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Folder Title:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid-Nov. - Early Dec. 1994) [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Sanctions #6. (4 pages)	11/30/1994	P1/b(1)
002. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1994. Record ID: 9421440. (1 page)	12/08/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421425. (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. draft	Memo for the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations. Record ID: 9409463. (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
003c. memo	For the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Bill Perry. Subject: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations. (1 page)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
003d. paper	Bosnia Policy After the Fall of Bihac. (4 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)
004. report	Air Defense Threat (4 pages)	12/05/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Response to Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Record ID: 9409464. (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. draft	Letter to Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Record ID: 9409464. (1 page)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)
006. letter	Bosnian President Izetbegovic to President Clinton. (1 page)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Duplicate of 003d. (4 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2612

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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008. map	Air Defense Threat. (1 page)	11/1994	P1/b(1)
009. email	Donald Kerrick to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: FW: Bosnia. (1 page)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)
010. note	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake. (1 page)	11/30/1994	P1/b(1)

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REDMAN DISCUSSIONS IN SARAJEVO/PALE

Background: At Secretary Christopher's request, U.S. Ambassador to Germany Charles Redman -- who served previously as the Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia -- went to Sarajevo on December 1 and held meetings with Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb officials on December 2-3.

Q: Why did Redman go?

A: Secretary Christopher asked Ambassador Redman to inform the Bosnian Government of the firm U.S. commitment to the Contact Group plan and he wanted the current thinking of the Bosnian Government prior to the Ministerial Meeting of the Contact Group on Friday night December 2.

- The Secretary asked Ambassador Redman to travel as his personal representative from Bonn to Sarajevo to meet with Bosnian Government officials. Given Ambassador Redman's expertise on Bosnia and his close working relationship with Bosnian Government officials, he was a natural choice for this assignment. (U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Vic Jackovich was out of the country at the time, Ambassador Charles Thomas, U.S. Envoy to the Contact Group, was in Brussels for NATO and Contact Group talks.)
- Our goal is to reinvigorate the diplomatic effort to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. We wanted the best thinking of the Bosnian Government on this subject and we also wanted someone to be in a position to quickly transmit the results of Contact Group deliberations to the Bosnian Government.
- Redman met on December 2 with President Izetbegovic, Prime Minister Silajdzic, and Vice President Ganic. The meetings were productive and very helpful in framing a U.S. approach to how best to get on with a renewed diplomatic push to end the conflict.
- Redman also had discussions with UN officials, who suggested he consider a trip to Pale. This suggestion was strongly encouraged by the Bosnian Government.
- Accordingly, Ambassador Redman went to Pale on Saturday afternoon December 3 and met with Radovan Karadzic. Ambassador Redman gave Karadzic a presentation on the Contact Group proposal from last July and a report on the deliberations of the Contact Group ministers on December 2. We want to stress that Ambassador Redman went as a representative of the Secretary, not as a negotiator for the Contact Group.

Q: How would you characterize Redman's discussions with the Bosnian Serbs?

A: Useful. But we'll have to see where they go.

Q: Were other Contact Group members aware of Ambassador Redman's mission?

A: Secretary Christopher briefed his Contact Group colleagues on Ambassador Redman's trip Friday afternoon December 2 and discussed with them Redman's going to Pale during a dinner later that evening.

Q: Is this a unilateral U.S. effort?

A: This is an effort by the U.S. to contribute to the new diplomatic efforts underway on the Bosnia conflict, but it complements the efforts underway by other Contact Group members -- for example, British Foreign Secretary Hurd and French Foreign Minister Juppe are going to Belgrade on Sunday December 4 to meet with Milosevic.

Q: Was Redman's visit to Pale a success/What was outcome?

A: Ambassador Redman gave information to the Bosnian Serbs on the status of Contact Group deliberations and features of the Contact Group proposal from last July.

-- These were not negotiations, but an effort to bring new life to the diplomatic effort to bring the conflict to an end. We will have to see how things develop from here.

-- Contact Group experts will remain in contact with the parties to follow up on the meetings of the past several days. We hope additional discussions will follow in the days ahead. We certainly expect that the Contact Group experts will consult with the Bosnian Government this week.

-- We cannot predict the outcome of these discussions at this point. The U.S. is determined to do everything it can to keep the diplomatic effort on track and to carry forward on the approach outlined in the Contact Group Ministers' Communique of December 2.

Q: Where is Redman now?

