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Folder Title:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid-Nov. - Early Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC-12/23/1994 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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850

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: UN Request for Additional Troops and Equipment for UNPROFOR. (2 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)
002. draft	Talking Points: Unilateral Lift Implications. (5 pages)	01/06/1995	P1/b(1)
003. memo	State Department Talking Points. (1 page)	01/05/1995	P1/b(1)
004. email	Donald Kerrick to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: FW: Bosnia. (1 page)	12/29/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For Warren Christopher from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Bosnia: A Roadmap for January. (4 pages)	01/03/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	re: Carter Letter to Milosevic. (2 pages)	12/30/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Will the Croats Order UNPROFOR to Leave? (4 pages)	12/30/1994	P1/b(1)
007. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Bosnia Update. Record ID: 9410009. (3 pages)	c. 12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2617

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Dear, FYI

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REPUBLICAN CHIEF OF STAFF

One Hundred Third Congress
Congress of the United States
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

January 3, 1995

The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write to express my concerns about the Administration's commitment to deploy U.S. ground troops, if necessary, to help NATO allies withdraw their UNPROFOR peacekeepers from Bosnia.

My concerns relate to the policy decision itself, the manner in which it was made, and the almost casual attitude with which such a commitment of U.S. ground troops is being treated. I expressed these concerns to Peter Tarnoff and Walter Slocombe at a closed briefing on Friday, December 16, but I believe that I must also make my points directly to you.

First, a commitment to put U.S. ground troops in harm's way is the most serious undertaking a President can make. A commitment of this significance requires -- at a minimum -- that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, state the case directly to the American people. They, as well as our allies, need to hear from the President precisely why he is making this commitment, and what its parameters and requirements entail. To my knowledge, no such Presidential statement has been made.

Second, the Administration has not spelled out what U.S. policy in Bosnia will be if an UNPROFOR withdrawal occurs. There is a contingency plan for getting peacekeepers out, but no contingency policy. The State Department has testified that the U.S. would, under such circumstances, refocus its efforts on securing a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. But this is not a Bosnia policy for a post-UNPROFOR period: most of our NATO allies and the Russians categorically oppose lifting the embargo. Moreover, it is the Administration's own testimony that lifting the embargo would (1) not likely reverse the current military balance; (2) intensify the conflict; (3) worsen the humanitarian crisis; (4) risk rekindling an east-west conflict with Russia; and (5) confront the U.S. with a further decision of whether more explicit military involvement is required.

Honorable Warren Christopher
January 3, 1995
Page 2

The American people and the Congress must be made aware fully of what U.S. ground troops deployed to Bosnia would confront once the UNPROFOR withdrawal is completed. Key questions must be answered:

- Would U.S. forces be required to assume humanitarian functions carried out by UNPROFOR?
- Would U.S. forces be called upon to protect Bosnian civilians in the absence of UNPROFOR?
- Would U.S. forces end up having to take sides in this conflict?
- What would be the size and composition of the U.S. forces required to carry out these missions?
- How long would these U.S. forces be required to remain in Bosnia?
- How would you extract U.S. forces from Bosnia at the appropriate time?

Third, in explaining this commitment to help withdraw UNPROFOR peacekeepers from Bosnia, the State Department emphasized that this commitment is conditioned on "consultations" with Congress. To the best of my knowledge, Members of Congress, including myself, were informed of the Administration's decision, but never consulted about it -- either during the Bush Administration or your Administration. I was called in Indiana and conversation began with the State Department official saying: "The President has decided..." This is not consultation and it gives me little assurances about pledges of future consultation.


Finally, I understand the political and diplomatic pressures which led you to decide to announce this troop commitment. The U.S. needs to reassure NATO allies of U.S. support, at a time when dangerous rifts over Bosnia policy have divided the U.S. from its allies. Yet any commitment of U.S. ground troops to assist in a highly risky operation such as evacuating UNPROFOR peacekeepers from Bosnia will, to be successful, need the full support of Congress and the American people. The direct and precise articulation of policy is essential in winning that support. Therefore, I urge the President to state the policy.

Honorable Warren Christopher
January 3, 1995
Page Three

I appreciate your attention to this letter, and I look forward to your reply in writing to both my specific questions and the broader concerns raised.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lee H. Hamilton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "L" and "H".

Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member

cc: Hon. Tony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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
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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

SV

OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY

To:	Don Kerrick
Organization:	NSC
Phone:	202-456-9151
Fax:	- 456-9150
From:	John Klekas
Organization:	OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:	703-697-6026
Fax:	703-695-6506
Date:	January 5, 1995
Pages including this cover page:	6

Comments: We're asking for inter-agency clearance of these Qs & As soonest --preferably before tomorrow's DC meeting. They would be used as a general reference for all DOD leaders in talks with Congressmen and in a variety of other fora.

THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFING CONGRESS

Questions & Answers

Briefings on Capitol Hill during the first half of January 1995 should focus on five topics:

- Unilateral Lifting of the Arms Embargo
- Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (current implications; next steps)
- Military Equipment to Invigorate UNPROFOR
- Sanctions relief for Serbia
- Build-down as an alternative to lift

Unilateral Lifting of the Arms Embargo (summary of inter-agency TPs)

Q. Would you summarize for us your primary arguments against unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia.

A. Unilateral lift would present us with a wide range of problems, which we have grouped into six categories:

First: Americanize. Unilateral Lift means unilateral U.S. responsibility for defending Bosnia as the Serbs react to our initiative by launching all-out pre-emptive attacks before the Bosnian government can be adequately supplied and trained.

Second: Widen war. The ensuing escalation of fighting would likely widen the war by drawing in the Serbs from the Krajina, thus spreading the war to Croatia. It could also precipitate an upheaval in Kosovo leading to instability in neighboring Macedonia, and ultimately into a wider Balkan war involving Greece and Turkey. Russia would likely provide arms to the Serbs which would be used against any U.S. personnel in Bosnia.

