

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid-Nov. - Early Dec. 1994) [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

Row:

34

Section:

1

Shelf:

10

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Principals Committee Review of Bihac and Bosnia Policy. Record ID: 9421411. (4 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Principals Committee Review of Bihac and Bosnia Policy. Record ID: 9409293. (3 pages)	11/19/1994	P1/b(1)
003. statement	U.S. Military Representative Intervention at MC. [NATO] (1 page)	12/05/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	For the Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Subject: Draft Preliminary Concept of Operations. [NATO] (15 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	For the Members of the Provisional Policy Coordination Group from Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning. Subject: NATO Support of UNPROFOR Withdrawal. [NATO] (1 page)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
004c. paper	NATO Support of UNPROFOR Withdrawal. [NATO] (7 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
005. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Principals Committee Review of Bihac and Bosnia. Record ID: 9421411. (4 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
006a. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to President Bill Clinton. (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)
006b. draft	Letter in Response to British Prime Minister John Major. (1 page)	11/27/1994	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Reply to Prime Minister Major. Record ID: 9409393. (1 page)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
007b. letter	From President Clinton to British Prime Minister John Major. (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2614

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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007c. cable	Duplicate of 006a. (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)
007d. letter	From British Prime Minister John Major to President Bill Clinton. (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)

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FAX COVER SHEET

FOR UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGES ONLY



British Embassy
Washington

3100 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

To	SANDY VERSHBOW
At	
Fax	

From	JEREMY GREENSTOCK		
Telephone			
Date	25/11/94	Time	12.05
Reference		Number of pages (including cover)	3

FACSIMILE NUMBER FOR REPLY

SENDER
PLEASE
TICK



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	PRESS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS	(202) 898 4273
	MANAGEMENT	(202) 898 4654
	ACCOUNTS	(202) 789 7958
	TECHNICAL WORKS GROUP	(202) 371 6819

MESSAGE:

HERE IS THE DRAFT MENTIONED ON
THE TELEPHONE JUST NOW

1. Following is text of draft Contact Group Ministerial communique.

Begins

The Foreign Ministers of Germany, Greece and France and the European Commissioner for External Affairs (representing the Troika of the European Union), the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, and the US Secretary of State, together with the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, met in Brussels on 2 December.

The Ministers expressed deep concern about the recent hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They called on all parties and others concerned to refrain from any hostile action that could cause further escalation in the fighting and to achieve urgently a ceasefire, particularly in the Bihac area. They called for strict respect and enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. They expressed their full support for the efforts by the United Nations Protection Force to ensure implementation of the Security Council resolutions on safe areas and to pursue the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.

The Ministers highlighted the dangers of the present situation and strongly reiterated the view that a solution to the problems of the former Yugoslavia could only be reached at the negotiating table. They reconfirmed the Contact Group proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will preserve that state's independence as a Union within its internationally recognised borders. They also reconfirmed the sanctions relief available under their proposal.

They welcomed the continuing endorsement of their proposal by the Bosniac-Croat Federation.

They also welcomed its endorsement, following their last meeting in Geneva on 30 July, by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the subsequent decision by those authorities to restrict their exports to the Bosnian Serb entity to food stuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs. They stressed the importance of the continuing cooperation between the authorities of the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the mission of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in this respect.

The Ministers strongly condemned the continued refusal by the Bosnian Serb leadership to agree to the Contact Group peace proposal. To avoid any doubt about the equity of the proposal, they made clear the following. After Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group map, which will be accompanied by a full cessation of hostilities and freedom of movement of people, commerce and humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia, mutually agreed land swaps, including in relation to Sarajevo, will be possible. In terms of constitutional arrangements, balanced treatment of the Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities will be ensured, including the establishment of parallel special relationships with neighbouring countries, provided this is not inconsistent with the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following agreement on constitutional arrangements, there will be withdrawal to the lines agreed. The United Nations and the international community will make arrangements to ensure the separation of forces and to provide effective monitoring of these lines. The Ministers reaffirmed that the settlement should provide for refugees and displaced persons to have the possibility to return freely to their homes of origin.

The Ministers considered the wider situation and the importance of addressing the fundamental causes of instability in the region. They called for mutual recognition between all states of the former Yugoslavia within their internationally recognised borders. They noted the economic agreement accepted by the Government of the Republic of Croatia and they urged the Krajina Serb authorities to accept it as well. They urged the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Krajina Serb authorities to negotiate constructively on the plan of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia for the UN protected areas in Croatia, once finalised, and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to support it as a balanced basis for a solution in these areas.

