

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia 1994: December (Late) [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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1073

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34

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V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 23, 1994. Record ID: 9421498. (4 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 23, 1994. Record ID: 9421496. (1 page)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	re: Bosian President Karadzic. (2 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)
001d. presentation	Incomplete copy of Nunn-Mitchell Amendment. (3 pages)	11/30/1994	P1/b(1)
001e. cable	re: Report to Capitals of Informal CHODS Meeting. (5 pages)	12/20/1994	P1/b(1)
001f. draft	Working Group on a Framework for a Plan. (2 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)
001g. draft	Working Group on a Framework for an Emergency. (2 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421481. (6 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)
003. memo	For Strobe Talbott, John Deutch, Leon Fuerth, et al. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421473. (2 pages)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)
004. paper	U.S. Proposals for Strengthening UNPROFOR. [NATO] (6 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
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2013-0687-F

vz2622

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001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 23, 1994. Record ID: 9421496. (1 page)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)

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COMPREHENSIVE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The undersigned representatives agree as follows:

1. There shall be a general cease-fire along all lines of confrontation which will take effect at 1200 hours on 24 December 1994. The general cease-fire shall be for an initial period of seven days and four months and shall be subject to renewal by agreement of the parties.
2. Should any party breach the terms of this agreement, and if such a breach is verified, UNPROFOR shall report such a breach of the terms of the agreement through the Secretary-General to the Security Council immediately. The parties shall be responsible for reporting breaches to each other and to UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR shall assess allegations of breaches, attempt to resolve them where possible, and make public the results of its assessment, as appropriate.
3. The parties shall enable the passage of UNPROFOR and humanitarian convoys as well as teams deployed for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire in accordance with the terms of this agreement and existing procedures. The parties commit themselves to the full respect for the safety and security of UNPROFOR, humanitarian and related personnel.
4. The parties agree to protect the human rights of those persons residing within territory under their control in accordance with international standards, to include international humanitarian law. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. The human rights situation in all areas shall be subject to international monitoring and observation.
5. The parties agree to the prompt and unconditional release of all detainees, to include prisoners of war, and the release of all available information on missing persons, each to be carried out in its own right. ICRC will elaborate, in conjunction with the parties, a plan of action to implement this portion of the agreement.
6. Negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities agreement

DELETED
BY
BOSNIAN
GOVT.

for a period of no less than four months shall commence immediately after this agreement takes effect, with the intention of concluding the cessation of hostilities agreement by 1 January 1995. During the negotiations the Commanders of the parties in conflict will meet under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR to determine the military arrangements for the implementation of a cessation of all combat activities along all lines of confrontation.

23 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic

Radovan Karadzic

Rasim Dolic

Ratko Mladic

Witnessed by:

Yasushi Akashi

Rortand de La Presle

21-DEC-1994 17:42

FROM EASTERN AFFAIRS UNIT

071 200 3421

21-DEC-1994 19:25

FROM BRITISH RESIDENCE

TO

9-9940712703631

The Contact Group welcomes the agreement by the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to a ceasefire and a four-month cessation of hostilities throughout the country which has been facilitated by former President Carter.

The Contact Group is ready for early negotiations under its auspices leading to a comprehensive peace settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as two conditions are fulfilled.

1. When the Assembly is Pale, in the light of the outcome of the visit of former president Carter, confirms the readiness of the Bosnian Serb party to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point, and so informs the Contact Group.

2. When UNPROFOR informs the Contact Group that the ceasefire is in effect, and agreement on cessation of hostilities throughout BiH has been reached (sic)

William Ehaman

Akachi suggested
the attached addition.
I think it makes
sense

Charlie

Bob Frasure

This is the Milosevic
proposal to hijack the
Carter process and bypass
Karadzic. I think it has
some merit.

Charlie

FROM : GENERAL

TO :

202 647 0967

1994.12-22

11:00AM #202 P.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

It is understood that Republic of Srpska will resume negotiations under following circumstances:

1. Republic of Srpska shall be treated equally as Moslem-Croatian Federation under the Washington accord with respect to legal status and current international economic sanctions against the Serbian peoples.

2. Permanent cessation of hostilities with interposition of U.N. forces at confrontation lines.

3. Resumption of Final Peace negotiations in _____ with the Contact Group proposal as the basis for negotiation of all points, in full cooperation with the Contact Group.

