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Folder Title:

Bosnia 1994: Principals Committee 8/10 [3]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Reply to FM Kozyrev. (2 pages)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1)
002. letter	Russian Foreign Minister to Warren Christopher. [English Translation] (2 pages)	08/08/1994	P1/b(1)
003. letter	Russian Foreign Minister to Contact Group Members. [English Translation] (2 pages)	08/08/1994	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For the Secretary of State from Leon Fuerth. Subject: Encouraging a Split. (3 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9420883. (3 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. paper	Effects of Creating and Strictly Enforcing Exclusion Zones. (4 pages)	07/25/1994	P1/b(1)
005c. memo	For Distribution from Leon Fuerth. Subject: Principals Committee Meeting Agenda Item. (6 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Status of Planning for Extension and Strict Enforcement of Exclusion Zones. (3 pages)	08/05/1994	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: Bosnia: Completing Contact Group Agreed Planning. (2 pages)	08/05/1994	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: Message from the Secretary for Contact Group Foreign Ministers. (2 pages)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Russian Defense Minister Visits Bosnia. (1 page)	08/05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: Principals Committee 8/10 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2630

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. memo	For Members of the Military Committee from Chief French Military Mission. Subject: Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones. [NATO] (20 pages)	08/02/1994	P1/b(1)
010b. memo	For Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe from Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Sauville de la Presle. (3 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

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August 5, 1994

RE-ENERGIZING THE KRAJINA TALKS

Prior to Gorazde, the negotiating process on Krajina seemed to be on target. Milosevic was pressing Knin hard to compose its differences with Zagreb. On March 30 ICFY Representatives Eide and Ahrens, Ambassador Galbraith and Russian Ambassador Kerestiedianc brokered a comprehensive cease-fire agreement. A second phase of talks aimed at negotiating economic confidence-building measures had been planned, and it looked like both sides were serious about moving step-by-step toward a third phase involving a political settlement. All this changed in the wake of the Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde, which apparently convinced the Krajina Serbs they could stall with impunity until they could gauge the international response and the direction Bosnia peace talks were likely to take.

Although the Contact Group's efforts revived the negotiating process in Bosnia, talks on Krajina remain stalled. In July, however, Zagreb and Belgrade exchanged notes on furthering their dialogue, professing their commitment to talks on economic CBMs but setting no date for their resumption. The Serbs also recently signalled their interest in a Milosevic-Tudjman meeting, ostensibly to help move the process forward. But Tudjman has responded that there must be mutual recognition between Croatia and the "FRY" before a meeting with Milosevic can take place.

Developing Concrete Political Autonomy Proposals

As we make progress toward a Bosnia settlement, we need to be prepared to intensify our efforts to seriously address the Krajina problem. A Bosnia settlement would address many of the key issues that also need to be overcome concerning Krajina, i.e., mutual recognition, recognition of existing borders, and granting a special relationship for Serbs with Belgrade short of allowing a Greater Serbia. Since we might need to move quickly to capitalize on the momentum from a Bosnia deal, we should begin now to work to develop precise arrangements for meaningful autonomy for the Krajina Serbs. This will not only help us be prepared to move forward quickly when the opportunity arises, it will also underscore to Zagreb that we have not forgotten the Krajina, thus reducing pressures on the Croat leadership to seek to regain the UNPA's militarily.

In seeking to move the negotiating process sharply forward, we should consider adopting an approach similar to the one we are now pursuing in Bosnia. This would involve having the international community put together proposed agreements in the two key areas essential to an overall settlement-- confidence-building measures and a political settlement-- and then give the parties a consequences package of incentives and disincentives beyond what is already in place for Bosnia to induce them to accept them.

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Maintaining the Ad Hoc ICFY/U.S./Russia Negotiating Framework

To date, the Croatian leadership has been impressed with the U.S. role within the Contact Group, and believes that only the United States can act as an honest broker in the negotiations with Knin. Rather than hand this task to a new Contact Group, which would introduce complications about who should represent the EU, we should rely on the existing ICFY/U.S./Russia framework. This is a view shared by Ambassador Galbreath in a recent cable from Zagreb. So far, the Russians have played a constructive role in the Zagreb-Knin talks and could be instrumental in getting Belgrade to press the Krajina Serbs to arrive at a settlement. If necessary, the Contact Group could be brought in at a later date if deemed necessary to lend additional weight to this effort.