Third: Damage NATO. Given most European powers' opposition to unilateral lift, they likely would refuse consent to allow NATO facilities to be used for U.S. More generally, the rift would undermine the consensus behind NATO's unified military command and deeply harm the political underpinnings of NATO.

Fourth: Undermine Sanctions on Serbia. Increasing chaos would lead some of the states neighboring on Serbia, which have incurred heavy economic costs for support of the embargo, would almost certainly abandon the embargo on Serbia.

Fifth: Weaken other UN sanctions regimes. If the U.S. asserted the right to abrogate unilaterally the UNSC embargo resolutions, others would claim similar rights for other UNSC sanctions resolutions (including those on Iraq).

*First, second and other
operations in Bosnia*

Sixth: *Worsen the Humanitarian Crisis.* Unilateral lift would mean the withdrawal UNPROFOR and the end of UNHCR efforts.

Q. Why do you favor multilateral lift but oppose unilateral lift?

A. Multilateral lift simply would not pose the same risks, mainly because it would entail the concurrence of France, Britain and Russia and a majority of other members of the UNSC. The unity among the Contact Group members and the Perm 5 would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift. With Russia's help, Serbia may be kept out of the war.

We recognize that multilateral lift is not without risks and adverse consequences (e.g., UNPROFOR and UNHCR would still depart).

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement

Q. What is your reaction to the Carter initiative?

A. President Carter went to Bosnia as a private individual and as head of the Carter Center in Atlanta. That said, we are pleased that he was able to secure agreement to a cease-fire which in turn facilitated successful subsequent negotiations which led to agreement among the parties on a four-month Cessation of Hostilities agreement. What matters now is the willingness of the Parties to negotiate a just settlement and sustain the cease-fire.

Q. Can the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement last, and what more is likely to come out of it?

A. We hesitate to predict whether the agreement will hold as we have been disappointed with failed cease-fire agreements so many times in the past. The Agreement has been generally holding over these first few days. The significant diminution of conflict made possible by this Agreement presents a more favorable climate for agreement among the Parties on other confidence building steps and, ultimately, to resumption of negotiations on a peace settlement based on the Contact Group proposal.

Military Equipment for UNPROFOR

Q. We have heard rumors the U.S. is willing to provide military equipment to UNPROFOR. What can you tell us about it?

A. -- In early December French MOD Leotard proposed to Secretary Perry that steps be taken to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to execute its mission. SecDef agreed, because we wanted UNPROFOR to stay in place and continue to do its job; we welcomed the shift in discussion among allies from whether to terminate UNPROFOR's role to a recognition of its continuing importance. UNPROFOR has made many positive

contributions. But we agree with the French that it can do better within its present mandate.

-- Subsequently, on December 18, the CHODs met at The Hague to work out specific, practical plans to increase UNPROFOR effectiveness. The key conclusion reached was that nations should be urged to offer military equipment to upgrade UNPROFOR from a list developed during the CHOD meeting at The Hague. Accordingly, the USG is in the process of identifying what equipment we might offer, along with the attendant terms and condition for delivery. Other nations are conducting their own independent assessments for offers. Ultimately the UN will have to decide what equipment it might accept, and come to agreements with the various nations making the offers regarding financing and delivery arrangements.

Q. Has DOD compiled a list of proposed military equipment?

A. DOD has tentatively identified equipment that could be made available if the UN declares it wants such equipment, and if agreement can be reached on the methods of delivery and financing. {If Pressed} The list currently includes a few helicopters, APCs, engineer vehicles, communications equipment, cargo trucks.

Q. What would be the effect on U.S. readiness if this equipment is provided to the UN?

A. The equipment we currently have in mind would have minimal, if any, impact on readiness.

EXPLAIN WAY

Q. How much U.S. training and maintenance would be involved in the transfer of this equipment?

A. Our offer would not include training and maintenance by DOD personnel, nor would the USG defray the cost of any associated training and maintenance.

Q. How quickly could the equipment be provided?

A. Much would depend, of course, on what specific items, if any, the UN wishes to accept. Some equipment might be ready in February; other items might be made available several weeks later, i.e., in the Spring.

Q. Can you explain who will bear the cost and exactly how U.S. military equipment would be transferred to the UN?

A. We are now in the process of determining the most desirable and feasible financing arrangements from the perspective of the USG; we do not know what arrangements would be acceptable to the UN.

Q. Why haven't you been consulting with Congress about giving away U.S. military equipment?

A. The concept of invigorating UNPROFOR with more military equipment surfaced shortly before Christmas. We fully intend to consult with Congress on this matter as our proposal takes final shape and in the event the UN wishes to accept some or all of our offer. Whether delivery of items ultimately occurs will also depend on whether mutually satisfactory financial and delivery agreements can be reached with the UN.

Sanctions Relief for Serbia

Q. Can you clarify reports we've been hearing about granting sanctions relief to Serbia?

A. The UN granted limited sanctions relief to Serbia for 100 days in response to Milosevic's declared willingness to close the border with Bosnia to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Contact Group peace plan. The 100 days expires on January 13. Accordingly, before the U.S. takes a position on whether sanctions relief should continue, we are investigating the extent to which Serbia has carried out its pledge to block all non-humanitarian deliveries to the Bosnian Serbs. We have come to no final conclusions yet.

Q. What about the border with the Krajina region of Croatia -- is that blocked by Milosevic?

A. No, it is not blocked. It is not clear to what extent Milosevic can influence the flow of commodities across that border. We are also endeavoring to assess the impact of goods to the Bosnian Serbs from that direction.) ?

Q. Have Bosnian Serb military operations been significantly undercut so far by Milosevic's border closure?

A. Probably not, but we are still assessing that situation.

Q. If it appears that Milosevic has taken sincere and effective steps to cut off the Bosnian Serbs, what kind of sanctions relief would the UN be likely to grant?

A. Options might range:

- ~~automatic rollover for another 100 days of the current level of sanctions relief~~
- another formal decision to extend the current level of relief for another 100 days
- expand the level of sanctions relief.

