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Folder Title:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid-Nov. - Early Dec. 1994) [3]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	Restricted Session Bosnia. (3 pages)	12/09/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	NATO Enlargement and the PFP. (5 pages)	12/09/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421451. (5 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)
002b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1994. Record ID: 9421440. (1 page)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	Proposed Congressional Strategy. (2 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations. Record ID: 9409463. (4 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Bill Perry. Subject: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations. (1 page)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Bosnia in 1995. (7 pages)	12/11/1994	P1/b(1)
005. email	To Alexander Vershbow from Donald Kerrick. Subject: FW: What Can They Do to Us? (2 pages)	12/09/1994	P1/b(1)
006. paper	The Milosevic-Karadzic Break: Stalemated for Now. [CIA Act] [partial] (6 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2611

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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001b. paper	NATO Enlargement and the PFP. (5 pages)	12/09/1994	P1/b(1)

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PREVIOUS U.S. COMMITMENTS TO PROTECT
ALLIED TROOPS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

In his Univision interview last Thursday, the President was asked about his decision in principle earlier that week to provide U.S. ground forces to a possible NATO operation to support the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Bosnia. The President referred to commitments made during the Bush Administration to help in the protection of Allied troops in former Yugoslavia in the event they were in trouble and needed to withdraw.

The President did not state or mean to imply that these previous commitments encompassed the use of U.S. ground forces. Discussions with our NATO allies in 1992 and early 1993 focused on the possible use of U.S. air power in support of Allied forces in Bosnia if they needed protection or assistance in evacuation. While some discussions between U.S. and Allied military authorities covered options that would have involved the use of U.S. ground forces, no commitments were made in this regard.

The President's decision last week therefore represents an extension of previous commitments. He felt it was important for the U.S., as the leader of the Atlantic Alliance, to offer ground forces to assist its Allies in the event they come into danger during a possible withdrawal from Bosnia. Congressional leaders were informed of this decision before it was conveyed to our Allies.

As we have stated previously, no decision has been made to withdraw UN forces from Bosnia, and we hope that UNPROFOR can continue to perform its important humanitarian mission. In the event a decision is made to withdraw UNPROFOR, the actual deployment of U.S. forces will be subject to our review of the plans and further consultations with the Congress at the time. Any deployment of U.S. ground forces would be under NATO command.

I would note that since the Clinton Administration took office, the U.S. has joined in decisions by NATO to provide close air support to UNPROFOR troops throughout Bosnia if requested by the UN commanders (June 1993) and to conduct air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, Gorazde and other areas in Bosnia in coordination with the UN (August 1993, February 1994, and April 1994).

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002a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421451. (5 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 12, 1994. Record ID: 9421440. (1 page)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)

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002c. paper	Proposed Congressional Strategy. (2 pages)	12/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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9643

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

34 DEC 1 P5:15

November 30, 1994

The President
The White House
Room 102 East Wing
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We support a change in U.S. policy toward Bosnia. Current policy has been on a path of encouraging increased violence and assuming greater U.S. responsibility for the outcome of the conflict. The net effect of current policy is to embolden the Bosnian Muslim-Croat forces to continue the fighting indefinitely, believing the United States is their ally against the Bosnian Serbs.

Last week, we completed a fact-finding trip to Europe consulting with several U.S. and European diplomats and military officials closest to this conflict. Most of those officials believe that current U.S. policy needs reconsideration. We agree. The view we bring to you represents a consensus opinion calling for a redirection in U.S. policy.

No one challenges U.S. intentions. But the complexity of the Bosnian conflict defies understanding. We found that no nation or international organization has a complete picture of the situation. Each is working hard to find a solution, but without collective unity of effort...it could be described as a "Tower of Babel" situation.

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has not been given sufficient credit, particularly in the media, for successfully providing humanitarian relief and controlling violence. The continued presence of UNPROFOR in the region is critical to achieving a cease fire and any future political solution.

NATO unity is jeopardized by recent U.S. unilateral action concerning Bosnia. Our proposed unilateral lift of the arms embargo and robust use of air power threatens the safety of our allies' troops on the ground. We are convinced that the strength and unity of NATO is more important than pursuing short-sighted and expedient policies in Bosnia. Independent U.S. action undermines U.S. leadership and influence which most NATO members regard as key to effective security and stability in Europe.

We urge that U.S. policy be modified to reflect a realistic appraisal of the political, social, and military conditions in Bosnia. Despite its repugnant picture, the lines are drawn in Bosnia...we cannot roll back the clock. All parties are resolved to defend their ground and are blinded by irrationality, hatred, and deep distrust.

Unfortunately, it is clear that many Americans have a simplistic view of the conflict. The most obvious misconception is that the Serbs are the "bad guys" while the Muslim-Croats are the "good guys." However, the tragic record of loathsome behavior and willful violations of civility show that all parties have very dirty hands in this conflict.


Recognizing these difficulties, we believe a consensus exists within UNPROFOR, NATO, and among our friends in Europe that negotiations can bring about agreement in Bosnia. Accordingly, we support a change in U.S. policy that follows these themes:

- Harmonize U.S. Bosnian policy with NATO's long-term aims for unity and European security.
- Contain the conflict to Bosnia.
- Do not take sides. Support UNPROFOR's impartial task of humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.
- Get a cease fire as soon as possible.
- Talk to the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Government. Bring all parties to the negotiating table.
- Work through the Contact Group to redraw the map, negotiate a settlement, and establish security guarantees for all sides.

We believe a window of opportunity exists to end widespread violence in the region. Bosnians are tired of war. A military stalemate exists that prevents either side from gaining meaningful results. Now is the time to start negotiating an attainable settlement.

