

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Secretary of Defense William Perry. Subject: Special Defense Report. (2 pages)	11/15/1994	P1/b(1)
002. poster	Overview of Sanctions, November 21, 1995. (1 page)	11/21/1995	P1/b(1)
003. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Principal's Committee Review of Bihac and Bosnia Policy. Record ID: 94209293 (3 pages)	11/19/1994	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Memo for the Secretary of State from Tobi Gati and Richard Holbrooke. (4 pages)	11/18/1994	P1/b(1)
005. paper	U.S. Military Presence in Bosnia. (2 pages)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)
006. draft	Bihac Options. (1 page)	c. 11/18/1994	P1/b(1)
007. report	Status of UNPROFOR Forces in Bihac. (4 pages)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)
008. report	Assessment of Military Situation at Bihac and Croatian Threats to Intervene. (4 pages)	11/12/1994	P1/b(1)
009. draft	Paper, Bihac Issues. (1 page)	11/14/1994	P1/b(1)
010. draft	Memo for the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Bosnia: Strategy to Prevent Croatian Intervention in Bihac. Record ID: 9409115. (3 pages)	11/12/1994	P1/b(1)
011. paper	Bihac Issues. (1 page)	11/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2608

RESTRICTION CODES

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012. note	Walter B. Slocombe to Anthony Lake. Subject: Bihac. (1 page)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)
013. paper	Bihac: Implications of the Worst Case Scenario. [CIA Act] [partial] (3 pages)	11/15/1994	P3/b(3)
014. paper	Bosnia and Croatia: The Next Six Months. [CIA Act] [partial] (3 pages)	10/17/1994	P3/b(3)
015a. memo	Duplicate of 003. (3 pages)	11/19/1994	P1/b(1)
015b. paper	Bihac Options. (1 page)	11/18/1994	P1/b(1)
016. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Telephone Call with French President Mitterrand. Record ID: 9409366. (3 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)

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Talking Points for Call to Senator Dole

- I wanted to bring you up to date on developments in Bosnia, given your concerns about the deteriorating situation in and around Bihac (BEE-hatch).
- This morning, 24 NATO aircraft conducted air strikes against the Udbina (OOD-bean-nah) airfield in Serb-occupied Croatia.
- This was the base from which Serb aircraft attacks against Bihac have been launched in recent days, in violation of the no-fly zone and UN resolutions on the safe areas.
- While we only have preliminary reports, the aircraft appear to have succeeded in cratering the runway and eliminating fixed surface-to-air missile emplacements around the airfield. While some shoulder-launched SAMs were fired, all the planes returned safely.
- This action followed a week of active U.S. diplomatic efforts at the UN and NATO to respond to the latest Serb offensive against Bihac.
- Last Sunday, Ambassador Albright, as President of the Security Council, convened an emergency session of the Council and won agreement to a Presidential statement condemning the Serb offensive and the cross-border actions by the so-called Krajina (CRY-ee-nah) Serbs.
- Our Ambassadors in NATO capitals went in the same day to press our concerns and called for firm action by NATO. On Tuesday, the North Atlantic Council tasked NATO's Military Authorities to work with the UN on appropriate military responses to contain the fighting around Bihac.
- As the situation continued to escalate, Ambassador Albright convened the Security Council Thursday and Friday afternoon, and again on Saturday, to press for action by the UN in coordination with NATO.
- In Saturday's meeting, at her urging, the Security Council adopted new resolutions on the protection of the safe areas that included the authorization to conduct air strikes in Croatia (as well as in Bosnia) against targets threatening the safe areas.

- The North Atlantic Council convened Saturday night in Brussels to provide the corresponding authority to NATO forces.
- The strikes were planned for Sunday, but delayed owing to poor weather conditions
- With today's strikes, I hope we have turned a page toward a more robust posture by the UN in using NATO air power to enforce its decisions.
- We have often shared your frustration at the "dual key" system that operates in Bosnia, but have had to accept it given the legitimate concerns of our allies about the safety of their UNPROFOR troops, who have limited means to defend themselves.
- These strikes do not, in themselves, end the crisis around Bihac. We are continuing to work with our allies on a range of additional options for NATO action to protect the safe area and halt the Serb offensive.
- I think we agree that, only by increasing the pressure on the Serbs, will we be able to end the fighting and achieve our overarching goal of a political settlement that preserves the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and provides a viable future for all the peoples of that country.

cc + return

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11/15

To Sandy V.
Bo G Bell

Good reading.
pls keep close hold
(ie you two).

MS.

