

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid-Nov. - Early Dec. 1994) [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

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34	1	10	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	U.S. Proposals for Strengthening UNPROFOR. [NATO] (7 pages)	c. 12/1994	P1/b(1)
002. draft	Testimony before a Closed Session of a Congressional Committee. (6 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Points to be Made by Walter Slocombe before Congress. (7 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Points to be Made by Lieutenant General Wesley Clark before Congress. (2 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: French MOD Non-Paper. (5 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
006. form	Phone Number. [partial] (1 page)	n.d.	b(7)(C)
007a. memo	For Strobe Talbott, John Deutch, Leon Fuerth et al from Samuel Berger. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421473. (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)
007b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 19, 1994. Record ID: 9421473. (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)
008. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Pat Griffin. Subject: Possible Presidential Veto of Legislation. Record ID: 9409784. (2 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)
009a. note	To General Shalikashvili, Dick Holbrooke and Sandy Vershbow from Robert Hunter. Subject: Informal TOR. (2 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)
009b. draft	Informal TOR for CHODS. [NATO] (1 page)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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010. cable	re: Guidance on President Carter's Contacts. (2 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

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PREVIOUS U.S. COMMITMENTS TO PROTECT
ALLIED TROOPS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

In his Univision interview last Thursday, the President was asked about his decision in principle earlier that week to provide U.S. ground forces to a possible NATO operation to support the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Bosnia. The President referred to commitments made during the Bush Administration to help in the protection of Allied troops in former Yugoslavia in the event they were in trouble and needed to withdraw.

The President did not state or mean to imply that these previous commitments encompassed the use of U.S. ground forces. Discussions with our NATO allies in 1992 and early 1993 focused on the possible use of U.S. air power in support of Allied forces in Bosnia if they needed protection or assistance in evacuation. While some discussions between U.S. and Allied military authorities covered options that would have involved the use of U.S. ground forces, no commitments were made in this regard.

The President's decision last week therefore represents an extension of previous commitments. He felt it was important for the U.S., as the leader of the Atlantic Alliance, to offer ground forces to assist its Allies in the event they come into danger during a possible withdrawal from Bosnia. Congressional leaders were informed of this decision before it was conveyed to our Allies.

As we have stated previously, no decision has been made to withdraw UN forces from Bosnia, and we hope that UNPROFOR can continue to perform its important humanitarian mission. In the event a decision is made to withdraw UNPROFOR, the actual deployment of U.S. forces will be subject to our review of the plans and further consultations with the Congress at the time. Any deployment of U.S. ground forces would be under NATO command.

I would note that since the Clinton Administration took office, the U.S. has joined in decisions by NATO to provide close air support to UNPROFOR troops throughout Bosnia if requested by the UN commanders (June 1993) and to conduct air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, Gorazde and other areas in Bosnia in coordination with the UN (August 1993, February 1994, and April 1994).

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DRAFT

Build Down

SV
New
Version
(2)

Background: On September 30, 1994, Senators Nunn and Lugar sent Dr. Perry a letter outlining key components of a build down strategy. Dr. Perry endorsed the concept as worthy of serious consideration in his October 7, 1994, response. Nunn followed up with a second letter on December 1, 1994, endorsing build down as an alternative to either unilateral or multilateral lifting of the arms embargo as a means to establish rough military parity and hence create one of the essential conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Issue: obtain Deputies agreement on a definition of build down, how it fits into our near and long-term strategy, and how it should be presented to our Allies.

Discussion:

The Concept: an alternative to lifting the embargo. The idea is to reduce weapons rather than increase those of the Bosnian Govt. Build down is designed to equalize the forces by eliminating all or most of the heavy weapons on both sides by either destroying them or removing them from B-H. It is intended to establish rough military equivalence by eliminating the current Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnian conflict.

Build down should be a step-by-step process of demilitarization, beginning as an amplification of our current policy. Since force asymmetries exist, trades-off could include the dismantling of BSA heavy weapons in return for the demobilization of Bosnian Govt troops. Possible key provisions which can be inserted at any point in the negotiating process include:

- Demilitarized zones (DMZ) around Sarajevo and elsewhere;
- Demilitarized roads for humanitarian deliveries ("blue routes");
- More vigorous enforcement and/or extension of EZs;
- Cease-fire areas beyond the EZs with gradual extension into nation-wide DMZ.

Implementation: (Assumption--former President Carter has some success in getting the Bosnian Serbs to resume negotiations for a settlement to the conflict in good faith) Present build down to the UN, NATO, and the Contact Group (CG) for their endorsements. Have the CG present the idea to the Bosnian Serbs as an alternative to lift and strike. Also present to the UN and NATO the idea of partial multilateral lifting of the

DRAFT

arms embargo by providing the Bosnian Govt forces with a carefully selected package of defensive arms in areas where air attacks have proved ineffective. This idea would be pushed if the build down was not accepted by the warring parties.