Sincerely,


IKE SKELTON
Member of Congress


JIM CHAPMAN
Member of Congress


CHET EDWARDS
Member of Congress

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ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR
RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

December 1, 1994

9672
31 DEC 5 49:10

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As we discussed on the telephone yesterday, I believe that there is strong sentiment in the Congress that something must be done to establish rough military parity in Bosnia by eliminating the current Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and thus accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnia conflict. Some members of Congress favor accomplishing this through a unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia. Others support lifting the embargo multilaterally. Unfortunately, there is little hope that this latter approach will be agreed upon by NATO or by the U.N. Security Council.

I believe that the cohesion of NATO will be seriously threatened if the United States pursues a unilateral lift of the arms embargo. This will lead to our allies basically saying to us that Bosnia is now the responsibility of the United States.

Senator Lugar and I have asked Secretary Perry to review an alternative strategy. With the cohesion of NATO at issue if the U.S. undertakes a unilateral lift, we suggest the following three-prong approach.


- (1) The zones in Bosnia from which all heavy weapons are excluded would be expanded step by step.
- (2) Any heavy weapon detected in a proscribed area would be subject to NATO air attack.
- (3) In areas where air attack is not adequate, we and our NATO allies would undertake partial lifting of the embargo by providing the Bosnians with a carefully selected package of defensive arms (anti-tank weapons, mortars).

Enclosed is a copy of the letter we sent to Secretary Perry, setting forth this basic approach. I am also enclosing a copy of Secretary Perry's reply.

Our NATO allies may have serious concerns with this approach, particularly while UNPROFOR is deployed throughout Bosnia. There is no doubt that our strategy involving enforcement from the air will be very difficult as long as UN forces remain on the ground in Bosnia. However, if our allies will not agree to a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, a multilateral "build-down" of heavy weapons would be much preferable to a unilateral U.S. arms build-up in Bosnia. It could be discussed with our allies as a policy option that would meet Congressional concerns while avoiding the grave problems for U.S.-European relations associated with a unilateral lift.

I hope you will give this idea careful consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sam", written over a horizontal line.

Sam Nunn
Chairman

Enclosures

SAM NUNN GEORGIA CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

ARNOLD L. PUNARO, STAFF DIRECTOR
RICHARD L. REYNARD, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301

September 30, 1994

Dear Bill:

We are writing to ask you to conduct an expedited policy review of the military impact of a build down strategy as an alternative to the lifting of the United Nations Arms Embargo on the government of Bosnia Herzegovina.

As you know, there is strong support in the Congress for reducing the disparities in defense capability among the parties involved in the conflict in Bosnia. Some members of Congress have supported a unilateral lifting of the embargo, others have favored a multilateral lifting that would involve our NATO allies who have troops on the ground with the UNPROFOR forces.

All versions of the lift strategy have the downside that the introduction of more arms, especially heavy armament, could increase the level of violence in Bosnia and thus run counter to the widely shared objective of ending the military conflict. Our allies have been particularly concerned about this prospect, and have stated their intention to withdraw their troops from UNPROFOR if the arms embargo on the Bosnian government is lifted. They are convinced that such a move would lead to a significant increase in violence in Bosnia including Serbian attacks on allied troops.

The recent change of policy by the government of Bosnia Herzegovina regarding the timing of a lift of the arms embargo, and the recent closing of the Serbian-Bosnian border has provided the opportunity for a new US approach which could lead to the leveling of the field in Bosnia we have sought, while also leading to a reduction in violence. This new approach would be to eliminate the heavy equipment held by all sides in Bosnia in a step by step process. We feel this approach warrants a serious and comprehensive review at the highest levels within the Department of Defense.


The build down concept is the flip side of the idea of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The idea would be to level the ground by eliminating all or most of the heavy equipment on both sides by either destroying it or removing it from Bosnia. This could apply to all tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars.

This strategy, like the strategy of lifting the arms embargo raises serious questions which merit your review. How would our NATO allies react to such a proposal? How would the factions in Bosnia likely react? Would such an approach be enforceable? Could we find economic incentives to make the proposal attractive to the factions?

If feasible, we believe a proposal along these lines could garner broad support in the Congress and could set the stage for renewed efforts to develop a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian crisis. We know that the lifting of the arms embargo has met with significant implementation obstacles. A build-down policy may have similar disadvantages. We therefore urge you to conduct an immediate policy review of such a strategy to assess its merit.

As you consider this alternative approach to the current legal requirement for the President to request a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, we would also appreciate your assessment of the outcome of compliance with current law, in view of the recent changes of policy by the governments of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sincerely,



Richard C. Lugar
U.S. Senator



Sam Nunn
U.S. Senator



7 October 1994

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, SROB Room 228
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Sam:

I am pleased to respond to your letter of September 30, 1994 asking me to review the military impact of a build down strategy.

You present an intriguing concept. Bosnia build down is a conceptual breakthrough that captures the moral high ground on this issue--namely, that there is another way to level the battlefield. Rather than increase arms through lifting the embargo, we may be able to reduce the number of available weapons through a regulated process.

Indeed our current Bosnia policy might be seen as the first phase of a build down strategy. Our commitment to robust enforcement of the exclusion zones and our effort to seal the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina represent the first steps in an arms reduction process. An interagency team is working to develop a phased strategy that would move from these early steps to a more comprehensive build down of all heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars. Obviously, we will need to address a number of difficult questions about verification, enforcement, assurances against circumvention, and economic incentives that might make the proposal more attractive. We are confident that we can find solutions to these problems, and we will keep you informed as we proceed. We are extremely grateful to you and Dick Lugar for developing the concept and bringing it to our attention.

You asked for our assessment of the outcome of compliance with the current law. We intend to abide fully by the intent of the law. If the Bosnians Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group's proposal by October 15, the President intends within two weeks of that date to introduce and support a UN Security Council Resolution to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are considering various formulations of the lift resolution that would delay implementation for six months, as President Izetbegovic proposed at the United Nations last week.