-- He spent Saturday night in Sarajevo and met again with Prime Minister Silajdzic. He expects to return to Bonn on Sunday.

drafted: PA - MMcCurry (via State Ops)
clearance: S - TDonilon
EUR - RHolbrooke
EUR/SEY - CThomas
Ambassador Redman

MMC foz

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U.S. SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

- I am calling to brief you on an important decision the President has made on Bosnia.
- As you know, the situation of the UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) has deteriorated significantly in the wake of the Serb offensive against Bihac. Over 300 UNPROFOR personnel are being held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs.
- Although no decision has been made by the UN Security Council to withdraw UNPROFOR, many of our allies are warning that such a move could become necessary.
- We do not favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Despite its performance at Bihac and the constraints it has imposed on NATO air power, UNPROFOR continues to perform an important humanitarian mission. Its withdrawal now, just as winter sets in, could lead to a real human tragedy.
- Nevertheless, in light of recent events, contingency planning has accelerated at NATO to prepare for a possible UN request to support UNPROFOR's withdrawal.
- NATO's planning reflects the possibility that the withdrawal could take place in hostile conditions for which UNPROFOR is not equipped. This could require the deployment of sizeable NATO ground forces to protect UNPROFOR as it leaves.
- The President believes it is important that the U.S., as the leader of the Atlantic Alliance, be ready to assist its Allies in the event their forces are in danger.
- Moreover, we have longstanding commitments, dating back to the Bush Administration, to assist in rescue or evacuation of allied troops in the former Yugoslavia in emergency situations.
- Therefore, the President has decided to inform the Allies that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a future NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- The actual deployment would, of course, be subject to our approval of the plan and to further consultations with the Congress at the time.
- I would note that both sides have recently said they would not impede UNPROFOR in the event a decision were made to withdraw. Therefore, we can't say what the actual requirements for NATO ground forces would be.

- In fact, NATO is also planning for more benign scenarios that could involve very few NATO ground forces.
- But the President felt it was important to assure our allies that we would be there if necessary. Indeed, if we decided not to participate and our British, French and other allies suffered serious casualties during withdrawal, it would cause serious damage to the transatlantic relationship.
- Let me stress that NATO is only conducting contingency planning at this point.
- Our priority in the near term is to press for a country-wide ceasefire and renewed negotiations on a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan.
- Secretary Christopher met with the Foreign Ministers of the other Contact Group countries last Friday in Brussels, and agreement was reached to make an all-out diplomatic effort.
- But if over the coming weeks and months the Serbs continue to refuse a ceasefire and negotiations, our policy will remain to seek to lift the arms embargo multilaterally.
- We would not want UNPROFOR's withdrawal to leave the Bosnian Government even worse off than it is now.
- We hope the President's readiness in principle to contribute U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to remove UNPROFOR will strengthen Alliance unity and permit UNPROFOR to remain, and that it will also build support for tougher action following UNPROFOR's withdrawal if that nevertheless becomes unavoidable.

Mrs Beretta

~~SECRET~~

21440

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 8, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Principals Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1994

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals Meeting on Bosnia to be held on December 12, 1994. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/20/2011*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

21440

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President of the
United States

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

There will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia on Monday, December 12, 2:00-3:30pm in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only plus Ambassador Thomas. The agenda is attached at Tab A.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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002. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1994. Record ID: 9421440. (1 page)	12/08/1994	P1/b(1)

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003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421425. (3 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

BOSNIA: WITHDRAWING UNPROFOR NOW AND MOVING TO LIFT AND STRIKE

Q: What is your response to the proposal that UNPROFOR be withdrawn now so that the arms embargo can be lifted, the Bosnians armed and trained, and NATO authorized to conduct strategic air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs?

A: Despite UNPROFOR's limited effectiveness at Bihac and the constraints it has imposed on NATO air power, it continues to perform an important humanitarian mission in delivering aid to Bosnia's population.

UNPROFOR's withdrawal now, just as winter sets in, could lead to a real human tragedy.

This is one of the reasons why we and our Contact Group partners have agreed that the immediate objective must be to achieve a ceasefire and a reinvigoration of negotiations on a political settlement based on the Contact Group proposal.

This said, we are concerned about the increasing pattern of Bosnian Serb threats to UNPROFOR personnel and obstruction of relief convoys. We stand ready to use NATO air power to protect UNPROFOR whenever the UN requests.

If the Bosnian Serbs refuse a ceasefire and renewed negotiations, the fighting will escalate and it may become increasingly difficult for UNPROFOR to perform its mission.

In those circumstances, there may be no alternative to withdrawing UNPROFOR, lifting the arms embargo multilaterally, and supporting the Bosnian Government with air strikes.

This is a course of action that will have serious implications in terms of resources and U.S. military involvement. It is one that we believe should be pursued in concert with our allies and not unilaterally.

We want to consult closely with the new Congress on these issues with the goal of developing a long-term strategy that will enjoy strong bipartisan support.

But in the near term, it is important to do everything possible to maximize the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to agree to a ceasefire and accept a political settlement.

Precipitating a conflict with our allies and the Russians over unilateral lift would only undercut this effort.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

Q: Has the President decided to commit U.S. ground forces to a possible NATO operation to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia?

A: The U.S. has longstanding commitments, dating back to the previous Administration, to assist in the rescue or evacuation of allied troops in the former Yugoslavia in emergency situations. These commitments still stand.

NATO has been conducting contingency planning for several months for the possibility that the UN could request the assistance of NATO forces in protecting UNPROFOR troops in the event a decision is made to withdraw them.

NATO's planning takes into account the possibility that the withdrawal could take place in hostile conditions, which could necessitate the temporary deployment of significant numbers of NATO ground forces.