Again, let me stress that the U.S. has not taken a position on these possible options. } wing option

Build-Down

Q. *What is "Build-Down"?*

A. In September 1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter outlining key components of a build down strategy revolving fundamentally around the idea that, as an alternative to building up heavy weapons by lifting the arms embargo, the Parties might agree to "build-down" the level of heavy weapons in Bosnia. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as worthy of serious consideration.

Q. *Can you elaborate on the concept of "Build-Down"?*

A. Build-down is intended to establish rough military equivalence by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian conflict. A build down of heavy weapons would be rejected initially by the BSA. It must, therefore, be expanded to include incentives for the BSA or contain threats that will compel them to accept an unfavorable arrangement.

Q. *What specific "build-down" steps do you envisage?*

A. We have not finalized the specific aspects of any proposed build down strategy, and have yet to share our ideas fully with the Parties, our Allies and UNPROFOR troop contributors, or the Russians. With that caveat, we can say that some notional steps might include:

- Establishment of small heavy weapons exclusion zones in each of the safe areas that supplement the EZs around Sarajevo and Gorazde.
- Expand each of the six EZs at the rate of one KM every 30 days.
- Collect all excluded weapons from these EZs and place them under UNPROFOR control.
- Disable or destroy said weapons within 30 days.
- At, say the 100-day point, broaden EZs into larger DMZs beginning with Sarajevo.

Q. *How does the "Build-down" concept figure in our diplomatic strategy?*

A. The Cessation of hostilities agreement signed by the Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Serbs creates a window of opportunity to negotiate a peace agreement. Employing some of the principles of build down could contribute to a further reduction in tensions and heighten the prospects for a fair, just and equitable settlement. At a minimum, their acceptance (or lack thereof) by the combatants will send a clear signal to the rest of the international community about the seriousness of the warring parties to negotiate an end to the conflict.

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DRAFT OF 5 JAN 95

LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA-- THE PATH TO AN AMERICANIZED FOURTH BALKAN WAR

When the history of the tragic conflict in the FRY is written, it will be clear that the arms embargo on Bosnia -- imposed in 1991 -- was a mistake. It has been discriminatory in depriving B-H of the means of self-defense against the Bosnian Serbs' superiority in tanks and artillery drawn from Tito's old arsenals and from some fresh supplies from outside, notably supporters in Serbia itself. An international agreement to lift the arms embargo multilaterally and deal collectively with the consequences would be both wise and just -- and has been supported by the Administration. ~~But for a variety of reasons, no such multilateral lifting of the arms embargo is in the cards.~~

] NO

^{however,}
Some Americans, ~~including such normally level-headed leaders as Sen. Dole,~~ reacting with understandable frustration, are demanding the U.S. ignore UN resolutions and act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. They claim unilateral lift would ensure that Bosnian government forces receive the arms and training they need to "level the field" and defend themselves. And they claim such a step would do this without drawing the US into the Balkan fighting.

But a realistic look at the facts on the ground and the likely consequences of unilateral US action demonstrate that taking such a seemingly fair, direct, and simple action would be a grave mistake, for both U.S. interests and the people of Bosnia. Among the consequences -- ignored or denied by proponents of unilateral lift -- would be these:

- Unilateral lift would undermine the most successful diplomatic initiative in many months -- the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, negotiated with the help of former President Carter -- which was just signed by all the warring parties, and is now coming into effect. An American decision now to end the arms embargo would end that Cessation of Hostilities agreement -- and end also the hope of negotiations to a permanent peace *that would preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state, as prescribed by the Contact Group proposal.*
- The Bosnian Serbs would have every incentive launch pre-emptive attacks, designed to exploit their advantages before American arms supplies reached Bosnia. While the Serbs probably could not totally defeat government forces, it is virtually certain they would occupy the eastern enclaves and renew military pressure on Sarajevo and elsewhere, especially on relief supply routes.
- Current UNPROFOR operations would end as European and many other contributing countries withdraw from Bosnia, seizing on U.S. action as an excuse to end a commitment that has been costly for them in lives, treasure, and involvement.
- UN and most other outside relief efforts would stop, at the very time humanitarian requirements would increase dramatically, both because of the increased fighting and the withdrawal of Serb cooperation. Most Americans are unaware that a high percentage of the food reaching the enclaves comes through Belgrade and Bosnian-Serb controlled territory. All airfields and most land routes are within range of Bosnian-Serb artillery. Whatever else they did, the Serbs could easily cut off these relief supplies.

The cumulative effect of these consequences would be strong pressure for direct American combat involvement -- something President Clinton, like President Bush before him has consistently ruled out. The U.S. would have precipitated the increased

fighting and the end of international relief and peacekeeping efforts. Moral responsibility for the resulting military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia would shift to the U.S.

In short, unilaterally ending the arms embargo is not an alternative to US military intervention. It is a way of accomplishing such intervention.

The implications of taking on this responsibility are many and grave. To begin with, the U.S. would have to take over relief efforts, or accept responsibility for the large-scale starvation and refugee flows that would result from the lack of food.

Similarly, unless we were prepared to watch as pre-emptive Serb attacks further battered Bosnian cities and defensive positions, US air strikes would be required to defend government forces. However the necessary European bases and other NATO support on which our current, much smaller air efforts depend, might not be available in the aftermath of a major break with our allies. In any case, airstrikes alone, even with the added planes needed, would probably not halt Serb ground attacks, given the difficult weather and terrain conditions.

Furthermore, contrary to the claims of unilateral lift backers, the "playing field" in Bosnia is not self-leveling. Simply authorizing U.S. manufacturers to sell arms to Bosnia would not get any arms to Bosnia. For lifting the embargo to have its intended effect of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, the US would have to undertake a major military assistance program to provide arms. *without the cooperation of our major allies and, potentially, in the face of their active opposition.*

The financial costs, though substantial, would be the least of the problems in carrying out such an effort. Upgrading Bosnia's light infantry to confront Bosnian Serb

heavy weapons successfully is not a simple task--as earlier US efforts to equip local forces in other countries from Vietnam to El Salvador have shown. Most important, sophisticated arms -- which the Bosnians would need to overcome Bosnian Serb advantages in heavy weapons -- are ineffective without trained soldiers to use them and a continuing stream of support. U.S. trainers, advisers and logistics support personnel on the ground would be necessary to assist the Bosnian Government in using the arms effectively.