With respect to the limitation on the use of funds in Section 1404(f)(2), we are reviewing our rules of engagement and will make any changes necessary to comply with the law. We also intend fully to maintain the arms embargo on Serbia and to that end will continue our operations in the Adriatic. In his statement on signing the bill the President noted that it would not affect the

US government's ability to participate in activities in the Adriatic needed to enforce sanctions against Serbia.

The President has also agreed that if no UN resolution on multilateral lift is passed within a reasonable period of time, he will consult with the Congress on next steps, to include the possibility of unilaterally lifting the embargo. In our view, this step should be considered after all other remedies are exhausted. The consequences of unilateral lift are perilous: Americanizing the conflict, as well as prolonging and intensifying it; precipitating an arms race; souring relations with our NATO and UN allies; undermining the partnership we are building with Russia; causing retaliatory attacks on UNPROFOR and the collapse of its mission; and in the end not offering any guarantee of ultimate success on the battlefield.

We appreciate your willingness to work with us in finding a solution to the complex and seemingly intractable problem of bringing peace to Bosnia. You have my assurance that we will consult regularly and work with you at every opportunity.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill Perry". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the "Sincerely," text.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations. Record ID: 9409463. (4 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2611

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Bill Perry. Subject: U.S. Participation in UNPROFOR Withdrawal Operations. (1 page)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	Bosnia in 1995. (7 pages)	12/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [3]

2013-0687-F
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BOSNIA

Background

In remarks at a Pentagon press conference Friday, Secretary Perry announced the Administration is giving consideration to a policy that would "build-down" the Bosnian Serb heavy weaponry advantage by expanding the number of exclusion zones within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ministers Juppe of France and Hurd of Britain both suggested publicly this week that withdrawal of UNPROFOR soon may prove to be inevitable, but both countries have since backed away from suggestions that withdrawal is imminent. NATO Ambassadors met Friday and agreed UNPROFOR's departure would not be desirable.

Meanwhile, Dole and Gingrich have asserted that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn, the arms embargo lifted and a bombing campaign launched.

On Thursday the Pentagon announced the President's decision to inform Allies that the U.S. is ready, in principle, to commit U.S. ground troops to a future NATO-led UNPROFOR withdrawal operation.

Following the Contact Group Ministers Meeting last week and the CSCE summit this week, the Contact Group is traveling throughout the region promoting talks.

Key Points

- We have been working to solve the Bosnian conflict in two administrations -- without the success we had hoped.
- The prospects on the ground are for a protracted, bloody stalemate. The only way out is a political settlement.
- As the President said in Budapest, the Bosnian Government has made the right choice by accepting the international peace plan and agreeing to recent calls for a cease-fire.
- We renew our call to the Bosnian Serbs to end the aggression and agree to a cease-fire and renewed negotiations on the basis of the peace plan.
- Differences must be settled at the negotiating table, not the battlefield.
- We can't let frustrations with war undermine our efforts to end it peacefully.

UNPROFOR Withdrawal

- We are concerned about Serb threats to UNPROFOR. We are relieved that hostages have apparently been released.
- We hope UNPROFOR doesn't have to withdraw. Its humanitarian mission is critical, especially in the winter months.
- We are pleased that UN and troop contributors have made clear that UNPROFOR withdrawal is not imminent.
- NATO allies agreed on Friday that UNPROFOR withdrawal is not desirable and urged that every effort be made to keep it in place.
- Nevertheless, we are supporting contingency planning at NATO in case UNPROFOR withdrawal becomes necessary.
- President's decision in principle to commit ground troops to future withdrawal operation reflects his commitment to the Alliance and is an extension of previous commitments to help Allies if they're in danger.
- Our NATO allies have warmly welcomed the President's decision.
- We are pleased that both parties to the conflict have said they would not impede UNPROFOR if a decision to withdraw is made. Therefore, we can't at this time say what the actual requirements for NATO ground forces would be.
- In fact, NATO is also planning for scenarios that could involve very few ground forces.

Previous Commitments to Protect Allied Forces

- As the President said Thursday, during the Bush administration the U.S. made commitments to Allies that we would assist in protecting or evacuating their troops if they got in trouble.
- At that time, the focus was on the possible use of U.S. airpower.
- President's decision in principle to commit U.S. ground forces for UNPROFOR withdrawal is an extension of past commitments.
- President felt it was desirable to go beyond past commitments because of the importance he attaches to NATO and to the safety of Allied troops.

UN Versus U.S. Command and Control?

- U.S. ground forces would only deploy under NATO command.
- If NATO is asked to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal, we expect that NATO would take charge of all ground forces in its area of operations and that the "dual key" would no longer apply for use of NATO airpower.

Congressional Consultations?

- We plan to consult with Congress before the actual deployment of U.S. ground forces to assist with UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- (If asked about authorization): If a NATO operation becomes necessary, we would welcome an expression of congressional support for U.S. participation.

Response to Dole/Gingrich Position

- We do not favor UNPROFOR withdrawal at this time.
- Even though its presence limits use of NATO airpower, UNPROFOR is performing a vital humanitarian mission. Withdrawal in winter would lead to a real human tragedy.
- If we were to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, it would force UNPROFOR to withdraw under heavy Serb attack and put Allied troops at grave risk.
- It would cause a major crisis in NATO as well as undermine other UN sanctions against countries such as Iraq and Libya.
- We think the focus now should be on getting a ceasefire and pushing for a negotiated settlement.
- We believe there is a chance of reaching a settlement over the next few months based on the Contact Group plan.
- But if the Serbs refuse a ceasefire and negotiations break down, the war could escalate and UNPROFOR might have to withdraw.
- At that point, more aggressive use of airstrikes would become feasible and we would support a multilateral lift of the arms embargo.