The Ministers decided that if the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) maintained their support for the Contact Group plan and continued to restrict all but humanitarian assistance over their borders in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, and if they recognised the other states of the former Yugoslavia within their internationally recognised borders and supported the plan of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia for the UN

protected areas in Croatia, once finalised, the Ministers would be prepared to recommend suspension of all UN sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

The Ministers charged the Contact Group vigorously to pursue the peace process on the lines above.

Ends

Revised

26 November 1994

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

The Security Council reiterates its deep concern over the deteriorating situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the Bihac region, and especially in the safe area of Bihac. It condemns in the strongest possible terms all the violations of the safe area of Bihac by whomsoever committed, and in particular, the flagrant and blatant entry into the safe area by the Bosnian Serb forces. It also notes with concern the hostilities around Velika-Kladusa. It demands that all parties and others concerned agree to and implement an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the Bihac region, and in particular in and around the safe area of Bihac. It calls on all parties to intensify negotiations for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of the territorial settlement for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed by the Contact Group as part of an overall peace settlement.

The Security Council expresses its full support for the continued efforts by United Nations personnel to achieve a cease-fire in the Bihac area, as well as for UNPROFOR's efforts to implement its mandate to deter attacks against the safe areas. The Council insists on the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military forces from the Bihac safe area and on the need to ensure full respect by all parties of the safe areas, particularly for the benefit of the civilian population. The Council calls on all parties and others concerned fully to cooperate with these efforts. The Council underlines the terms of resolution 836 (1993), which enable UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate in relation to safe areas.

The Security Council commends UNPROFOR, including those of its personnel serving in the Bihac region, and in particular the Bangladeshi troops, for the important contributions they are making under the most difficult conditions. It calls on the parties and all others concerned to ensure freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR personnel and access to necessary supplies for UNPROFOR and the civilian population throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.

The Security Council condemns violations of the international border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the so-called Krajina Serb forces and others concerned in the Bihac region. It demands that all hostile acts across that international border cease immediately and also demands that all so-called Krajina Serb forces withdraw immediately from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Security Council reiterates its full support for the proposed territorial settlement for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been put by the Contact Group to the parties as part of an overall peace settlement. The Council reiterates its condemnation of the Bosnian Serb party's refusal to accept the proposed territorial settlement and demands that that party accept it unconditionally and in full.

The Security Council will monitor compliance with the terms of this statement and react appropriately.

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FOLDER TITLE:

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2013-0687-F
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November 18, 1994

BIHAC OPTIONS

TRIGGERS

- o Serb offensive captures more territory in the Bihac area than held prior to the Bosnian Government offensives.
- o Serious artillery attacks on Bihac City.
- o Serious attacks against the Bangladeshi Battalion.
- o Bihac City suffers strangulation.

MENU OF OPTIONS

- o Establish exclusion zone (Dimensions negotiable).
- o Close Air Support in defense of UNPROFOR (Requires TACP insertion -- no new UN or NAC decisions required).
- o Close air support in response to artillery attacks from Croatia (NAC has approved; requires Croatian approval).
- o Extend Deny Flight ROE to permit attacking air defense assets in Croatia displaying hostile intent (Requires decisions at UN and NATO).
- o Modify existing authorities to authorize "hot pursuit" of aircraft attacking targets in Bosnia from Croatian airfields.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

12 5/9/2014



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

I share your deep concern about the deteriorating situation in and around the town of Bihac in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the last few days, Bosnian Serb forces have rolled back most of the Bosnian Government's recent gains, and they appear bent on overrunning other areas that have been under Government control. We are particularly disturbed at the large-scale involvement of Serb forces from the Krajina region of Croatia.

As the Bihac crisis began to escalate last weekend, we took action on a number of fronts. In an emergency session of the UN Security Council on Sunday, Ambassador Albright won agreement to a Presidential statement condemning the Serb offensive and the cross-border actions of the so-called Krajina Serbs. Our Ambassadors in NATO capitals have pressed our concerns with our NATO allies and we have called for firm action in the North Atlantic Council. NATO Military Authorities with their UN counterparts are developing appropriate military responses to contain the fighting around Bihac. At the same time, we have been consulting with the government of Croatia on NATO's behalf and have obtained its approval for NATO to conduct close air support, if requested by the UN, against artillery and other targets in the Krajina region that have been involved in the assault on Bihac.

We are continuing to press our Allies on measures to limit the Serb offensive and are actively working on a range of options that could bring NATO air power to bear in response to continued escalation by Serb forces.

