

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia 1994: December (Late) [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

1073

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

3

Position:

3

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. draft	Report on CHODS Meeting. (6 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Press Communique. (2 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Working Group on an Emergency. (4 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	Implications of FR/US Proposals. (3 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)
002. report	Bosnia: Informal Meeting of the CHODS in the Hague. [NATO] (5 pages)	12/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: (Late) [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2623

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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001b. draft	Press Communique. (2 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)

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001c. draft	Working Group on an Emergency. (4 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)

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PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE INFORMAL CHOD MEETING ON UNPROFOR

20 DECEMBER 1994, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS.

Following the Ministerial Defence Planning Committee on December 14th it was decided to convene an informal meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff from the NATO troop contributing countries, and non-troop contributing countries. Also invited were representatives from the Russian Federation, NATO, the UN Secretariat and the commander of UNPROFOR.

A number of military recommendations were formulated to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness. The discussions were positive and constructive, and the meeting reached consensus on all points.

The participants clearly reflected the unified resolve to continue UNPROFOR's mission in order to help alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in the conflict areas of the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the meeting recognized the important role UNPROFOR is playing in creating the conditions favourable to the eventual achievement of a negotiated political agreement. They also expressed their admiration for UNPROFOR's commanders and troops who are carrying out their difficult peacekeeping mission with great courage and determination.

The recommendations made ~~will now be~~ taken back to the respective capitals for their individual consideration and briefed to the UN and NATO. This afternoon the participating non-NATO troop

contributing countries were briefed on the results of this meeting.

The meeting considered a wide range of measures including the adequacy of principles and procedures, the sufficiency of means, and issues of organization, equipment and manning. Measures explored ranged from improvements in liaison parties to more effective actions within the limits of the existing mandate and authority. These proposals were assessed to determine their specific efficacy in meeting UNPROFOR's humanitarian purpose as well as their overall sustainability and practicability.

The meeting's specific recommendations cover various steps for improving the capabilities, effectiveness and the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and reducing its vulnerability. These include measures to:

- Enhance the effectiveness and self-defense capabilities of UNPROFOR. Examples include equipment, communications enhancements and the improvement of liaison between UNPROFOR and the warring parties. Additional capabilities were also discussed.
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to isolated areas
- Develop an emergency supply plan for Sarajevo and the enclaves

Finally, the meeting reaffirmed the crucial importance of maintaining UNPROFOR's impartial mission, and stressed the need to present UNPROFOR's achievements in a positive way.

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Bosnia**10/UNP****UNCLASSIFIED FAX**

ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE

URGENT

TEL. 647-0045

FAX: 647-0039

COVER • 2 PAGES**FROM:**

John W. Chamberlin

TO:

NSC - Don Kerrick/Sandy Vershbow - 456-9150

✓ NSC - ^{Randy Beers} Susan Rice - 456-9360

OSD - John Klekas - 703-695-6506

JCS - Balkans Unit - 703-697-0180

SUBJECT: Draft UNSC Pres letter to BBA**COMMENTS:** Council will meet at 10:30 Thursday -
so we need an ASAP turnaround

21 December 1994

4:25 p.m.

**DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

Excellency,

The Security Council has considered your report of 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389), presented pursuant to Security Council resolution 959 (1994). It is grateful to you for that report.

The Security Council reiterates that the safe area concept is designed to protect the civilian population. It is a temporary measure pending an overall political settlement. Its successful implementation requires the cooperation of the parties. It reiterates the importance it attaches to facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

The Security Council supports your efforts and those of UNPROFOR to stabilise the situation in and around the safe areas, and in particular in Bihać, and the efforts being made to strengthen UNPROFOR's effectiveness.

The Security Council is of the view that the precise circumstances of each of the safe areas differ, and that the modalities to be applied in them may consequently differ from case to case. It calls upon the parties and others concerned to examine with UNPROFOR, and without delay, confidence building measures in and around the safe areas. It encourages you and UNPROFOR to pursue the goal of demilitarisation of the safe areas through agreement with the parties and having due consideration to the resources required. It supports UNPROFOR's efforts to delineate the operational boundaries of the safe areas with the cooperation of the parties where possible, and requests that you report to the Security Council regularly on progress towards that end. The Security Council draws attention to the fact that in its relevant resolutions authorisation has been given to take all necessary measures to fulfill UNPROFOR's mandate in relation to the safe areas.