A U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo unilaterally would undermine the most important U.S. national security objectives for the region. The primary U.S. objective has been to avoid a wider war in the Balkans. Among the most serious potential consequences of unilateral U.S. action would, however, be strong pressures to widen the conflict beyond Bosnia. There are painfully many scenarios for such wider fighting:

- Escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from Krajina (as it did in Bihac), thus extending the actual fighting to Croatia.

With the U.S. acting unilaterally, over the objections of our allies and the Russians, it would be difficult to convince

- The Belgrade Serbs, though very sympathetic to the Bosnian Serbs are now, under strong international pressure, cutting off supplies to the Bosnian Serbs and pressing them to settle on terms the government of Bosnia Herzegovina has accepted. *to hold back from intervening in support of*
~~The Belgrade Serbs would, however, be very unlikely to let the Bosnians gain an effective military advantage over their Bosnian Serb compatriots, unless we were prepared to threaten Belgrade militarily.~~

- U.S. military confrontation with Serbia could precipitate a sharp ^{principle} crackdown by Belgrade in the Muslim province of Serbia, Kosovo, a development which would have the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region, and which the US has pledged to meet with force.

- Broader conflict could draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey into the conflict.



Neither our horror at the destruction brought by this long and brutal war and at the atrocities of Serbian ethnic cleansing nor our frustration with the irrationality of Balkan rivalries and the difficulty of international peacekeeping should be allowed to cause us to forget that much has been accomplished by international action even as the war has continued. The European role, and our cooperation with Europe, has been central to what has been achieved to moderate the suffering in Bosnia and prevent a wider war. The UN for all its limitations, has saved thousands of lives by its military and civilian efforts. UNPROFOR, for all its problems, has been the necessary element for the large scale delivery of food, and for support of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. NATO cooperation has been essential for enforcement of the "No Fly Zone," the heavy weapons exclusion zones, and the economic sanctions against Serbia. The Contact Group, which includes Russia, as well as key European allies, has been the principal instrument for seeking a negotiated solution.

Maintaining that cooperation and avoiding a fundamental break with our NATO allies over the Bosnian issue is, of course, also essential to our broader national interests in European and international security. Virtually every European nation opposes lifting the arms embargo at this time. Thus U.S. unilateral action would be undertaken in the face of vehement opposition of most NATO allies. The resulting rift would undermine consensus underlying NATO's unified military command and deeply damage the alliance and the US ability to lead it.

Bosnia,

Additionally, hopes of a cooperative relationship with Russia on European security would be seriously jeopardized by actions that Russians of all political stripes would see as de facto US intervention ^{not just} against the Serbs. ~~Russia would likely counter US action by arming the Serbs, thereby raising the ante and revising U.S.-Russian confrontation.~~

*but against the Balgards
Serbs as well.*

Finally, while it is fashionable in some circles these days to ridicule the UN and all its works, the US has an important interest in nations not taking unilateral action in contravention of UN resolutions. Such actions not only undermines both international law and internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations. It also undercuts the US interest in international sanctions being observed. One of the main pressures on the Serbs is the UN embargo on their trade. If the US unilaterally dropped the part of the UN sanctions it finds objectionable, the front line states--Serbia's immediate neighbors--would likely stop enforcing the trade embargo against Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs which they claim has cost them billions of dollars already.

Nor would the effects on sanctions regimes we support be confined to the Balkans. If the US acted alone in this matter, other nations would claim the right to ignore UN embargo resolutions that we strongly favor such as those that pertain to Iraq and other pariah states.

In sum, Congressional action mandating unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia would be a tragic and short-sighted mistake. It would mean the Americanization of the war, for unilateral action entails unilateral responsibility for the consequences of that action. We should be under no illusion that the US could responsibly simply lift the arms embargo and walk away. Nor should we do the only thing that would really produce the Bosnian victory many lift proponents

understandably think the only just and fair outcome -- commit US ground forces to solve the problems of Bosnia.

What we must do instead, therefore, is continue to work within the international community to limit the scale of fighting, provide humanitarian relief, prevent a wider war, and seek to achieve an early agreed settlement to this tragic war. That settlement will not be ideal; it will likely on some scale be unjust. But it will be far better than the consequences of expanded war, division from our allies, and likely U.S. combat involvement that unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would bring.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1/5

09:00

Tom Riss —

Sandy Vershbow —

Nancy Soderberg —

Sandy Berger —

Tony Lanza —

HAVE ATTACHED
Draft Perry/Shale CP-SC
on "LIFT" For Sunday's
papers. BEING worked —
PA channels. Drafted by
Staccato. Need clearance
this AM.

Jim

Build Down

Background: On September 30, 1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as worthy of serious consideration in his October 7, 1994, response. Nunn followed up with a second letter on December 1, 1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how it fits into our near-term strategy (UNPROFOR remains as presently constituted) and longer-term strategy (after UNPROFOR withdrawal); and how it should be presented to our Allies and the warring parties.

Discussion:

The Concept: Build down is an alternative to lifting the embargo. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian conflict.

A build down of heavy weapons would be rejected by the BSA. It must therefore be expanded to include incentives for the BSA or threats that will compel them to accept an unfavorable arrangement. One incentive would be the demobilization of Bosnian Govt troops. The most obvious threat would be the lifting of the arms embargo, possibly coupled with air strikes.