The ICFY team, which is scheduled to meet again during the last week in August, would be charged with developing proposals on the two tracks. Once agreed, the proposals could be discussed with the Croatian government prior to raising them with Knin. The Croats, specifically Tudjman, appear ready to accept --and in fact would welcome-- such an approach. We are already considering possible elements of a political settlement and could send the two constitutional experts who worked on the Federation agreement to Zagreb to assist the ICFY/U.S./Russia team.

Confidence-Building Measures/Incentives Package

Among the confidence-building measures likely to be included in an economic reintegration package are the reopening of road, rail, river, and air links; the restoration of energy and water facilities and supplies; the resumption of commercial trade activities; the restoration of post and telecommunications links; and the cessation of extraction and removal of oil and other natural resources from Sector East and other UNPAs without permission of the Croatian government.

If necessary, we could also follow the Bosnia precedent and develop an incentives and disincentives package to motivate the parties to accept the proposals. While Croatia is anxious to finalize an agreement, the Krajina Serbs are not. Milosevic remains the key to delivering the Krajina Serbs. There is good reason to believe he would be prepared to press forward with a Krajina settlement once a Bosnia settlement has been reached, particularly if credible sanctions remain linked to Krajina, as both we and the EU propose.

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JCS/PENTAGON

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

MSG NBR

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TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM John Klekas OFFICE/DESK OSD/ISA/EUR PHONE NBR 703-697-6026
SUBJECT 4000 troops for Macedonia: NSC tasker

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES 7

(INCLUDING COVER)

☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE

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REMARKS:

MARKS: This is still "draft", but Dr. Kruzel has cleared -- we're awaiting comments from many other offices -- will further distribute at the teleconference

WASHFAX COVER SHEET

WASHFAX OPERATOR (703) 695-2427

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DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY: JULY 30 GENEVA MINISTERIAL

The Communique

Our primary goal for the July 30 Geneva Ministerial should be to reach agreement on a Ministerial Communique announcing the phased imposition of consequences against the Bosnian Serbs. Contact Group Ministers need to commit themselves publicly to tighten sanctions against the Serbs, to extend and strictly enforce the exclusion zones, and to agree that lifting the arms embargo could become inevitable if the Bosnian Serbs continue in their refusal to accept the Contact Group map. This should include, at the very least, tasking NATO to take prompt action to extend the exclusion zones to the other safe areas.

Ministers should also welcome the unconditional Bosnian government acceptance of the map and express disappointment at Bosnian Serb rejection. Contact Group commitment to preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders should also be stressed.

Preparing for the Meeting

Although the Communique is the public manifestation of ministerial agreement, we will need to work hard in the run-up to the meeting, and probably in its aftermath as well, to ensure that the consequences package agreed to is as tough as we can possibly make it. This will not be easy, since both the Europeans and the Russians will probably become increasingly nervous at the prospect of bringing increasing pressure, particularly military pressure, to bear against the Serbs. An added complication is the Boutros Ghali letter stating that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn if any additional military steps against the Bosnian Serbs are implemented.

Taking a "No" for a "Yes But"

We may face pressure from the Russians and Europeans to give the Bosnian Serbs more time to change their minds, or even to agree to resume negotiations. Since we have already agreed with the Russians that we would use the July 30 meeting to present any recalcitrant party with a final deadline for accepting the map, we can agree to give the Serbs an additional week or ten days to do so, at which time the consequences package would begin to be implemented. Under no circumstances, however, should we agree to let the Serbs reopen negotiations.

Another possibility is that the Russians will succeed in convincing the Bosnian Serbs to take a more forthcoming position in the run-up to July 30. To satisfy us as a "yes" they would have to drop all their territorial reservations, as well as their linkages to extraneous issues. We need to make certain that this remains our bottom line, and that we do not permit further negotiations. The case will be more difficult if the Serbs whittle down their

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objections to the constitutional issue alone. In that case, we would face considerable pressure from both the Russians and the Europeans to provide assurances. Since the Contact Group has already done work in this area, we should be in a position to quickly table a proposal that does not prejudge key constitutional issues, such as partition.

