bosnia—but nothing has materialized.

"We certainly could use American logistical

support," said one high-ranking British officer. "But they've just left us to clean up their mess."

A U.S. diplomat in the region said Washington is apparently unaware of the problems in the Croat-Muslim accord.

"It's like we wound up a toy and a running by itself. No one seems to realize that we need to be more involved," the diplomat said. "Unless we engage more on the ground, this thing could collapse."

For example, since the Muslim-Croat agreement was reached in Washington in March, more than 3,500 Croats have left the north-central city of Zenica, partly because of anti-Croat propaganda. For their part, Croat gangs continue to force Muslims from their homes near Mostar.

Beginning this week, authorities in the predominantly Muslim town of Travnik began enforcing an astonishing new rule: The town's public kitchen, which kept thousands of needy people alive during the toughest times last winter, is no longer serving Croats.

Mustafa Indic, the president of the local Muslim charity, Nerhamet, justified his decision by saying that Croat forces to the south of Travnik won't let him leave the city to buy food in Croatia and bring it home.

"Why should we help these people if they won't let me help them?" he said.

Croat forces do block Muslims from traveling freely in their territory, even though the peace accord guarantees freedom of movement. When they do allow Muslims to move

they charge \$30 a head for "processing"—a huge fee in a country where the average salary hovers around \$2 a month.

At Travnik's Catholic church, the Rev. Pavlo Nikolic argues that Indic is wrong to take out his anger on the weakest members of the Croat community. In response, he has refused to charge any more aid from the Catholic charity Caritas to Indic's kitchen.

In an indication of just how badly the area needs negotiators, both sides requested a reporter to act as an interlocutor to work out the problem.

Back in Pirota, Finka sat uncomfortably with one of her unwelcome guests, Majda Uzeiragic, a 31-year-old mother of four who moved into the house last year when Croat gunmen chased her from her home near Vitez. Alternating between conciliation and stubbornness, Majda stared straight ahead, insisting: "But this is my land. Why can't you leave?"

The Uzeiragic wants to return to their three-bedroom apartment near Vitez, but a Croat family has occupied it and has been refusing to leave. Moreover, Majda still fears the threats one grandson made.

When the milkman barged into her home, Majda was pregnant. Pointing his gun at her stomach, he asked her the sex of her baby-to-be. Majda pleaded ignorance.

"If I knew it was a boy, I'd kill you now," Majda recalled him as saying. "Well, it was a boy. Do you think I should return?"

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