Potential Problems: The UN and our NATO allies may have difficulty with more rigorous enforcement of the EZs so long as UNPROFOR is deployed throughout B-H. Re-deployment of those forces to more defensible and less exposed positions could be married to the more vigorous use of NATO air and partial lift. Expanding EZs may require more forces. Bosnian Govt is likely to resist build down. Advocates of lift (with or without strike) may label build down naive.

Recommendation: adopt build down as a component of the diplomatic strategy. Present it as an alternative to lift. If it is not readily accepted, use that as an additional argument in favor of lift, particularly the partial multilateral lift to provide defensive weapons to the Bosnian Govt in areas where NATO air power has been ineffective.

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RECORD ID: 9421473

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
002

Z 94121511 FOR SIGNATURE
X 94121511 BERGER SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 941214 TALBOTT, S
002 941214 DEUTCH, J
002 941214 FUERTH, L
002 941214 OWENS, W
002 941214 STUDEMAN, W
002 941214 INDERFURTH, K

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White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014

2013-0687-F

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WH SITROOM

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: DC Meeting on Bosnia 19 DecNSC LOG # 21473

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u>S. Talbott</u>	_____
<u>DoD</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u>J. Deutch</u>	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Secretary</u>	<u>Adm. Owens</u>	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	<u>Adm. Studeman</u>	_____
<u>USUN/State</u>	<u>Office of the Ambassador</u>	<u>Amb. Enderforth</u>	_____
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REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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Initials: VZ Date: 5/20/2014

2015-0687-F

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☒ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

NSC LOG # 21473

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: Notice of Meeting PAGES: 2

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>212-415-4016</u>	<u>(b)(7)(c)</u>

[006]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

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2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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AMBASSADOR RICK Inderfurth U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 12/14
7:30PM

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21473

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PBS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG DRS A/O _____

[Handwritten initials]

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Itoh	<u>1</u>	<u>WZ</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>mlr</u>	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>DRS 12/14</u>	<u>[Handwritten mark]</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

→ Format of outgoing memo,
per Mr. Berger's instruction,
12/14 DB

14 DEC 94

Andrew 12/14

Exec S

Forwarded to agencies,
copy made for
Faeth.

[Handwritten mark]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. memo	For Strobe Talbott, John Deutch, Leon Fuerth et al from Samuel Berger. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9421473. (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, December 19, 1994. Record ID: 9421473. (1 page)	12/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2609

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 14, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(12)*
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum and agenda for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia to be held on December 19, 1994, 3:00-4:30pm.

Concurrences by: Bill Danvers and Bill Wise

N/A I am in Moscow
Copy preserved
(12)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to your agency counterparts.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to counterparts
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *5/20/2011*

2013-0687-F

Talking Points: Unilateral Lift Implications

I. Unilateral lift of the arms embargo would have a number of severe and negative consequences for the United States and the region. Unilateral lift would ultimately lead to:

- increased pressure to deploy more than 100,000 US ground troops in Bosnia and U.S. responsibility for the conflict;

- a possible widening of war to engulf the entire Balkans, including two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey);

- a significant increase in violence. And a dramatic deterioration in the humanitarian crisis with millions more refugees;

- a serious rift between the US and our Western allies, endangering NATO;

- a direct confrontation with Russia;

- an undermining of the authority of all UN Security Resolutions, including sanctions on Iraq, Libya, etc.

1. If the US lifts unilaterally, most UNPROFOR countries are likely to withdraw immediately, leaving at best a handful of Moslem peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs will launch all out pre-emptive attacks, before the Bosnian government can be supplied and trained. Even if the US launched massive airstrikes, the US would not have the support of NATO (because lift was unilateral) and so would have to act alone. Airstrikes alone would not halt the Serb ground attack, particularly in view of the mountainous terrain and generally poor visibility, and, in response to airstrikes, Serbia itself would come to the aid of the Bosnian Serbs, raising the possibility of a U.S. war with Serbia. In the face of the Bosnian government's certain defeat at the hands of the combined Serb forces, the United States prestige would be on the line, and we would have a moral responsibility to send sufficient US ground troops (more than 100,000) to rescue the Bosnian state.

2. The escalation of fighting would draw in the Serbs from the Krajina, thus spreading the war to Croatia. With the all out military confrontation between the US and Serbia, Serbia would no longer have any reason to exercise restraint in Kosovo, thus risking the spread to Macedonia, which in turn would bring in Greece and Turkey.

3. Given France and Britain's opposition to unilateral lift, they likely would refuse consent to allow NATO facilities to be used for the US air and ground operations.