Sanctions and the Russians

In our judgment, no amount of sanctions relief is likely to turn the Bosnian Serb "no" into a "yes." Nonetheless, the Russians have been intimating that unless we drop all sanctions linkages to Krajina and produce a draft UNSC resolution that would essentially lift all sanctions in return for full withdrawal, they might not be able to attend the July 30 meeting, much less agree to a robust consequences package against the Bosnian Serbs. Given the almost certain prospect of war over Krajina if we do not maintain some credible linkages, we cannot afford to give in to this Russian demand. The Russians and we have very similar interests in preventing new hostilities in Krajina, and we worked well together in brokering the Krajina cease-fire earlier this spring. We should play on this theme to win Moscow over to our position.

Our current position would suspend all sanctions against Serbia except those on strategic trade in return for full Bosnian Serb withdrawal to the territories allotted them in the Contact Group map. Strategic trade sanctions would be suspended in return for achievement of a modus vivendi in Krajina, including a cease-fire and confidence-building measures. Although strategic trade is a big-ticket item, we believe that Milosevic has the influence to deliver a modus vivendi in fairly short order. We need to continue to press this position with the Russians and hold firm to our key equities.

The Europeans and the Consequences Package

Tightening Sanctions

Although they very reluctantly agreed to the concept of disincentives for the Serbs, the British and the French do not like what they see when they look down the road to implementation. The British, in particular, do not like any aspect of the consequences package. They have refused to agree to a sanctions tightening resolution that would really shut down FRY offshore operations, since it would throw people working for FRY firms in Britain out of work. Although the UK successfully prevents the repatriation of profits from these firms, others do not, particularly the Cypriots, the Russians and the Greeks. Unless this loophole can be closed, any agreement to tighten sanctions will ring hollow.

Barriers to Strict Enforcement

Strict enforcement of the exclusion zones is an essential--and neuralgic--element of our strategy. The following considerations are in play. In order to implement strict enforcement, we must be prepared to address the following:

- o The UK, France and the UN tend to equate strict enforcement with the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the safe areas, and perhaps from Bosnia. This is the central issue.
- o Any NATO decision on strict enforcement will require full key allied support, and must be implemented in order to avoid damaging the Alliance.
- o The risks of doing nothing are now seen by many as less than the risk of implementing the disincentives.
- o Strict enforcement (even extension) will be widely seen as partisan, involving NATO on the Bosnian side. This is why Boutros Ghali apparently wants to pull UNPROFOR out prior to beginning extension.
- o Allied militaries and the UN have opposed going to strict enforcement.
- o UNPROFOR's withdrawal will mean the loss of ground observers, which will severely limit the effectiveness of air power.
- o Prior to a NATO decision on strict enforcement, we need assurances from UNPROFOR that they will approve the use of NATO air power. (Assuming UNPROFOR will still be there to perform an approval function.)

Implementing Strict Enforcement

Since movement to enforcement is generally understood to mean the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the enclaves (and perhaps from Bosnia), our Allies, the UN and the Russians are extremely reluctant to implement the military consequences. While never nailed down in the Contact Group, it was understood that tightening of sanctions and extension of the exclusion zones were "less difficult." A phased approach, such as the UK wants, makes sense as long as implementation is not overly lengthy. Strict enforcement would come later, and require a separate (and very difficult) NAC decision. The British seem less concerned about how strict enforcement would be staged, since they have made clear they would have removed their UNPROFOR forces before then. The French may harbor similar sentiments.

Since our Allies, Russia and the UN all want UNPROFOR to remain as long as possible, it is likely to prove very difficult for us to get the strict enforcement we are looking for regardless of what might be agreed to on paper. Sarajevo and Gorazde make clear that the British and French are not prepared to authorize that kind of

escalation when their forces are so vulnerably in harms way. Given this fundamental fact, if we need to move to enforcement we may be better off seeing them go sooner rather than later. This could make the transition to lifting the arms embargo easier, although the Russians might balk at taking action in the Security Council regardless of whether UNPROFOR has departed.

The same arguments would apply to Boutros Ghali's threat to pull out UNPROFOR prior to extension, although we would find ourselves looking at the lift option that much earlier. Although Contact Group partners might try to use Boutros Ghali's threat to delay action, if the Contact Group remains united and agrees to commence extending the exclusion zones by tasking the NAC to take the necessary steps, we can probably keep UNPROFOR in place through the extension phase.