We would note that both sides have recently indicated that they would not impede UNPROFOR in the event a decision were made to withdraw. Therefore, it is premature to make any assumptions about the actual requirements for NATO ground forces.

The President has not made any new decisions on this question.

(If pressed) As a member of the Alliance, we would certainly contribute in some way to a NATO operation to assist UNPROFOR's withdrawal. But the President has not made a decision in principle that our contribution would include U.S. ground forces.

Q: Does the U.S. favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal?

A: UNPROFOR has made a major contribution in delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia's population.

The United Nations Security Council has made no decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia. We do not favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal, despite UNPROFOR's limited effectiveness in protecting Bihac and the other safe areas and the constraints it has placed on the use of NATO air power.

Q: Did Boutros-Ghali call for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR?

A: UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali said that deteriorating conditions in Bosnia could make it difficult to persuade the members of the UN Security Council to continue UNPROFOR's mission.

He did not call for UNPROFOR's withdrawal.

This is a decision for the UN Security Council. We do not believe UNPROFOR should withdraw at this time.

Q: Do you agree with Senator Dole's call for tougher NATO air strikes?

A: We stand ready to implement all of NATO's commitments on the use of air power to protect the safe areas and to respond to threats against UNPROFOR troops.

We continue to favor robust action by NATO to enforce its decisions on exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde. When the Bihac situation began to worsen two and a half weeks ago, we called for establishment of an exclusion zone around Bihac enforced by NATO air power.

But we must take into account the concerns of our Allies about the safety of their troops.

The "dual key" was not an invention of the United Nations, but was established at the insistence of our allies.

In the current environment, with hundreds of Allied forces detained by the Bosnian Serbs, it is not likely that agreement will be reached on aggressive use of air power.

Questions and Answers on Bosnia

Q: Hasn't Administration policy on Bosnia been a series of flip-flops?

A: Our goal from the very start has been to promote the achievement of a negotiated settlement to the Bosnian conflict. We have consistently said that the war will not be settled on the battlefield.

We have not felt our vital interests have been directly engaged to the extent that a large-scale military intervention by the U.S. would be justified.

In joining the diplomatic process, we have sought to achieve a settlement that provides a fairer deal for the Bosnian Government than previous peace plans, and we have tried to apply a range of carrots and sticks to achieve this goal.

U.S. leadership has achieved some positive results: an end to the shelling of Sarajevo thanks to NATO's February ultimatum; the brokering of the deal to establish a Muslim-Croat Federation; creation of the Contact Group; and the crafting of a territorial solution supported by Russia and the European Union.

We stand ready to use NATO air power, to the extent that the UN agrees it will not unduly jeopardize the safety of UNPROFOR troops.

We intend to redouble our efforts to promote the achievement of a negotiated settlement, based on the Contact Group plan, that preserves Bosnia as a state and provides a viable future for all of Bosnia's peoples.

Q: Are we offering new concessions to the Serbs?

A: The Contact Group proposal's central principle is and remains to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its existing borders.

The Contact Group plan would divide Bosnia along ethnic lines -- the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity -- with the two parts linked in some kind of confederal arrangement.

While the Contact Group has presented its map on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the constitutional arrangements were left to be negotiated between the parties. Moreover, the map could always be changed by mutual agreement.

Thus, we are not offering new concessions, but trying to end the fighting and get the parties to complete negotiations on a political settlement.

Q: Are you willing to accept a Bosnian Serb "confederation" with Serbia-Montenegro? Won't this mean the break-up of Bosnia and the establishment of a Greater Serbia?

A: We do not favor a confederation between the Bosnians Serbs and Serbia-Montenegro.

The central principle underlying the Contact Group proposal is the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its existing borders.

The constitutional relationship between the two communities that will form the future state -- the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity -- is and always has been subject to negotiation among the parties.

One of the constitutional issues to be negotiated is the question of links between each of the two entities and neighboring states -- Croatia, in the case of the Federation; Serbia in the case of the Bosnian Serbs.

Any such links would have to be agreed upon by all the parties.

Neither we nor the Bosnian Government would favor arrangements that reduced the Bosnian state to a fig-leaf that permitted the effective merger of the Bosnian Serbs with Serbia-Montenegro.

Q: Have the Bosnians lost the war?

A: Despite the setback at Bihac, the Bosnians continue to hold their own in most areas under their control, especially in Central Bosnia.

But given the current huge disparity in weaponry, which is maintained by the arms embargo, we don't believe the Bosnians are presently capable of recovering much of the territory under Serb control.

A negotiated settlement based on the Contact Group proposal would roll back a considerable amount of Serb gains. That is why our priority is to reinvigorate the negotiating track.

If diplomacy fails, we continue to view a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as the option of last resort. With additional arms and training, the Bosnians could begin to reverse some of the Serb gains.

But multilateral lift is not a quick fix. It would require substantial resources and a long-term commitment of U.S. air power.