Policy After UNPROFOR Withdrawal/Build-Down

- If the Bosnian Serbs refuse a ceasefire and continued negotiations and UNPROFOR's withdrawal becomes unavoidable, our policy will remain to seek a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
- We wouldn't want UNPROFOR withdrawal to leave the Bosnian Government even worse off than it is now.
- As Secretary Perry has said, UNPROFOR's withdrawal would increase the flexibility for using air power against the Bosnian Serbs.
- We are considering the concept of a "build-down" of heavy weapons as a part of the negotiating process, based on a suggestion by Senator Nunn.
- This concept would involve establishing increasingly large exclusion zones from which heavy weapons would have to be removed, with violations punished by air strikes.
- The aim would be to stabilize the situation by *building down* the Bosnian Serbs' heavy weapons advantage, as an alternative to a Bosnian Government weapons *build-up*.
- If the Serbs continued to refuse a ceasefire and negotiations, there would be no alternative to lifting the arms embargo.

Policy Changes

- Our goal from the very start has been to promote a negotiated settlement. We have consistently said that the war will not be settled on the battlefield.
- We have redoubled our efforts to promote a negotiated settlement that preserves Bosnia as a state and provides a viable future for all of Bosnia's peoples.

Concessions to the Serbs

- The Contact Group proposal's central principle is and remains to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its existing borders.
- The Contact Group plan would divide Bosnia along ethnic lines -- the Muslim-Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity -- with the two parts linked in some kind of confederal arrangement.
- While the Contact Group has presented its map on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the constitutional arrangements were left to be negotiated between the parties. Moreover, the map could always be changed by mutual agreement.

- Thus, we are not offering new concessions, but trying to end the fighting and get the parties to complete negotiations on a political settlement.

Negotiations

- Renewed diplomatic efforts are now underway to achieve a negotiated settlement.
- Ambassador Redman traveled to the region to consult with the Bosnian Government. As a result of those talks, Redman held discussions in Pale with Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic.
- Our representative to the Contact Group, Ambassador Thomas, and his counterparts are traveling throughout the region discussing next steps in the negotiating process.
- It would be inappropriate to discuss the details of those talks, but I want to highlight that these efforts underscore our commitment to reinvigorating the negotiating process.

Vershbow, Alexander R.

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: Bosnia and the Hill [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, December 09, 1994 6:06PM

Don-- try this.

During the month of December, we should continue with Hill briefings and principal to principal conversations on our overall Bosnia policy. We will have to adjust our message as a result of the recent decision to commit U.S. forces as part of a NATO effort to secure the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We should also consider whether and when a Presidential meeting with key Congressional leaders would be appropriate as urged by both Rep. Hamilton and Sen. Lugar.

Before beginning briefings, we must also consider whether or not to seek Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in the NATO led operation. The problem with seeking an authorization is that we could fail to get Congressional approval. We would then have to decide whether or not to move forward with our decision to participate. In addition, it is important to understand any authorization will likely be loaded up with amendments that would attempt to dictate the terms of our Bosnia policy (time limits, command and control, rules of engagement, prohibition on a dual key, etc). This will also set a precedent for seeking an authorization on any future operations of this kind.

The benefit for seeking an authorization is putting Congress on record in support of a potentially dangerous mission. In addition, if we secure Congressional support we put ourselves in a much stronger position to fend off troubling legislative initiatives that might cut off funds or call for a date certain for the withdrawal of our troops. Finally, by seeking Congressional support, we are sending a strong signal to the Hill that we are making every effort to work with them.

We recommend undertaking further discussions with the Hill regarding our decision to participate in the operation before making a final decision. If the response is favorable, we then need to judge whether the conditions likely to be imposed in the authorization are tolerable. If they are not, then we will have to reconsider our options. We need to gear our Hill discussions over the coming weeks with this in mind.

We recommend that both DoD and State work together in discussing our overall Bosnia policy with the Hill and our specific decision to participate in principle in a NATO led operation to facilitate the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should that become necessary. It is crucial that we speak with one voice on this issue.

We will also continue to work with the relevant committees to set up briefings and hearings in January. Should we decide to seek an authorization and should such an authorization become necessary, we will step up efforts considerably in working with and briefing the Hill on the importance of our participation in the NATO operation.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	To Alexander Vershbow from Donald Kerrick. Subject: FW: What Can They Do to Us? (2 pages)	12/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

Internal Transcript

December 8, 1994

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY UNIVISION

Roosevelt Room

5:07 P.M. EST

Q Mr. President, let's go right to the point and let's talk about the Summit of the Americas. Apparently, an agreement has been reached that will allow most countries in the hemisphere to join NAFTA by the year 2003. Is that true, and what kind of agreement will that be?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that's not exactly accurate, but we are making real progress on getting an agreement for a date certain to have free trade throughout the hemisphere, and that is what I'm working for. I hope we can get there. A lot of other countries are working for the same goal.

What it means for the United States is the opportunity to have more trade with our best and fastest growing trading partners in Latin America. What it means for Latin America is the opportunity to have more access to the American market so that, economically, we will grow together as we try to promote and reinforce our democracies and as we try to develop responsible policies for sustainable development, the things that you have to do to keep the quality of life going, in the environment, in fighting crime and many other areas. So we are hoping it will work and we are working at it.

Q Are you going to announce in Miami that Chile will be the first country to join NAFTA?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm going to have an announcement in Miami.

Q Is it going to be Chile?

THE PRESIDENT: As I'm not going to make the announcement today. I'm going to have an announcement in Miami. We'll have an announcement when we go down there.

Q It has to do with Chile? Argentina? Colombia?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm going to make the announcement in Miami. I'll do that. I don't want to stop on my announcement.

Q Hundreds of Cuban refugees escaped today from their camps in Panama, injuring 40 American soldiers. And many people believe that you are responsible, or the U.S. Government is responsible because you have not allowed them to come to this country. Is that ever going to change?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me tell you what we are doing. First of all, we have taken in the families and children -- with young children. I mean, excuse me, we've taken in young children who are alone. We have taken in people over 70. We have taken in people who are seriously ill. The Attorney General has now authority to bring in families and children on a case-by-case basis.