The Security Council condemns all restrictions on freedom of movement to, from and within the safe areas and demands that the parties and others concerned guarantee such freedom of movement to the local civilian population, to UNPROFOR and to humanitarian agencies. It stresses, in particular, the need for the

DEC-21-94 THU 16:14

10/UNP

FAX NO. 202 646 4179

P.03

SENT BY:

08:42

PM

*US MISSION

POLSEC

PO3

12-21-84 ; 17:08 ; SECURITY COUNCIL-

94154418;# 2/ 2

restoration of normal life to Sarajevo and for free access to and from the city by land and air and the free and unimpeded movement of people, goods and services in and around the city. The Security Council takes this opportunity to express its grave concern at restrictions recently imposed on UNPROFOR personnel by the Bosnian Serb party and insists that all such restrictions be lifted completely and permanently.

The Security Council calls for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and supports all efforts to achieve an overall settlement consistent with the Contact Group peace plan.

The Security Council requests you to keep it, as well as troop-contributing countries, informed of the progress of his efforts and those of UNPROFOR with regard to the stabilisation and improvement of the situation in the safe areas. It will continue its consideration of this matter on a priority basis, in the light of developments on the ground.

The President of the Security Council



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

POLICY PLANNING STAFF

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

Date Sent: 12/20/94Number of Pages: 3
(Excluding Cover Sheet)Time Sent: 7³⁰ pmS/P FAX #: 202-647-4147Verification #: 202-647-2972

TO:

NAME	AGENCY	PHONE #	FAX #
<u>Margie Sullivan</u>	<u>OSD (for Strombe et al)</u>	<u>703-693-0566</u>	<u>703-695-0864</u>
<u>Sandy Vershow</u>	<u>NSC</u>	<u>456-9157</u>	<u>456-9150</u>
<u>Wes Clarke</u>	<u>JCS</u>		<u>703-695-1807</u>
<u>Mark Geeran</u>	<u>White House</u>		<u>456-6423/6210</u>

FROM: JIM STEINBERGPHONE #: 456-2372SUBJECT: BOSNIA LEFT TAKING POINTSCOMMENTS: This draft incorporates as many of your comments as possible. I'd appreciate your final comments asap. Thanks.

Talking Points: Unilateral Lift Implications

I. Unilateral lift of the arms embargo would have severe, negative consequences for the United States and the region.

Unilateral lift would ultimately lead to:

- an escalation of Serb attacks on Bosnian positions, including Sarajevo and the enclaves, to preempt and prevent arms aid;
- a US responsibility to supply, protect and sustain Bosnia.
- increased pressure to deploy US ground troops in Bosnia because of U.S. responsibility for the conflict; this could easily exceed 100,000 troops, given the force levels of the various belligerent parties.
- a possible widening of the war to engulf the entire Balkans, including two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey);
- a significant increase in violence, and a dramatic deterioration in the humanitarian crisis with millions more refugees;
- a serious rift between the US and our Western allies, endangering NATO;
- a confrontation with Russia;
- an undermining of the authority of all UN Security Council Resolutions, including sanctions on Iraq, Libya, etc.

1. Growing Unilateral US responsibility for defending Bosnia

If the US lifts unilaterally, most UNPROFOR countries are likely to withdraw immediately, leaving at best a handful of Moslem peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs will likely launch all-out pre-emptive attacks before the Bosnian government can be supplied and trained. Even if the US launched massive airstrikes, the US would probably not have the support of NATO and might not have use of European bases (because lift was unilateral) and so would have to act alone. Airstrikes alone would probably not halt the Serb ground attack, particularly in view of the mountainous terrain, generally poor visibility, and lack of strategic targets. In response to airstrikes (or, indeed, to improved Bosnian government capability relative to the BSA), Serbia itself could intervene directly in support of the Bosnian Serbs, further endangering Bosnia's military situation.

Unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would create pressure for an open ended US operational commitment to Bosnia. In the face of the Bosnian government's likely defeat at the hands of the combined Serb forces, US prestige would be

on the line, and we would have a moral responsibility to consider sending US ground troops to rescue the Bosnian state. In any event, to make the lifting of the arms embargo more than an empty gesture, we would have to undertake a considerable arms supply and training effort. For that effort to be effective, we would likely require US trainers, advisers, and logistics support personnel in or near Bosnia.