Basic Principles on Strict Enforcement

Although it may be overly ambitious to think that we can agree on all the details of implementing the consequences package prior to July 30, we should at least lay down some fundamental principles and seek agreement to phased implementation of the disincentives package. This will give us time to work the Serbs, keep the pressure on the Russians, and give NATO and UNPROFOR time to refine planning and redeploy forces if needed.

- o The first principle should be that tightening sanctions and moving to extend the exclusion zones should begin simultaneously. Otherwise, we will look like we are stalling from the get-go and Congress will be right back at us with pressure for unilateral lift. This problem will only be compounded if we do not get a robust tightening package. The British want to extend the regime to one zone at a time; we should agree as long as they accept simultaneity. If the other Contact Group members balk, our fallback should be to press for as short a period as possible between the beginning of sanctions tightening and exclusion zone extension.
- o Our second principle should be that the entire extension stage should not be unduly prolonged, and should take about one month. The point here is the same. Taking more time will make it look like we are stalling and invite the same response.
- o In moving through extension and toward strict enforcement, we cannot avoid the consequences for UNPROFOR. Even prior to beginning to extend the exclusion zones, we should encourage UNPROFOR and other UN and civilian personnel to consolidate themselves as far as possible out of harm's way. Our third principle should be that time--perhaps a week, perhaps a bit more--should be set aside before beginning to extend the exclusion zones during which at-risk troops and civilians could move to places of relative safety. We should seriously consider recommending that UNMOs be called in and that UNPROFOR forces guarding weapons depots within the Sarajevo exclusion zone withdraw.

- o Given the likelihood that the British and French will want to lead a European exodus from UNPROFOR prior to commencement of strict enforcement, we should provide a stage of perhaps three weeks between the end of extension and the beginning of strict enforcement during which time they and anyone else who wishes could depart. In laying this down as our fourth principle, we should consider making the following points.
- o If the Europeans do depart and UNPROFOR unravels we should ensure that this is perceived not as a rout or setback, but as a necessary step to set the stage for more robust military action, up to and including lifting the arms embargo. If UNPROFOR remains, however, we must insist that UNPROFOR agrees that in those new circumstances the dual key arrangement will not be used to thwart genuine implementation of strict enforcement. This should be our fifth principle. We cannot afford a situation in which NATO reconfirms its intent to enforce, and then is still blocked by the UN.
- o If UNPROFOR departs prior to strict enforcement, we should be prepared to move quickly to lift the arms embargo. This should be our sixth principle. Whether we move immediately to this stage should depend in large part on whether the Bosnian Serbs took advantage of the departure to take over the eastern enclaves, close the noose around Sarajevo or otherwise terminate the humanitarian relief effort through areas under their control. Although we would presumably respond with air power to such provocations, there would be no reason to delay seeking to rearm the Bosnian government. Assuming the Serbs did not engage in provocations, then we should begin the process of building support for multi-lateral lifting as the final element of pressure on the Serbs.
- o Assuming that Bosnian Serb actions do not precipitate immediate movement to lift, the process of implementing strict enforcement in each of the zones should not be unduly delayed. Although we could agree to progressive strict enforcement, beginning perhaps with Sarajevo and Gorazde and then moving on to the others, the entire process should not take any longer than one month to complete. The reasons here are the same as for the extension stage. This should be our seventh principle.
- o Given past Bosnian Serb behavior, there is good reason to believe that they will respond sooner rather than later to a ministerial decision to implement the consequences package against them. They have already managed to shut down Sarajevo airport in a show of displeasure. Such relatively minor behavior could easily escalate out of control, with hostages taken prior to consolidation, the humanitarian relief effort through Serb territories shut down, and perhaps UNPROFOR forces themselves directly attacked. We need to frame these possibilities for the other Contact Group members and seek agreement that in such a situation we would need to respond

quickly and decisively, including rapidly moving through the extension and strict enforcement, directly to lifting the embargo. This should be our eighth principle. We should also explore whether a prudent warning from all or some of the members of the Contact Group of the military consequences of such behavior is advisable.