Ambassador Albright convened the Security Council Thursday and Friday afternoon, and again on Saturday, to underscore the seriousness of the situation and to urge action by the UN in coordination with NATO.

In Saturday's meeting, at her urging, the Security Council adopted new resolutions on the protection of the safe areas that included the authorization to conduct air strikes in Croatia as well as Bosnia against targets threatening the safe areas. The North Atlantic Council convened Saturday night in Brussels to provide the corresponding authority to NATO forces.

I hope you will stay in touch on this issue. I will always welcome your ideas as we work to resolve it.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Minority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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003. statement	U.S. Military Representative Intervention at MC. [NATO] (1 page)	12/05/1994	P1/b(1)

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21404

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 2, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK Inderfurth
Office of the Representative of
the U.S. to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
November 28, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)


William H. Itoh

Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By RZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506Summary of ConclusionsMeeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: November 28, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 6:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (8)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIADirector James Woolsey
Norman SchindlerOVP

Leon Fuerth

JCSGEN. John Shalikashvili
LTG Dan ChristmanStateSecretary Warren Christopher
Peter TarnoffWhite HouseSamuel Berger
Nancy SoderbergDODSecretary William Perry
Walter SlocombeNSCAlexander Vershbow
Donald KerrickUNAmbassador Madeleine Albright
David SchefferSummary of ConclusionsNext Steps on Bihac

1. The Principals discussed the current situation in the Bihac region and agreed that our main goals should be to end the fighting and support efforts to negotiate measures to permit humanitarian aid to reach the besieged population. The Principals agreed not to press further for strategic air strikes to roll back Serb forces. They affirmed that the U.S. will stand by its commitment through NATO to provide Close Air Support or air strikes if requested by UNPROFOR with the proviso that appropriate action is available to NATO to deal with the Serb air defense threat.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 5/9/2014

2010-0533-M

Short-Term Strategy

2. The Principals agreed to press for a broadened diplomatic strategy based upon the following elements:

- Country-wide cessation of hostilities for at least three months, and preferably six months, tied to a reinvigorated diplomatic effort.
- Demilitarization of the Bihac safe area within its established limits, to be enforced by existing UNPROFOR troops, possibly with limited augmentation by Dutch or other NATO-country elements with TACP capabilities.
- Bosnian Serb agreement to provide unimpeded access for humanitarian relief convoys to all safe areas and other hard-pressed areas of Bosnia, including opening the "blue route" for commercial access to Sarajevo.
- Bosnian Government agreement to comply with previous demilitarization agreements around Sarajevo.
- Renewed diplomatic contacts with all parties by the Contact Group (and/or through the convening of an international conference).
 - While we would end the freeze on contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, the Contact Group map would remain as the starting point for negotiations on territory; nevertheless, the Contact Group could explore informally possible land swaps on the basis of mutual consent among the parties.
 - The Contact Group would make clear that constitutional principles and the question of links to neighboring states would be on the table, on the basis of "balanced" treatment for the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity.
- A modified "Plan B" should still be offered to Milosevic.
 - However, in return for U.S. agreement to the EU's front-loaded approach to sanctions relief, we should insist on more stringent conditions, possibly to include Bosnian Serb compliance with cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access agreements, as well as steps purely in Milosevic's control (mutual recognition, support for Z-4 plan, etc.).
 - We will also insist on short periods for sanctions suspension and a credible mechanism for reimposing the sanctions if Milosevic ceases to comply with the conditions.

- We will also press Milosevic to cut off support for the Krajina Serbs, including closing the Serbian-Croatian border in Sector East, with the sanctioning of international monitors.
- Final litmus tests should be laid down by Contact Group as the basis for a decision in January (at the end of 100-day period) on whether to extend the limited sanctions relief that is now in effect for Serbia. We should demand much stricter compliance than currently being demonstrated, including "zero option" for fuel and military shipments to the Bosnian Serbs, physical closure of most crossings, and perhaps agreement to increase the number of monitors.
- We should warn Milosevic that sanctions tightening, and not just an end to sanctions suspension, will occur if we are not satisfied at the 100-day mark.
- We should press forward with efforts to contain spillover: push Z-4 plan, press for Belgrade dialogue with Kosovo Albanians, strengthen support for Macedonia.