The resulting rift would undermine the consensus behind NATO's unified military command, and deeply harm the political underpinnings of NATO.

4. Russia would not only oppose unilateral lift, but in response would unilaterally lift sanctions against Serbia, and arm Serbia and perhaps the Bosnian Serbs. This would put the US and Russia on a direct military collision course, with the prospect of US troops being killed by Russian supplied weapons.

5. If the United States asserted the right to abrogate unilaterally the UNSC embargo resolutions, others would claim similar rights for other other UNSC Resolutions (e.g. France and Russia on Iraq sanctions).

II. Multilateral lift would not pose the same risks

Multilateral lift assumes the concurrence of France, Britain and Russia, all members of the Security Council. Thus the dangers to the Western alliance and the US-Russian relationship could be avoided, the United States would not assume sole responsibility for the defense of the Bosnian government, and the unity among the Contact Group members/Perm 5 would provide a powerful incentive for the Serbs to negotiate rather than attack in response to multilateral lift.

For these reasons, the Administration continues to believe that multilateral lift remains an option. For the present, the Bosnian government does not seek lifting of the arms embargo.

III. Complete disengagement would not serve US interests

Although unilateral lift is not in our interest, neither is complete disengagement. We have a strong interest in preventing the war from spreading, in meeting humanitarian needs, in supporting (though not with ground troops) the efforts of our allies and friends in UNPROFOR) and seeking (though not with ground troops) a negotiated agreement on the basis of the Contact Group plan that preserves Bosnia's territorial integrity.

IV. Reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, as launched by the Contact Group December 2 mininsterial, is the best course.

--neither side is capable of winning the war militarily

--only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting

--the international community continues to apply pressure through sanctions -- Milosevic's cut-off of

the Bosnian Serbs demonstrates that sanctions can have an impact.

--a unified Contact Group position on maintaining sanctions and insisting on the Contact Group plan, combined with the border closures, is increasing pressure on Karadzic, improving the chances for a negotiated solution.

--although there is no guarantee that this renewed effort will produce immediate success, it is the only realistic approach to a durable solution.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: NUNN, SAM

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
CO

NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM SEN NUNN RE STRONG SENTIMENT IN CONGRESS TO ESTABLISH
RUGH MILITARY PARITY IN BOSNIA BY ELIMINATING CURRENT SERB ADVANTAGE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 20 DEC 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
KERRICK

FOR CONCURRENCE
DANVERS
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO
CLARKE
SENS
SESTAK
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN
JIMMIE DAVIS, MISSISSIPPI
CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
JEFF Bingaman, NEW MEXICO
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
ROBERT C. SMITH, ALABAMA
ROBERT L. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
BIL CLARK, FLORIDA
CHARLES S. ROSS, VIRGINIA
ROBERT DUDMAN, CONNECTICUT
RICHARD D. BRYAN, NEVADA
JIMMIE THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA
JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI
DAN COATS, INDIANA
BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
DIK RUPPEL, IDAHO
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, NORTH CAROLINA
RAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, TEXAS

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

December 1, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As we discussed on the telephone yesterday, I believe that there is strong sentiment in the Congress that something must be done to establish rough military parity in Bosnia by eliminating the current Serb advantage in heavy weapons, thereby allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves and thus accelerating a negotiated end to the Bosnia conflict. Some members of Congress favor accomplishing this through a unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia. Others support lifting the embargo multilaterally. Unfortunately, there is little hope that this latter approach will be agreed upon by NATO or by the U.N. Security Council.

I believe that the cohesion of NATO will be seriously threatened if the United States pursues a unilateral lift of the arms embargo. This will lead to our allies basically saying to us that Bosnia is now the responsibility of the United States.

Senator Lugar and I have asked Secretary Perry to review an alternative strategy. With the cohesion of NATO at issue if the U.S. undertakes a unilateral lift, we suggest the following three-prong approach.

- (1) The zones in Bosnia from which all heavy weapons are excluded would be expanded step by step.
- (2) Any heavy weapon detected in a proscribed area would be subject to NATO air attack.
- (3) In areas where air attack is not adequate, we and our NATO allies would undertake partial lifting of the embargo by providing the Bosnians with a carefully selected package of defensive arms (anti-tank weapons, mortars).

Enclosed is a copy of the letter we sent to Secretary Perry, setting forth this basic approach. I am also enclosing a copy of Secretary Perry's reply.

Our NATO allies may have serious concerns with this approach, particularly while UNPROFOR is deployed throughout Bosnia. There is no doubt that our strategy involving enforcement from the air will be very difficult as long as UN forces remain on the ground in Bosnia. However, if our allies will not agree to a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, a multilateral "build-down" of heavy weapons would be much preferable to a unilateral U.S. arms build-up in Bosnia. It could be discussed with our allies as a policy option that would meet Congressional concerns while avoiding the grave problems for U.S.-European relations associated with a unilateral lift.