Q: Do recent strains over Bosnia signal the end of NATO or a crisis in NATO?

A: There is a serious crisis in Bosnia, to be sure, but there is not a crisis in NATO.

NATO has done all it has been asked to do in Bosnia and continues to make clear its readiness to bring air power to bear in protecting UN safe areas and UNPROFOR troops.

It is no secret that we have favored a more robust use of NATO air power, but since the UN is in charge on the ground, NATO must act in accordance with UN desires.

Many of our allies form the backbone of UN peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. It was the concerns of our own allies about the safety of their troops that led to the dual-key arrangement requiring NATO to coordinate military operations with the UN commanders.

U.S. strategic interests in Europe rest on NATO as the primary organization best suited for maintaining European security. No one should doubt our commitment or support: it is unwavering.

Q: What can be achieved by the Contact Group now? What are our expectations for Friday's meetings after the debacle at Bihac?

A: This Friday, Secretary Christopher will meet with his Contact Group counterparts in Brussels to renew the diplomatic effort.

We will be discussing how to bring the current fighting to an end, and how to resecure the safe areas.

We will look for ways to achieve a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia that will halt the killing and unblock humanitarian aid while we revitalize the negotiating track.

Our leverage has always been limited, but we believe that a combination of sanctions, further steps to deepen the wedge between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, the long-term threat of lifting the arms embargo, and continued readiness to use NATO air power give us the basis for mounting a new diplomatic initiative.

Bosnia Talking Points

- We have been working to solve the Bosnian conflict for two administrations, without the success we had hoped.
- We have made some progress over the past year, including the negotiation of an agreement between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats and the development of an international peace plan through the Contact Group.
- But the fighting continues and Bihac clearly shows that we have much work yet to do.
- In looking at the options, there are three basic ways the United States could proceed.
- One option would be to become directly involved by deploying tens of thousands of U.S. combat forces in an effort to alter the outcome of the war on the battlefield.
 - o It is doubtful the American people would consider that to be wise or in U.S. interests. It could result in major warfare, with high American casualties, yet still fail to resolve the underlying ethnic hatreds that sparked the war in the first place.
- A second option would be more or less to disengage, unilaterally lifting the arms embargo and allowing the outcome to be decided on the battlefield.
 - o While we have long maintained the arms embargo is unfair to the victim in this conflict, we are strongly opposed to unilateral lift. It would cause a serious rift within NATO and with the Russians if the U.S. were to go it alone, and it would severely undermine respect for UN sanctions on countries like Iraq and Libya.
 - o Unilateral lift would have grave consequences on the ground, putting UNPROFOR troops at risk and leading to major losses for the Bosnians, including the overrunning of the eastern enclaves and potentially Sarajevo as well.
 - o If we are to lift the arms embargo in the future, we need to do it in concert or at least in coordination with our allies. While the implications of lift are great, they are more manageable if done multilaterally, in tandem with efforts to achieve a settlement of the conflict.
- A third option is to move forward with vigorous efforts to seek a negotiated settlement. Considering the risks associated with the other available options, this is the best course for the United States.
- Our actions must seek to end the fighting, prevent the spread of the fighting into a wider Balkan war, ease the humanitarian situation for the innocent civilians who have suffered far too long, and promote a negotiated settlement that restores a lasting peace to the region.

- Our renewed efforts will not produce overnight results, but in the long run, there is no better alternative than to press vigorously for acceptance of a settlement based on the Contact Group's territorial proposal -- the best framework for a solution that could ensure a viable future for all of Bosnia's peoples.

Next Steps

- This Friday, Secretary Christopher will meet with his Contact Group counterparts in Brussels to renew this effort.
- We will be discussing new measures to convince the Bosnian Serbs of the need to accept the Contact Group proposal.
- We will be discussing how to bring the current fighting to an end, and how to resecure the safe areas.
- We will look for ways to achieve a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia that will halt the killing and unblock humanitarian aid while we revitalize the negotiating track.

NATO's Role

- There is a serious crisis in Bosnia, to be sure, but there is not a crisis in NATO.
- NATO has done all it has been asked to do in Bosnia and continues to make clear its readiness to bring air power to bear in protecting UN safe areas and UNPROFOR troops.
- It is no secret that we have favored a more robust use of NATO air power, but since the UN is in charge on the ground, NATO must act in accordance with UN desires.
- Many of our allies form the backbone of UN peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. It was the concerns of our own allies about the safety of their troops that led to the dual-key arrangement requiring NATO to coordinate military operations with the UN commanders.
- U.S. strategic interests in Europe rest on NATO as the primary organization best suited for maintaining European security. No one should doubt our commitment or support: it is unwavering.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: BILL DANVERS

SUBJECT: POTUS Meeting with Sen. Dole and Rep. Gingrich and
the Democratic leadership

The President is scheduled to meet with Sen. Dole and Rep. Gingrich on Friday at 1:45 PM and with the Democratic leadership after that meeting

In preparation for the meetings, we have prepared a memo forwarding suggested talking points on national security issues for the President from you and Pat Griffin (Tab I). The talking points address readiness (Tab A), Bosnia (Tab B), N. Korea (Tab C), Haiti (Tab D), peacekeeping (Tab E), the importance of aid to the NIS (Tab F) and the upcoming Summit of the Americas (Tab G).