Longer-Term Strategy

3. The Principals deferred decision on steps to take should the short-term approach fail to produce desired progress. The Principals were asked to consider the following elements, or a combination thereof, of a longer-term strategy as a basis for discussion at a future meeting:

- Multilateral lift and strike, preceded by an orderly (NATO-assisted) departure of UNPROFOR. U.S. would set time limit for its military support and air involvement (1-2 years), after which Bosnians would be on their own. Diplomatic efforts would continue in the hope that lift would bring Bosnian Serbs to their senses.
- Reinforcement of UNPROFOR and redefinition of its mission so that NATO air power can be used more aggressively on the basis of its current mandates. (This might have to include a U.S. ground force commitment, unless we would want a largely Islamic-country force).
- U.S. disengagement from diplomatic efforts, focus on containment of spillover to Croatia and Kosovo. Plan for maintaining sanctions against Serbia and Bosnian Serbs for the long term, with international community refusing to recognize Serb territorial conquests. UNPROFOR would remain in a purely humanitarian role, to the extent possible.

Dealing with NATO and Allies

U.S. - NATO Relationship

4. The Principals discussed the impact of recent events in Bosnia on NATO and strongly reaffirmed the importance of the alliance to the United States, recognizing that future U.S. involvement in Bosnia should be conducted in concert with our allies.

Impact of Nunn-Mitchell on NATO

Principals acknowledged allied concerns that Nunn-Mitchell was the first step leading to unilateral lifting of the arms embargo which could have serious consequences for the alliance. They agreed to make strong statements opposing unilateral lift in the upcoming Ministerials and in public.

U.S. Participation in NATO Ground Operations in Bosnia

The Principals reviewed the state of planning at NATO and within UNPROFOR for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces from Bosnia should that be required. They recognized that uncertainty surrounding U.S. ground forces participation in a NATO operation to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal required clarification. They agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize Secretaries Christopher and Perry to inform the allies that the U.S. agreed to participate in such an operation in principle, to include ground forces, pending review of the plan, alternatives and Congressional consultations. Action: OSD/JCS to prepare paper summarizing current state of NATO/UNPROFOR military planning and framing degree of U.S. commitment as a basis for decision memo for the President.

Dealing with Congress and the Public

5. The Principals agreed that efforts should continue to raise the awareness in Congress about the implications of unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and to strongly oppose unilateral lift in public and in Congressional consultations. Secretary Perry will begin the next round of consultations this week using his weekly breakfast with key members. The Principals further agreed to DoD hosting private sessions with key members. The Principals directed that talking points be prepared outlining next steps in Bosnia. Action: NSC to develop talking points.

~~SECRET~~

21411

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 29, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(12)*
SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on Bosnia

Attached is your memorandum for the President on Bosnia Policy following the November 28 Principals meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By V2 NARA, Date 5/20/2014
7013-0687 -2

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Principals Committee Review of Bihac and Bosnia. Record ID: 9421411. (4 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2614

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 27, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on Bosnia

Attached is your memorandum for the President on Bosnia Policy after the fall of Bihac.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum at Tab I

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A John Major's Letter of November 23
Tab B Draft Reply to Major

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 27, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓
SUBJECT: Bosnia Policy after the Fall of Bihac

Bihac's Fall: Despite our efforts over the past two weeks to halt the Serb offensive through establishment of an exclusion zone around Bihac, the city has effectively fallen. The UN and our key allies, after accusing us of exaggerating the situation, now claim there is nothing the UN can do to protect the safe area without additional ground forces. The UN and our allies remain unwilling to use NATO air power more aggressively out of a fear of Serb retaliation against their troops; indeed, the Serbs have placed several hundred UNPROFOR troops under house arrest throughout Bosnia and threatened "total war" if the UN and NATO escalate attacks against them. The Serbs are openly boasting of their success in standing up to NATO and are demanding the surrender of the Bosnian Fifth Corps.

In these grim circumstances, the focus of diplomatic efforts has shifted toward negotiation of a country-wide ceasefire as the only means of staving off a humanitarian disaster in Bihac and a widening of the war. A call for a ceasefire was the central theme in a strongly worded -- but largely rhetorical -- UNSC Presidential statement issued Saturday night. The Serbs are trying to link this to new international talks on an "end to the war" that would not be based on the Contact Group plan. The Bosnian Government, in desperate straits after its defeat at Bihac, has said it will agree to a three-month ceasefire (and perhaps longer), but is understandably wary of codifying the status quo and seeing the Contact Group plan abandoned. While we are assuring the Bosnians we will uphold the Contact Group plan in any new talks, it is doubtful mutually acceptable terms for a ceasefire will be found.

