

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid-Nov. - Early Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC-12/23/1994 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Operations Center from Embassy Sarajevo. Subject: Cessation Talks. (5 pages)	12/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002. draft	Memo for the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Bosnia Update. Record ID: 9410009. (2 pages)	12/24/1994	P1/b(1)
003. report	Planning. (3 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	For Distribution from Lieutenant General Wesley Clark. Subject: Follow-up Actions to CHOD Meeting at the Hague. (7 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. cable	re: Response to Dutch Demarche. [NATO] (2 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)
004c. cable	re: Response to Dutch Demarche. [NATO] (2 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)
004d. cable	re: Dutch Demarche on Strengthening UNPROFOR. (1 page)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. Following the Cease-fire Agreement signed on 23 December 1994, the parties agree to a complete cessation of hostilities with effect from 1200 hours 1 January 1995 along all lines of confrontation. This agreement will be in effect for an initial period of four months, subject to renewal under these same conditions by agreement of the parties.
2. The cessation of hostilities will be supervised and monitored by UNPROFOR through the establishment of Joint Commissions. A Central Joint Commission shall be established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR, with initial meetings at the Sarajevo Airport, and Regional Joint Commissions shall also be established in permanent session as needed and as determined by the Central Joint Commission.
3. Liaison officers will be exchanged between UNPROFOR and the parties by 15 January 1995 and afterwards where deemed appropriate.
4. Cessation of hostilities will include the following measures:
 - a. Separation of forces in conflict to mutually agreed positions and the positioning of UNPROFOR forces for observation and monitoring, to include interpositioning.
 - b. The parties agree to refrain from the use of all explosive munitions, and the use of weapons used to fire explosive munitions. In addition, talks will begin immediately on the modalities for the withdrawal and monitoring by UNPROFOR of heavy weapons of calibre 12.7mm and above.
5. Full freedom of movement with appropriate procedures shall exist for UNPROFOR and other official international agencies, in particular UNHCR, in order to implement this agreement, to monitor human rights and to deliver humanitarian aid, including medical supplies and evacuations. The parties commit themselves to full

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respect for the safety and security of UNPROFOR and related personnel. UNPROFOR shall continue to prevent any abuse of freedom of movement by its personnel or convoys which might be of military benefit to either party.

6. The parties agree to comply immediately and fully with all existing agreements including the 5 June 1992 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 24 April 1993 Srebrenica Agreement, the 8 May 1993 Srebrenica and Zepa Agreement, the 14 August 1993 Mt Igman DMZ Agreement, the 9 February 1994 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 17 March 1994 Agreement regarding the use of civilian traffic across the Sarajevo Airport, the 23 April 1994 Gorazde Agreement and the 14 August 1994 Anti-Sniping Agreement.

7. The parties agree to assist fully in the total restoration of utilities and the establishment of joint economic activities aimed at the normalization of life in all territories, and in particular, in and around the Safe Areas. These activities shall be undertaken on a reciprocal basis.

8. The parties agree to work continuously and simultaneously on processes for the early release of persons detained in relation with the conflict, as well as for the provision and cross-checking of all available information on persons unaccounted for. This work will be undertaken under the auspices of the ICRC, in accordance with their standard procedures. The parties commit themselves to commencing the processes by 15 January 1995.

9. The parties agree to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the monitoring and observation of the withdrawal of all foreign troops. UNPROFOR will perform this specific task on the basis of this agreement with the parties to the conflict and in accordance with its obligations towards the relevant Security Council resolutions and statements.

10. This agreement is to be without prejudice to the final political or territorial solution.

31 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic

Radovan Karadzic

Rasim Delic

Ratko Mladic

Witnessed by:

Yasushi Akashi

Sir Michael Rose

SSN-5412

SSN-2835

CEN-1947

C25-1369

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

CODE / CRYPTO FAX

1/4

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1994

NUMBER: Z-2018

SUBJECT: Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities

A copy of the agreement signed today for a complete cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina is attached for your information.

Dr. Genic has undertaken to obtain the signatures of President Zubak and General Blaskic.

General Rose intends to convene the first meeting of the Central Joint Commission tomorrow.