4. Republic of Srpska agrees that all parties shall abide by all applicable international standards for human rights.

5. Final settlement would take into account the following:

a) viability of the two states in possible confederation with each other;

b) roughly equal distribution of natural resources and infrastructure;

c) natural and defensible frontiers;

d) transformation of Sarajevo into two cities;

e) access to the sea for the Republic of Srpska;

f) lifting of the United Nations and Yugoslavian economic sanctions against Serbian peoples during negotiations.

6. In a final settlement all has to be agreed. If all is not agreed, nothing is agreed.

Jimmy Carter

Carter did not sign

Sarajevo-Pale, 12.1994.

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001c. cable	re: Bosian President Karadzic. (2 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)

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Legislative Strategy for Equipping UNPROFOR

Background: The SECDEF has committed to offer the UN a package of equipment to reinforce UNPROFOR as the initial U.S. response to the list of militarily feasible proposals and required resources outlined at the CHOD meeting on December 20, 1994.

What needs to be done: key leaders from both parties and both chambers of Congress need to be called in the next several days to explain the rationale of this decision and gain their understanding and support.

Talking Points:

- *The decision to offer this equipment package to the UN is based on a firm belief that we need to get the ball rolling on re-invigorating UNPROFOR and that this action on our part will precipitate equally quick responses from our allies. We realize that this will not solve all of UNPROFOR's problems, but it is a step in the right direction.*
- *Funding is a critical issue. Our package offered calls for a combination of lease and drawdown funding arrangements that we believe fairly distributes the burden. About \$21M of the total cost of \$36M is through the UN leasing the equipment.*
- *Let me re-assure you that providing this equipment does not detract from the readiness of our forces.*

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001e. cable	re: Report to Capitals of Informal CHODS Meeting. (5 pages)	12/20/1994	P1/b(1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

9957

December 21, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER.

FROM:

UCO *UCAF*
BILL DANVERS/JOHNATHAN SPALTER

SUBJECT:

Bosnia Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs
Strategies.

We have attached (Tab I) a legislative strategy for Bosnia, as well as a public affairs strategy (Tab II). In addition, we have included as part of this package a "brief" for the Hill (Tab III) and a calendar of diplomatic events (Tab IV) over the next few weeks. All of these pieces have been vetted interagency.

Obviously, we will have to adjust the various pieces according to events, but this should give you a good idea of how we would like to proceed.

We will let Pat Griffin know what we are planning on the legislative affairs strategy. We will also keep in close touch with him regarding setting up specific Hill meetings, particularly if it involves the leadership.

Pending Pat's concurrence on the legislative plan, we will begin the process of implementing our various plans immediately.

Concurrences by: Sandy Vershbow *V*

Attachment

Tab I Legislative strategy
Tab II Public affairs strategy
Tab III Briefing script
Tab IV Diplomatic schedule

BOSNIA LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

Dec. 20-

Jan. 3

JCS calls to big eight, Levin, Lieberman, McCain and Cohen on Hague meeting, as appropriate.

Set up meetings/briefings for early January with SASC, SFRC, HASC and HIRC, as well as both Intelligence Committees.

Set up targeted Perry/Shali meetings with Dole, Lieberman, Gingrich, Cohen, Levin, Hyde, Berman, McCain, Gilman.

Perry calls to Nunn and Warner asking them how we can best work this issue with the Senate.

Christopher call to Gephardt and Daschle about how to work this issue in the House.

Dick Erdman staff briefing on sanctions monitoring.

Set up national security briefings in the House and Senate for new members working with bipartisan leadership in the House and Republicans in the Senate, emphasizing Bosnia, Haiti, Korea, peacekeeping and other key foreign policy hot spots.

Work with bipartisan leadership in House and Senate to set up a small group briefing on our Bosnia policy, emphasizing perils of unilateral lift.

Establish briefing teams-- DoD, JCS, State and CIA-- for January meetings/briefings.

Jan. 3

Dress rehearsal for briefings.

Jan. 4-

Feb. 3

Senate and House briefings/meetings

Jan. 3-10

Amb. Galbraith individual meetings with target group, others as needed.

Jan. 9-13

Calls, staff briefings on Jan. 13 Bosnia sanctions roll-over and U.S. views, Carter initiative as appropriate.

Jan. 11-13

Amb. Harriman individual meetings with target group, others as needed (requested).