Near Term Strategy (UNPROFOR remains)

--Begin by establishing small heavy weapons EZs (5 kilometer radii) in each of the safe areas of Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Bihac, in addition to the EZs at Sarajevo and Gorazde. Expand each of the six EZs at the rate of one kilometer every 30 days and monitor them with the deployment of UNPROFOR in a step-by-step process (*build down*);

--Establish one new EZ every 30 days;

--Collect all excluded weapons from the new and expanded zones and place them in UNPROFOR-monitored existing weapons storage facilities within 10 days (*build down and monitor*);

--Disable or destroy said weapons collected weapons within 30 days;

--At the 100 day point, broaden EZs into larger DMZs beginning with Sarajevo. If the concept works, expand at the rate of one EZ into a DMZ every 10 days. Objective is to establish a nation-wide DMZ within 180 days;

--If UNPROFOR monitoring is not adequate or build down is subsequently rejected by the warring parties within six months, then introduce at the UN a resolution for a partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo with carefully selected defensive arms. This may stem the Congressional call for unilateral lift and/or convince the belligerents that we really are serious. In any event, such action is likely to trigger UNPROFOR's withdrawal (*build down and partial lift*).

Implementation: Present build down proposal to the UN, NATO, and the CG for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN, NATO, and the Congress the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where UNPROFOR monitoring reveals significant lack of compliance with build down. This idea would then be formalized into a formal UNSCR if build down were not accepted by the warring parties.

Potential Problems: The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with expanded monitoring of safe areas/EZs if UNPROFOR remains as currently configured. Re-deployment of current forces to more defensible and less exposed positions may be necessary. Expanding EZs may require more forces, new command and control arrangements, and augmented logistical capabilities. The Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

Longer Term Strategy (post-UNPROFOR withdrawal)

Background: UNPROFOR withdraws either due to unilateral lift passage or because there is general acceptance that UNPROFOR can no longer adequately perform its humanitarian mission. Flow of arms into the region increases dramatically, as does the level and nature of violence.

Proposal: Present build down concept through the UN to the Contact Group (CG) as a component of its negotiating strategy. The idea is to:

--Gain agreement by the warring parties in principle for a cap followed by a mutual reduction in heavy weapons and other equivalent force structures (*build down*);

--Create a Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor compliance with build down principles;

--Begin by establishing small heavy weapons EZs (5 kilometer radii) in the safe areas of Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Bihac, in addition to the EZs around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Expand each of the six EZs at the rate of one kilometer every 30 days and

rigorously monitor them through the JMC in a step-by-step process (*build down and monitor*);

- Establish one new EZ every 30 days;

- Collect weapons and place them in JMC-monitored weapons storage facilities;

- Disable or destroy said weapons within 10 days of collection;

- At the 100 day point, broaden EZs into larger DMZs beginning with Sarajevo. If the concept works in Sarajevo, expand at the rate of one EZ into a DMZ every 10 days. Objective is to establish a nation-wide DMZ within 180 days;

- Employ NATO air power to enforce the terms of build down should JMC prove ineffective. Limit air strikes to destruction of excluded weapons that remain within EZs. Give one warning and allow 72 hours for their removal to the collection site (*build down or strike*);

- If air power is not adequate or build down is not accepted by the warring parties within six months, then introduce at the UN a resolution for a partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo with carefully selected defensive arms to begin immediately upon passage (*build down with partial lift*).

Implementation: Present build down proposal to the UN, NATO, and the CG for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be pushed if build down were not accepted by the warring parties. Develop consensus for multilateral application of air power should UNPROFOR withdraw and build down is rejected (*Build down or strike*).

Potential Problems: The USG may be alone on any "compellance strategy." The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as the UN is deployed in any capacity whatsoever in B-H (UNHCR). Re-deployment of those personnel or forces to more defensible and less exposed positions perhaps could be married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift (limited withdrawal). Expanding EZs may require more forces, not less to verify compliance. Air power to be effective requires tactical air control personnel. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

Recommendation: adopt build down (and its variants) as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument in favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective. *Build down, build down and monitor, build down with partial lift, and build down or strike all have places in our efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.*

LINKING BUILD DOWN WITH THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT

Although none of the warring parties have renounced their military objectives, the cessation of hostilities agreement signed by the Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Serbs creates a window of opportunity to negotiate a peace agreement. Employing some of the principles of build down could contribute to a further reduction in tensions and heighten the prospects for a fair, just, and equitable settlement.

Build down steps:

- Establish small heavy weapons EZs (5 kilometer radii) in each of the safe areas of Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Bihac, in addition to the EZs at Sarajevo and Gorazde. Expand each of the six EZs at the rate of one kilometer every 30 days and monitor them with the deployment of UNPROFOR in a step-by-step process (*build down*);

- Establish one new EZ every 30 days;

- Collect all excluded weapons from the new and expanded zones and place them in UNPROFOR-monitored existing weapons storage facilities within 10 days (*build down and monitor*);

- Disable or destroy said weapons collected weapons within 30 days;

- At the 100 day point, broaden EZs into larger DMZs beginning with Sarajevo. If the concept works, expand at the rate of one EZ into a DMZ every 10 days. Objective is to establish a nation-wide DMZ within 180 days.

Cessation of hostilities agreement: calls for the establishment of joint commissions to monitor the accord under the supervision of UNPROFOR; includes provisions for the separation of forces and the interpositioning of UNPROFOR forces; parties agree to refrain from the use of all explosive munitions.

Linkage: reducing tensions is key to brokering a lasting peace settlement. Lifting the arms embargo at this time would assuredly increase the armaments in the region, increase tensions, make it improbable that UNPROFOR would be able to interposition itself, and thus create the conditions that would doom the cease-fire. Alternatively, employing some or all of the principles of build down will give peace its best chance. At a minimum, their acceptance (or lack thereof) by the combatants will send a clear signal to the rest of the international community about the seriousness of the warring parties to negotiate an end to this conflict.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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004. email	Donald Kerrick to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: FW: Bosnia. (1 page)	12/29/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2617

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

As we consider the issue of lift, we need to bear in mind that Bosnia seems to be moving into a new phase.

We have had the Jimmy Carter trip to Sarajevo and Pale that established the framework for a ceasefire and a formal cessation of hostilities. The UN then followed up with successful negotiations with both sides to sort out the details.