2. Widening of the War.

The escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from the Krajina, thus spreading the war to Croatia. An all-out military confrontation between the US and Serbia as a result of US military support for the Bosnian government could precipitate a crisis in Kosovo, which has the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region, including a potential conflict between Greece and Turkey.

3. Damage to NATO.

Given most European powers' opposition to unilateral lift, they likely would refuse consent to allow NATO facilities to be used for US air and ground operations. This would, of course, severely hamper both air strikes and arms supply efforts.

More generally, the resulting rift would undermine the consensus behind NATO's unified military command, and deeply harm the political underpinnings of NATO.

4. Confrontation with Russia and undermining sanctions against Serbia.

Russia would not only oppose unilateral lift, but in response would unilaterally lift sanctions against Serbia, and might choose to arm Serbia and perhaps the Bosnian Serbs. This would put the US and Russia on a collision course, with the prospect of US troops being killed by Russian-supplied weapons.

Some of the states neighboring on Serbia, which have incurred heavy economic costs for support of the embargo, would almost certainly abandon the embargo on Serbia.

5. Undermining other UN sanctions regimes.

If the United States asserted the right to abrogate unilaterally the UNSC embargo resolutions, others would claim similar rights for other UNSC Resolutions (e.g., France and Russia on Iraq sanctions).

6. Expanding the Humanitarian Crisis.

Unilateral lift of the arms embargo would mean the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and could seriously hamper UNHCR efforts. The relatively few NGOs that would continue operating without UN protection and coordination would be unable to sustain the Bosnian population.

II. Multilateral lift would not pose the same risks.

Multilateral lift assumes the concurrence of France, Britain and Russia and a majority of other members of the Security Council.

-- Thus the dangers to the Western alliance and the US-Russian relationship could be avoided, the United States would not assume sole responsibility for the defense of the Bosnian government, and the unity among the Contact Group members/Perm 5 would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift.

-- With NATO's cooperation, airstrikes would be more effective; the allies might acquiesce in arming the Bosnian government; and with Russia's help, Serbia may be kept out of the war -- a critical factor in whether a lift and strike strategy would succeed.

-- For these reasons, the Administration continues to believe that multilateral lift remains an option, although not without risks and adverse consequences. (For the present, the Bosnian government does not seek lifting of the arms embargo.)

III. Complete disengagement would not serve US interests

Although unilateral lift is not in our interests, neither is complete disengagement.

-- We have a strong interest in preventing the war from spreading, in meeting humanitarian needs, in supporting (though not with ground troops) the efforts of our allies and friends in UNPROFOR, and seeking a negotiated agreement on the basis of the Contact Group plan that preserves Bosnia's territorial integrity.

IV. Reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, as launched by the Contact Group December 2 ministerial, is the best course.

-- neither side is capable of winning the war militarily;

-- only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting;

-- the international community continues to apply pressure through sanctions -- Milosevic's cut-off of the Bosnian Serbs demonstrates that sanctions can have an impact;

-- a unified Contact Group position on maintaining sanctions and insisting on the Contact Group plan, which includes a commitment to Bosnia's territorial integrity, combined with the border closures, is increasing pressure on Karadzic, improving the chances for a negotiated solution;

-- although there is no guarantee that this renewed effort will produce immediate success, it is the only realistic approach to a durable solution.

ID:

UNITED NATIONS

21 DEC '94 19:15 No.009 P.03
NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

20 December 1994

Additional agreement to that of 19 Dec. 1994.

- 1) It is agreed that the negotiations to establish a total cessation of hostilities will commence on 23 December, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by 1 January 1995.
- 2) A complete ceasefire, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be implemented at noon, 23 December 1994, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities.
- 3) Based on assurances that convoys and humanitarian services will pass freely, the Bosnian ~~government~~ forces will withdraw from the ~~Osman~~ demilitarized zone in accordance with the existing agreement prior to commencement of the negotiations described in item (1) above.

Page 1 of 1

Witnessed.