SRSG

31 16 05

Out / 020
2225

UN
COM
94 DEC 31 21:40

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1
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04/020

1845 PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT ANY ABUSE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BY ITS PERSONNEL OR CONVOYS WHICH MIGHT BE OF MILITARY BENEFIT TO EITHER PARTY.

6. The parties agree to comply immediately and fully with all existing agreements including the 5 June 1992 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 24 April 1993 Srebrenica Agreement, the 8 May 1993 Srebrenica and Zepa Agreement, the 14 August 1993 Mt Igman DMZ Agreement, the 9 February 1994 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 17 March 1994 Agreement regarding the use of civilian traffic across the Sarajevo Airport, the 23 April 1994 Gorazde Agreement and the 14 August 1994 Anti-Sniping Agreement.

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
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021/020²


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
31 December 1994




Alija Izetbegović



Radovan Karadžić




Rasim Delić




Ratko Mladić

Witnessed by:



Yasushi Akashi



Sir Michael Rose

Out/020

CODE / CRYPTO FAX

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 24, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
SUBJECT: Bosnia Update for the President

Attached is your memorandum for the President updating him on Bosnia developments.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Text of ceasefire agreement

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 5/21/2014
2013-0687 -f

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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COMPREHENSIVE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The undersigned representatives agree as follows:

1. There shall be a general cease-fire along all lines of confrontation which will take effect at 1200 hours on 24 December 1994. The general cease-fire shall be for an initial period of seven days and four months and shall be subject to renewal by agreement of the parties.
2. Should any party breach the terms of this agreement, and if such a breach is verified, UNPROFOR shall report such a breach of the terms of the agreement through the Secretary-General to the Security Council immediately. The parties shall be responsible for reporting breaches to each other and to UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR shall assess allegations of breaches, attempt to resolve them where possible, and make public the results of its assessment, as appropriate.
3. The parties shall enable the passage of UNPROFOR and humanitarian convoys as well as teams deployed for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire in accordance with the terms of this agreement and existing procedures. The parties commit themselves to the full respect for the safety and security of UNPROFOR, humanitarian and related personnel.
4. The parties agree to protect the human rights of those persons residing within territory under their control in accordance with international standards, to include international humanitarian law. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. The human rights situation in all areas shall be subject to international monitoring and observation.
5. The parties agree to the prompt and unconditional release of all detainees, to include prisoners of war, and the release of all available information on missing persons, each to be carried out in its own right. ICRC will elaborate, in conjunction with the parties, a plan of action to implement this portion of the agreement.
6. Negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities agreement

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for a period of no less than four months shall commence immediately after this agreement takes effect, with the intention of concluding the cessation of hostilities agreement by 1 January 1995. During the negotiations the Commanders of the parties in conflict will meet under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR to determine the military arrangements for the implementation of a cessation of all combat activities along all lines of confrontation.

23 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic

Radovan Karadzic

Rasim Dolic

Ratko Mladic

Witnessed by:

Yasushi Akashi

Roderand de La Presle

COMPREHENSIVE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT


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
23 December 1994

Alija Izetbegović




Radovan Karadžić

Rasim Delić




Ratko Mladić

Witnessed by:



Yasushi Akashi



Bertrand de La Presle


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23 December 1994



Alija Izetbegovic


Radovan Karadzic


Rasim Delic

Ratko Mladic


Witnessed by:


Yasushi Akashi


Bertrand de La Presle

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

SV

Latest
Draft.

① 12/30

OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY

To:	Don Kerrick
Organization:	NSCEUR
Phone:	
Fax:	456-9150
From:	Hepler
Organization:	OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:	703-69
Fax:	703-695-6506
Date:	30 Dec 94
Pages including this cover page:	4

Comments:

Dr. Krugel changes
1ST iteration

Build Down

Background: On September 30, 1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as worthy of serious consideration in his October 7, 1994, response. Nunn followed up with a second letter on December 1, 1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how it fits into our near-term strategy (UNPROFOR remains as presently constituted) and longer-term strategy (after UNPROFOR withdrawal), and how it should be presented to our Allies and the warring parties.