Jan. 16-17

British Foreign Secretary Hurd in Washington, meetings with target group.

Jan. 24-

Feb. 2 Adm. Crowe meetings with target group, other
Members as needed.

Jan. 26-27 French FM Juppe in Washington, meetings with
target group.

January-

February Meetings by Ambs. Bartholomew, Hunter with
target group, others as needed.

(Contact Group meetings continue throughout this period. To the extent any significant developments, staff/member calls will be made whenever they occur. State/NSC/OSD leg will have daily press guidance to brief individual staffers in response to any inquiries.)

We should also explore the possibility of closed briefings with SFRC, HIRC, SASC and HASC with Hurd, Crowe and Juppe in addition to possible targeted meetings.

BOSNIA PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY

OPPOSING UNILATERAL LIFT LEGISLATION

Objective:

- To influence Congressional votes on unilateral lift.
- To limit the intrusion of Bosnia on the Administration's other objectives.

ACTIVITIES AND TIMING

In conjunction with public and legislative affairs offices at State and Defense, we will be prepared to implement the following initiatives as circumstances on the Hill, within NATO, and in the Balkans require. Because the strategy is calibrated to influence Congressional votes, we must avoid spotlighting the issue prematurely.

Major Markets

- OPED ONE. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili joint byline op-ed focusing on the US military and troop commitments required by a unilateral lift, and their policy implications. Can be placed Washington Post and various regional and international papers through the Los Angeles Times Syndicate. Fully cleared draft nlt January 5, 1995.
- PUNDIT PUSH. As legislative circumstances warrant, Ambassador Albright, National Security Adviser Lake, Secretaries Christopher Perry separately background leading pundits/columnists/news analysts.
- INTERVIEW BLITZ. In the week preceding Secretary Christopher's departure for his European meeting with Kozyrev, seek four to six satellite local television interviews in which unilateral lift will be a primary subject. Timing: week of January 9, 1995.

Regional Markets

- OPED ONE. Solicit and place op-ed for signature by one or two retired flags who will meet with the President on January 23. (Truly, Woerner, Perry Smith, etc.)
- OPED TWO. Solicit and place supportive Congressional opeds in appropriate regional papers.

-- OPED THREE. Solicit Bernard Rogers and John Galvin joint oped on unilateral lift to reach selected papers in individual Congressional Districts if a legislative vehicle emerges on which a vote might occur. Draft provided nlt January 10, 1995.

-- TALK RADIO. Identify markets for talk radio that will maximize pressure on swing votes. When unilateral lift emerges, deploy sub-Cabinet officials for targetted regional markets; Ambassador Crowe and Redman should be deployed, from abroad as needed. Timing, Week of January 16; markets and vehicles identified by January 6.

-- REGIONAL BACKGROUNDEERS. Sub-Cabinet officials begin background meetings with DC-based regional reporters (i.e. Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe, Cox, Knight Ridder, etc.) when legislative calendar warrants.

-- REGIONAL EDITORIAL BOARDS. Sub-Cabinet officials, (including Vershbow, Hunter, Slocombe, Hobbrooke, Nye, Wes Clark, Kruzel, Frasure, Kerrick et. al.) begin editorial board conference calls with various regional papers, targetted to markets in Congressional target group districts.

Talking Points: Unilateral Lift Implications

I. Unilateral lift of the arms embargo would have severe, negative consequences for the United States and the region.

Unilateral lift would ultimately lead to:

- 4 -- an escalation of Serb attacks on Bosnian positions, including Sarajevo and the enclaves, to preempt and prevent arms aid;
- 7 -- a US responsibility to supply, protect and sustain Bosnia.
- 8 -- increased pressure to deploy US ground troops in Bosnia because of U.S. responsibility for the conflict; this could easily exceed 100,000 troops, given the force levels of the various belligerent parties.
- 6 -- a possible widening of the war to engulf the entire Balkans, including two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey);
- 5 -- a significant increase in violence, and a dramatic deterioration in the humanitarian crisis with millions more refugees;
- 1 -- a serious rift between the US and our Western allies, endangering NATO;
- 2 -- a confrontation with Russia;
- 3 -- an undermining of the authority of all UN Security Council Resolutions, including sanctions on Iraq, Libya, etc.