Concurrence by: ^{McDon} Bell, ²⁷ Vershbow, Clarke, Aoki, Rossin, Burns, and ^{and} Feinberg

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo

Attachment

Tab I Memo for the President
Tabs A-G Talking points

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PAT GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: National security points for meeting with Senator
Dole and Representative Gingrich and the
Democratic Leadership

Attached are suggested talking points on national security issues for your meeting on Friday, December 2 at 1:45 PM with Senator Dole and Representative Gingrich and with the Democratic leadership after that meeting. The talking points address military readiness (Tab A), Bosnia (Tab B), N. Korea (Tab C), Haiti (Tab D), peacekeeping (Tab E), the importance of aid to the NIS (Tab F) and the upcoming Summit of the Americas (Tab G).

Attachments

Tab A	Talking points on military readiness
Tab B	Talking points on Bosnia
Tab C	Talking points on N. Korea
Tab D	Talking points on Haiti
Tab E	Talking points on peacekeeping
Tab F	Talking points on the importance of aid to the NIS
Tab G	Talking points on the Summit of the Americas

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

READINESS AND MILITARY SPENDING

BACKGROUND

On November 15, Secretary Perry informed Congress that the readiness status of three active Army divisions (1st and 4th Infantry and 2d Armored) had slipped in September to "C-3" -- a substandard condition that means the units could not execute all their assigned missions. Although SecDef made it clear that this was a temporary situation occasioned by the failure of Congress to pass a supplemental appropriations measure quickly enough this fall to reimburse Defense for unexpected contingencies overseas, many in Congress attacked the Administration for allowing what they saw as a return to the "hollow force." The funding shortfall that led to this readiness problem is being corrected using FY 1995 defense appropriations. Future reoccurrences will be prevented thru the Defense topline increases for FY 1996-2001 you announced with the Joint Chiefs at your meeting on December 1st (Thursday).

TALKING POINTS

- Last summer several unanticipated contingencies (Cuba, Haiti, Rwanda, etc.) arose which required immediate funding by the Defense Department.
- In August, Secretary Perry appeared before Chairman Murtha's defense appropriations subcommittee and urged Congress to enact supplemental appropriations at once to pay for these military operations. Perry warned that unless Congress acted immediately, training would have to be cancelled to free up O&M funds to pay for the contingencies.
- In his testimony, Perry itemized exactly which units would have their readiness impaired if the training were cancelled. He specifically named the three active Army divisions that have now been classified "C-3" for readiness (1st Division, 4th Division and 2nd Armored).
- Unfortunately, Congress did NOT enact a supplemental in time. Instead, it went on its Labor Day recess and did not pass the supplemental until early October. By then, the training had been cancelled and the damage to readiness done.
- Now, with the supplemental bill and the FY 1995 defense authorization and appropriations acts signed into law, we

have the funds to reschedule the training and restore the readiness. (Perry estimates a "get well" date for the 3 divisions of January-March of next year).

- One of the reasons we will have the necessary money is because we fought for an INCREASE in defense spending in FY 1995 compared to the enacted FY 1994 level of one percent (not adjusted for inflation). Specifically, last year we increased the Defense topline (in Budget Authority) for FY 1995 by \$2.4 billion and added \$11.4 billion back to the defense spending plan across the FYDP. In our FY 95 defense budget we also increased funding for O&M by 5.7% even though the size of the force was decreasing by 7%. In other words, the dollars available for readiness purposes in FY 1995 on a per-soldier basis have been substantially increased.
- I have decided to increase defense budget over the next six years by \$25 billion. And, as I announced after my meeting with the Joint Chiefs yesterday, I have decided to increase the defense budget over the levels specified in this year's Budget Resolution for FY 96-99 by \$10.5 billion. This increase will ensure that our defense spending plans will meet our requirement to: (1) protect readiness, (2) maintain the conventional and strategic nuclear force postures specified in the Bottom Up Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, (3) improve the Quality of Life for our military personnel (including the full pay raise authorized under current law), and (4) fund necessary modernization programs.

BOSNIA

- Have been working to solve the Bosnian Conflict for two administrations, without success we had hoped.
- Have made progress over the past year, including Bosnia's Federation of Muslims and Croats and the development of the Contact Group peace plan.
- Events at Bihac have set back, but not ended, our efforts to bring peace to Bosnia.
- Bosnian Government forces are not defeated, despite Bihac setback. Prospects on the ground are for a protracted, bloody stalemate.
- In looking at options, there are three basic ways the United States can proceed.
- One option is to become directly involved by deploying tens of thousands of U.S. combat forces in an effort to alter the outcome of the war on the battlefield.
 - Doubtful American people would consider it wise or in U.S. interests. Could result in major war, high U.S. casualties, yet fail to solve underlying ethnic hatreds.
- A second option would be to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, provide massive air strikes, or if no air strikes, disengage and allow the outcome to be decided on the battlefield. Strongly oppose this option.
 - No guarantee this would work. Would be difficult to provide assistance, conduct airstrikes without Allied cooperation. Bosnians could lose substantial territory. Then what?
 - Grave consequences on the ground. UNPROFOR departure would leave terrible humanitarian situation.
- Third option is to move forward with vigorous efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. Considering risks associated with other options, this is best course for our country. Only way out is a political solution.
- Continue to stand by the Contact Group plan as the best basis for a political settlement that can provide a viable future for all of Bosnia's peoples.