Discussion:

The Concept: Build down is an alternative to lifting the embargo. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian conflict.

A build down of heavy weapons would be rejected by the BSA. It must therefore be expanded to include incentives for the BSA or threats that will compel them to accept an unfavorable arrangement. One incentive would be the demobilization of Bosnian Govt troops. The most obvious threat would be the lifting of the arms embargo, possibly coupled with air strikes.

Near Term Strategy (UNPROFOR remains)

--Begin by establishing small heavy weapons EZs (5 kilometer radii) in each of the safe areas of Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Bihac, in addition to the EZs at Sarajevo and Gorazde. Expand each of the six EZs at the rate of one kilometer every 30 days and monitor them with the deployment of UNPROFOR in a step-by-step process (*build down*);

--Establish one new EZ every 30 days;

--Collect all excluded weapons from the new and expanded zones and place them in UNPROFOR-monitored existing weapons storage facilities within 10 days (*build down and monitor*);

--Disable or destroy said weapons collected weapons within 30 days;

--At the 100 day point, broaden EZs into larger DMZs beginning with Sarajevo. If the concept works, expand at the rate of one EZ into a DMZ every 10 days. Objective is to establish a nation-wide DMZ within 180 days;

--If UNPROFOR monitoring is not adequate or build down is subsequently rejected by the warring parties within six months, then introduce at the UN a resolution for a partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo with carefully selected defensive arms. This may stem the Congressional call for unilateral lift and/or convince the belligerents that we really are serious. In any event, such action is likely to trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal (*build down and partial lift*).

Implementation: Present build down proposal to the UN, NATO, and the CG for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN, NATO, and the Congress the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where UNPROFOR monitoring reveals significant lack of compliance with build down. This idea would then be formalized into a formal UNSCR if build down were not accepted by the warring parties.

Potential Problems: The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with expanded monitoring of safe areas/EZs if UNPROFOR remains as currently configured. Re-deployment of current forces to more defensible and less exposed positions may be necessary. Expanding EZs may require more forces, new command and control arrangements, and augmented logistical capabilities. The Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

Longer Term Strategy (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal)

Background: UNPROFOR withdraws either due to unilateral lift passage or because there is general acceptance that UNPROFOR can no longer adequately perform its humanitarian mission. Flow of arms into the region increases dramatically, as does the level and nature of violence.

Proposal: Present build down concept through the UN to the Contact Group (CG) as a component of its negotiating strategy. The idea is to:

--Gain agreement by the warring parties in principle for a cap followed by a mutual reduction in heavy weapons and other equivalent force structures (*build down*);

--Create a Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor compliance with build down principles;

--Begin by establishing small heavy weapons EZs (5 kilometer radii) in the safe areas of Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Bihac, in addition to the EZs around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Expand each of the six EZs at the rate of one kilometer every 30 days and

rigorously monitor them through the JMC in a step-by-step process (*build down and monitor*);

--Establish one new EZ every 30 days;

--Collect weapons and place them in JMC-monitored weapons storage facilities;

--Disable or destroy said weapons within 10 days of collection;

--At the 100 day point, broaden EZs into larger DMZs beginning with Sarajevo. If the concept works in Sarajevo, expand at the rate of one EZ into a DMZ every 10 days. Objective is to establish a nation-wide DMZ within 180 days;

--Employ NATO air power to enforce the terms of build down should JMC prove ineffective. Limit air strikes to destruction of excluded weapons that remain within EZs. Give one warning and allow 72 hours for their removal to the collection site (*build down or strike*);

--If air power is not adequate or build down is not accepted by the warring parties within six months, then introduce at the UN a resolution for a partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo with carefully selected defensive arms to begin immediately upon passage (*build down with partial lift*).

Implementation: Present build down proposal to the UN, NATO, and the CG for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be pushed if build down were not accepted by the warring parties. Develop consensus for multilateral application of air power should UNPROFOR withdraw and build down is rejected (*Build down or strike*).