MORE

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We have also found resettlement opportunities for people who want to go to third countries. Seventy Cubans went to Spain just this week. There are a few hundred who really seem to want to go home to Cuba and we are facilitating that, and we are spending several million dollars to upgrade living conditions at Guantanamo.

I think it is important that we not have a different policy for Cuba than for every other country in the world. We have to do something to protect our borders and we have to do something to avoid having a replay of the Mariel situation back in 1980 when, if we did that again today I am afraid it would just fuel a whole new round of anti-immigrant feeling in the United States and undermine what I think is important, which is to keep the pressure on for continuing to democratize in Cuba.

Now, we do have our regular laws for people coming into this country and regular processes for people to be able to apply that way, and I think that should still be available. We have increased, actually, dramatically the number of people we are going to bring in as legal immigrants from Cuba every year. We are going way, way higher than any previous administration. And so these are the things that we are doing, and I think that, over time, they will alleviate the situation.

Q Many people believe that behind this is Fidel Castro, and for 35 years the U.S. policy towards Cuba has not succeeded in getting rid of Fidel Castro. Are you willing to go beyond the embargo and explore different alternatives and change U.S. policy towards Cuba?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I believe in the Cuba Democracy Act. You know, the Cuba Democracy Act provided for not only a stronger embargo and firmer measures in dealing with Cuba, measures that almost no one in our hemisphere agreed with, you know.

Q They voted against the U.S. at the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, correct. But it also, if you read the Cuba Democracy Act carefully, it also provides for a step-by-step response from the United States in response to measures, movements towards democracy and freedom and openness within Cuba. So I still believe that our policy is correct, and I have no intention of moving away from it, except -- well, I have no intention of moving away from it.

But if you read the Cuba Democracy Act, the Cuba Democracy Act plainly sets out a framework within which progress can be made. President Menem today when he arrived at the summit apparently said he was hoping that there would soon be free elections in Cuba, and I hope the same thing.

Q Going back to the summit, you said that only democratically elected leaders will attend the summit. But the president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, dissolved the congress and put aside the constitution while president of the Dominican Republic, Joaquin Balaguer, got reelected by widespread fraud according to U.S. observers. Are they democratic presidents? Do you support their governments?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, they were both elected and neither election has been set aside yet, so I think that they are still operating under democratic systems. And I think it would have been a mistake not to invite them.

Q Talking about Mexico, Mexico has had one of the worst years in their modern history in terms of violence from the rebel movement, in Chiapas (ph.), to political assassinations of major political figures.

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What do you think is the source of this political violence in Mexico?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that there are probably different sources and others might have a better judgment than I do. I think that the rebel movement is different from the political assassinations, I believe. I don't know anyone who has argued that the two were tied together.

I think the remarkable thing is that Mexico has survived these things so well, that President Zedillo was elected with a very, very large turnout of voters that everyone believes it was the freest election in Mexican history; that he had two very vigorous opponents who felt free to run against him and to make a strong case and got a lot of votes.

So, to me, the most encouraging thing is that Mexican democracy is alive and well. NAFTA is working well. It is benefitting both Mexico and the United States in terms of jobs and income. Mexico is like every country, like the United States: it has problems, it has challenges that will have to be addressed. But with all the heartbreak and sadness and difficulty of this last year, the lesson I draw is that Mexico's democracy is getting healthier and more open, and I think they've got a good chance to solve their problems.

Q Changing subjects, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru are convinced that the real reason behind drug trafficking are consumers in the United States. Do you agree with this?

THE PRESIDENT: No, only partly. I think, obviously, that they could grow all the -- they could raise all the coca plants in the world and convert it into cocaine and send it here, and if nobody would use it there would be no market; I think that's true. But I think it's also true that if there were no cocaine, our country would be better off and there wouldn't be as many drug addicts, and other drugs.

So I think that the truth is that we both have responsibilities. I worked very hard in the Crime Bill that we just passed here to get funds directed toward drug prevention, drug education, drug treatment programs that would work to reduce demand in the United States. We have also dramatically strengthened the penalties that we impose on our own citizens, especially for selling or giving drugs to children, to minors.

So we are moving as aggressively as we can in this country to deal with Americans and the problems of Americans, both on the demand side and on the supply side, with better treatment, better prevention, better education, and tougher punishment. We have heavy responsibilities here. The United States purchases probably almost 50 percent of the illegal drugs in the world, so we are a big part of the problem, but we are moving at it.

But it is also true that we have to work with the other countries where the problem begins to try to help move farmers out of those crops into other things and to try to help change the culture in those nations as well.

Q What do you think about the Latin American leaders who were very reluctant to discuss the issue of corruption, as suggested by the President of Venezuela? Do they have something to fear?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I hope not. I would say that there are two elements here I would like to address. First is that going back a very long time, for decades, many Latin American

MORE

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countries have felt that if governmental corruption were discussed, if it were brought up by the United States, then the subject was, in effect, being used by the United States to patronize other countries.

That is why I was so pleased that the issue in this summit was brought up by other countries. Because the United States has no interest in doing that. I mean, we have had our own difficulties in this country. We have a very high crime rate, we have a high use of drugs. We have a lot of problems in the United States.

But this governmental corruption issue, the second point I want to make, is a legitimate issue. It's a problem. And all we want to do, I think any of us should want to do, is to talk about what we can do to help each other in good faith -- not to point the finger, but to honestly help each other in good faith to deal with this.

Too much corruption can undermine democracy, can undermine the fabric and the strength of democracy. My central goal here is to use the expansion of trade, the strengthening of the environment, the dealing with the drug issue, to deal with all these things to reinforce the movement of democracy throughout the hemisphere.