Jimmy Carter

ID:

21 DEC '94 19:08 No.009 P.01

For SANDY
Verzhboz

456 - 9150

From Amb. Frasure

Press statement, Sarajevo, 20 December, 1994

Since arriving in the Balkans two days ago, we have had extensive discussions with the president of Croatia, the U.N. special representative, present and former members of the multi-national Contact Group, commanders of UNPROFOR, representatives of relief agencies and human rights groups, and the leaders of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs.

Mutual agreements have been reached between the warring parties as follows:

1. An implementation of a nationwide cease-fire within 72 hours, including monitoring by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation.
2. The commencement of negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 23, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 1, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.
3. The negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement, with [the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points] [acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point]. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.
4. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.
5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.
6. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

ID:

21 DEC '94 19:12 No. 009 P.02

7. There will be an early exchange of all detainees under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

8. In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE INFORMAL CHOD MEETING ON UNPROFOR

20 DECEMBER 1994, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS.

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The recommendations made ~~will now be taken~~ back to the respective capitals for their individual consideration and briefed to the UN and NATO. This afternoon the participating non-NATO troop

contributing countries were briefed on the results of this meeting.

The meeting considered a wide range of measures including the adequacy of principles and procedures, the sufficiency of means, and issues of organization, equipment and manning. Measures explored ranged from improvements in liaison parties to more effective actions within the limits of the existing mandate and authority. These proposals were assessed to ~~determine~~ their specific efficacy in meeting UNPROFOR's humanitarian purpose as well as their overall sustainability and practicability.

The meeting's specific recommendations cover various steps for improving the capabilities, effectiveness and the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and reducing its vulnerability. These include measures to:

- Enhance the effectiveness and self-defense capabilities of UNPROFOR. Examples include equipment, communications enhancements and the improvement of liaison between UNPROFOR and the warring parties. Additional capabilities were also discussed.
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to isolated areas
- ~~Develop~~ an emergency supply plan for Sarajevo and the enclaves

Finally, the meeting reaffirmed the crucial importance of maintaining UNPROFOR's impartial mission, and stressed the need to present UNPROFOR's achievements in a positive way.

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12/21/94

To President Bill Clinton

I returned to Frankfurt from Belgrade, Pale and Sarajevo, and want to give you a brief report on my trip. As you know, I went to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the invitation of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and with his assurance of willingness to make progress toward peace. My goals were limited: to assure the continued openness of the Sarajevo airport, a cessation of attacks by the Serbs against the city, and freedom of convoys to move with relief supplies. I also had a vague promise of a cease fire and some willingness to negotiate.

As the attitude of both sides became clearer, my efforts went beyond these goals to include a permanent nationwide cease-fire, the commitment of both sides to a total cessation of hostilities, the negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement with the proposal of the five-nation Contact Group as a basis, the honoring of human rights with access by international observers to assure compliance, the right of all persons to live in locations of their own choice, and the exchange of all prisoners of war and other detainees under supervision of the International Red Cross.

As you will see from the enclosed documents, which were signed by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and the political and military leaders of the Serbs, these goals were achieved. There are many uncertainties that remain, of course, but the military leaders in UNPROFOR are prepared to work closely with the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General to effectuate the cease-fire and permanent cessation of hostilities, beginning at noon on December 23rd. Ambassador Charles Thomas and the other members of the Contact Group are meeting today in Belgrade to plan how to follow up on the negotiations based on their peace proposal. I have offered the services of The Carter Center if they are needed, since we know the leaders well and believe we have their confidence.

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You can tell from the detailed agreements that the one notable difference between the two parties that I was not able to resolve in my two days of talks concerns language about the Contact Group's proposal. My effort was to gain acceptance of the language given to me by your representatives and the Contact Group. The Serbs agreed to this language, but I was not able to convince President Izetbegovic to accept the exact wording. In my opinion, however, his "acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point" is the practical equivalent. Ambassador Thomas is confident that the Bosnian officials will be willing to negotiate on a permanent peace despite this difference in wording.

Our Carter Center team received full support from U.S. officials, including invaluable transportation from Frankfurt to Zagreb and Belgrade. We are grateful for this, and also for your approval of our peace effort. If both sides are treated with firmness and respect, there is a good chance that permanent benefits can result from our trip. I should add that President Slobodan Milosevic is fully supportive of the peace process and will continue to use his maximum influence to help with its successful consummation.