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United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

November 16, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am deeply concerned about the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Bihac region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. News reports and information I have received from the Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, indicate that this latest Serbian assault on Bihac involves artillery, ground-launched rockets, helicopters, and ground troops, not only from Bosnian Serb forces, but from Serb forces based in occupied areas of Croatia -- the so called U.N. protected areas (UNPAs). This action has made a mockery of U.N. designated protection areas and U.N. designated safe areas, and raises serious doubts about the impact of President Milosevic's announced embargo of the Bosnian Serb forces.

The offensive on Bihac is yet another manifestation of the Serbs' continued defiance of the international community, which unfortunately is not surprising in light of the Contact Group's failure to honor its commitments to stronger military action in its July 30 communique. Equally as troubling as recent developments in Bihac is the absence of any concerted high-level administration pressure on the United Nations to end, once and for all, its obstructionism and defacto "veto" of militarily effective NATO air strikes.

Enough is enough. In the name of consensus, for over two years the United States has complied with the failed policies of the U.N. and European Union while the Bosnian people and the credibility of the NATO alliance have paid a heavy price. The United Nations has simultaneously blocked the Bosnians from exercising their inherent right to self-defense and blocked NATO from taking actions it has pledged to take to confront Serbian aggression. The United States must begin to exercise the leadership necessary to reverse this trend.

Therefore, Mr. President, I urge you to act now to end this brutal Serbian assault. By acting now, the United States and NATO can prevent what the U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb warns could become a humanitarian catastrophe, while beginning to reestablish NATO's credibility.

Sincerely,



BOB DOLE

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UNITED
NATIONS

S

A.1



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/1316

19 November 1994

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH,
RUSSIAN AND SPANISH

958

France, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:
Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, and in particular its resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993,

Recalling also the statement of the President of the Security Council of 13 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/66) and 18 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/69), and reiterating its concern about the deteriorating situation in and around the safe area of Bihać,

Having considered the letter of 18 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1312),

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia,

Determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, and determined to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 836 (1993), and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Decides that the authorization given in paragraph 10 of its resolution 836 (1993) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina referred to in resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 836 (1993) shall apply also to such measures taken in the Republic of Croatia.

UNITED
NATIONS

S



Security Council

#2

959

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/1317

19 November 1994

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH
AND RUSSIAN

France, Germany, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of
America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in particular its resolution 836 (1993),

Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all the Bosnian parties, and implemented in good faith by them, and condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb party to refuse to accept the proposed territorial settlement (S/1994/1081),

Reaffirming also the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Expressing special concern about the escalation in recent fighting in the Bihac area, and the flow of refugees and displaced persons resulting from it,

Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 10 March 1994 (S/1994/291) and 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) and of his recommendations concerning the definition and implementation of the concept of safe areas in his report of 9 May 1994 (S/1994/555),

Recalling the statements by the President of the Security Council of 6 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/14), 30 June 1994 (S/PRST/1994/31), 13 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/66) and 18 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/69),

Reaffirming its previous calls on all parties and others concerned to refrain from any hostile action that could cause further escalation in the fighting, and to achieve urgently a cease-fire in the Bihac area,

Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre, and noting in this context the positive contribution that agreement between the parties on the demilitarization of Sarajevo could make to this end, to the restoration of normal life in Sarajevo and to achieving an overall settlement,

S/1994/L517

English

Page 2

Taking note of the communiqué on Bosnia and Herzegovina issued on 30 July 1994 by the Troika of the European Union and the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (S/1994/916) and, in particular, of their commitment to strengthen the regime of safe areas,

1. Expresses its grave concern over the recent hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina including those in, from and around the safe areas;

2. Condemns any violation of the international border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and demands that all parties and others concerned, and in particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, fully respect the border and refrain from hostile acts across it;

3. Expresses its full support for the efforts by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), inter alia, as described in the reports of the Secretary-General of 10 March 1994, 16 March 1994 and 9 May 1994, to ensure implementation of the Security Council resolutions on safe areas;

4. Calls upon all the Bosnian parties to respect fully the status and functions of UNPROFOR and to cooperate with it in its efforts to ensure implementation of the Security Council resolutions on safe areas and demands that all parties and others concerned show maximum restraint and put an end to all hostile actions in and around the safe areas in order to ensure that UNPROFOR can carry out its mandate in this regard effectively and safely;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to update his recommendations on modalities of the implementation of the concept of safe areas and to encourage UNPROFOR, in cooperation with the Bosnian parties, to continue their efforts to achieve agreements on strengthening the regimes of safe areas taking into account the specific situation in each case, and recalls its request to the Secretary-General in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 13 November 1994 to report as soon as possible on any further measures to stabilize the situation in and around the safe area of Bihac;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the Bosnian parties on the modalities of demilitarization of Sarajevo, bearing in mind the need for the restoration of normal life to the city and for free access to and from the city by land and air and the free and unimpeded movement of people, goods and services in and around the city in line with its resolution 900 (1994);

