

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia 1994: Principals Committee 8/17 [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

1073

Row:

34

Section:

2

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3

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3

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. note	Note on the Draft Plan. (2 pages)	08/18/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Assistant Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject: August 23 Meeting. (2 pages)	08/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: Principals Committee 8/17 [5]

2013-0687-F

vz2636

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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20954

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 12, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security

AMB RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Representative
to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State


MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
August 10, 1994 (8)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (8)


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/22/2014
2013-0687 -F

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Declassify on: OADR

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20954

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 10, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:00-11:55am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIA

William Studeman
Ray Converse

OVP

Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

JCS

GEN John Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark

State

Secretary Warren Christopher
Ambassador John Kornblum
Ambassador Charles Redman

White House

Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

DOD

Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

USUN

Ambassador Albright

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions Issues

1. The U.S. should table an omnibus sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council encompassing sanctions tightening in the face of the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the Contact Group proposal, sanctions easing in the event of Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group proposal, and sanctions easing in the context of acceptance by Milosevic of international monitors to verify a permanent cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs. This may be the most effective way of gaining Russian support for sanctions-tightening provisions. The draft will be shown first to the Russians and then to other Contact Group partners prior to tabling in New York. Action: OVP to prepare draft UNSC resolution by as soon as possible. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

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2. On sanctions tightening, we should press the British on the one serious issue unresolved in August 9 bilateral negotiations, blocking access to FRY funds even for humanitarian purposes. Action: OVP and State to coordinate demarches to the British. (S)

3. On sanctions easing in the context of a Bosnia settlement, the five-stage approach in the OVP memorandum of August 9 was reaffirmed. The U.S. will hold firm in linking the third stage of sanctions suspension (strategic trade sanctions) to a *modus vivendi* in the Krajina; if the Russians continue to object, we will be prepared to limit the UN Security Council resolution to the first two stages of sanctions suspension, but we will maintain our position on the Krajina linkage. On cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal, we will not insist on an explicit linkage to any of the first four stages of sanctions easing, but make reintegration of Serbia into the world community (including IFI assistance) contingent upon progress with the Tribunal. Similarly, on compliance with all other relevant UNSC resolutions, we will include hortatory language but not draw any explicit linkages to the sanctions-easing program. (S)

4. On sanctions easing in response to a Milosevic cut-off of the Bosnian Serbs, international monitoring of the Serbian-Bosnian border is essential to verify Serbian performance, and sanctions relief can only be provided on that basis. The four-stage approach to sanctions easing in the OVP memorandum will be modified to raise the thresholds so that Milosevic would get no sanctions relief until the monitors were actually deployed. This revised plan will be integrated into the omnibus sanctions resolution cited above. Action: OVP and State to prepare revised sanctions-easing plan. (S)

Exclusion Zone Enforcement

5. Principals will continue to press their UK and other NATO counterparts on the need for further NATO air strikes in response to continuing Serb violations of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. Ambassador Albright will in parallel press the UN on the need for broader targeting of Serb assets than occurred on August 5 in response to future Serb violations. (S)

6. The U.S. should press for completion by the end of August of the planning for UNPROFOR redeployment/withdrawal that was agreed at the July 30 Contact Group Ministerial as the prerequisite to strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones. That planning should include the option of redeployment to Sarajevo as well as withdrawal. Action: JCS to follow-up. (S)

Macedonia

7. Planning should be completed on a concept for expanding UNPROFOR/Macedonia, but a decision is not needed at this time. Action: IWG complete options paper for future PC meeting. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20954

August 10, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, August 10, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held August 10, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *W* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/22/2014*

2013-0687-F

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Declassify on: OADR

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August 27, 1994

Note for Alexander Vershbow ✓
Kathy Stephens

The Joint Staff has provided the
attached as a heads up to an action they
are staffing with the CJCS.