I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those in the United States who would oppose this.

Best wishes for the holiday season.

Jimmy Carter

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21 December, 1994

To Br. Radovan Karadzic

I will always appreciate your contributions toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina by inviting me to your country and by your cooperation in our brief negotiations.

The U.N. officials will deliver to you a copy of the agreement signed by President Izetbegovic, so that you will see the minor differences between his position and your own. The language that you have accepted is that proposed by the Contact Group. His insistence on using the word "acceptance" is inconsequential, I believe, since he was willing to add "as a starting point."

I found President Milosevic fully supportive of these agreements and eager to help with the achievement of peace in your country. He made a strong point of the need for your parliament to approve the documents you have signed.


My report has already gone to President Bill Clinton and to Secretary-General Boutros Ghali. In them, I included the following paragraph:

"I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those who would oppose this."

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance to you. It is extremely important that nothing interrupt the path to peace that you have helped to initiate.

Best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely,



Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Immediately implement a cease-fire, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc., as described below.
2. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.
3. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group.

It is understood that there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

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There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

Signed 20 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic
President

Rasim Delic
Supreme Commander

Jimmy Carter
Witness

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12/21/94

To Secretary-General Boutros Ghali

I returned to Frankfurt from Belgrade, Pale and Sarajevo, and want to give you a brief report on my trip. As you know, I went to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the invitation of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and with his assurance of willingness to make progress toward peace. My goals were limited: to assure the continued openness of the Sarajevo airport, a cessation of attacks by the Serbs against the city, and freedom of convoys to move with relief supplies. I also had a vague promise of a cease-fire and some willingness to negotiate.

As the attitude of both sides became clearer, my efforts went beyond these goals to include a permanent nationwide cease-fire, the commitment of both sides to a total cessation of hostilities, the negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement with the proposal of the five nation Contact Group as a basis, the honoring of human rights with access by international observers to assure compliance, the right of all persons to live in locations of their own choice, and the exchange of all prisoners of war and other detainees under supervision of the International Red Cross.

As you will see from the enclosed documents, which were signed by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and the political and military leaders of the Serbs, these goals were achieved. There are many uncertainties that remain, of course, but the military leaders in UNPROFOR are prepared to work closely with the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General to effectuate the cease-fire and permanent cessation of hostilities, beginning at noon on December 23rd. Ambassador Charles Thomas and the other members of the Contact Group are meeting today in Belgrade to plan how to follow up on the negotiations based on their peace proposal. I have offered the services of The Carter Center if they are needed, since we know the leaders well and believe we have their confidence.

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
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You can tell from the detailed agreements that the one notable difference between the two parties that I was not able to resolve in my two days of talks concerns language about the Contact Group's proposal. My effort was to gain acceptance of the language given to me by the U.S. government officials and members of the Contact Group. The Serbs agreed to this language, but I was not able to convince President Izetbegovic to accept the exact wording. In my opinion, however, his "acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point" is the practical equivalent. Ambassador Thomas is confident that the Bosnian officials will be willing to negotiate on a permanent peace despite this difference in wording.

Our Carter Center team received full support from U.N. officials, including invaluable transportation from Zagreb to Sarajevo. We were especially impressed with the objectivity and dedication of Yusushi Akashi, Victor Andreiev, and Tony Banbury. We are grateful for this, and also for your approval of our peace effort. If both sides are treated with firmness and respect, there is a good chance that permanent benefits can result from our trip. I should add that President Slobodan Milosevic is fully supportive of the peace process and will continue to use his maximum influence to help with its successful consummation.

I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those who would oppose this.

Best wishes for the holiday season.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background.

12/21/94

To Secretary of State Warren Christopher

I returned to Frankfurt from Belgrade, Pale and Sarajevo, and want to give you a brief report on my trip. As you know, I went to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the invitation of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and with his assurance of willingness to make progress toward peace. My goals were limited: to assure the continued openness of the Sarajevo airport, a cessation of attacks by the Serbs against the city, and freedom of convoys to move with relief supplies. I also had a vague promise of a cease-fire and some willingness to negotiate.

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
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I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those in the United States who would oppose this.

Best wishes for the holiday season.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background.