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution by 1 December 1994;

8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

The Council:

- (1) condemned the recent air attacks and shelling against the safe area of Bihac by Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces;
- (2) reaffirmed the readiness of the Alliance, as stated in the January NATO Summit, to support the UN in its efforts to protect the safe areas, as authorized under UN Security Council Resolutions 824, 836 and 844, noting also Security Council Resolution 913;
- (3) to this end, authorized CINCSOUTH, in accordance with current procedures, to conduct air strikes in response to attacks on, or which threaten, UN safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina launched from UNPAS in Croatia.

Other elements of the NAC decision (we are awaiting exact text):

Say NATO responds positively to UNSCR 985 (i.e. the 11/19 decision);

Authorize the NMAs, using agreed procedures (i.e. the dual key) to initiate air strikes;

Authorize CINCSOUTH to add aircraft and associated ground facilities to authorized target lists;

State that ROE for airstrikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina extend to Croatia.

PRESS

The NATO press line will be that the NAC met and responded positively to UNSCR 985.

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- Establish exclusion zone (Dimensions negotiable).

1. Determination of NATO Commander that there has been an attack on the safe area

2. The determination of CINCSOUTH and UN military commanders that there is a concentration or movement of key weapons within a 20 km radius.

3. What the precise definition of the Bihac EZ will be decided between NATO and UNPROFOR. (Recommend this be decided at AFSOUTH (Smith) and UNPROFOR (De Lapresle).

4. Execution will require UNPROFOR/NATO dual key authorization.

- Close Air Support in defense of UNPROFOR if UNPROFOR is blocked in the performance of its mission.

Yes - in Bosnia/ROZ. Dual key authorization only.

- Close air support in response to artillery attacks from Croatia (NAC has approved; requires Croatian approval).

Dual key authorization within Restricted Operating Zone

- Extend Deny Flight ROE to permit attacking air defense assets in Croatia displaying hostile intent (Requires decisions at UN and NATO).

1. MC must recommend change in ROE

2. Approval required by NAC (Brits blocked two days ago)

- Modify existing authorities to authorize "hot pursuit" of aircraft attacking targets in Bosnia from Croatian airfields.

MC recommendation of ROE modification.

Require NAC approval

These changes would need to be coordinated with UNSYG.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

I share your deep concern about the deteriorating situation in and around the town of Bihac in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the last few days, Bosnian Serb forces have rolled back most of the Bosnian Government's recent gains, and they appear bent on overrunning other areas that have been under Government control. We are particularly disturbed at the large-scale involvement of Serb forces from the Krajina region of Croatia, and the air strikes launched from that area against Bihac city.

As the Bihac crisis began to escalate last weekend, we took action on a number of fronts. In an emergency session of the UN Security Council on Sunday, Ambassador Albright won agreement to a Presidential statement condemning the Serb offensive and the cross-border actions of the so-called Krajina Serbs. Our Ambassadors in NATO capitals have pressed our concerns with our NATO allies and we have called for firm action in the North Atlantic Council. NATO Military Authorities with their UN counterparts are developing appropriate military responses to contain the fighting around Bihac. At the same time, we have been consulting with the government of Croatia on NATO's behalf and have obtained its approval for NATO to conduct close air support, if requested by the UN, against artillery and other targets in the Krajina region that have been involved in the assault on Bihac.

We are continuing to press our Allies on measures to limit the Serb offensive and are actively working on a range of options that could bring NATO air power to bear in response to continued escalation by Serb forces.

Ambassador Albright convened the Security Council Thursday and Friday afternoon, and again on Saturday, to underscore the seriousness of the situation and to urge action by the UN in coordination with NATO.

In Saturday's meeting, at her urging, the Security Council adopted new resolutions on the protection of the safe areas that included the authorization to conduct air strikes in Croatia as well as Bosnia against targets threatening the safe areas. The North Atlantic Council convened Saturday night in Brussels to provide the corresponding authority to NATO forces.