So that's my view of it. I don't want to be seen as the United States sort of lecturing other countries; that's not the way I view this. But if we can help other countries to deal with this, they will be the stronger for doing it.

Q The last question about Latin American, Mr President. After the American occupation of Haiti, many people fear in Latin America that the U.S. might use the same rationale to invade other countries like Cuba.

Do you think that the United States has the right to invade or intervene militarily in Latin America?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q At all, under no circumstances?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the lives of Americans were at risk, if some fundamental American interest were at stake, that's a different thing. But in Haiti, what did we do? In Haiti we, first of all, had a United Nations Security Council resolution encouraging us to take action. Secondly, we had a United Nations Security Council resolution which said that if the United States would lead an action to restore democracy in Haiti, we would as quickly as possible turn that action over to the United Nations, which would then stay in place until the first parliamentary elections are held and, second, a new president of Haiti is elected late next year and inaugurated in early 1996.

So the United States did not go there with any imperialist ambition. We went there only reluctantly. We went over backwards to avoid killing a single Haitian. We did what we did in Haiti only to restore President Aristide and democracy, and only because there was no other way to do it, and only after we had bent over backwards for three years and tried every other single way peaceably to do it. So the democracies of Latin America should actually be encouraged by what we did in Haiti because we did it with such reluctance, we did it with such peaceable intentions, and we did it only after the United Nations had asked us to take action.

Q Let me finish with a little bit of news. The United States committed 20,000 troops to go to Bosnia. What is the objective? When are they leaving?

30 951-4376
207 862-0409

- 5 -

THE PRESIDENT: What we did was, we agreed for planning purposes that in the event the United Nations mission in Bosnia would be terminated and the soldiers had to get out and they were in trouble so that they needed protection in getting out, that we would participate in doing that. That is a commitment that the United States has had for some time now.

We said that back before I became President and when President Bush was in office, and the Europeans said that they wanted to take the lead on Bosnia; and we encouraged them to do that but, if they got in trouble and had to get out, we would help them get out.

If we were to refuse to be part of a planning process, it would be very damaging to our alliance, our NATO alliance, our United Nations alliance, our friendships with the Europeans and with the other countries, the brave people from many other countries, including many Muslim countries that are there.

Now, having said that, I hope very much that the United Nations operation will not collapse. I hope the soldiers will be able to stay, and I hope we will still be able to get a peace agreement there based on the Contact Group proposal. But all we --

Q Now NATO lost the war in Bosnia?

THE PRESIDENT: No, NATO didn't lose the war in Bosnia. NATO was never -- first of all, NATO never committed to fight the war in Bosnia on behalf of the government. What NATO committed to do was to be ready to use air power to protect the decisions of the United Nations. If the United Nations decided not to let NATO do that, then NATO was not defeated, rejected, undermined, or weakened in any way. All we could ever do is what we were permitted to do by the United Nations. And every time they permitted us to do something, we did it, and did it very well.

Q Mr. President, thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Q Do you have any plans to go to Latin American any time soon?

THE PRESIDENT: I hope I can go before too long.

Q Surely not for lack of invitations.

END

5:23 P.M. EST

U.S. SUPPORT FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

- Although no decision has been made by UNSC to withdraw UNPROFOR, many allies warning it could become necessary.
- We do not favor UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Despite Bihac and constraints imposed on NATO air power, UNPROFOR continues to perform important humanitarian mission. Withdrawal now, just as winter sets in, could lead to real human tragedy.
- Nevertheless, NATO contingency planning has accelerated to prepare for possible UN request to support withdrawal.
- NATO planning reflects possibility withdrawal could occur in hostile conditions, requiring deployment of sizeable NATO ground forces to protect UNPROFOR as it leaves.
- President believes it important that U.S., as leader of NATO, be ready to assist Allies if their forces are in danger.
- Moreover, we have longstanding commitments, dating back to Bush Administration, to assist in rescue or evacuation of allied troops in former Yugoslavia in emergency situations.
- Therefore, President has decided to inform Allies that U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a future NATO-led operation to support UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- Actual deployment, of course, subject to final approval of plan and to further consultations with Congress at the time.
- Note that both sides have recently said they would not impede UNPROFOR if decision made to withdraw. Therefore, we can't say what would be actual requirements for NATO ground forces.
- In fact, NATO is also planning for scenarios that could involve very few NATO ground forces.
- Stress that NATO is only doing contingency planning. We hope UNPROFOR's withdrawal can be avoided.
- Our priority in near term is to press for country-wide ceasefire and renewed negotiations based on Contact Group plan. Contact Group representatives are in the region now, following up on December 2 Contact Group Ministerial in Brussels.

(If asked about our policy after withdrawal:)

- If, over coming weeks and months, Serbs continue to refuse ceasefire and negotiations and if UNPROFOR withdrawal cannot be averted, our policy at that time will be to lift arms embargo multilaterally. We wouldn't want UNPROFOR withdrawal to leave Bosnian Government even worse off than now.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**10/UNP**

12/8

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SUBJECT: SAFE AREAS STATEMENT - WHETHER TO
LEAVE DELINEATION EXCLUSIVELY IN UNPROFIT'S HANDS

COMMENTS: Appreciate your thoughts on the question,
as sketched in the attached.

ISSUE: In the draft presidential statement, a sentence in the third para reads: "It (i.e., the Council) encourages UNPROFOR to delineate the operational boundaries of the safe areas with the cooperation where possible of the parties." The question focuses on the words "where possible." If they are retained, the implication is that UNPROFOR has the Council's authorization to delineate the areas even if the parties do not agree. If they are dropped, the implication is that UNPROFOR should not finally delineate the areas if the parties do not agree.