Press statement, Sarajevo, 20 December, 1994

Since arriving in the Balkans two days ago, we have had extensive discussions with the president of Croatia, the U.N. special representative, present and former members of the multi-national Contact Group, commanders of UNPROFOR, representatives of relief agencies and human rights groups, and the leaders of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs.

Mutual agreements have been reached between the warring parties as follows:

1. An implementation of a nationwide cease-fire within 72 hours, including monitoring by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation.
2. The commencement of negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 23, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 1, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.
3. The negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement, with [the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points] [acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point]. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.
4. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.
5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

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6. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

7. There will be an early exchange of all detainees under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

8. In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

UNPROFOR

20 December 1994

Additional agreement to that of 19 Dec. 1994.

1) It is agreed that the negotiations to establish a total cessation of hostilities will commence on 23 December, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by 1 January 1995.

2) A complete ceasefire, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be implemented at noon, 23 December 1994, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities.

3) Belated assurance that convoys and humanitarian services will pass freely. The Bosnian ~~government~~ forces will withdraw from the Idman demilitarized zone in accordance with the existing agreement prior to commencement of the negotiations described in item (1) above.

Pagolu Bhumu

Witnessed

Jimmy Carter

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1996. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease-fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for ~~four~~ months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

We agree that
we shall 2. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.

3. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFIL inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

4. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

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
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6. There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this Agreement are fulfilled.


7. In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNHCR as appropriate.


Signed 19 December 1994



Radovan Karadzic



Ratko Mladic



Jimmy Carter
President

Results of Former President Carter's Talks
in Sarajevo and Pale

Background

Former President Carter has completed two days of talks with the Bosnian Government in Sarajevo and with Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale. In separate agreements with each of the parties, he has apparently secured agreement to an immediate country-wide ceasefire to begin on Friday, December 23, and the initiation of negotiations on a four-month cessation of hostilities, to be completed by January 1. The parties also agreed, in conjunction with a cessation of hostilities, to resume negotiations on a peace settlement based on the Contact Group proposal, but with differences over how to formulate this point (the Bosnians want "acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point"; the Serbs want "the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points").

This falls short of a bilateral agreement between the parties. The next steps are for the parties to abide by their commitment to a ceasefire, for the UN to oversee negotiations on the cessation of hostilities, and for the Contact Group then to resolve differences regarding the status of the Contact Group proposal and to organize talks on a political settlement.

Karadzic has asserted that his agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group proposal was the result of some "new interpretation" of the proposal by the U.S. whereby "everything" is negotiable. This is a deliberate misrepresentation.

Key Points

- Encouraged by news that former President Carter reportedly gained the parties' agreement to an immediate ceasefire throughout Bosnia, and that he may have brought them closer to agreement on a four-month cessation of hostilities and resumption of peace negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group's proposal.
- Don't have all the details, and clearly there are issues that still have to be worked out between the parties.
- We will be working with our Contact Group partners, the United Nations, and the Bosnian Government in the coming days to follow up.

- As we have said before, a solution to this conflict will only be found at the negotiating table. The Contact Group proposal provides the best basis for a settlement that will provide a viable future for all of Bosnia's peoples.

Contingency Points

(Why have you turned over U.S. diplomacy to former President Carter?)

- President Carter was on a private mission, in response to an initiative from the Bosnian Serbs.
- While I was and remain skeptical of the Bosnian Serbs' intentions, I did not object to President Carter making the trip in the hope that it could help get negotiations re-started on the basis of the Contact Group proposal.
- We briefed President Carter before the trip to help him understand the complexities of the conflict and the fundamentals of Contact Group proposal.
- We appreciate his efforts. We and our Contact Group partners will be working to nail down agreements on a cessation of hostilities and renewed negotiations in the coming days.

(If asked whether the U.S. changed or reinterpreted the Contact Group proposal in order to gain Bosnian Serb agreement to use it as the basis for negotiations?)

- The Contact Group proposal has not changed, nor has the U.S. put forward a new interpretation.
- When the proposal was presented to the parties in July, it was made clear that constitutional arrangements would have to be negotiated by the parties following agreement on the map.
- Moreover, while Contact Group members made clear that they would not renegotiate the map with any of the parties, the parties themselves could work out mutually agreed amendments.
- What remains non-negotiable is that a political settlement based must preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its existing borders.

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