I hope you will stay in touch on this issue. I will always welcome your ideas as we work to resolve it.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Minority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	U.S. Military Presence in Bosnia. (2 pages)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2608

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. draft	Bihac Options. (1 page)	c. 11/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2608

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ARGUMENT THAT EXISTING AUTHORITY
PERMITS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
TO BIHAC, INCLUDING USE OF NATO AIR POWER
AGAINST UBDINA, IN KRAJINA-HELD CROATIA

Under the authority of UNSC 836 (June 4, 1993), paragraphs 5, 9 and 10, which read in part:

"... that member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR...";

and under the authority of UNSC 844, (June 18, 1993), paragraph 4, which:

"... reaffirms [the] decision in paragraph 10 of resolution 836";

the UN may request NATO use of air power to support UNPROFOR in Bihac.

Neither SC resolution restricts air power requests to Bosnia-Herzegovina only. The USC reads the reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina in paragraph 10 of UNSC 836 as referring to the location of safe areas, not the location of strike targets; we believe this is confirmed by paragraph 4 of UNSC 844.

The Croatian government has approved the proposed use of air power.

Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

"Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR. Like the UN resolutions, the NATO Decision Sheet makes no reference to territory in Bosnia only.

On November 18, 1994, the UN requested a strike to respond to Krajina Serb attacks on Bihac. It has selected the target of Ubdina Airbase in Krajina Serb-held Croatia. The specific strike may take place under authorities cited above.

UNPROFOR'S inherent right of self-defense, which is supported by NATO in paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), is an additional justification for immediate use of air power.

FYI: Proposing a NATO response to UNPROFOR's request under either SC resolution or based on the inherent right of self-defense may raise questions of necessity and proportionality. Our position is that the requested NATO response is both necessary and proportional.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. report	Status of UNPROFOR Forces in Bihac. (4 pages)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F
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UNITED
NATIONS

S



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/1316*

19 November 1994

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH,
RUSSIAN AND SPANISH

France, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
draft resolution

958

15-0-0

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, and in particular its resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993,

Recalling also the statement of the President of the Security Council of 13 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/66) and 18 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/69), and reiterating its concern about the deteriorating situation in and around the safe area of Bihac,

Having considered the letter of 18 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1312),

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia,

Determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, and determined to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 836 (1993), and, to this end, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Decides that the authorization given in paragraph 10 of its resolution 836 (1993) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina referred to in resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 836 (1993) shall apply also to such measures taken in the Republic of Croatia.

UNITED
NATIONS

S



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/1317*

19 November 1994

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH,
RUSSIAN AND SPANISH959
15-0-0

France, Germany, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of
America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in particular its resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993),

Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all The Bosnian parties, and implemented in good faith by them, and condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb party to refuse to accept the proposed territorial settlement (S/1994/1081),

Reaffirming also the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Expressing special concern about the escalation in recent fighting in the Bihac pocket, including those in, from and around the safe areas, and the flow of refugees and displaced persons resulting from it,

Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 10 March 1994 (S/1994/291) and 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) and of his recommendations concerning the definition and implementation of the concept of safe areas in his report of 9 May 1994 (S/1994/595),

Recalling the statements by the President of the Security Council of 6 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/14), 30 June 1994 (S/PRST/1994/31), 13 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/66) and 18 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/69),

Reaffirming its previous calls on all parties and others concerned to refrain from any hostile action that could cause further escalation in the fighting, and to achieve urgently a cease-fire in the Bihac area,

Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre, and noting in this context the positive

S/1994/1317

English

Page 2

contribution that agreement between the parties on the demilitarization of Sarajevo could make to this end, to the restoration of normal life in Sarajevo, and to achieving an overall settlement, consistent with the Contact Group peace plan,

Taking note of the communiqué on Bosnia and Herzegovina issued on 30 July 1994 by the Troika of the European Union and the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (S/1994/916) and, in particular, of their commitment to strengthen the regime of safe areas,

1. Expresses its grave concern over the recent hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

2. Condemns any violation of the international border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and demande that all parties and others concerned, and in particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, fully respect the border and refrain from hostile acts across it;

3. Expresses its full support for the efforts by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to ensure implementation of the Security Council resolutions on safe areas;