1. Growing Unilateral US responsibility for defending Bosnia

If the US lifts unilaterally, most UNPROFOR countries are likely to withdraw immediately, leaving at best a handful of Moslem peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs will likely launch all-out pre-emptive attacks before the Bosnian government can be supplied and trained. Even if the US launched massive airstrikes, the US would probably not have the support of NATO and might not have use of European bases (because lift was unilateral) and so would have to act alone. Airstrikes alone would probably not halt the Serb ground attack, particularly in view of the mountainous terrain, generally poor visibility, and lack of strategic targets. In response to airstrikes (or,

indeed, to improved Bosnian government capability relative to the BSA), Serbia itself could intervene directly in support of the Bosnian Serbs, further endangering Bosnia's military situation.

Unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would create pressure for an open ended US operational commitment to Bosnia. In the face of the Bosnian government's likely defeat at the hands of the combined Serb forces, US prestige would be on the line, and we would have a moral responsibility to consider sending US ground troops to rescue the Bosnian state. In any event, to make the lifting of the arms embargo more than an empty gesture, we would have to undertake a considerable arms supply and training effort. For that effort to be effective, we would likely require US trainers, advisers, and logistics support personnel in or near Bosnia.

2. Widening of the War.

The escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from the Krajina, thus spreading the war to Croatia. An all-out military confrontation between the US and Serbia as a result of US military support for the Bosnian government could precipitate a crisis in Kosovo, which has the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region, including a potential conflict between Greece and Turkey.

3. Damage to NATO.

Given most European powers' opposition to unilateral lift, they likely would refuse consent to allow NATO facilities to be used for US air and ground operations. This would, of course, severely hamper both air strikes and arms supply efforts.

More generally, the resulting rift would undermine the consensus behind NATO's unified military command, and deeply harm the political underpinnings of NATO.

4. Confrontation with Russia and undermining sanctions against Serbia.

Russia would not only oppose unilateral lift, but in response would unilaterally lift sanctions against Serbia, and might choose to arm Serbia and perhaps the Bosnian Serbs. This would put the US and Russia on a collision course, with the prospect of US troops being killed by Russian-supplied weapons.

Some of the states neighboring on Serbia, which have incurred heavy economic costs for support of the embargo, would almost certainly abandon the embargo on Serbia.

5. Undermining other UN sanctions regimes.

If the United States asserted the right to abrogate unilaterally the UNSC embargo resolutions, others would claim similar rights for other UNSC Resolutions (e.g., France and Russia on Iraq sanctions).

6. Expanding the Humanitarian Crisis.

Unilateral lift of the arms embargo would mean the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and could seriously hamper UNHCR efforts. The relatively few NGOs that would continue operating without UN protection and coordination would be unable to sustain the Bosnian population.

II. Multilateral lift would not pose the same risks.

Multilateral lift assumes the concurrence of France, Britain and Russia and a majority of other members of the Security Council.

-- Thus the dangers to the Western alliance and the US-Russian relationship would be avoided, the United States would not assume sole responsibility for the defense of the Bosnian government, and the unity among the Contact Group members/Perm 5 would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift.

-- With NATO's cooperation, airstrikes would be more effective; the allies might acquiesce in arming the Bosnian government; and with Russia's help, Serbia may be kept out of the war -- a critical factor in whether a lift and strike strategy would succeed.

-- For these reasons, the Administration continues to believe that multilateral lift remains an option, although not without risks and adverse consequences. (For the present, the Bosnian government does not seek lifting of the arms embargo.)

III. Complete disengagement would not serve US interests

Although unilateral lift is not in our interests, neither is complete disengagement.

-- We have a strong interest in preventing the war from spreading, in meeting humanitarian needs, in supporting (though not with ground troops) the efforts of our allies and friends in UNPROFOR, and seeking a negotiated agreement

on the basis of the Contact Group plan that preserves Bosnia's territorial integrity.

IV. Reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, as launched by the Contact Group December 2 ministerial, is the best course.

- neither side is capable of winning the war militarily;

- only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting;

- the international community continues to apply pressure through sanctions -- Milosevic's cut-off of the Bosnian Serbs demonstrates that sanctions can have an impact;

- a unified Contact Group position on maintaining sanctions and insisting on the Contact Group plan, which includes a commitment to Bosnia's territorial integrity, combined with the border closures, is increasing pressure on Karadzic, improving the chances for a negotiated solution;

- although there is no guarantee that this renewed effort will produce immediate success, it is the only realistic approach to a durable solution.