Although we should seek agreement to as many of the above principles as possible, other Contact Group members are unlikely to be willing to agree to all of them at this time. Nonetheless, pressing these principles forward will give the Europeans and the Russians a good idea of our own view of the situation and of our determination to follow through. At the very least, we need to produce ministerial agreement to ask the NAC to produce the requisite decision on extending the exclusion zones.

Lifting the Arms Embargo

At the July 5 ministerial, Secretary Christopher reminded ministers of Congressional efforts to unilaterally lift the arms embargo and made clear that we beat back these efforts--barely--only because a negotiating process was in train that would either produce a peace settlement or ultimately lead to multilateral lift. The Secretary made clear that if the Contact Group effort did not produce either result, pressure in the Congress would redouble and could prove overpowering.

At this key ministerial meeting, we need to make clear that the current Contact Group effort is the last best hope we have to produce peace through a negotiated settlement. In putting forward the consequences package the Contact Group has made use of all the leverage available to the international community. If the Bosnian Serbs do not accept peace on these terms, then the Contact Group has no choice but to implement the consequences against them. If the international community steps back from this effort, then it will have conceded victory to the Bosnian Serbs and accepted a precedent that can only have the gravest consequences for stability in the region.

Although the Secretary laid down a marker on July 5, we now need to go beyond this and make clear that we will not permit this to happen. We need to let them know that if the other members of the Contact Group waver and step back from vigorous implementation of the consequences package, including multilateral lift when the time comes, we will have no choice but to move together with the Congress to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, and to provide the Bosnian government with the arms and air support they would need to carry the conflict to the Bosnian Serbs.

ATTACHMENT: Paper on New Exclusion Zones and Strict Enforcement

July 25, 1994

NEW EXCLUSION ZONES AND STRICT ENFORCEMENT

The Contact Group agreed that if the Bosnian Serbs reject the proposed territorial settlement, NATO could impose Gorazde-type exclusion zones around the other safe areas -- Srebrenica, Zepa, Bihac and Tuzla. In addition, NATO could strictly enforce the exclusion zones (which would require that new instructions be given to UNPROFOR, to ensure that it approves the use of air power when NATO decides to strike).

Declaring new zones around established safe areas would require a NAC decision demanding that the Bosnian Serbs withdraw all their military personnel and weapons from around the other safe areas and prohibiting heavy weapon and ground attacks. If the Bosnian Serbs fail to comply, their military forces in proximity to the safe areas, including support facilities, would be subject, with UN approval, to NATO air strikes.

Timing: The NAC could declare new exclusion zones around the other safe areas and NATO could implement strict enforcement at once or in phases. Assuming that -- as the British and French want -- new exclusion zones are created first, followed by strict enforcement, we should press to have the time period during which the new exclusion zones are created made as short as possible; Bihac and Tuzla are the most difficult cases, given the array of forces in these areas. The "strict enforcement" decision should be taken shortly thereafter to maintain credibility. Enforcement may be phased in as well, beginning with Gorazde and Sarajevo.

Risks to UNPROFOR: The creation of new zones, and especially their strict enforcement, will be perceived by the Serbs as a UN/NATO intervention on the side of the Bosnian Government. As risk to its forces increases, UNPROFOR should:

- o redeploy from exposed positions (e.g. heavy weapons sites);
- o withdraw from the safe areas; or
- o withdraw completely from Bosnia.

NATO's Military Committee sees these steps as virtually undifferentiated, simply stages in a withdrawal process. UNPROFOR should be prepared to redeploy on short notice on the date that Contact Group Foreign Ministers give the Bosnian Serbs their final ultimatum on accepting the map. Isolated UNPROFOR units should be redeployed before that date. However, even if UNPROFOR redeploys from exposed positions, it would remain a lightly armed peacekeeping force not equipped for combat. These withdrawals would limit UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandate, including protection of humanitarian relief convoys and monitoring the safe areas and the heavy weapons collection sites around Sarajevo.