Potential Problems: The USG may be alone on any "compellence strategy." The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as the UN is deployed in any capacity whatsoever in B-H (UNHCR). Re-deployment of those personnel or forces to more defensible and less exposed positions perhaps could be married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift (limited withdrawal). Expanding EZs may require more forces, not less to verify compliance. Air power to be effective requires tactical air control personnel. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

Recommendation: adopt build down (and its variants) as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument in favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective. *Build down, build down and monitor, build down with partial lift, and build down or strike all have places in our efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.*

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. report	Planning. (3 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Carter
papers



CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Executive Office
American Consulate General
Siesmayerstrasse 21
60323 Frankfurt am Main, FRG

FAX Number (International) 49-69-7535-~~2222~~ 2422
FAX Number (FRG) 069-7535-~~2222~~ 2422

Tel. Number (International) 49-69-7535-2222
Tel. Number (FRG) 069-7535-2222

DATE: Dec. 21, 1994

TO:

John M. Pommerheim

American Embassy - BONN

FAX Number

0226-339-2069

FROM:

John Barcas

Deputy Principal Officer

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS SHEET)

12

COMMENTS:

John Mark,

Peace Agreements (2) Additional Agreement, Press Statement
and Letter dated 12/21 are in packages for President, Secretary,
and U.N. Secretary General. Karadzic and Izetbegovic packages
include only letters to them, (faxed) a copy of the others
signed agreement, and press statement.

21 December, 1994

To Dr. Radovan Karadzic

I will always appreciate your contributions toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina by inviting me to your country and by your cooperation in our brief negotiations.

The U.N. officials will deliver to you a copy of the agreement signed by President Izetbegovic, so that you will see the minor differences between his position and your own. The language that you have accepted is that proposed by the Contact Group. His insistence on using the word "acceptance" is inconsequential, I believe, since he was willing to add "as a starting point."

I found President Milosevic fully supportive of these agreements and eager to help with the achievement of peace in your country. He made a strong point of the need for your parliament to approve the documents you have signed.

My report has already gone to President Bill Clinton and to Secretary-General Boutros Ghali. In them, I included the following paragraph:

"I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those who would oppose this."

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance to you. It is extremely important that nothing interrupt the path to peace that you have helped to initiate.

Best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

12/21/94 13:43
Dec. 21 '94 13:33

2283392002
0000 C. U. FRANKFURT

AMBASS OFF BONN
TEL 0049307/3332000

00004

12/21/94

To President Bill Clinton

I returned to Frankfurt from Belgrade, Pale and Sarajevo, and want to give you a brief report on my trip. As you know, I went to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the invitation of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and with his assurance of willingness to make progress toward peace. My goals were limited: to assure the continued openness of the Sarajevo airport, a cessation of attacks by the Serbs against the city, and freedom of convoys to move with relief supplies. I also had a vague promise of a cease fire and some willingness to negotiate.

As the attitude of both sides became clearer, my efforts went beyond these goals to include a permanent nationwide cease-fire, the commitment of both sides to a total cessation of hostilities, the negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement with the proposal of the five-nation Contact Group as a basis, the honoring of human rights with access by international observers to assure compliance, the right of all persons to live in locations of their own choice, and the exchange of all prisoners of war and other detainees under supervision of the International Red Cross.

As you will see from the enclosed documents, which were signed by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and the political and military leaders of the Serbs, these goals were achieved. There are many uncertainties that remain, of course, but the military leaders in UNPROFOR are prepared to work closely with the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General to effectuate the cease-fire and permanent cessation of hostilities, beginning at noon on December 23rd. Ambassador Charles Thomas and the other members of the Contact Group are meeting today in Belgrade to plan how to follow up on the negotiations based on their peace proposal. I have offered the services of The Carter Center if they are needed, since we know the leaders well and believe we have their confidence.

You can tell from the detailed agreements that the one notable difference between the two parties that I was not able to resolve in my two days of talks concerns language about the Contact Group's proposal. My effort was to gain acceptance of the language given to me by your representatives and the Contact Group. The Serbs agreed to this language, but I was not able to convince President Izetbegovic to accept the exact wording. In my opinion, however, his "acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point" is the practical equivalent. Ambassador Thomas is confident that the Bosnian officials will be willing to negotiate on a permanent peace despite this difference in wording.