A cessation of hostilities is now in place and it may be something much more profound than the thirty some ceasefires that have preceded it, notably:

- It seems to be working pretty well. The most notable problems are around Bihac.
- There is a structure of Joint Military Commissions to monitor the cessation.

Of course it is winter and people want time to rest and reload. But we cannot exclude the possibility that this war may be smoldering to some kind of conclusion.

The Contact Group diplomacy now appears to be reviving with meetings this week in Bonn and a trip through the region.

Obviously any negotiation based on the Contact Group plan is going to be tough. But I think we have to be very careful at this stage about doing anything that might rekindle this war and make it our responsibility.

And there are still the tough, unresolved issues about lift in any case:

- Does it provoke a Serb offensive and UNPROFOR departure?
- Are we going to provide weapons to the Bosnians or just walk away? How much would it cost?
- Do we provide air cover if they start to go under? Would NATO play a role or are we on our own?

Whatever we do on lift should be designed to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs in a negotiating context. And that will require careful thought.

We shouldn't just charge ahead on this without carefully connecting whatever we do to the situation on the ground--including the new elements--and the diplomacy.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Hilton Head, South Carolina)

For Immediate Release

December 31, 1994

Statement by the President

I welcome the agreement of the parties for a four-month cessation of hostilities in Bosnia.

We hope it will be respected fully and pave the way for a negotiated settlement that brings peace to all the long-suffering people of Bosnia.

We applaud the flexibility that the parties have shown and commend the United Nations and former President Carter for their efforts.

We will be working with our Contact Group partners, the United Nations and the parties in a renewed effort to seize this opportunity for peace.

-30-30-30-

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	For Warren Christopher from Richard Holbrooke. Subject: Bosnia: A Roadmap for January. (4 pages)	01/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

1. Following the Cease-fire Agreement signed on 23 December 1994, the parties agree to a complete cessation of hostilities with effect from 1200 hours 1 January 1995 along all lines of confrontation. This agreement will be in effect for an initial period of four months, subject to renewal under these same conditions by agreement of the parties.

2. The cessation of hostilities will be supervised and monitored by UNPROFOR through the establishment of Joint Commissions. A Central Joint Commission shall be established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR, with initial meetings at the Sarajevo Airport, and Regional Joint Commissions shall also be established in permanent session as needed and as determined by the Central Joint Commission.

3. Liaison officers will be exchanged between UNPROFOR and the parties by 15 January 1995 and afterwards where deemed appropriate.

4. Cessation of hostilities will include the following measures:

a. Separation of forces in conflict to mutually agreed positions and the positioning of UNPROFOR forces for observation and monitoring, to include interpositioning.

b. The parties agree to refrain from the use of all explosive munitions, and the use of weapons used to fire explosive munitions. In addition, talks will begin immediately on the modalities for the withdrawal and monitoring by UNPROFOR of heavy weapons of calibre 12.7mm and above.

5. Full freedom of movement with appropriate procedures shall exist for UNPROFOR and other official international agencies, in particular UNHCR, in order to implement this agreement, to monitor human rights and to deliver humanitarian aid, including medical supplies and evacuations. The parties commit themselves to full

UNPROFOR shall continue to prevent any abuse of freedom of movement by its personnel or convoys which might be of military benefit to either party.

6. The parties agree to comply immediately and fully with all existing agreements including the 5 June 1992 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 24 April 1993 Srebrenica Agreement, the 8 May 1993 Srebrenica and Zepa Agreement, the 14 August 1993 Mt Igman DMZ Agreement, the 9 February 1994 Sarajevo Airport Agreement, the 17 March 1994 Agreement regarding the use of civilian traffic across the Sarajevo Airport, the 23 April 1994 Gorazde Agreement and the 14 August 1994 Anti-Sniping Agreement.

7. The parties agree to assist fully in the total restoration of utilities and the establishment of joint economic activities aimed at the normalization of life in all territories, and in particular, in and around the Safe Areas. These activities shall be undertaken on a reciprocal basis.

8. The parties agree to work continuously and simultaneously on processes for the early release of persons detained in relation with the conflict, as well as for the provision and cross-checking of all available information on persons unaccounted for. This work will be undertaken under the auspices of the ICRC, in accordance with their standard procedures. The parties commit themselves to commencing the processes by 15 January 1995.


9. The parties agree to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the monitoring and observation of the withdrawal of all foreign troops. UNPROFOR will perform this specific task on the basis of this agreement with the parties to the conflict and in accordance with its obligations towards the relevant Security Council resolutions and statements.

02+ / 020²


CODE / CRYPTOFAX

DEC-31-94 18:48 FROM: SLOVENIA CENTER NEW YORK TO: NEW YORK 000 2001
This agreement is to be without prejudice to the final political or territorial
solution.


31 December 1994




Alija Izetbegović



Radovan Karadžić




Rasim Delić




Ratko Mladić

Witnessed by:



Yasushi Akashi



Sir Michael Rose

Out/020

CODE / CRYPTOFAX



Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY

Dear Mr. Secretary of State,

Thank You for Your letter of 28 th December 1994.

The negotiations on the Agreement on cessation of hostilities are in progress, and I would like to convince You that we shall do our best to complete these negotiations successfully. We will definitely not be the impediment in reaching the mutually acceptable agreement.

We are also in favour of the peace process continuation. The condition for this is that the Serb side accepts the Contact Group peace plan. To achieve this, we think it is necessary to ensure the unity of all members of the Contact Group, as well as the respect of the Cease Fire Agreement on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, bad news are coming today from Bihać, the city is being shelled and the offensive activities by the Serb side along the separation lines are going on.

Therefore, I am asking You to use Your influence to calm down situation in the Bihać region and to withdraw the Martić's Serbs forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina. I assure You that we shall express the maximum degree of refraining.

I use this opportunity to wish You all the best in the New Year of 1995.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

A. Izetbegović
Alija Izetbegović

Sarajevo, December 30 1994.

H.E. Mr Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON D.C.

DRAFT104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**S.** _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. DOLE/^{LIEBERMAN} introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to
the Committee on _____

A BILL

To terminate the United States arms embargo applicable
to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled;*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995".