If we move to strict enforcement, the UK and France must take the lead to get UNPROFOR out of harm's way. The UN may offer some assistance but past experience suggests they will not

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move quickly. We may be asked to help support the withdrawal. In response to limited NATO bombing around Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs closed all convoy routes and stopped all ground and air delivery of humanitarian aid, took some UNPROFOR personnel hostage, confiscated UNPROFOR equipment and fired on NATO aircraft. We must be prepared for a similar -- or harsher -- reaction should NATO again use air power. The UK and the UN/SYG will insist on UNPROFOR withdrawal prior to strict enforcement. UNPROFOR troops in the Krajina present a difficult problem: withdrawal could help precipitate a Croat-Serb confrontation; staying puts ten thousand UNPROFOR troops at increased risk of Serb retaliation.

One partial way to address these problems would be to establish a time period of up to several weeks between the end of the extension period and the beginning of strict enforcement, during which time those UNPROFOR forces that wished to depart could do so. The remaining UNPROFOR forces could use the time to further consolidate around Sarajevo, and possibly in the interior cores of the other safe areas (the Turks have indicated a willingness to do this). We should be aware that most of the remaining forces are likely to be from Muslim countries -- Turkey, Malaysia -- and would be seen as staying to assist the Bosnian Government. In addition, without the logistical network set up by the UK and France, they would have difficulty maintaining their forces in Bosnia. A British and French withdrawal will result in the de facto end of UNPROFOR.

Moving to Strict Enforcement: We need assurances before deciding on strict enforcement that the UN/SYG is on board, and that UNPROFOR will approve the use of NATO air power. UNPROFOR, at the direction of the UN/SYG, should agree in advance that NATO can carry out strikes for a fixed period of time against Bosnian Serb forces and their support facilities. Our decision on strict enforcement should be:

- o transparent, and give the Serbs time to change their minds and sign on to the Contact Group proposals;
- o preceded by a warning to the Serbs by the Contact Group that attacks against UN/aid personnel or hostage taking will elicit an appropriate military response;
- o accompanied by UNPROFOR redeployment.

Other Bosnian Serb Reactions: Reacting either to new exclusion zones or strict enforcement, the Bosnian Serbs may step up military activity in areas not covered by the exclusion zones, such as Maglaj or Brcko. In order for NATO to respond directly, other than in defense of UNPROFOR, we would need a new Security Council resolution authorizing further NATO action (such as creating a new exclusion zone in the area of the offensive). The Serbs may also take hostages from among the many civilian UN and NGO humanitarian aid workers spread throughout Bosnia. If NATO plans to implement strict enforcement, and UNPROFOR is withdrawing, it would be prudent for aid workers to withdraw as well (at least from areas where the Serbs can take them hostage).

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. paper	Effects of Creating and Strictly Enforcing Exclusion Zones. (4 pages)	07/25/1994	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005c. memo	For Distribution from Leon Fuerth. Subject: Principals Committee Meeting Agenda Item. (6 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

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UNCLASSIFIED

Impact of Lifting Sanctions

If the UN were again to allow Serbia/Montenegro to import everything except for energy products and basic metals, it would give the "FRY" the ability to restore many of its heavy industries, particularly chemicals, textiles, electronics, transportation, and other heavy equipment.

Eventually, with the reopening of large factories, some workers returning to work, and trade resuming, Belgrade would no longer face the financial crunch or the potential for public unrest which has, at least to some limited degree, been prompting it to maintain diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group proposal.

- It is questionable whether Milosevic, even if offered sanctions relief, would be any more able to force Pale into accepting the Contact Group's plan.

Allowing the importation of energy-related equipment would allow Belgrade to repair and refurbish its electric power system which had fallen into severe disrepair over the past two years because of the lack of spare parts. The potential for the system to collapse during heavy winter usage was also a problem putting considerable pressure on Belgrade to get sanctions lifted. Also, the ability to import equipment and spare parts might allow Belgrade to stretch its domestic fuel supplies by adopting energy saving measures.

In addition, the ability to import or even transship some of those goods will improve the FRY's ability to smuggle the remaining prohibited items:

- Documents for energy-related equipment and motors can be used to disguise shipments of arms and other military imports.
- Belgrade will also attempt to bring in military vehicles and aircraft under the category that allows imports of civilian items. Likewise, it will try to import tires for military vehicles among civilian orders. UNSCR 820 kept military tires out by prohibiting all tires.
- The ability to import chemicals will allow greater numbers of rail tanker cars to cross the borders of the frontline states. Neither the SAM team nor local customs services currently inspect the contents of rail tankers, allowing Belgrade to import large quantities of fuel by rail from Thessaloniki and Bulgaria.

