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Folder Title:

Bosnia 1994: Principals Committee 8/10 [4]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: UNPROFOR Assessments. (3 pages)	08/11/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Milosevic, Sanctions, and the Border Monitor Issue. (1 page)	08/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: Principals Committee 8/10 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2631

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~

20891

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 1, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National Security

AMB RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State


MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
July 27, 1994 (8)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (8)


for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 5/22/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: July 27, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:22am - 12:10pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIADirector James Woolsey
Norman SchindlerOVP

Leon Fuerth

JCSGEN John Shalikashvili
LTG Michael Ryan
LTG Wesley ClarkStateSecretary Warren Christopher
David Gergen
Peter Tarnoff
Ambassador Charles RedmanWhite HouseLeon Panetta
Samuel Berger
Nancy SoderbergDODSecretary William Perry
Walter SlocombeNSC

Don Kerrick

USUN

Ambassador Albright

Summary of Conclusions

1. Secretary Christopher will seek Contact Group Ministers' support at the July 30 meeting for the full range of consequences: sanctions tightening, and extension and enforcement of exclusion zones. Recognizing Contact Group consensus on all measures is unlikely, Secretary Christopher will insist on strict enforcement of existing zones and support urgent planning for extension of exclusion zones to other safe areas, which could be implemented in phases. There can be no extension without agreement to strictly enforce existing zones. A strong marker will be laid down that if there are no agreed serious consequences, we will move sooner rather than later to seek multilaterally lifting the arms embargo, and failing that, there will be irresistible pressures to lift unilaterally. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

RZ 5/5/2014

2010-533-M

2. Leon Fuerth will develop a strategy to increase high-level U.S. pressure on the British to accede to our view concerning tightening of economic sanctions, specifically dealing with closing down offshore "FRY" enterprises. (S)
3. Leon Fuerth and Ambassador Redman will spearhead an effort to urgently develop a strategy to separate Milosevic from the Bosnian Serbs. (S)
4. In view of recent Bosnian Serb provocations, the Principals agreed to press for implementation of existing NATO decisions on enforcement of exclusion zones. (S)
5. The IWG will urgently examine two scenarios for lifting the arms embargo: (1) with no follow-on U.S. requirement to support the Bosnian Government; and (2) with a presumption that external support will be required. The analysis will include a review of UNPROFOR with a view to the creation of an UNPROFOR II with appropriate mandates. (S)

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20891

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(DK)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, July 27, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the
Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 27, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/22/14*
2013-087-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BOSNIA PRESS GUIDANCE

Q: Is the Administration cutting a deal with the Congress to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government?

A: We have always favored lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government, since it deprives the victim of aggression of the ability to defend itself.

At the same time, we have made clear that, if current efforts to negotiate a political settlement fail and the arms embargo is lifted, we would like it to be done multilaterally.

The Contact Group initiative provides the basis for a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo if the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the proposed territorial solution.

We have agreed with our partners in the Contact Group that other forms of pressure should be attempted first in order to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept the map. At their July 30 meeting in Geneva, Contact Group Ministers moved forward with that strategy, agreeing to tighten economic sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro and to complete the necessary military planning for strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones.

But the Ministers also declared that UN Security Council action to lift the arms embargo could become unavoidable if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the Contact Group plan.

For our part, we have made clear that we will not allow this process to be strung out for much longer and that, if other forms of pressure prove ineffective, we will want to move this fall in the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo multilaterally.

Our consultations with the Congress on the DoD authorization are aimed at ensuring that Congressional action reinforces our diplomatic efforts to convince the Bosnian Serbs to settle, and to lift the arms embargo multilaterally if they remain intransigent.

We have also made clear to the Congress that, if the UN Security Council for some reason fails to adopt a resolution lifting the arms embargo, we will consult immediately with the Congress on possible further action on the arms embargo

Q: What is the U.S. view of UNPROFOR commander Rose's proposal for a demilitarized zone around Sarajevo?

A: The immediate priority in Sarajevo is for the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the terms of the exclusion zone and to end their blockade of humanitarian convoys to the city.

As for General Rose's proposal, we believe that any measure that could stabilize the situation around Sarajevo and alleviate the increasingly difficult humanitarian conditions there should be given serious consideration by the parties to the conflict.

August 9, 1994

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Communique of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers
in Geneva, 30 July 1994

The Foreign Ministers of Germany, Greece, and France and the European Union Commissioner for External Affairs (representing the Troika of the European Union), the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Secretary of State, together with the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, met in Geneva on 30 July.

In evaluating the responses of the Bosnian parties to the territorial proposal presented to them on 6 July by the Contact Group, the Ministers underscored their firm belief that the principles for a settlement set forth in their communique of 13 May and the territorial proposal reviewed by the Ministers at their 5 July meeting in Geneva offer a reasonable and realistic basis for a settlement.

In this regard, the Ministers reaffirmed the importance of achieving a settlement that preserves Bosnia and Herzegovina as a union within its internationally recognized borders, while providing for constitutional arrangements that establish the relationship between the Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities. They also expressed their firm view that the settlement should provide for refugees and displaced persons to have the possibility to return freely to their homes of origin.

The Ministers welcomed the Bosniac-Croat delegation's acceptance of the Contact Group proposal and urged the Bosnian government to maintain its commitment to this proposal and to a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Bosnia.

The Ministers expressed their profound regret that the Bosnian Serb delegation did not accept the Contact Group proposal. They called on the Bosnian Serb leadership to urgently reconsider their response and to provide a clear acceptance of the Contact Group proposal.

The Ministers emphasized that acceptance of the Contact Group proposal is the essential first step for achieving an equitable and balanced overall settlement covering all relevant issues, and that they are determined to use incentives and disincentives as agreed on 5 July to this end. In this regard, the Ministers reaffirmed that acceptance of the Contact Group proposal will bring important benefits for all parties.

Against this background, the Ministers:

- 1) Agreed that proposals will be put to the Security Council to extend sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and tighten enforcement of the existing sanctions regime. They agreed that a draft resolution to this effect should be submitted to the Security Council as soon as possible for early adoption.
- 2) Decided that, simultaneously, as agreed 5 July, a draft resolution concerning suspension of sanctions will be prepared, to be submitted to the Security Council immediately upon acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact Group map.
- 3) Underlined the need for vigorous action to prevent sanctions violations across borders, and agreed that international cooperation with the neighboring states should be developed to promote strict enforcement of the sanctions regime.
- 4) Called on all parties to respect the cease-fire, demanded an immediate end to attacks and provocations against UN personnel and the UN airlift operation, condemned in strongest terms the taking of UN personnel as hostages, and insisted that freedom of movement for UNPROFOR be respected.
- 5) Warned against any renewed effort to effect the strangulation of Sarajevo.
- 6) Expressed their commitment to strengthen the regime of safe areas and requested finalization of planning to permit strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones, including at each stage appropriate provision for the safety of UNPROFOR troops.

The Ministers reiterated that in the event of continuing rejection of the Contact Group proposal, as a last resort a decision in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo could become unavoidable. They also agreed that this would have consequences for the presence of UNPROFOR.

Noting the wider situation in the former Yugoslavia and the importance of addressing the fundamental causes of instability in the region, the Ministers urged mutual recognition between all states of the former Yugoslavia. They support the immediate resumption of talks between the Croatian government and local Serb authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas.

The Ministers will monitor the situation closely and agreed to continue their common effort to achieve a political settlement and, meanwhile, to prevent the conflict from spreading.

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