I hope you will give this idea careful consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Sam Nunn", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Sam Nunn
Chairman

Enclosures


The build down concept is the flip side of the idea of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The idea would be to level the ground by eliminating all or most of the heavy equipment on both sides by either destroying it or removing it from Bosnia. This could apply to all tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars.

This strategy, like the strategy of lifting the arms embargo raises serious questions which merit your review. How would our NATO allies react to such a proposal? How would the factions in Bosnia likely react? Would such an approach be enforceable? Could we find economic incentives to make the proposal attractive to the factions?

If feasible, we believe a proposal along these lines could garner broad support in the Congress and could set the stage for renewed efforts to develop a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian crisis. We know that the lifting of the arms embargo has met with significant implementation obstacles. A build-down policy may have similar disadvantages. We therefore urge you to conduct an immediate policy review of such a strategy to assess its merit.

As you consider this alternative approach to the current legal requirement for the President to request a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, we would also appreciate your assessment of the outcome of compliance with current law, in view of the recent changes of policy by the governments of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sincerely,



Richard C. Lugar
U.S. Senator



Sam Nunn
U.S. Senator



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

37E

7 October 1994

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, SROB Room 228
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Sam:

I am pleased to respond to your letter of September 30, 1994 asking me to review the military impact of a build down strategy.

You present an intriguing concept. Bosnia build down is a conceptual breakthrough that captures the moral high ground on this issue--namely, that there is another way to level the battlefield. Rather than increase arms through lifting the embargo, we may be able to reduce the number of available weapons through a regulated process.

Indeed our current Bosnia policy might be seen as the first phase of a build down strategy. Our commitment to robust enforcement of the exclusion zones and our effort to seal the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina represent the first steps in an arms reduction process. An interagency team is working to develop a phased strategy that would move from these early steps to a more comprehensive build down of all heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and heavy mortars. Obviously, we will need to address a number of difficult questions about verification, enforcement, assurances against circumvention, and economic incentives that might make the proposal more attractive. We are confident that we can find solutions to these problems, and we will keep you informed as we proceed. We are extremely grateful to you and Dick Lugar for developing the concept and bringing it to our attention.

You asked for our assessment of the outcome of compliance with the current law. We intend to abide fully by the intent of the law. If the Bosnians Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group's proposal by October 15, the President intends within two weeks of that date to introduce and support a UN Security Council Resolution to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are considering various formulations of the lift resolution that would delay implementation for six months, as President Izetbegovic proposed at the United Nations last week.


With respect to the limitation on the use of funds in Section 1404(f)(2), we are reviewing our rules of engagement and will make any changes necessary to comply with the law. We also intend fully to maintain the arms embargo on Serbia and to that end will continue our operations in the Adriatic. In his statement on signing the bill the President noted that it would not affect the

US government's ability to participate in activities in the Adriatic needed to enforce sanctions against Serbia.

The President has also agreed that if no UN resolution on multilateral lift is passed within a reasonable period of time, he will consult with the Congress on next steps, to include the possibility of unilaterally lifting the embargo. In our view, this step should be considered after all other remedies are exhausted. The consequences of unilateral lift are perilous: Americanizing the conflict, as well as prolonging and intensifying it; precipitating an arms race; souring relations with our NATO and UN allies; undermining the partnership we are building with Russia; causing retaliatory attacks on UNPROFOR and the collapse of its mission; and in the end not offering any guarantee of ultimate success on the battlefield.

We appreciate your willingness to work with us in finding a solution to the complex and seemingly intractable problem of bringing peace to Bosnia. You have my assurance that we will consult regularly and work with you at every opportunity.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill Perry". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: DECEMBER 09, 1994

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE SAM NUNN

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN REGARDING U.S LIFTING OF
THE ARMS EMBARGO IN BOSNIA

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
PATRICK GRIFFIN		ORG	94/12/09		C 94/12/09
REFERRAL NOTE:					
WILLIAM ITOH		RSA	94/12/09		
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS: ENCLOSURE

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 _____
 _____ MAIL USER CODES: (A)D GA (B)_____ (C)_____

 *ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
 * * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
 *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
 *C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
 *D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
 *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
 I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
 *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
 *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
 *X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

SCANNED

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
 (ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
 KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
 LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
 MANAGEMENT.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Pat Griffin. Subject: Possible Presidential Veto of Legislation. Record ID: 9409784. (2 pages)	12/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2609

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2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9409813
RECEIVED: 13 DEC 94 18

TO: SENS

FROM: SUTTON, J

DOC DATE: 13 DEC 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA MEDIA

PERSONS: SAVICH, TED

SUBJECT: REQUEST DRAFT REPLY FOR SAVICH LTR & ARTICLE ON BOSNIA

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 16 DEC 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
KERRICK

FOR CONCURRENCE
ROSS

FOR INFO
CLARKE
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

Staff
9813

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

FROM: John Sutton
for Harold Ickes

SUBJECT: Attached Correspondence

I would appreciate if you could forward the attached correspondence on Bosnia to the appropriate person to prepare a draft response for Mr. Ickes. Obviously, I only need a prepared response on Mr. Savich's attached article on Bosnia by George Kenney (not about Raymond).