IMPORTANT DATES FOR BOSNIA/BALKANS

- December 23: Ceasefire brokered by former President Carter to begin at noon. Talks to begin on Cessation of Hostilities.
- January 1: Talks aimed at arranging four-month Cessation of Hostilities to conclude. Negotiations on peace agreement to begin (time and place tbd).
- January 3: New Congress convenes.
- January 13: FRY sanctions suspension up for review at United Nations.
- March 18: First anniversary of Federation Agreement (Washington Accords).
(Note: possible Hill interest in CODELS to Sarajevo in conjunction with anniversary)
- March 31: UNPROFOR mandate up for renewal at United Nations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For Samuel Berger from Don Kerrick. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421481. (6 pages)	12/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: (Late) [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2622

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003. memo	For Strobe Talbott, John Deutch, Leon Fuerth, et al. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421473. (2 pages)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: (Late) [1]

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REINVIGORATED UNPROFOR PROPOSALS (revised)

FRENCH PROPOSALS.

- Secure the Sarajevo Airport. This idea is consistent with the current humanitarian mission. However, when considered previously, the idea was rejected because of the number of troops required to secure the Serb controlled approaches to the airport on a full-time basis. The French may have in mind something less ambitious than this.
- Secure a land route to Sarajevo. Consistent with current UNPROFOR mandate; most of the route is in Muslim/Croat control, but Serbs control the immediate access to Sarajevo and will oppose UN convoys and target the route; weather also an issue in some areas; and the troop requirement is unclear.
- Consolidate UNPROFOR in the central area. Provides economy of force and efficiency; if it means pulling out of the enclaves, creates the image of withdrawal and abandonment of the eastern enclaves; French seem to have in mind a less complete pull back, e.g., closing down the isolated weapons storage sites around Sarajevo, pulling back UNMO's.

OTHER OPTIONS (within existing mandate)

- Tougher convoy ROE. A variant of the "blue route" concept. Would force through Serb roadblocks, instead of negotiating. Problems are Serb counter-escalating, use of civilians to block convoys.
- Safe Area/EZ focus. Clearly define safe areas, create small exclusion zones and expand them. Deploy UNPROFOR more heavily in safe areas/EZs. Use military force to defend people in safe areas and the movement of humanitarian supplies to them. Option is impartial and within current mandate. Links easily to build-down. Difficult to coordinate, support and control dispersed units; requires a tactical reorientation and probably more troops.
- Central Based Rapid Reaction Force. Concentrate UNPROFOR in Sarajevo with a small presence in limited, designated safe areas. Create a viable mechanized and armor (consider attack helicopters) reaction force (Bn or Bde) configured for combat and located in Sarajevo to respond with ground combat power and air support to UN missions as required. UNPROFOR more defensible; restores UN initiative and gives combat capability to UN but requires new organizational structure, C3I, combat equipment and log support. May increase fighting.

- Secure Tuzla airport. Easier to secure than Sarajevo airport because it is deeper inside government area. However, it creates new opportunity for fighting, and Tuzla is remote from other areas requiring humanitarian support. Would also require redeployment of many UNPROFOR forces.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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004. paper	U.S. Proposals for Strengthening UNPROFOR. [NATO] (6 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 1073

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia 1994: (Late) [1]

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Build Down

Background: On September 30, 1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as worthy of serious consideration in his October 7, 1994, response. Nunn followed up with a second letter on December 1, 1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how it fits into our near and long-term strategy, and how it should be presented to our Allies.

Discussion:

The Concept: an alternative to lifting the embargo. The idea is to reduce weapons rather than increase those of the Bosnian Govt. Build down is designed to equalize the forces by eliminating all or most of the heavy weapons on both sides by either destroying them or removing them from B-H. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian conflict.

Build down should be a step-by-step process of demilitarization, beginning as an amplification of our current policy. Since force asymmetries exist, trades-off could include the dismantling of BSA heavy weapons in return for the demobilization of Bosnian Govt troops. Possible key provisions which can be inserted at any point in the negotiating process include:

- Demilitarized zones (DMZ) around Sarajevo and elsewhere;
- Demilitarized roads for humanitarian deliveries ("blue routes");
- More vigorous enforcement and/or extension of EZs;
- Cease-fire areas beyond the EZs with gradual extension into nation-wide DMZ.