- Remain committed to the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its existing borders.
- Do not favor Bosnian Serb confederation with Serbia, but it is up to parties to work out constitutional arrangements.
- Have not authorized any new concessions to the Bosnian Serbs, despite press reports you might have seen.
- This being said, our leverage is limited, but believe there is a real chance for success in renewed diplomatic effort.
- Thus, we are trying to end the fighting and get the parties to complete negotiations on a political settlement.
- Secretary Christopher is meeting with his Contact Group counterparts today to reinvigorate the negotiating process.
- Stand by our NATO commitments to provide air power throughout Bosnia when requested by the UN, although circumstances now make it unlikely that the UN will agree to robust air strikes.
- Dual key, while frustrating, was established at insistence of allies, who have genuine concerns about troops' safety.
- Must emphasize that while there is a serious crisis in Bosnia, there is not a crisis in NATO. NATO has done all it has been asked to do in Bosnia.
- NATO is vital to U.S. strategic interests. Our actions must not harm NATO. If the war spreads, it will have to be dealt with by NATO, not the U.S. alone. And Europeans can't cope without us.
- Will do everything we can to achieve a political settlement, but remain prepared to move forward with our proposal to multilaterally lift the arms embargo if necessary.
- Remain strongly opposed to unilateral lift as a step that would have grave consequences for the United States. Will consult closely with the new Congress on implications of both unilateral and multilateral lift and on U.S. involvement.

ADDITIONAL QS AND AS ON BOSNIA

Q: Has the President decided to commit U.S. ground forces to a possible NATO operation to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia?

A: The U.S. has longstanding commitments, dating back to the previous Administration, to assist in the rescue or evacuation of allied troops in the former Yugoslavia in emergency situations. These commitments still stand.

NATO has been conducting contingency planning for several months for the possibility that the UN could request the assistance of NATO forces in protecting UNPROFOR troops in the event a decision is made to withdraw them.

NATO's planning takes into account the possibility that the withdrawal could take place in hostile conditions, which could necessitate the temporary deployment of significant numbers of NATO ground forces.

We would note that both sides have recently indicated that they would not impede UNPROFOR in the event a decision were made to withdraw. Therefore, it is premature to make any assumptions about the actual requirements for NATO ground forces.

The President has not yet made a decision on this question.

(If pressed) As a member of the Alliance, we would certainly contribute in some way to a NATO operation to assist UNPROFOR's withdrawal. But the President has not made a decision in principle that our contribution would include U.S. ground forces.

Q: Does the U.S. favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal?

A: The United Nations Security Council has made no decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia. We do not favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal.

UNPROFOR has made a major contribution in delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia's population.

Despite UNPROFOR's limited effectiveness in protecting Bihac and the other safe areas and the constraints it has placed on the use of NATO air power, we believe it continues to play a stabilizing role overall.

Q: Did Boutros-Ghali call for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR?

A: UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali said that deteriorating conditions in Bosnia could make it difficult to persuade the members of the UN Security Council to continue UNPROFOR's mission.

He did not call for UNPROFOR's withdrawal.

This is a decision for the UN Security Council. We do not believe UNPROFOR should withdraw at this time.

Q: Do you agree with Senator Dole's call for tougher NATO air strikes?

A: We stand ready to implement all of NATO's commitments on the use of air power to protect the safe areas and to respond to threats against UNPROFOR troops.

We continue to favor robust action by NATO to enforce its decisions on exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde. When the Bihac situation began to worsen two and a half weeks ago, we called for establishment of an exclusion zone around Bihac enforced by NATO air power.

But we must take into account the concerns of the UN and our Allies about the safety of their troops.

NORTH KOREA

- The Agreed Framework with North Korea meets our key national security objectives by:
 - Freezing and eventually eliminating North Korea's dangerous plutonium production program;
 - Requiring full compliance by North Korea with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.
- IAEA inspectors now in North Korea report that the DPRK is complying with the freeze. They are discussing additional measures to continue to monitor the freeze on the reprocessing plant, reactor construction and other nuclear activities.
- We have begun discussing with North Korea how to store safely the 8,000 spent fuel rods, for eventual removal from North Korea. As part of these technical discussions, a U.S. team visited the Yongbyon reactor for the first time.
- The North Koreans agreed to accept special inspections, and to comply fully with IAEA safeguards, before they get significant nuclear components of a light water reactor. Deferring these inspections has no adverse effect on U.S. national security.
- In return for these significant nonproliferation steps, the U.S. agreed to lead an international consortium to provide alternative energy to North Korea (heavy fuel oil) and to construct a light water reactor project, to open liaison offices, and to begin removing barriers to U.S. trade and investment in North Korea.
- At the APEC summit, South Korea and Japan reiterated their support for the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. They will bear the lion's share of the costs for the light water reactor project and alternative energy supply.
- This agreement is not based on trust, but on independent monitoring of North Korean compliance by the IAEA and on interlocking steps by both sides, ensuring that we retain leverage at each stage.
- The North Korean Agreed Framework is strongly in our national interest. Hope we can keep this issue from becoming a partisan battleground.