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 The Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the
9 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
10 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236), the Congress
11 has found that continued application of an inter-

1 national arms embargo to the Government of Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina contravenes that Government's in-
3 herent right of individual or collective self-defense
4 under Article 51 of the United National Charter and
5 therefore is inconsistent with international law.

*not passed
by States*

6 (2) The United States has not formally sought
7 multilateral support for terminating the arms em-
8 bargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina through a
9 vote on a United Nations Security Council resolution
10 since the enactment of section 1404 of the National
11 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
12 (Public Law 103-337).

13 (3) The United Nations Security Council has
14 not taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
15 national peace and security in Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina since the aggression against that coun-
17 try began in April 1992.

18 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.**

19 The Congress supports the efforts of the Government
20 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina—

21 (1) to defend its people and the territory of the
22 Republic;

23 (2) to preserve the sovereignty, independence,
24 and territorial integrity of the Republic; and

1 (3) to bring about a peaceful, just, fair, viable,
2 and sustainable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia
3 and Herzegovina.

4 **SEC. 4. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.**

5 (a) **TERMINATION.**—The President shall terminate
6 the United States arms embargo of the Government of
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina on—

8 (1) the date of receipt from that Government of
9 a request for assistance in exercising its right of
10 self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
11 Charter, or

12 (2) April 30, 1995,

13 whichever comes first.

14 (b) **DEFINITION.**—As used in this section, the term
15 “United States arms embargo of the Government of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina” means the application to the
17 Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of—

18 (1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and pub-
19 lished in the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58
20 F.R. 33322) under the heading “Suspension of Mu-
21 nitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia”; and

22 (2) any similar policy being applied by the

23 United States Government as of the date of receipt
24 of the request described in subsection (a) pursuant
25 to which approval is denied for transfers of defense

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4

1 articles and defense services to the former Yugo-
2 slavia.

3 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
4 tion shall be interpreted as authorization for deployment
5 of United States forces in the territory of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina for any purpose, including training, support,
7 or delivery of military equipment.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	re: Carter Letter to Milosevic. (2 pages)	12/30/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2617

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).



RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

SU —
 Bill D —
 First draft
 of DoD op-31.
 (C)
 12-30

OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY

To:	Don Kerrick
Organization:	NSC
Phone:	456-9131
Fax:	456-9150
From:	John Klekas
Organization:	OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:	703-69
Fax:	703-695-6506
Date:	December 29, 1994
Pages including this cover page:	4

Comments:

THIS IS NOT/NOT AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT --
 NO ONE IN OSD HAS CLEARED IT.

DRAFT**LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA-- LET'S NOT GO IT ALONE**

The current United Nations embargo of arms destined for the area of the Former Yugoslavia denies one recognized new nation--The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina--the ability to defend itself adequately against a better equipped and organized enemy. The United States has lobbied hard within the international community to reverse this unfair UN-imposed embargo to give the Government of Bosnia the adequate means of self defense. Even though peace in Bosnia is elusive and our international proposals to lift the embargo are unsuccessful at this point, we should continue our policy of working within the international community and resist the dangerous temptation to take unilateral US action to lift the embargo.

US national security objectives for Bosnia are a stable constant of our policy and guide our view of how to proceed to resolve the conflict. The first, and primary, US objective is to avoid a wider war in the Balkans. Second, we seek to stop the violence and relieve human suffering as we establish Bosnia-Herzegovina as a viable nation-state. At the same time, we must preserve NATO as an effective alliance and support the peacekeeping role of the UN. While accomplishing these difficult tasks, we are committed to avoiding the use of US ground forces in the conflict.

Some Americans, reacting with understandable frustration, are demanding the U.S. ignore UN resolutions and act unilaterally to ensure that Bosnian government forces receive the arms and training they need to "level the field" in the face of overwhelming Bosnian Serb superiority in tanks and artillery. But such a seemingly fair, direct and simple action would be a grave mistake, leading to these unacceptable short-term consequences:

- Moral responsibility for the resulting military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia would shift immediately to the US.;
- Fighting caused by preemptive Bosnian Serb attacks will increase. While the Serbs probably could not totally defeat government forces, loss of the eastern enclaves and renewed military pressure on Sarajevo and elsewhere are virtually certain.

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- Current UNPROFOR operations will end as European and many other contributing countries withdraw from Bosnia immediately;
- UN protected humanitarian operations in Bosnia will end while humanitarian requirements will increase dramatically;
- US air strikes will be required to defend government forces, but the necessary European basing and other NATO support may not be available.
- Airstrikes alone would probably not halt Serb ground attacks;
- U.S. trainers, advisers and logistics support personnel would be necessary to assist the Bosnian Government in or near Bosnia.

Returning to our primary US security objective, one of the most serious potential consequences of unilateral US action is to spread the conflict beyond Bosnia. Escalation of fighting would likely draw in the Serbs from Krajina (as it did in Bihac), thus spreading the war to Croatia. Further, U.S. military confrontation with Serbia could precipitate a crisis in Kosovo, a development which would have the potential to destabilize the entire southern Balkan region and draw NATO-member nations Greece and Turkey into the conflict.

Virtually every European nation opposes lifting the arms embargo at this time. Thus U.S. unilateral action would be undertaken in the face of vehement opposition of key NATO allies. The resulting rift would undermine the consensus behind NATO's unified military command and deeply harm the political underpinnings of the alliance. Additionally, our cooperative relationship with Russia would be seriously threatened. Russia would likely counter US action by arming the Serbs, thereby raising the ante and presenting the prospect of American troops being killed by Russian-supplied weapons.

Unilateral action in contravention of UN resolutions undermines both international law and internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations. If the US acted alone in this matter, other nations can also claim the right to abrogate UN embargo resolutions such as those that pertain to Iraq and other pariah states.

In contrast, lifting the arms embargo multilaterally involves the concurrence of France, Britain, Russia and a majority of other members of the Security Council. Accordingly, it does

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not have the drawbacks of unilateral lift. Furthermore, unity among the Contact Group and the five permanent nations on the UN Security Council would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift.