Implementation: (Assumption--former President Carter has some success in getting the Bosnian Serbs to resume negotiations for a settlement to the conflict in good faith) Present build down to the UN, NATO, and the Contact Group (CG) for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the

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arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be pushed if the build down was not accepted by the warring parties.

Potential Problems: The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as UNPROFOR is deployed throughout B-H. Re-deployment of those forces to more defensible and less exposed positions could be married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift. Expanding EZs may require more forces. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

Recommendation: adopt build down as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument in favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective.

Bosnia Hill Strategy

Issue

We have to make certain that a very vocal group in the House and the Senate in favor of a lift and strike strategy for Bosnia are not able to pass legislation that would force unilateral lift on the Administration.

Despite all of our past briefings and outreach efforts, this group believes that our policy of seeking a diplomatic solution and multilateral lift does not work. For the past year they have been progressively introducing more and more restrictive legislation trying to force a unilateral lift. Thus far, we have been able to fight back their efforts, although the Nunn-Mitchell amendment, part of the FY 95 DoD authorization bill, forced us not to enforce the embargo and to prepare plans for a unilateral lift and arming the Bosnians.

Another problem we may have to confront at some point in the future is whether or not we should support or even seek an authorization for our participation in an NATO-led operation to get UNPROFOR troops out of Bosnia. While this will not become an issue until NATO makes a decision, we may want to do some initial soundings on the Hill during upcoming Bosnia briefings.

Hill Strategy

We need to get the story out as to why a unilateral lift is not a good idea. In addition, we must also explain, clearly, what our alternative strategy is.

We should use the next couple of weeks before Congress comes back into session to refine the arguments we want to make against unilateral lift and in support of our policy. We will, however, have an opportunity to brief members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Bosnia in a closed briefing on Friday, December 16. Peter Tarnoff will take the lead. He will be accompanied by representatives from DoD and JCS.

During the first week of January, we will begin a round of intense briefings on Bosnia. Three important issues we have to raise are: the problems of a unilateral lift, our alternative to lift and strike and our participation in a NATO-led operation to get UNPROFOR troops out of Bosnia.

The briefings should be closely coordinated with the new leadership, as well as the new committee chairmen and ranking

members. We will be more effective if we go committee by committee-- i.e. Armed Services, International Relations, Intelligence-- as opposed to offering one big briefing for the House and Senate. We should also make an effort to target every new Senator and the freshman members of the House Armed Services and International Relations Committees.

Between now and the beginning of January, we should form a State/DoD/JCS briefing team to present our case. It is crucial that DoD and JCS take the lead when discussing the problems of unilateral lift. We should also prepare a set of common talking points that lay out simply and clearly our policy and the case against unilateral lift. If at all possible we should have a dry run of the presentation we will make to the Hill during the next few weeks.

Once the initial round of briefings are held in January, we should have principals make calls to key members on Bosnia to gauge where they are. We should also consider bringing back to Washington Admiral Crowe, Peter Galbraith and other Ambassadors to meet with a select group of members in January.

It is particularly important that we remain in close touch with Senators Dole, Lieberman, Levin, Cohen, McCain, Nunn, Lugar, McConnell, Leahy, Biden and Kassebaum. In the House we should keep in contact with Representatives Gingrich, Gephardt, Bonior, Gilman, Hamilton, Murtha, Obey, and Livingston. They are key to any legislative action on unilateral lift. We should be under no illusions that we can defeat a resolution on a unilateral lift or that its proponents won't find a way to make it very difficult to veto a bill containing such language.

While a veto should always be an option, it should be used strategically, so that members do not feel they are getting a free ride in supporting a resolution calling for a unilateral lift because they know the legislation will be vetoed.

Public Affairs

There should be a coordinated Hill/public affairs campaign that helps us make the case on the perils of unilateral lift and explains why our policy is the right one. Articles, public statements, calls and meetings from individuals outside the government, like Colin Powell, in support of our policy would be of help with the general public and the Hill.

Between now and when Congress convenes in January, we should reach out to editorial boards across the nation on the problems

of unilateral lift. The public affairs people from DoD, State and the White House should coordinate this effort.

We recommend that the White House working with the NSC form an interagency public affairs/legislative strategy group to help shape our Bosnia strategy over the coming weeks. A similar group on Haiti group worked quite well.

Summary

Sen. Dole and others will likely force the issue of a unilateral lift on us sometime in January. We need to use the time between now and when Congress comes into session to mount a public affairs strategy on the perils of a unilateral lift.