Implications: Bihac's fall has exposed the inherent contradictions in trying to use NATO air power coercively against the Bosnian Serbs when our Allies have troops on the ground attempting to maintain impartiality in performing a humanitarian mission. This has been exacerbated by our fundamentally different views of the parties: we see the Bosnians as victims of aggression; the Allies (despite having been the first to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state) regard all the parties as morally equivalent; they have been quick to blame the

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Bosnians' recent offensive as the cause of Bihac's demise. Against this backdrop, our efforts to use NATO air strikes to prevent the fall of Bihac have only intensified transatlantic frictions. The absence of U.S. troops on the ground is cited as disqualifying us from the right to tell our allies what to do.

Allied Views: As John Major's November 23 letter to you indicates (Tab A), the British are worried about the permanent damage Bosnia could inflict on NATO and U.S.-European relations. British diplomats are telling us London is concerned (however belatedly) about the appearance of UN and NATO impotence that has been conveyed by the weak response to Bihac. They are asking whether UNPROFOR's continued presence is becoming untenable -- both because escalating hostilities threaten its safety, and because it is blocking tougher action by NATO. The British want to make one last all-out effort at a political settlement, with UNPROFOR withdrawing by mid-1995 if this effort fails.

The French, for their part, have been exploiting recent events to promote their traditional agenda: the development of an independent European defense identity at the expense of NATO. They cite our non-enforcement of the arms embargo under Nunn-Mitchell, together with our refusal to send ground forces to Bosnia, as evidence that Europe can no longer rely on the U.S. One side-effect has been French efforts to water down our initiative to have this week's NAC Ministerial launch a formal process of deliberations on NATO expansion. (Between now and the French elections in May, we can expect Balladur and Juppé -- the latter on behalf of Chirac -- competing over who can be more Gaullist.)

Where do we go from here? Principals will be meeting Monday afternoon to consider how to contain the damage from Bihac and what our longer-term strategy should be, looking to Chris's discussions at the NAC on Thursday and the Contact Group Ministerial on Friday. As usual, there are very few attractive options. In Bihac, there is no prospect of action to compel the Serbs to withdraw. Our main goals are to halt the fighting and negotiate measures to permit humanitarian aid to reach the besieged population.

Restoring momentum to the diplomatic process will be even harder. Our strategy since the beginning of the year, when we decided to take a more active part in international peace efforts, was premised on two key points:

- Insistence on a territorial solution that would preserve Bosnia as a single state and provide a better deal for the Bosnian Government than previous peace plans; and

- Using military pressure to achieve Serb acceptance (as reflected in NATO's February ultimatum on Sarajevo and what we hoped would be a more aggressive use of NATO close air support by UNPROFOR).

While this strategy achieved important results (an end to the shelling of Sarajevo; the Muslim-Croat Federation; creation of the Contact Group and the crafting of a 51:49 territorial solution), the "stick" of military pressure seems no longer viable. The threat of tighter economic sanctions prompted Milosevic to endorse the Contact Group plan and cut off of support for the Bosnian Serbs. But this has not been effective enough to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to reconsider their defiant rejection of the Contact Group proposal.

Unless we can come up with other forms of leverage, the chances of a political settlement will remain slim, and Congressional pressures to lift the arms embargo will grow even stronger. Yet it is not clear that Congressional proponents are prepared to provide the political and financial support that would be required for an effective lift-and-strike strategy -- even assuming that we can persuade the Allies and the Russians to go along with multilateral lift in the spring.

In the short term, we may have no choice but to go along with Allied and Russian efforts to use the carrot of additional sanctions relief for Milosevic to induce him to increase the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs. After Bihac, however, we will need to demand that Milosevic produce immediate and tangible changes in Bosnian Serb behavior if we are to defend the further easing of sanctions against Belgrade.

We will consult with you immediately following the Principals discussion Monday afternoon on the recommendations reached and the strategy Chris proposes to adopt at this week's NATO and Contact Group meetings. We have attached a draft reply to John Major's letter, which we plan to revise based on the conclusions reached at the Principals Committee meeting and your further guidance.

Attachments:

Tab A John Major's Letter of November 23
Tab B Draft Reply to Major

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to President Bill Clinton. (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2614

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. draft	Letter in Response to British Prime Minister John Major. (1 page)	11/27/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2614

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 2, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS *118* DON KERRICK *10*
SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister Major

Attached is a Presidential message replying to Prime Minister Major's November 23 letter regarding Bosnia and his December 1 letter on Northern Ireland.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Major
Tab B Incoming Correspondence (2 letters)

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/20/2014*

2003-0687-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Reply to Prime Minister Major. Record ID: 9409393. (1 page)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. letter	From President Clinton to British Prime Minister John Major. (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2614

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. cable	Duplicate of 006a. (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2614

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007d. letter	From British Prime Minister John Major to President Bill Clinton. (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2614

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]