Option A: Drop the two words. The Council should not leave solely in the hands of UNPROFOR such an important operational issue. If the parties agree to the delineation, the Council could live with it. If they do not, the Council should review UNPROFOR's proposed delineation before those "boundaries" are made final. UNPROFOR is certain to delineate the area narrowly -- we would be foolish to bind ourselves to this if future developments on the ground demanded UNPROFOR and/or NATO action that was ruled out because the area in question was outside the safe area, as delineated. (Note: the issue could be resolved in other ways, for example, by specifying that UNPROFOR should "begin" the process of delineation and should report its recommendations to the Council.)

Option B: Retain the two words. Granted, this is an important operational issue. But, leaving an effective "veto" in the hands of either of the parties would kill the delineation -- the parties will never agree. Getting the task done now is important -- without clear delineation of the areas, we weaken efforts to get agreement on demilitarization measures and to achieve a cessation of hostilities, which depend in part on assuring that the safe areas won't be the flash point for escalating hostilities. If we remove the words, we signal to UNPROFOR and to the British, French, and Russians a lack of confidence in UNPROFOR and a willingness to continue to tie its hands, at a time when it needs all the support it can get.

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006. paper	The Milosevic-Karadzic Break: Stalemated for Now. [CIA Act] [partial] (6 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
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(b)(3)



Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

23 November 1994

The Milosevic-Karadzic Break: Stalemated For Now

(b)(3)

Serbian President Milosevic continues to work to undermine the Bosnian Serb leadership but probably has little additional leverage now to compel them to sign the Contact Group peace plan. In response, Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Krajisnik are shoring up their internal support and publicly insisting that the international community guarantee Bosnian Serb sovereignty or reopen discussions of the map--conditions unacceptable to the Bosnian Government. Meanwhile, Milosevic is consolidating his support at home and in the Contact Group which should bolster his ability to squeeze the Bosnian Serbs.

(b)(3)

Milosevic Puts the Squeeze on the Bosnian Serbs

Milosevic has continued the public pressure on the Bosnian Serbs he began in early August.

- The government-controlled Serbian press continues to condemn the Bosnian Serb rejection of the international peace plan and has recently reported on disagreements and disunity within the Bosnian Serb leadership. As a tactic to increase Karadzic's paranoia, a Belgrade newspaper with ties to Milosevic's wife, published a scenario for the Bosnian Serb leader's overthrow.

[006]

(b)(1)

- With the exception of Seselj's radicals, Serbia's major political parties are publicly supporting the Contact Group plan and criticizing the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic orchestrated a vote of support in the Yugoslav Assembly for his hardline against the Bosnian Serbs.

(b)(3)

Milosevic appears to be serious about preventing prohibited goods from entering Bosnian Serb areas in order to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group map. Although Milosevic is probably aware of the magnitude of the leakage, we have no hard evidence that he is directly involved in arranging

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violations. Sarajevo consistently has alleged that Belgrade continues military support to the Bosnian Serbs, however, Bosnian Prime Minister Siladjic, normally a tough critic of the Serbian President, (b)(1) believes Milosevic had made a genuine effort to close the border and would seek to replace Karadzic if he remained obdurate. (b)(3)

The Bosnian Serbs have reacted with surprise and indignation at Milosevic's action.

(b)(1)

- Karadzic publicly blamed Milosevic's blockade for the losses the Bosnian Serb Army suffered to the Bosnian Government around Bihac and Kupres.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Bosnian Serbs Remain Stubborn

Despite these pressures, the Bosnian Serbs are maintaining their defiant, intransigent stance, especially by disrupting relief efforts.

- Karadzic responded last month to a public appeal by Milosevic to end the war by stating that the international community is wasting its time waiting for a positive response by the Bosnian Serbs.
- The Bosnian Serb Army is vigorously pursuing a counteroffensive in the Bihac area, attempting to eliminate government forces in the region.
- The Bosnian Serbs have also denied UNPROFOR requests for fuel convoys and convoys carrying winterization materials to the eastern enclaves, attacked a humanitarian convoy in Goradze, and hijacked a medical convoy outside Sarajevo, and have stepped up harassment attacks on the city--including an attack on the Holiday Inn housing US diplomats and other foreigners, according to Embassy and press reporting. The Bosnian Serbs also continue to disrupt efforts to reopen the UN-protected road that connects Sarajevo to the rest of federation territory. (b)(3)

[006]

This report was prepared by (b)(3) Office of European Analysis, at the request of Ambassador Thomas, Department of State. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, (b)(3)

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

Karadzic also has strengthened his grip over Bosnian Serb levers of power.

- Karadzic fired his interior minister, who reportedly had ties to Milosevic, and orchestrated the ouster of two party officials, at least one of whom the press says supported Milosevic's blockade of the Bosnian Serbs.
- Karadzic also replaced the director of the Bosnian Serb radio and TV, and (b)(1)
(b)(1)

In press interviews, Karadzic has shown interest in negotiating territorial swaps with the Muslims but on terms that conflict with Bosnian Government preferences and Contact Group thinking.

- (b)(1) Karadzic plans to ask former President Carter to help negotiate the division of Bosnia. Earlier this fall, Karadzic advocated "Camp David-style" negotiations, with the US and possibly Russia as mediators, and indicated a willingness to trade territory around Sarajevo for the eastern enclaves. (b)(1)
- (b)(1)
- (b)(1)

[006]

Options for Milosevic

Milosevic wants to rein in the Bosnian Serb leadership because he views Karadzic as an obstacle to solving the current impasse over Bosnia and as a rival who has interfered with Milosevic's efforts to consolidate control.

- Milosevic's strong personal dislike for Karadzic has been aggravated by Karadzic's defiance of Milosevic's wishes--for instance with his offensive this spring in Gorazde and with his rejection of the international peace plan.
(b)(3)

In addition to Karadzic, Milosevic probably would also have to replace Bosnian Serb Army Commander General Mladic and Bosnian Serb "Assembly President" Krajisnik, who hold views similar to Karadzic and are at least as powerful.