I appreciate your help.

MR. HAROLD L. ICKES
90 White House
Washington, DC

12/7/94

TED SAVICH

2455 TAMARACK TR. APT 135
Bloomington, IN. 47408

Dear Mr. Ickes:

I was a student at the University of Chicago in the early 30s and became good friends with Raymond who liked to practice his Spanish with me. I also was a house guest with your father and Raymond in Washington.

I married in 1936 while doing research chemistry at the graduate level. I left Chicago at the end of 1938, for employment with Phillips Petroleum Co. in Oklahoma doing research on aviation gasoline. In 1942 I left Phillips for employment with the USDA in New Orleans, where I was a research chemist. When WWII started the emphasis of my research was on Synthetic rubber from turpentine.

I am enclosing two articles on the Yugoslav war which I think should be persuasive with you and the president and help terminate the wars in Yugoslavia. This would of course enhance our performance in the 1996 elections. One of the axioms of peacemaking which is of especial importance in Yugoslavia is to avoid taking sides, as these articles emphasize.

I would also especially appreciate any word about Raymond. In the ensuing years the only notice I've had of him was in a financial article which indicated that he was a CEO of some corporation and living in California.

Sincerely,

Ted

Two writers offer ways of understanding, and possibly of ending, the killing in Central Europe

Dec 2 1994
Toronto
Globe & Mail

Ending Bosnia's endgame

BY GEORGE KENNEY
Steyning, England

I NEVER imagined I would find myself defending Serbian conquests. Yet the choices the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have made throughout the Bosnian conflict have been so bad that there are no good choices left. It is better to end the carnage, even on unfair terms, than to have it continue for what could be a decade or more. The Europeans are right. The West should make the Bosnian government settle against its wishes.

After the humiliation surrounding the Muslim defeat in the struggle for Bihac, the United Nations is deadly serious about withdrawing its peacekeeping troops, perhaps even this winter, unless the warring parties agree to a ceasefire across Bosnia and a new round of talks aimed at ending the war. The risks of withdrawal would be great, since NATO forces — presumably including American ground troops — would have to provide escort to retreating UN personnel.

Until his policy shift this week, U.S. President Bill Clinton had been halfheartedly pursuing a strategy that did nothing to end the war while raising tensions with Britain and France: arguing for lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia, unilaterally ending American enforcement of the embargo, and pressing for more NATO air strikes against Serbian positions. Finally, Mr. Clinton has backed away from these efforts now that Western forces have failed to stop the Serbs in Bihac. Now, the strategy should be formally dropped.

DESPITE the Muslims' recent losses, there are worrying signs that they are preparing another large offensive — this time in central Bosnia. Such a move would be another fiasco. In the past, faint American encouragement has led to gross Muslim overconfidence. But has the White House learned not to underestimate the Muslims' irrational and dangerous belief that the West will eventually come to their rescue?

The last two winters in Bosnia, fighting abated. This winter, it may escalate as Muslims, Serbs and Croats anticipate the UN's withdrawal and the possibility of capturing equipment left behind. In the last week peacekeepers have been *de facto* hostages of both Muslims and Serbs, while European governments insist that they will pull their troops out of Bosnia if the fighting escalates.

And what happens if the UN leaves Bosnia? Humanitarian aid will end. The Serbs will shut down Sarajevo. There will be no passage by road in or out; no electricity, no gas, no water. There will be violent shelling. The Serbs will no doubt grab all of eastern

Bosnia and what's left of the Bihac pocket. The Muslims can maintain a stronghold in central Bosnia, but if they ever seriously threaten Serb-held areas, Bosnian Serbs can rely on allies in Serbia and Croatia to back them up.

If the UN pulls out, my guess is that the Muslims will surrender within six months, with less land than they have now. Bosnia would disappear, carved up between Serbia and Croatia. This scenario might improve somewhat if the Muslims got outside help, but the Bosnian Serbs would find benefactors, too. Jingoistic Russian legislators, for example, have said that Russia will arm the Serbs if the arms embargo on Bosnia is lifted. The Muslims, in short, have no winning strategy. Like it or not, they are looking at the war's endgame.