HAITI

- Want to work together with you to consolidate our achievements, fulfill all our objectives in Haiti.
- Major accomplishments already -- peaceful deployment of multinational force to restore democracy and elected President. Initial security and stability established. Aristide stress on reconciliation critical to process.
- Establishment of Haitian police on schedule. Overall Haitian progress in restoring functioning government adequate though slow given damage of coup period.
- To finish job, protect interests, must keep our commitments to general security, economic aid, private sector support. Only basis for credible foreign policy.
- Means no premature or forced departure, but rather smooth hand-off to UNMIH capable of fulfilling UNSCR 940 mandate. Need your support for steps to achieve seamless transition to UN Mission, including U.S. participation in UNMIH.
- Well on track to smooth transition to UNMIH in early months 1995. Our troops coming home fast. 9000 remain now, will be 6000 of original 20,000 by end December.
- Good quality foreign participants for UNMIH identified, most already in Haiti, others ready now or soon.
- Pleased to note UNMIH military commander will be U.S. general. (IF ASKED: Not yet made decision who it will be.)
- Working well with UN to shape UNMIH. Major joint planning session next week.
- Delay in scheduling elections need not hamper transition. Will make point forcefully if needed to UN, Haitians.
- With bipartisan support, ingredients there for exit strategy to ensure UNMIH withdrawal in early 1996 as planned.
- (IF RAISED) Share your concern over role of reintegrated officers associated with excesses during last Aristide Presidency. Reviewing best way to handle problem.

PEACEKEEPING

- Peacekeeping has been portrayed as a point of contention between the Administration and the Republican-led Congress.
- It does not have to be. I hope we can work together constructively on this as well as other national security issues.
- There will certainly be points of difference between us, but I think there is a good deal of common ground.
- UN peacekeeping serves our common interest in burden-sharing
 - getting others to take responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It is in our national interests to preserve this as one of many tools of U.S. foreign policy.
- UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, Cyprus, Cambodia, Namibia, El Salvador, and elsewhere demonstrate the value to the U.S. of many recent UN efforts.
- As our policy on *reforming* UN peacekeeping makes clear, we share a commitment to using UN peacekeeping only when it serves U.S. interests, to reducing costs and the U.S. assessment, and to improving UN management and accountability. We have made progress thus far and will continue pressing for meaningful reforms.
- We are serious about keeping U.S. troops under U.S. command and control when they serve in large numbers or potentially complex missions, as demonstrated by our insistence on a U.S. commander for UNMIH.
- We do not intend to use the UN for operations likely to involve combat. Instead, we will act unilaterally or through NATO.
- I hope we can build on our points of agreement and avoid partisanship on this issue.

RUSSIA/NIS POLICY

- You both have been strong supporters of our policies toward Russia, Ukraine, and other ex-Soviet states.
- You also haven't held back with criticism when you felt it was warranted -- e.g. on effectiveness of our aid program (Gingrich) or Russia's foreign policy (Dole).
- That's constructive -- appreciate it because it shows you share concern about importance of this effort.
- Still my top priority: make sure we do everything we can to help Russia keep on the right road, lock in the changes already made and keep moving ahead. Get them so integrated into the global world they can never be isolated and threatening again.
- Want to maintain bipartisan support -- I will need your personal help to do this.
- Hard to see any other foreign policy issue with such impact on our own national security. Detargeting agreement; getting nuclear weapons out of Ukraine, Belarus, etc.; recent operation corralling loose nuke material in Kazakhstan. This is Nunn-Lugar money at work. Lots more to do.
- START I enters into force next week when I meet Yeltsin and Kuchma in Budapest. President Yeltsin and I agreed at our summit in September that we wanted to be able to exchange the instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty at our next summit, late next spring. I will work with the Senate to achieve this goal.
- Economically, Russia and other states getting up on their feet a bit more. Our assistance shifting from direct aid to trade. OPIC and Ex-Im can leverage relatively small amounts into large U.S. investments. Exchanges with next generation also very important.
- Think we have our assistance level about right -- just under one billion this year and next. Russia no longer gets the lion's share, because others -- Ukraine, Armenia, Baltics -- need it even more and will get majority in 1995.
- I will work to ensure our assistance is relevant and efficient -- a top priority. Appreciate your continued interest in this. Bipartisan support has brought us a long way already.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

