

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia 1994: December (Late) [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

1073

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

3

Position:

3

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Proposed Contact Group Statement. (2 pages)	12/18/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: ICFY: Apparent Breakthrough. (4 pages)	12/19/1994	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Contact Group: December 15 Meetings. (4 pages)	12/20/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. draft	Talking Points (for you and the President). (1 page)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. draft	Suggested Talking Points for the President with British PM Major. (1 page)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
005. paper	A Multilateral Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Bosnia. [CIA Act] [partial] (6 pages)	11/01/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: (Late) [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2624

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

ID:

21 DEC '94 19:08 No.009 P.01

For SANDY
Vershbow

456 - 9150

From Amb. Frasure

Press statement, Sarajevo, 20 December, 1994

Since arriving in the Balkans two days ago, we have had extensive discussions with the president of Croatia, the U.N. special representative, present and former members of the multi-national Contact Group, commanders of UNPROFOR, representatives of relief agencies and human rights groups, and the leaders of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs.

Mutual agreements have been reached between the warring parties as follows:

1. An implementation of a nationwide cease-fire within 72 hours, including monitoring by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation.
2. The commencement of negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 23, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 1, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.
3. The negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement, with [the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for :: negotiation of all points] [acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point]. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.
4. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.
5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.
6. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

ID:

21 DEC '94 19:12 No. 009 P.02

7. There will be an early exchange of all detainees under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have Unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

8. In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

ID:

UNITED NATIONS

21 DEC '94 19:15 No.009 P.03
NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

20 December 1994

Additional agreement to that of 19 Dec. 1994.

- 1) It is agreed that the negotiations to establish a total cessation of hostilities will commence on 23 December, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by 1 January 1995.
- 2) A complete ceasefire, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be implemented at noon, 23 December 1994, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities.
- 3) Based on assurances that convoys and humanitarian services will pass freely, the Bosnian ~~government~~ forces will withdraw from the ~~human~~ demilitarized zone in accordance with the existing agreement prior to commencement of the negotiations described in item (1) above.

Page 2m (signed)

W. signed.

Jimmy Carter

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease-fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for five months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

We agree that

we shall negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.

3. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at San Jose, in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may work with UNPROFOR inspectors to secure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

4. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

6. There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

7. In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

Signed 19 December 1994

Radovan Karadzic

Ratko Mladic

Jimmy Carter
Witness

Results of Former President Carter's Meeting
with Bosnian Serb Leaders

- Former President Carter has phoned the White House with a preliminary report on the results of his meetings today with the Bosnian Serb leaders.
- We have been told that these meetings have led to a set of proposals regarding a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and resumption of negotiations on a peace agreement.
- We have not seen the text of these proposals.
- We understand that President Carter will be meeting with Bosnian Government President Izetbegovic tomorrow morning to present these proposals.
- Our goal has been the achievement of a country-wide cessation of hostilities and the resumption of negotiations toward a political settlement on the basis of the Contact Group's proposal.
- If President Carter's efforts advance the parties toward an agreement on this basis, it would be an important step toward bringing an end to this tragic conflict.
- As we have said before, a solution to this conflict will only be found at the negotiating table. The Contact Group proposal provides the basis for a settlement that will preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina while providing a viable future for all its peoples.
- We will be consulting with the Bosnian Government and with our Contact Group partners.

**Contact Group Ministerial Text
December 2nd, 1994**

Ministers expressed very deep concern about the recent intensification of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly around Bihac. They were unanimous that the solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia can only be reached at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.

Ministers stressed that there must be a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, including an immediate ceasefire in and around the safe area of Bihac. The agreement on cessation of hostilities must include the separation of forces, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the interposition of UNPROFOR troops.

Ministers supported UNPROFOR efforts to pursue demilitarisation, particularly of the Bihac safe area and Sarajevo. They demanded immediate freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and for humanitarian supplies throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. They reconfirmed their full support for strict enforcement of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and decisions taken in pursuance of them.

Ministers agreed that UNPROFOR is performing a mission of great importance. It should continue provided that the risks do not become unacceptable.

Ministers reaffirmed their prior communiqués and the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina which must be accepted by all parties.

Ministers instructed the Contact Group to seek resumption of negotiations on this basis, to commence immediately after a ceasefire, particularly in and around the Bihac safe area, and a withdrawal of Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces from this safe area.