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- [redacted] (b)(1) Milosevic may have considered replacing Karadzic with Mladic, Mladic told Milosevic that he was unwilling to sacrifice Bosnian Serb goals. [redacted] (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Although he is finding the overthrow of Karadzic to be a complicated task, Milosevic reportedly is considering several options.

- Milosevic recently discussed with Bosnian Serb opposition leaders either a military overthrow of Karadzic or a more peaceful, political method to oust the Bosnian Serb leader. [redacted] (b)(1)
- Bosnian Serb Vice President Koljevic reported an attempt last month to assassinate Karadzic, probably by two former members of a security force that Karadzic had created then disbanded, probably because of its ties to Serbia's secret police. [redacted] (b)(1)

[006]

(b)(1)

- Milosevic also could tighten sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, although we have no evidence he has considered doing so. [redacted] (b)(3)

Next Steps

Milosevic is continuing to consolidate his support at home and in the Contact Group in ways that bolster his ability to pressure the Bosnian Serbs.

- Milosevic continues to work to marginalize the nationalist opposition, install his supporters in the hierarchy of the Yugoslav Army, and tighten his control of the media.

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(b)(3)

- Most notably, he has jailed his biggest rival, Vojislav Seselj, because of Seselj's efforts to undermine Milosevic's approach toward the Bosnian Serbs. The loosening of sanctions Milosevic received in exchange for allowing international observers on the border almost certainly has boosted his popular support.
- Milosevic also retired and reappointed generals in the Yugoslav Army, apparently weeding out some senior officers who had not shown loyalty to his break with the Bosnian Serbs.
- Belgrade reportedly has begun to pressure the non-governmental media both financially and politically to be more responsive to its policies, according to the US Embassy.
- Meanwhile, most Contact Group members advocate a further easing of sanctions against Serbia. Russia argues that the international community should lift the remaining sanctions and normalize relations with Belgrade in order to show the Bosnian Serb leadership the benefits of accepting the peace plan.
- Milosevic almost certainly hopes Moscow will block any international effort to require Serbia to recognize Bosnia and Croatia's international borders in order to get further easing of sanctions--a step Milosevic reportedly told Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin recently he is unable to take.

[006]

(b)(3)

Milosevic also probably believes that his more cooperative stance is encouraging the Contact Group to modify their peace plan.

- French Foreign Minister Juppe has publicly called for a summit between Milosevic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjman. Juppe also recommended allowing the warring parties to make mutually agreed changes to the map.
- France and the UK have pressed for "equal rights" for the Bosnian Serbs to confederate with Serbia. At its ministerial late last month, the EU endorsed "balanced treatment" for the Bosnian Serbs and the Contact Group - apparently has signed on to this approach.

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~~PROPOSED~~

POINTS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION OF SYG SAFE AREAS REPORT

-- We can support UNPROFOR efforts to arrive at measures, acceptable to the parties, that would make the safe areas safer.

-- We can support the principle that the safe areas should be free of hostile acts directed against them and of offensive military operations mounted from them.

-- We can also support in principle UNPROFOR's working with the parties to delineate the safe areas. However, we have serious questions whether UNPROFOR could undertake such a task without the cooperation of the parties.

-- We have questions whether the complete demilitarization of the safe areas, as conceived in the SYG's report, could be reached with the agreement of the parties. For example, we wonder whether UNPROFOR could credibly provide the security guarantees that would seem to be called for if the safe areas were completely demilitarized.

-- This raises a resource question, as well. As the report points out, the Security Council has not authorized the troop numbers the SYG, in his original report, contended would be necessary to provide sufficient deterrence in the safe areas. We wonder if the resources that might be necessary to provide sufficient deterrence in the case of complete demilitarization of the safe areas would be even greater.

-- We cannot make any commitment to support increases in authorized UNPROFOR manpower levels.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SUBJECT: BOSNIA: DRAFT PRES STATEMENT**COMMENTS:** COMMENT ASAP -- CG REFS MEET

AT 3:00 TO DISCUSS; CALL CHRIS HILL (647-3024

WITH COMMENT. I'LL BE OUT.

12. 07. 94

02:53 PM

*US MISSION *POLSEC*

FO2

*working copy*6 December 1994
17.00 hours**ELEMENTS FOR COUNCIL ACTION ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 959 (1994)**

- The Security Council has ~~non~~considered the Secretary-General's report of 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389). It is grateful to the Secretary-General for his ~~swift~~ response to the request in its resolution 959 (1994) that he update his recommendations on modalities for the implementation of the concept of safe areas.

- The Security Council supports the efforts of the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to ~~stabilise the situation in and around the~~ safe areas, and in particular Bihać.

- The Security Council is of the view that the precise circumstances of each of the safe areas differ, and that the modalities to be applied in them may consequently differ from case to case. It encourages the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to pursue the goal of demilitarisation of the safe areas through agreement with the parties. It calls upon the parties and others concerned to cooperate with UNPROFOR in implementing without delay interim measures to promote such demilitarisation. It encourages UNPROFOR to delineate the safe areas with the cooperation where possible of the parties.

- The Security Council condemns restrictions on freedom of movement to, from and within the safe areas. It demands that the parties and others concerned guarantee such freedom of movement both to the local population and to UNPROFOR and humanitarian agencies.

- The Security Council reiterates that the safe area concept is a temporary measure designed to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population pending an overall political settlement. Its success depends crucially upon the cooperation of the parties, as well as the efforts of UNPROFOR.

should this be dropped?

- The Security Council endorses the Secretary-General's call for an immediate ceasefire in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and supports his efforts and those of the Contact Group to achieve an overall political settlement. *GoB has accepted; B.S. hasn't*

- The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the progress of his efforts and those of UNPROFOR with regard to the stabilisation of the situation in the safe areas. It will remain seized of the matter.