- Summit will promote U.S. interests in hemisphere for new relationship between United states and countries of the hemisphere.
- We will announce hemispheric wide commitment to goal of free trade.
- Important step in trade policy that benefits U.S. companies and American consumers. Follows other important steps: NAFTA, APEC and GATT.
- Commitments also to seek more favorable climate for private investment in infrastructure and telecommunications that will benefit U.S. companies.
- Measures to strengthen democratic institutions, primarily through OAS.
- Combating corruption, U.S. companies disadvantaged competing with foreign firms not barred from bribery, similar practices. First step toward redressing that in the hemisphere.
- Strong counter-narcotics and money-laundering initiative. Cooperative effort to get at traffickers and their assets.
- Joint efforts to improve education and health and protect the environment.
- Latin America will become increasingly important to United States-- in business obviously but in other ways as well.
- Want to keep the hemisphere democratic. Fundamental goal.
- Want to keep economies on road to reform and to more open trading practices.
- Want U.S. businesses to participate fully, fairly in growing hemispheric market. By next year, U.S. exports to hemisphere will exceed those in Europe, including Eastern Europe and Russia. Cannot ignore this market.

- Want to end once and for all north-south divide and approach common issues on cooperative basis. Previous summits consisted largely of Latin requests for more U.S. foreign aid. This summit is different. Emphasis on trade and investment opportunities and we expect reciprocity.
- Will put in place what we are calling Miami process, which will include regular high-level hemispheric meetings on such issues as trade and counter-narcotics. Strengthened role for OAS and Inter-American Development Bank. A new architecture for hemispheric relations.
- 27 years since last hemispheric summit. Cannot let that happen again.
- Miami process will lead to continual hemispheric dialogue and real progress on issues important to the United States and rest of the hemisphere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9464

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

December 1, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *DK*
SUBJECT: Message to Bosnian President Izetbegovic

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a letter from Bosnian President Izetbegovic. At Tab A is a suggested message to President Izetbegovic in reply.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Message to Izetbegovic
Tab B Incoming correspondence

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014
7013-0687-f

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Response to Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Record ID: 9409464. (2 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2612

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005b. draft	Letter to Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Record ID: 9409464. (1 page)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)
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Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Washington, DC

November 29, 1994


The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to forward to you the attached letter dated November 29, 1994 from the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, addressed to your Excellency.

Please accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest considerations.

Sincerely,


Sven Alkalaj
Ambassador

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. letter	Bosnian President Izetbegovic to President Clinton. (1 page)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Duplicate of 003d. (4 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [4]

2013-0687-F
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Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Late November 1994



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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. map	Air Defense Threat. (1 page)	11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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Bob Dole



NEWS

U.S. SENATOR FOR KANSAS

FROM:

SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, December 8, 1994

Contact: Clarkson Hine
(202) 224-5358

BOSNIA UPDATE

PLANNING FOR U.N. WITHDRAWAL APPROPRIATE;
UNPROFOR DEPARTURE WOULD CLEAR WAY FOR NATO LIFT & STRIKE;
END TO U.N./NATO "DUAL KEY" ESSENTIAL TO
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

WASHINGTON -- Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole today issued the following statement regarding the President's announcement that the U.S. is prepared to offer the support of U.S. forces, including ground troops, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. Protection Forces in Bosnia should that become necessary:

"In my view, planning for the withdrawal of U.N. Protection Forces is the appropriate course of action. Clearly, as developments throughout Bosnia demonstrate, these forces are in danger and are unable to protect themselves, let alone fulfill their mandate -- despite their continuing courage under difficult circumstances. Ironically, the only protection being provided, albeit unintentionally, is to the Bosnian Serb forces.

"Once U.N. forces are withdrawn, the way would be cleared for NATO to carry out effective air strikes, and for the arms embargo to be lifted against the Bosnians so that they may, at long last, defend themselves. Realistically, without UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the lifting of the arms embargo and robust air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets, such as ammunition dumps, fuel depots and air fields, cannot occur. Furthermore, the withdrawal of U.N. forces will remove any excuses for opposing the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Secretary of Defense Perry contacted me today regarding the President's decision to provide U.S. forces, including ground troops, if necessary, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. protection forces. He did not mention any estimates of how many U.S. troops may be required. Hopefully, such assistance will not be necessary. In any case, the Congress will want to discuss these contingency plans with the administration in detail.

"In my view, essential to Congressional support for any operation potentially involving U.S. ground forces will be a firm commitment from the administration that the dual-key arrangements currently in place will be terminated and that the U.N. will not be in command of any such operation. Under no circumstances should any American forces be subject to United Nations decisions on their manner of operations, rules of engagement, or ability to defend themselves, as is presently the case with NATO air forces. Right now, NATO air crews are at risk because U.N. commanders refuse to allow NATO to take normal defensive measures in particular, with respect to addressing the threat posed by Bosnian Serb air defenses."

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. email	Donald Kerrick to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: FW: Bosnia. (1 page)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. note	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake. (1 page)	11/30/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

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