If the Serbs react by intensifying the fighting we could, with NATO's cooperation, launch more effective airstrikes, and the allies might acquiesce in arming the Bosnian government. Moreover, with Russia's help, Serbia may be kept out of the war.

For these reasons, we continue to believe that multilateral lift remains an option, although it is not totally without risks and adverse consequences. As an example, UNPROFOR would still withdraw from Bosnia, and that is one reason even the Bosnian government does not favor lifting the arms embargo at this time.

We must not let our impatience with the arms embargo cause us to forget that much has been accomplished by international action even with the arms embargo in place. The European role, and our cooperation with Europe, has been central to what has been achieved in Bosnia. Maintaining that cooperation is, of course, also essential to our broader national interests in European and international security. UNPROFOR, for all its problems, has been the necessary element for the large scale delivery of food, and for support of the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zone. NATO cooperation has been essential for enforcement of the "No Fly Zone" and the economic sanctions against Serbia, and the Contact Group, which includes Russia, has been the principal instrument for seeking a negotiated solution.

A law which forces independent US action to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia would be a mistake. Unilateral action demands unilateral responsibility for the consequences. The US cannot simply lift the arms embargo and walk away. Yet we should not commit US ground forces to solve the problems of Bosnia. We should, therefore, continue to work within the international community to achieve fairness and a peaceful solution to this tragic situation.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Will the Croats Order UNPROFOR to Leave? (4 pages)	12/30/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid.-Nov. - Early-Dec. 1994): Bosnia DC 12/23/1994 [2]

2013-0687-F
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THE WHITE HOUSE

**Office of the Press Secretary
(Hilton Head, South Carolina)**

For Immediate Release

December 31, 1994

Statement by the President

I welcome the agreement of the parties for a four-month cessation of hostilities in Bosnia.

We hope it will be respected fully and pave the way for a negotiated settlement that brings peace to all the long-suffering people of Bosnia.

We applaud the flexibility that the parties have shown and commend the United Nations and former President Carter for their efforts.

We will be working with our Contact Group partners, the United Nations and the parties in a renewed effort to seize this opportunity for peace.

-30-30-30-

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Bosnia Update. Record ID: 9410009. (3 pages)	c. 12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

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COMPREHENSIVE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The undersigned representatives agree as follows:

1. There shall be a general cease-fire along all lines of confrontation which will take effect at 1200 hours on 24 December 1994. The general cease-fire shall be for an initial period of seven days and four months and shall be subject to renewal by agreement of the parties.

2. Should any party breach the terms of this agreement, and if such a breach is verified, UNPROFOR shall report such a breach of the terms of the agreement through the Secretary-General to the Security Council immediately. The parties shall be responsible for reporting breaches to each other and to UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR shall assess allegations of breaches, attempt to resolve them where possible, and make public the results of its assessment, as appropriate.

3. The parties shall enable the passage of UNPROFOR and humanitarian convoys as well as teams deployed for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire in accordance with the terms of this agreement and existing procedures. The parties commit themselves to the full respect for the safety and security of UNPROFOR, humanitarian and related personnel.

4. The parties agree to protect the human rights of those persons residing within territory under their control in accordance with international standards, to include international humanitarian law. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. The human rights situation in all areas shall be subject to international monitoring and observation.

5. The parties agree to the prompt and unconditional release of all detainees, to include prisoners of war, and the release of all available information on missing persons, each to be carried out in its own right. ICRC will elaborate, in conjunction with the parties, a plan of action to implement this portion of the agreement.

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BY
BOSNIAN
GOVT.

6. Negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities agreement

for a period of no less than four months shall commence immediately after this agreement takes effect, with the intention of concluding the cessation of hostilities agreement by 1 January 1995. During the negotiations the Commanders of the parties in conflict will meet under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR to determine the military arrangements for the implementation of a cessation of all combat activities along all lines of confrontation.

23 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic

Radovan Karadzic

Rasim Delic

Ratko Mladic

Witnessed by:

Yasuaki Akashi

Rortand de La Presle

5 pm 12/24/94

To President Bill Clinton

Despite the condemnation of the Bosnian Serbs for their past actions, I promised that in negotiations for peace, they would be treated equally. As you may know, the Contact Group have refused to meet with them since August.

I've sent the attached note to Secretary Christopher, and wanted you to know about it.

Merry Christmas!

Jimmy Carter

Sent 4 pm 12/24/94

12/24/94

FAX to Secretary of State Christopher, from Jimmy Carter

I am concerned about the Contact Group Statement on the Bosnian cease-fire which was issued today.

It is counterproductive for a "contact" group to negotiate or contact only one side in a dispute and insist on dealing with the other side through public ultimatums. When I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I attempted to induce both the Serb leaders and Bosnian officials to accept the language given to me by the White House and the State Department, and which Ambassador Charles Thomas said was the language of the Contact Group. The Serbs accepted this language exactly, and it was President Izetbegovic and his associates who insisted on its modification. Now, the Contact Group, apparently with U.S. approval, has changed the language to match the preference of the Bosnian officials by adding the word "acceptance."

Also, according to Mr. Akashi, the Bosnian officials have now rejected the agreement they signed with me re the immediate release of detainees, insisting that there be a prior accounting for all those missing in action. You know from experience how difficult and time-consuming this can be, having dealt with the problem in Viet Nam.

My entreaty to you is for our government to act forcefully to carry out the very delicate and balanced agreement signed in Bosnia-Herzegovina earlier this week. It can endanger the entire process if the Contact Group equivocates on its language or refuses to treat both sides equally in future peace talks.

By hope is that, on the "acceptance" language, the Serbs will agree, despite my assurances to them earlier. I have asked them to be in touch with me before making a public rejection.

A handwritten signature of Jimmy Carter, written in dark ink. The signature is stylized, with a large, sweeping 'J' and 'C' that are connected. The name 'Carter' is written in a cursive script. The signature is underlined with a single horizontal line.

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