Before the Muslims' recent devastating

What was once a clear-cut war of aggression gradually turned into the civil war many incorrectly thought it always was.

setbacks, there was reason to believe that the Bosnian Serbs were ready to sign a deal — one quite close to the plan the five-nation "contact group" proposed this summer. Although senior Clinton administration officials dismissed this possibility, conversations I have had over the past two months with diplomats close to the negotiations have convinced me of the Serbs' genuine desire to end the fighting.

The Serbs' recent successes have shifted the terms in their favour, but their interests in a settlement remain the same. They don't want all of Bosnia; they know they couldn't control it. And they want to support the efforts of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, to get international economic sanctions lifted from Serbia and Montenegro.

The Bosnian Serbs flatly refused the contact-group plan for several reasons. They want to keep their northern corridor connecting Serb-held territory in eastern and western Bosnia at its current four-kilometre width, rather than narrow it to 2½ kilometres as the plan provides. As a military calculation, that logic is reasonable. They would trade Muslim-held land in eastern Bosnia, which the plan leaves with the Muslims, for Serb-held land around Sarajevo. The exchange carries both advantages and drawbacks for the Muslims, but also seems negotiable. The Serbs want most of the Bihac pocket; thanks to Sarajevo's in-temperate, failed offensive, they are taking it.

Finally, they want the same rights of confederation with Serbia that the Bosnian

Muslim-Croat federation enjoys with Croatia, a proposal that now seems to be on the table. Outsiders should note: The U.S.-brokered constitution of the Muslim-Croat federation gives no explicit rights to Serbs living in federation territory, whereas it does explicitly protect Muslims and Croats. (American officials privately admit that the arrangement was too hastily put together, and they are working to fix the problem.)

UNCRITICAL condemnation of the Serbs and uncritical support for the Bosnian Muslims must be re-examined. Much has changed since the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia in July, 1991. What was once a clear-cut war of aggression — some call it genocide — gradually turned into the civil war many incorrectly thought it always was. What was once a genuinely multi-ethnic and legitimately elected Bosnian government turned into a hard-line, anti-democratic Muslim entity.

Now we find ethnic cleansing by Muslims alongside that of the Serbs, and the senseless determination of President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia to wage war against his long-time rival Fikret Abdic, the dissident Muslim leader of northwestern Bosnia, thus shattering the one region spared from earlier fighting.

It's all understandable, but it isn't right. In August, 1992, when I resigned from the U.S. State Department, I said the West had a brief window of opportunity to intervene. Well, it shut a long time ago.

The clique of nationalist politicians around President Izetbegovic — particularly hard-liners such as Ejup Ganic, the Vice-President — don't want to admit that they will never govern all of the former Bosnia, because doing so raises questions about their legitimacy. Nor can they clearly explain what is to be gained by further fighting. These men — inexperienced, corrupt, unable to fathom international politics — hardly warrant U.S. support in a civil war that would destroy their country in order to save it.

I don't believe morality has an existential reality independent from the world: Arguing that we must lift the arms embargo so the Muslims can defend themselves ignores the brutal consequences of arming them. In Bosnia, we have to recognize that the good is the enemy of the least bad, however tragic that may be. If there is anything left to be salvaged from this debacle, Mr. Clinton must work more closely with the Europeans, not against them.

George Kenney resigned from the U.S. State Department in August, 1992, to protest against the Bush administration's policy in the former Yugoslavia. This piece is reprinted from The New York Times, where it appeared yesterday.

Dec. 2 1994
Toronto Globe
& Mail

Canada, Bihac and Bosnia

BY THEODORE OLSON
Toronto

IS it possible for Canadians to think straight about Bihac and Bosnia and the rest of "the former Yugoslavia"? Not if we keep letting ourselves be jerked around by slogans, images and crisis-of-the-week reporting.

For starters, almost nothing in recent CBC or Globe and Mail coverage about Bihac shows any remembrance that earlier in the year Bihac was in the hands of anti-Sarajevo Bosnian *Muslims*, and had been for some time. That such people exist should tell us that "Bosnian good, Serbian bad" is not adequate political analysis.

This confusing third or fourth or ninth side in "the former Yugoslavia" was defeated some months ago by a combined Croatian and Sarajevo Bosnian military campaign. But I don't remember any NATO or United Nations or American or Canadian complaints about this force violating a "safe area" or exclusion zone.

Bihac sits in an angle of land that forces Croatia into an awkward boomerang shape. Left in hands unfriendly to Croatia or Sarajevo, it continues to be a problem. On the other hand, if it is left in hands friendly to Bosnian Serbs or to Serbian Serbs, Bihac rounds out an otherwise too slender salient of Serb-held land across northern Bosnia and southern Croatia, most of it ethnically Serbian.