When Congress convenes, we will begin an aggressive Hill briefing strategy to clearly state our policy and why we are against a unilateral lift. We will work through the leadership and key committees and will follow up with calls from principals. During this process we will take discreet soundings of how the Hill views our participation in a NATO-led operation to get UNPROFOR troops out of Bosnia, which will help us decide whether to support or possibly seek an authorization for our participation.

Obviously the outcome of the Carter mission could affect our approach to the Hill.

Talking Points: Unilateral Lift Implications

I. Unilateral lift of the arms embargo would have a number of severe and negative consequences for the United States and the region. Unilateral lift would ultimately lead to:

- increased pressure to deploy more than 100,000 US ground troops in Bosnia and U.S. responsibility for the conflict;

- a possible widening of war to engulf the entire Balkans, including two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey);

- a significant increase in violence. And a dramatic deterioration in the humanitarian crisis with millions more refugees;

- a serious rift between the US and our Western allies, endangering NATO;

- a direct confrontation with Russia;

- an undermining of the authority of all UN Security Resolutions, including sanctions on Iraq, Libya, etc.

1. If the US lifts unilaterally, most UNPROFOR countries are likely to withdraw immediately, leaving at best a handful of Moslem peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs will launch all out pre-emptive attacks, before the Bosnian government can be supplied and trained. Even if the US launched massive airstrikes, the US would not have the support of NATO (because lift was unilateral) and so would have to act alone. Airstrikes alone would not halt the Serb ground attack, particularly in view of the mountainous terrain and generally poor visibility, and, in response to airstrikes, Serbia itself would come to the aid of the Bosnian Serbs, raising the possibility of a U.S. war with Serbia. In the face of the Bosnian government's certain defeat at the hands of the combined Serb forces, the United States prestige would be on the line, and we would have a moral responsibility to send sufficient US ground troops (more than 100,000) to rescue the Bosnian state.

2. The escalation of fighting would draw in the Serbs from the Krajina, thus spreading the war to Croatia. With the all out military confrontation between the US and Serbia, Serbia would no longer have any reason to exercise restraint in Kosovo, thus risking the spread to Macedonia, which in turn would bring in Greece and Turkey.

3. Given France and Britain's opposition to unilateral lift, they likely would refuse consent to allow NATO facilities to be used for the US air and ground operations.

The resulting rift would undermine the consensus behind NATO's unified military command, and deeply harm the political underpinnings of NATO.

4. Russia would not only oppose unilateral lift, but in response would unilaterally lift sanctions against Serbia, and arm Serbia and perhaps the Bosnian Serbs. This would put the US and Russia on a direct military collision course, with the prospect of US troops being killed by Russian supplied weapons.

5. If the United States asserted the right to abrogate unilaterally the UNSC embargo resolutions, others would claim similar rights for other other UNSC Resolutions (e.g. France and Russia on Iraq sanctions).

II. Multilateral lift would not pose the same risks

Multilateral lift assumes the concurrence of France, Britain and Russia, all members of the Security Council. Thus the dangers to the Western alliance and the US-Russian relationship could be avoided, the United States would not assume sole responsibility for the defense of the Bosnian government, and the unity among the Contact Group members/Perm 5 would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift.

For these reasons, the Administration continues to believe that multilateral lift remains an option. For the present, the Bosnian government does not seek lifting of the arms embargo.

III. Complete disengagement would not serve US interests

Although unilateral lift is not in our interest, neither is complete disengagement. We have a strong interest in preventing the war from spreading, in meeting humanitarian needs, in supporting (though not with ground troops) the efforts of our allies and friends in UNPROFOR) and seeking (though not with ground troops) a negotiated agreement on the basis of the Contact Group plan that preserves Bosnia's territorial integrity.

IV. Reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, as launched by the Contact Group December 2 mininsterial, is the best course.

--neither side is capable of winning the war militarily

--only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting

--the international community continues to apply pressure through sanctions -- Milosevic's cut-off of

the Bosnian Serbs demonstrates that sanctions can have an impact.

--a unified Contact Group position on maintaining sanctions and insisting on the Contact Group plan, combined with the border closures, is increasing pressure on Karadzic, improving the chances for a negotiated solution.

--although there is no guarantee that this renewed effort will produce immediate success, it is the only realistic approach to a durable solution.

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