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS
OF ESCALATION

Kerrick

FYE
SV

SETTING:

At present UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced and war affected in Bosnia. The total of these categories in Croatia is 800,000.

At the moment, because many roads are open to commercial traffic because of the Federation Agreement, supply conditions in central Bosnia are favorable, enough so that the Red Cross and UNHCR were planning to reduce their food and assistance programs. UNHCR had already suspended most of its operations in Eastern Bosnia because of staff security concerns.

However an escalation in fighting would imperil the ability to maintain food and other forms of humanitarian aid at present levels, especially in the coming winter; at the same time, the number of casualties and displaced will increase. In many areas, deteriorating security conditions, especially if coupled with the dissolution of UNPROFOR, could lead to a full or partial reduction in personnel and programs by many relief agencies. Any change in security conditions should be reviewed carefully with UNHCR, to (A) determine their impact on UNHCR operations and (B) identify areas where alternative approaches to humanitarian programs, especially those involving cooperation between NATO/US and the agency, need to be developed.

HUMANITARIAN PLANNING:

EASTERN BOSNIA:

If Bosnian Serb forces overrun the eastern enclaves and other currently Muslim areas of eastern Bosnia, a major exodus of refugees headed for central Bosnia or other areas thought to be "safe" would probably ensue. This would call for expanded shelter and food programs, either by the US/NATO, the UNHCR, or all three. An expansion of ethnic cleansing and reprisals against the former enclaves is probable. UNHCR currently estimates the number of its (mostly Muslim) beneficiaries in Eastern Bosnia at 472,000. UNHCR would presumably completely cease its operations in this area.

Escalation will increase Bosnian Serb efforts to strangle the city, whose perilous supply situation is already becoming evident. Given the physical and security conditions of the roads entering Sarajevo, the city would, even under current conditions, face important supply difficulties this winter. The resumption of shelling and the continuing closing of the airport and supply roads would presumably make the city untenable, with drastic political and humanitarian implications for Sarajevo's 400,000 residents. NATO/US actions to enforce exclusion zones and force open entry roads and the airport are indispensable to supplying and safeguarding Sarajevo.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL BOSNIA:

Unless fighting sweeps back and forth across the main highways leading from the coast to Tuzla and Zenica, these areas will be relatively well-off in humanitarian terms. The presence of Bosnian and Croatian forces, presumably on the offensive, would secure major routes against Serb attacks. However both the humanitarian situation and supply/logistical conditions for either NATO or US forces in Bosnia would be enhanced by US/NATO cooperation with the Federation in maintaining secure supply corridors into this area from Zagreb and the Dalmatian coast. Steps like these to maintain food supplies and other forms of humanitarian aid will also have the important political effect of supporting the Federation.

Keeping UNHCR, the Red Cross, IOM and other relief organizations active in unoccupied Bosnia should be an important element of our humanitarian strategy in the region. Even without new evacuees and casualties, UNHCR now assists 1.7 million beneficiaries in this region, a number which the US or NATO would presumably "inherit". Therefore steps which, by enhancing the security of UNHCR convoys or other operations, encourage UNHCR and other relief agencies to remain are therefore important to us.

This area will also be the most likely site for settlement camps for refugees and evacuees from the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo as well as treatment areas for the many additional military and civilian casualties who will be needing medical care.

PRM/ENSA: WBWhitman/x 33315

SEENSA 602

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Status of Planning for Extension and Strict Enforcement of Exclusion Zones. (3 pages)	08/05/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: Principals Committee 8/10 [3]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	re: Bosnia: Completing Contact Group Agreed Planning. (2 pages)	08/05/1994	P1/b(1)

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008. cable	re: Message from the Secretary for Contact Group Foreign Ministers. (2 pages)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	re: Russian Defense Minister Visits Bosnia. (1 page)	08/05/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. memo	For Members of the Military Committee from Chief French Military Mission. Subject: Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones. [NATO] (20 pages)	08/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010b. memo	For Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe from Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Sauville de la Presle. (3 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: Principals Committee 8/10 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2630

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
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