Why Canada is in the business of favouring one side or the other is a considerable mystery. Why there is a Bosnian problem at all is not a mystery. Some European states led by Germany, having recognized Slovenia and Croatia, were very quick off the mark to recognize an independent Bosnia-

Herzegovina. But Bosnia has never been a nation or state or people. It is a population and an administrative designation characterized by the presence of several peoples stirred rather well together.

RECOGNIZING this mélange as a nation-state (given the ethnic turmoil then going on around it) immediately led various Bosnian factions to take defensive actions against one another, lest they be labelled "rebels" in their own land. Eager European democrats thrust on Bosnia the awful fate of other contested areas of "the former Yugoslavia."

Why? Largely because the Serbian Serbs had acquired a bad press in "civilized" Europe, President Slobodan Milosevic was a demagogue, etc. And a big Serbia was an inconvenient thing. Perhaps it is not entirely unfair to say that the Bosnian horrors are the price paid — by Bosnians, of course — for frets among civilized Europeans about the balance of power.

Is there, by the way, a Yugoslavia? There is. Go to the UN and see. There sits its representative. His is not a shadow government or a phantom state. It is one made up — still — of Serbia, the Voivodina, Montenegro and the Kossovo that many Westerners would also like to detach from what the media have been trained to call "the former Yugoslavia." But that Kossovo is to Serbia what the 13 original colonies are to the United States or what the Ile de France is to the French Republic. Detach it if the reasons are good enough, but know what you're getting into when you do it. What is the state of our knowledge? After three years of anxious bulletins, how many Cana-

dians even know where Herzegovina is, or why it's called by that odd name?

Ignorance, prejudice and embarrassed concealment of past errors of judgment about Yugoslavia are not useful guides to action there by states far removed from the scene. And blindly to accommodate a NATO happy after 50 years to find *someone* to shoot at, or reflexively to support a giddy American "policy," is not very sensible for Canada.

What can Canada do? If there is a humanitarian role to be played there still, let us play it, realizing that, as in Somalia, even that role can come to nothing and can in fact curdle. But let us quit deceiving ourselves by means of easy slogans that confuse somebody's advantage or somebody's political fears with humanitarianism.

Or if there is a side to take, a faction to support, a warlord who's good because he's *our* warlord — fine. That's politics; and we may be ready not only to fight to the last Bosnian but to see some Canadians die with them, if it's really worth it. But let's not treat humanitarianism as a cosmetic to spread over that.

We could make a little start by demanding more of our media and of our memories. The CBC and The Globe did, after all, say at least something months ago about the complexities of Bihac. It's our fault as well as theirs that we don't demand a fuller story instead of "today's story."

Theodore Olson is an external fellow and former senior research fellow at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies at York University. He is retired from York's social-science division.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. note	To General Shalikashvili, Dick Holbrooke and Sandy Vershbow from Robert Hunter. Subject: Informal TOR. (2 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2609

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. draft	Informal TOR for CHODS. [NATO] (1 page)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [1]

2013-0687-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	re: Guidance on President Carter's Contacts. (2 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia Post-Bihac (Mid. - Nov.-Early Dec.) [1]

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CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC STRATEGY ON BOSNIA

The Problem: Getting out a Clear Message on Policy

Distortions in public and congressional understanding of what U.S. policy is in Bosnia have been plainly evident the past three weeks with the Administration's decision 1) to shift tactics to de-emphasize our disagreements with our Allies over use of military force in Bosnia, in the aftermath of Bihac and in the run-up to the NAC; and 2) over the President's decision in principle to offer U.S. ground troops for planning purposes for an eventual UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Considerable effort has been made to right those misperceptions of policy, with the latest to be U/S Tarnoff, J-5 General Clark, and Def. A/S Slocumbe's December 16 closed briefing before HFAC. As we approach the beginning of the 104th Congress, with the added element of the "Carter gambit" to the diplomatic strategy, it is critical that the Administration speak with one voice, at a senior level, both to Congress and the public.

Senator Dole and unilateral lift

Senator Dole has made clear that he will put Bosnia front and center early in the 104th, threatening to hold hearings in January. It is also clear from statements the past two weeks that Speaker Gingrich and incoming House International Relations Chair Gilman will also push the Dole line publicly.

In dealing with Dole's et al three step push for unilateral lift, we should pursue the line Secretary Christopher developed in the talk shows two weeks ago. The Secretary correctly framed the issue as one of our following a "peace strategy," while Dole's was a "war strategy." This is a message we have to pound home in the next two months. The emphasis should be, as the Secretary laid out in his interview, on the likely consequences of following the three-stepped scenario Dole proposed, including the inevitable deployment of 100,000 U.S. ground troops in an Americanized war in Bosnia.