My advice to them was to first determine
if OSD/JS wished to pursue, then get
interagency OK.... After reading the
MFR., I'd have to see the message we
were delivering before agreeing.

Don



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 5/22/2014

2013-0687 -F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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002. memo	For Assistant Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject: August 23 Meeting. (2 pages)	08/23/1994	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 1073

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2013-0687-F

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20981

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to
the United Nations

MR. MAX ROBINSON
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and the
Eastern Mediterranean, August 17, 1994 (8)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (8)


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/22/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 17, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
and the Eastern Mediterranean (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

OVP

Bill Wise

Rick Saunders

State

Secretary Warren Christopher

Peter Tarnoff

Charles Redman

John Kornblum

Charles Thomas

David Gergen

DOD

Secretary William Perry

Walter Slocombe

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Dave Scheffer

CIA

William Studeman

Norman Schindler

JCS

Admiral William Owens

LTG Wesley Clark

White House

Leon Panetta

George Stephanopoulos

OMB

Alice Rivlin

Gordon Adams

NSC

Donald Kerrick

Kathleen Stephens

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions:

- ✓ 1. The Principals agreed to continue to push for completion of the easing and tightening resolutions in New York and to continue to insist on Krajina linkage in the easing resolution. Secretary Christopher will consult with allies on options for moving forward with sanctions. (S)

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2. Regarding Milosevic's closure of his border with Bosnian Serb territory, the Principals agreed that an effective international monitoring system was essential if the UNSC were to be able to determine whether to extend the delay in imposition of new sanctions or to take other sanctions measures in response to Serbian enforcement of the embargo. (S)

one
clause
deleted
(R)

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

3. Principals agreed the goal in seeking a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on the Federation is to provide the Bosnians with a defensive capability to ensure the inherent right of self-defense. A detailed planning document developing a concept of how arms might be provided, and including a range of options, should be developed within two weeks time. Action: OSD and JCS to develop comprehensive plan. (S)

4. The U.S. should be prepared to provide air support, but not ground troops, to the Bosnian government in connection with the arms embargo lifting in the likely event of increased Bosnian Serb military action against the Federation. Planning should focus on the development of robust air options, including the use of air power for tactical, punitive, deterrent, or other purposes. Planning should include options for responses to Bosnian Serb action against the eastern enclaves, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and elsewhere. Scenarios considered should include: 1) air options following complete UNPROFOR withdrawal, and 2) air strike options within the context of a remaining, reconfigured UNPROFOR presence following lift. Planning should assume action in the NATO context, or within a coalition of willing allies. Action: OSD and JCS. (S)

5. On the future of UNPROFOR, Principals agreed to review options for a new role for UNPROFOR. The options should include at a minimum, a defense of Sarajevo model, and a humanitarian aid escort mission through Federation territory. Once the options are developed and reviewed by the Principals, they will be presented to the allies. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options. (S)

6. The U.S. will seek multilateral support for the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. NATO should remain engaged as we move toward a more robust use of air power. Action: State develop a paper outlining a diplomatic and Congressional strategy for achieving these objectives, including options for sustaining the negotiating track. (S)

The Eastern Mediterranean:

7. A Presidential emissary to both Greece and Turkey should deliver a strong message to each country warning that recent incidents, and the overall increase in Greek-Turkish military tensions, risk leading to serious erosion of U.S. support for both countries. The envoy's message should be specific, with sticks and carrots for each country. Action: State to draft concept and talking points. (S)

8. The new U.S. Special Coordinator for Cyprus should be identified and announced as soon as possible. It should be someone perceived by all sides as impartial. Action: State to recommend candidates. (S)

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9. On Macedonia, the previously tasked study of reinforcing UNPROFOR there should be completed, concurrent with the completion of the arms embargo lift paper. Further attention is required to economic assistance to Macedonia as well. Action: OSD and JCS to develop options for UNPROFOR-Macedonia reinforcement planning by end of August. State to develop options for increased economic assistance. (C)

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