Ministers welcomed the economic agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Krajina Serb Authorities signed today and called for its early and full implementation. A modus vivendi will then have been achieved in the Krajinas. They urged the parties to negotiate constructively on the International plan for the UN protected areas of Croatia, once finalised, and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to support this process.

Ministers called for early mutual recognition between all states of the former Yugoslavia within their internationally recognised borders, which is key to the future stability of the region.

The territorial proposal of the Contact Group with its 51/49 parameter and its commitment to the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, remains the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal can be adjusted by mutual agreement between the parties. Constitutional arrangements agreeable to the parties will need to be drawn up which preserve the integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina and allow equitable and balanced arrangements for the Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities. The Contact Group will facilitate discussions between the parties looking toward a settlement.

~~SECRET~~

21486

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(R)*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 19, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held December 19, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/21/2014*
2013-0687-f

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

21486

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia December 19, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/21/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of ConclusionsMeeting of NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: December 19, 1994

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:10 - 1:15pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia (8)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Samuel Berger

CIA

Douglas MacEachin

Norman Schindler

OVP

Leon Fuerth

JCS

ADM. William Owens

LTG Daniel Christman

BG John Walsh

State

Strobe Talbott

Peter Tarnoff

Richard Holbrooke

UN

Rick Inderfurth

James O'Brien

DOD

John Deutch

Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Donald Kerrick

Bill Danvers

Summary of ConclusionsAdministration of Deputies Meetings

1. The Deputies convened in accordance with the direction of the December 12, 1994 Principals' Committee Meeting which asked the Deputies to meet regularly on Bosnia. The Deputies agreed to meet at least weekly with a goal of imposing discipline on the Interagency Bosnia policy-making process.

Negotiating Track

2. The Deputies discussed the progress of ongoing efforts to restart the negotiations under the auspices of the Contact Group and how the former President Carter initiative would affect those

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

12/5/2014

2010-0533-M

negotiations. The Deputies agreed that a common Administration position should be developed and followed by all agencies.

Action: NSC draft talking points for use with press and Congressional consultations.

Retaining and Strengthening UNPROFOR

3. The Deputies discussed the efforts underway at the meeting of the Chiefs of Defense at The Hague designed to strengthen and retain UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Noting the lack of enthusiasm on the part of most Allies for robust options, the Deputies agreed that we should continue our efforts to identify steps that will make UNPROFOR more viable in the performance of its existing mandate.

Build-Down Concept

4. The Deputies discussed the concept of build-down and recognized that, despite the difficulties of implementation, build-down was now a political reality and, therefore, required clear definition and integration into our strategy both pre- and post-UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action: OSD flesh out the build-down concept and identify where and how it fits into our near- and long-term strategy.

Sanctions

5. The Deputies discussed steps that have been taken in the run-up to the January 13, 1995 decision point on extending sanctions relief for the Serbian border closure. The Deputies agreed that the yet-to-be announced cut-off of the Krajina Serbs by Milosevic could be a positive step and could affect our action on January 13. The Deputies also agreed that steps must be taken within the interagency community to replace the U.S. border monitors now participating in the ICFY border monitoring mission. Action: OVP.

6. Leon Fuerth circulated a paper outlining a process to guide actions in the run-up to the January 13 decisions and reached an informal agreement that the Deputies Committee was the appropriate level for decisions regarding policy decisions on compliance. The Deputies agreed to consult further on this issue before reaching a decision. Action: OVP.

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

7. The Deputies ongoing efforts to raise the awareness in Congress and in the public about the implications of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. The Deputies directed that an interagency group be immediately established to oversee the development and implementation of a Congressional and public

affairs strategy. The group will meet daily and will be under the co-chairmanship of Bill Danvers, NSC Legislative Affairs, and a State Department Public Affairs representative. The group will develop a detailed Congressional and public affairs strategy including an interagency-agreed script and timetable. Action: NSC and State.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Proposed Contact Group Statement. (2 pages)	12/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: (Late) [3]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.
2. We agree that while the cessation of hostilities is in effect, we shall negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the contact group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.
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Signed 19 December 1994

Radovan Karadzic

Ratko (?) Mladic

Jimmy Carter
Witness

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SV
~~Your copy~~
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

DATE

12/16

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF SOUTH CENTRAL EUROPE (EUR/SCE)
FACSIMILE NUMBER (202) 647-0555

PLEASE
DELIVER TO:

DON KERRICK

FAX:

456-9150

FROM: CHRIS HILL - Director - EUR/SCE
Tel (202) 647-0608

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

REMARKS:

Per Request

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004b. draft	Suggested Talking Points for the President with British PM Major. (1 page)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)

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005. paper	A Multilateral Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Bosnia. [CIA Act] [partial] (6 pages)	11/01/1994	P3/b(3)

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(b)(3)

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National Intelligence Council

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

A Multilateral Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Bosnia: Political and Military Implications

(b)(3)

The Intelligence Community has differing views on whether the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would approve a resolution to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. Most Agencies believe that conditions demanded by UNSC members would be too far reaching and mutually incompatible to obtain agreement. Other Agencies judge that the UNSC would approve the action if the United States were willing to pay a substantial political, military, and economic price to obtain members' acquiescence. (b)(3)

Britain and France would want US military assistance to withdraw their forces from Bosnia, and once withdrawn, would place the onus on the United States for settling the conflict. Russia's many demands would include lifting economic sanctions against Serbia. (b)(3)

[005]

Multilateral lifting of the arms embargo would lead both sides to escalate the fighting. Sarajevo's war aims would escalate, and it would show correspondingly less interest in a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The Bosnian Serbs would go on the offensive to seize the eastern enclaves and other areas and would seek Krajina Serb cooperation for joint operations. Serbia would loosen its own embargo against the Bosnian Serbs unless granted substantial economic and political concessions and subjected to heavy pressure by Moscow. (b)(3)

Withdrawing UNPROFOR units would require US transport, air cover, and probably ground troops to cover their evacuation. Remaining UNPROFOR forces, consisting primarily of Muslim contingents, could not survive without continuing US military assistance. (b)(3)

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SE 94-4
November 1994
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE

Gaining UNSC Approval

The Intelligence Community has differing views on whether the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would approve a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia.¹

(b)(3)

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the National Intelligence Officers for Europe and for General Purpose Forces, National Intelligence Council, believe that conditions demanded by UNSC members to approve a resolution to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia would be so far reaching (relaxation of sanctions against Serbia) and incompatible (calls for the US military presence in Bosnia to be both expanded and minimized), that obtaining such an agreement is impossible. (b)(3)

The Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, judge that the UNSC would approve a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia if

¹ Previous NIC assessments on lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia include NIC 2765/94, "Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia" (13 May 1994); and SE 94-1, "Ending US Compliance with the Bosnian Arms Embargo: Military and Political Implications," (August 1994).

(b)(3)

Scope Note

This Special Estimate assesses the following questions: (1) Under what conditions would the UNSC be willing to lift the multilateral arms embargo against the Bosnian Government? (2) What are the political and military implications of such a move on the situation in Bosnia? This paper was requested at a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting held on 7 November. (b)(3)

the United States were willing to pay a substantial political, military, and economic price to obtain members' acquiescence.² (b)(3)

[005]

Britain and France do not believe that lifting the embargo would help end the war, but probably would want to avoid the open split with the United States that would follow their veto of a Security Council decision to do so:

- British and French acquiescence would depend on US agreement to support the withdrawal of their UNPROFOR units with transport, air cover, and ground forces for escort protection.
- Withdrawing UNPROFOR units would be obstructed by forces on both sides seeking to delay their departure and seize weapons.

(b)(3)

² The UNSC would require nine positive votes to lift the arms embargo and no veto of the resolution by any of the five permanent members. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

London and Paris also would seek to avoid specifying a fixed date for lifting the arms embargo until their UNPROFOR contingents had been safely extracted from Bosnia. Once their forces were out, Western Europe would put the onus on the United States for settling the conflict. Over the longer term, Europeans would increasingly question the US role in Europe, thereby affecting overall Alliance relations:

- If UK and French forces are withdrawn from Bosnia, other European UNPROFOR units also would pull out—they have said so and have been planning for such a withdrawal.

(b)(3)

Russia and Ukraine probably would withdraw their troops as well. Moscow would demand that all sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro be lifted as its price for acquiescence, but it probably would settle for lifting the economic embargo.³ Yelt'sin would also seek other concessions as his price for support, including assurances that the US military role in the Balkans would not increase and probably Western accommodation to a greater Russian peace-keeping role in the Caucasus. (b)(3)

In contrast, Turkey and Malaysia have said that their forces would remain—although it is unclear whether they would stay unilaterally or under UN aegis. We believe that Egyptian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi units also would opt

³ The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State, judges that domestic pressure in the Russian Parliament would force Yelt'sin to remove restrictions on arms for Serbia if the arms embargo on Bosnia were lifted and that no package of concessions could forestall a strong challenge to Yelt'sin from Russian nationalists if Moscow supported the UNSC resolution. (b)(3)

to remain. They would seek economic and logistic support for their units from other Islamic states and from the United States:

- The Turks, Egyptians, and Pakistanis also would seek US protection for their peace-keepers; the Saudis would press for just such a commitment.
- These Islamic military units would be incapable of performing UNPROFOR's missions without continuing UN and US support.