Dole has claimed that he has as many as 80 Senators behind unilateral lift. It is evident, however, that few of these Senators understand the likely consequences of the scenario Dole has proposed, namely the inevitable deployment of ground troops. Probably a majority favor a "lift and leave" scenario; few support the deployment of U.S. troops and the Americanization of the war.

The Carter gambit

Congressional posturing on Bosnia will no doubt be given an added push by the introduction of President Carter into the diplomatic fray. While Carter's activity at a minimum can help

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string out the diplomatic process, helping us to achieve our key short-term goal of getting the Bosnians through the winter, his activity will be pointed to as undermining the President's and the Administration's leadership on the issue.

How to Proceed

For our arguments to be credible, it is critical that Chairman Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry take the lead in direct briefings for key members, including both Senator Dole and Speaker Gingrich. It is clear at this juncture that the hearings that Senator Dole has threatened the Administration with in mid-January would be an ideal opportunity for us to make our case. If he goes forward with hearings, we should push that they include as many Senators as possible, that they be open, and that Shali, Perry, and the Secretary be the briefers. In fact, if Dole does not press for those hearings, we will want to make sure that we do have a Consultative Group (Shali, Perry, Christopher, Lake, and Albright) meeting with both houses in January so that we can make our case in the most effective and public manner.

Working Individual Members

If our strategy is to be successful, however, we must also work individual Members, who, if we can turn them around, might change the entire Congressional dynamic a la Murkowski on North Korea. On the Senate side, this group would include Cohen, and Levin. In the House, Gingrich, Hyde, and Berman.

Individual Perry and/or Shali meetings for this group would be key, and, for many of these members, could take place before the new Congress convenes. We should consider as well bringing back to Washington Admiral Crowe, Peter Galbraith and perhaps other Ambassadors to meet select members in January. Other Ambassadors might make calls from overseas. Calls/meetings from outsiders, such as Colin Powell, might also help turn key members around.

Beyond this we will want to develop a core list of Members whom we brief either on the phone or in direct meetings on Bosnia policy as events take place. Our focus would be on the Armed Services Committees, where our arguments about NATO and the military risks of unilateral lift will get the best hearing. Our list would include Nunn, Pell, Lugar, Dole, McConnell, Helms, Kassebaum, Warner, and Leahy in the Senate; Gilman, Hamilton, Gingrich, Gephardt, Obey, Murtha, and Livingston in the House (and others on our standard call list). We will want to work over some of our more active opponents on this issue, such as Senators Lieberman and Biden, to try to turn them around, but in any case to keep them engaged in the discussions.

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Finally, if we seem to be approaching votes on lift legislation, we will want to increase discussions with Members, particularly Senators who in the past have lined up behind unilateral lift, but who have not been outspoken on the issue. It is important that they hear directly from the military our view that "lift and leave" is not an option and why, as well as what the consequences are of unilateral lift, particularly the cost and number of U.S. ground troops such a war strategy would require.

These meetings would be intended to get a feel for how locked in the individual Congressmen/Senators are to a "lift and strike" scenario. If our reading is that a CJCS/Secdef briefing would be useful to walk them back, that would be arranged.

The President's role

Given the Carter gambit, it is critical that we address the issue of whether the President should call in Hill leadership to lay out our policy and whether to make a speech to the nation on Bosnia early in January.

Looking down the line: Presidential veto?

(Bill's language on strategic use of veto: no free ride)

Other approaches: Cut UNPROFOR funding

Dole and his allies may decide that a frontal attack on the Administration pushing unilateral lift may not be the way to go. Or he may try, and failing (by virtue of an inevitable veto), look to other legislation he might offer. One obvious option is to seek to cut Congressional funding for UNPROFOR.

Here, too, our message must be consistent. While we have had our differences with our Allies and the UN on UNPROFOR's role, we must throughout our briefings and public statements make clear that we and the Allies strongly support UNPROFOR's role. We must make clear that withdrawing support for UNPROFOR will be the same as pursuing Dole's "war strategy," one we believe neither Congress or the public will ultimately accept.

The Dole-Gingrich Letter

The Dole-Gingrich letter, calling on the President to tie U.S. support of eventual UNPROFOR withdrawal to Allied agreement to multilateral lift, may give us some added leverage in dealing with the Allies and Russians on this question, but ultimately we cannot make our assistance conditional on their agreement to multilateral lift.

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A Danger: Unilateral vs. Multilateral lift

Throughout these discussions, we will need to be careful to distinguish between our firm opposition to unilateral lift and our support for multilateral lift.

Other issues: Congressional authorization

So long as we can keep the Allies and UN on board on keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the question of whether we will ask for formal Congressional authorization to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal will become less urgent. We believe Peter Tarnoff's et al briefing December 16 should help lay that issue to rest. If UNPROFOR withdrawal appears to be more imminent, however, this issue will come again to the fore.

Public affairs

(Bill's language on outreach)