Our Carter Center team received full support from U.S. officials, including invaluable transportation from Frankfurt to Zagreb and Belgrade. We are grateful for this, and also for your approval of our peace effort. If both sides are treated with firmness and respect, there is a good chance that permanent benefits can result from our trip. I should add that President Slobodan Milosevic is fully supportive of the peace process and will continue to use his maximum influence to help with its successful consummation.

I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those in the United States who would oppose this.

Best wishes for the holiday season.

Jimmy Carter

12/21/94

To Secretary-General Boutros Ghali

I returned to Frankfurt from Belgrade, Pale and Sarajevo, and want to give you a brief report on my trip. As you know, I went to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the invitation of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and with his assurance of willingness to make progress toward peace. My goals were limited: to assure the continued openness of the Sarajevo airport, a cessation of attacks by the Serbs against the city, and freedom of convoys to move with relief supplies. I also had a vague promise of a cease-fire and some willingness to negotiate.

As the attitude of both sides became clearer, my efforts went beyond these goals to include a permanent nationwide cease-fire, the commitment of both sides to a total cessation of hostilities, the negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement with the proposal of the five nation Contact Group as a basis, the honoring of human rights with access by international observers to assure compliance, the right of all persons to live in locations of their own choice, and the exchange of all prisoners of war and other detainees under supervision of the International Red Cross.


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You can tell from the detailed agreements that the one notable difference between the two parties that I was not able to resolve in my two days of talks concerns language about the Contact Group's proposal. My effort was to gain acceptance of the language given to me by the U.S. government officials and members of the Contact Group. The Serbs agreed to this language, but I was not able to convince President Izetbegovic to accept the exact wording. In my opinion, however, his "acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point" is the practical equivalent. Ambassador Thomas is confident that the Bosnian officials will be willing to negotiate on a permanent peace despite this difference in wording.

Our Carter Center team received full support from U.N. officials, including invaluable transportation from Zagreb to Sarajevo. We were especially impressed with the objectivity and dedication of Yusushi Akashi, Victor Andreev, and Tony Banbury. We are grateful for this, and also for your approval of our peace effort. If both sides are treated with firmness and respect, there is a good chance that permanent benefits can result from our trip. I should add that President Slobodan Milosevic is fully supportive of the peace process and will continue to use his maximum influence to help with its successful consummation.

I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those who would oppose this.

Best wishes for the holiday season.



12/21/94

13:46

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AMBASS OFF BONN

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12/21/94

To Secretary of State Warren Christopher

I returned to Frankfurt from Belgrade, Pale and Sarajevo, and want to give you a brief report on my trip. As you know, I went to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the invitation of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and with his assurance of willingness to make progress toward peace. My goals were limited: to assure the continued openness of the Sarajevo airport, a cessation of attacks by the Serbs against the city, and freedom of convoys to move with relief supplies. I also had a vague promise of a cease-fire and some willingness to negotiate.

As the attitude of both sides became clearer, my efforts went beyond these goals to include a permanent nationwide cease-fire, the commitment of both sides to a total cessation of hostilities, the negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement with the proposal of the five-nation Contact Group as a basis, the honoring of human rights with access by international observers to assure compliance, the right of all persons to live in locations of their own choice, and the exchange of all prisoners of war and other detainees under supervision of the International Red Cross.

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7

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I believe strongly that, once good faith is demonstrated in honoring a cease-fire and in peace negotiations, the economic sanctions should be lifted. I would be glad to help with some of those in the United States who would oppose this.

Best wishes for the holiday season.

Jimmy Carter

Press statement, Sarajevo, 20 December, 1994

Since arriving in the Balkans two days ago, we have had extensive discussions with the president of Croatia, the U.N. special representative, present and former members of the multi-national Contact Group, commanders of UNPROFOR, representatives of relief agencies and human rights groups, and the leaders of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs.

Mutual agreements have been reached between the warring parties as follows:

1. An implementation of a nationwide cease-fire within 72 hours, including monitoring by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation.

2. The commencement of negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 23, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 1, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

3. The negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement, with (the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points) [acceptance of the proposal of the Contact Group as a starting point]. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.

4. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

6. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

7. There will be an early exchange of all detainees under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

8. In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group, or UNPROFUR as appropriate.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease-fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for ~~four~~ months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

We agree that
we shall 2. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.

3. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFIL inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

4. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.


5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

6. There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.


7. In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNHCR as appropriate.


Signed 19 December 1994



Radovan Karadzic



Ratko Mladic



Jimmy Carter
Witness

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Immediately implement a cease-fire, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc., as described below.

2. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

3. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group.

It is understood that there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

Signed 20 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic
President

Rasim Dalic
Supreme Commander

Jimmy Carter
Witness

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	For Distribution from Lieutenant General Wesley Clark. Subject: Follow-up Actions to CHOD Meeting at the Hague. (7 pages)	12/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994); Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. cable	re: Response to Dutch Demarche. [NATO] (2 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2618

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. cable	re: Response to Dutch Demarche. [NATO] (2 pages)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2618

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004d. cable	re: Dutch Demarche on Strengthening UNPROFOR. (1 page)	12/22/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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~~SECRET~~

21486

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies
 Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 19, 1994

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held December 19, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *sl* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
 Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/21/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

21486

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 20, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN


MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia December 19, 1994 (8)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (8)



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By h2 NARA, Date 5/21/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: December 19, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:10 - 1:15pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Samuel Berger

CIA
Douglas MacEachin
Norman Schindler

OVP
Leon Fuerth

JCS
ADM. William Owens
LTG Daniel Christman
BG John Walsh

State
Strobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

UN
Rick Inderfurth
James O'Brien

DOD
John Deutch
Walter Slocombe

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Donald Kerrick
Bill Danvers

Summary of ConclusionsAdministration of Deputies Meetings

1. The Deputies convened in accordance with the direction of the December 12, 1994 Principals' Committee Meeting which asked the Deputies to meet regularly on Bosnia. The Deputies agreed to meet at least weekly with a goal of imposing discipline on the Interagency Bosnia policy-making process.

Negotiating Track

2. The Deputies discussed the progress of ongoing efforts to restart the negotiations under the auspices of the Contact Group and how the former President Carter initiative would affect those

negotiations. The Deputies agreed that a common Administration position should be developed and followed by all agencies. Action: NSC draft talking points for use with press and Congressional consultations.

Retaining and Strengthening UNPROFOR

3. The Deputies discussed the efforts underway at the meeting of the Chiefs of Defense at The Hague designed to strengthen and retain UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Noting the lack of enthusiasm on the part of most Allies for robust options, the Deputies agreed that we should continue our efforts to identify steps that will make UNPROFOR more viable in the performance of its existing mandate.

Build-Down Concept

4. The Deputies discussed the concept of build-down and recognized that, despite the difficulties of implementation, build-down was now a political reality and, therefore, required clear definition and integration into our strategy both pre- and post-UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action: OSD flesh out the build-down concept and identify where and how it fits into our near- and long-term strategy.

Sanctions

5. The Deputies discussed steps that have been taken in the run-up to the January 13, 1995 decision point on extending sanctions relief for the Serbian border closure. The Deputies agreed that the yet-to-be announced cut-off of the Krajina Serbs by Milosevic could be a positive step and could affect our action on January 13. The Deputies also agreed that steps must be taken within the interagency community to replace the U.S. border monitors now participating in the ICFY border monitoring mission. Action: OVP.

6. Leon Fuerth circulated a paper outlining a process to guide actions in the run-up to the January 13 decisions and reached an informal agreement that the Deputies Committee was the appropriate level for decisions regarding policy decisions on compliance. The Deputies agreed to consult further on this issue before reaching a decision. Action: OVP.

Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy

7. The Deputies ongoing efforts to raise the awareness in Congress and in the public about the implications of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. The Deputies directed that an interagency group be immediately established to oversee the development and implementation of a Congressional and public

affairs strategy. The group will meet daily and will be under the co-chairmanship of Bill Danvers, NSC Legislative Affairs, and a State Department Public Affairs representative. The group will develop a detailed Congressional and public affairs strategy including an interagency-agreed script and timetable. Action: NSC and State.