(b)(3)

If the Islamic countries remain under the UNPROFOR flag, even if augmented by a token non-Muslim force, the United Nations would be seen to have lost its last shred of neutrality; UNPROFOR would be perceived by the Serbs as a Muslim army helping the Bosnian Muslims. (b)(3)

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Regional Responses

The Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Serb intentions—consolidation of Serb-held territory and confederation with Serbia—remain unchanged, and they will not accept the Contact Group's plan as tabled:

- The Bosnian Serbs cannot win the war outright but believe that they can do enough damage that the international community would pressure the Bosnian Government to end hostilities. (b)(3)

However, offensives by Bosnian Government forces have stretched Bosnian Serb military capabilities, largely because of shortfalls in fuel and other logistic needs resulting from Serbia's embargo. Although Bosnian Serb military dominance is not as substantial as it was last May, enduring strategic advantages would permit the Bosnian Serb army to go on the offensive in weeks to months after a Security Council decision:

- The Bosnian Serb army would attempt to seize the eastern enclaves, pressure Sarajevo, and secure key lines of communications. Bosnian Serb leaders would also seek greater military cooperation with the Krajina Serbs for joint operations against the Bosnian Government. (b)(3)

The ultimate effectiveness of Bosnian Serb offensives would depend in large measure on Serbia's willingness to supply the fuel and munitions necessary for extensive, high-intensity combat operations:

- If Serbia tightens its embargo and the Bosnia-Croat federation holds, the strategic military balance will shift, compelling the Bosnian Serbs to make concessions. (b)(3)

Bosnia. Sarajevo remains committed to the reconstruction of Bosnia to its pre-civil war borders and would welcome a lifting of the arms embargo:

- Sarajevo's war aims would escalate if the arms embargo were lifted, and it would show correspondingly less interest in a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Instead, fighting

would escalate as the government sought a military victory that brought it substantially more territory than allocated in the Contact Group's plan. (b)(3)

Bosnian Government forces are more capable than they were earlier in the year, before outside arms began reaching them in large amounts. Bosnian Government gains are due to the infusion of light weapons and munitions and improved tactics and training. (b)(3)

The Bosnian Government also would seek heavy weapons—tanks and artillery—once the embargo were lifted. Obtaining these weapons—and the training essential to use them effectively—remains fundamental to ultimate Bosnian Government aims: rolling back Serb gains and seizing sufficient territory to block the linkage of Serb-held territory in eastern and western Bosnia via Brcko and the Posavina corridor:

- The Army would require less than the six months to one year of training and logistic support that we previously assessed was necessary to make effective use of tanks and large-caliber artillery in large-scale offensive operations. (b)(3)

Serbia. Belgrade would oppose any lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government. If the embargo were lifted and current economic sanctions against Belgrade remained in place, Serbia's enforcement of its embargo against the Bosnian Serbs would loosen. Milosevic probably would opt to do so covertly in order to maintain plausible denial. His price

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for maintaining the embargo would include significant reconstruction assistance, lifting of economic sanctions, support on resolving the Krajina dispute, and a general amnesty. Heavy Russian pressure on Belgrade also would be necessary. All agencies agree, however, that he would act to prevent the destruction of the Bosnian Serbs and could not stop small-scale violations of the embargo:

- Milosevic would walk a fine line—letting the Bosnian Serbs absorb considerable punishment—in order to get them to accept a deal.

(b)(3)

Croatia. The Croats would argue for lifting the embargo against Croatia but would acquiesce in a resolution that lifts it against only the Bosnian Government. They would expect to take a cut, as they now do, on all equipment being transported to Bosnian Government forces. The Croatian Government still would attempt to

limit the amount and type of equipment supplied to Bosnia that could present a long-term threat to Bosnian Croats:

- Croatia might use the opportunity to attack the Krajina Serbs. A major incident would reopen the war in Croatia, possibly involving Serbia. (b)(3)

[005]

This Special Estimate was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces and the National Intelligence Officer for Europe and was coordinated with the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps. (b)(3)

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