4. Calls upon all the Bosnian parties to respect fully the status and functions of UNPROFOR and to cooperate with it in its efforts to ensure implementation of the Security Council resolutions on safe areas and demande that all parties and others concerned show maximum restraint and put an end to all hostile actions in and around the safe areas in order to ensure that UNPROFOR can carry out its mandate in this regard effectively and safely;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to update his recommendations on modalities of the implementation of the concept of safe areas and to encourage UNPROFOR, in cooperation with the Bosnian parties, to continue their efforts to achieve agreements on strengthening the regimes of safe areas taking into account the specific situation in each case, and recalls its request to the Secretary-General in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 13 November 1994 to report as soon as possible on any further measures to stabilize the situation in and around the safe area of Bihac;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the Bosnian parties on the modalities of demilitarization of Sarajevo, bearing in mind the need for the restoration of normal life to the city and for free access to and from the city by land and air and the free and unimpeded movement of people, goods and services in and around the city in line with its resolution 900 (1994), particularly operative paragraph 2;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution by 1 December 1994;

8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Assessment of Military Situation at Bihac and Croatian Threats to Intervene. (4 pages)	11/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2608

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Bihac Press Points

Background

The situation in Bihac has quieted somewhat, but remains of great concern as being the catalyst for a widened Balkans war. Demarches have been sent to NATO capitals and Russia highlighting U.S. concerns and seeking support for creation of an exclusion zone around Bihac to deflect further widening of the war.

Points to Make

- o Concerned about the increased fighting in the Bihac area and risk of more casualties in an area that has already seen more than its share of conflict and suffering.
- o Call upon all parties in the conflict to avoid any actions that might further escalate hostilities.
- o Raised our concerns with NATO allies, the Russians, other partners, and the UN. Have urged all parties to use restraint in an effort to defuse the situation.
- o Particularly concerned about reports of cross-border operations by Krajina-Serbs, which could trigger a widening of the conflict. Call for an immediate halt of Krajina-Serb military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- o Have begun consultations at the UN on possible steps to defuse the situation, including the establishment of an exclusion zone around Bihac to deter further fighting and to deflect escalation of hostilities. (FYI: Bihac is a safe area but has not been designated an exclusion zone.)
- o Will continue discussing at the UN and at NATO over next several days.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. draft	Paper, Bihac Issues. (1 page)	11/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9115

November 12, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: Bosnia: Strategy to Prevent Croatian Intervention
in Bihac.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President on a strategy to prevent Croatian intervention in the Bihac crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Va Zbina* NARA, Date *6/4/2014*

2013-0687-f

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. draft	Memo for the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Bosnia: Strategy to Prevent Croatian Intervention in Bihac. Record ID: 9409115. (3 pages)	11/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

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011. paper	Bihac Issues. (1 page)	11/13/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

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Bosnia Press Points

Background

Fighting continues in Bihac. Reports of air attacks on Bihac by Krajina Serb aircraft proved false. UNSC Presidential statement urged parties to refrain from hostile actions and condemned border violations. Responses to U.S. Bihac exclusion zone proposal generally positive. French oppose. Russians not likely to support. U.S. to begin discussions at NATO on exclusion zone on November 15. Nunn-Mitchell fallout diminishing, but on agenda at NATO where French will fully exploit to their advantage.

UNSC Presidential Statement on Bihac

- o Welcome statement by the UNSC President on the situation in Bihac.
- o Appreciate the Security Council's prompt consideration of our concerns about the fighting there. Look forward to the Secretary General's report on measures to stabilize the Bihac safe area.
- o Support the Security Council's call for restraint and for avoiding any actions that would further escalate hostilities.
- o Pleased the statement condemned border violations by the "Krajina Serb forces" and called upon the Krajina Serbs to cease all hostilities within the internationally recognized boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Next Steps at NATO

- o Will begin discussions Tuesday with our NATO partners on steps to defuse the situation in Bihac, including the idea of establishing an exclusion zone around Bihac.
- o Will continue our efforts at the UN, at NATO, and with our Contact Group partners and other allies over the next several days.

Reaction to Nunn-Mitchell

- o Understand our allies concern about steps we have taken to stop enforcing the arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- o Believe steps we have taken are measured and appropriate and are practical ways to end our enforcement of the arms embargo, while at the same time continue enforcement of sanctions against Serbia.
- o Remain steadfast in our commitment to NATO and to working with Contact Group partners and others to end the terrible fighting in Bosnia.

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

November 16, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am deeply concerned about the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Bihac region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. News reports and information I have received from the Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, indicate that this latest Serbian assault on Bihac involves artillery, ground-launched rockets, helicopters, and ground troops, not only from Bosnian Serb forces, but from Serb forces based in occupied areas of Croatia -- the so called U.N. protected areas (UNPAs). This action has made a mockery of U.N. designated protection areas and U.N. designated safe areas, and raises serious doubts about the impact of President Milosevic's announced embargo of the Bosnian Serb forces.

The offensive on Bihac is yet another manifestation of the Serbs' continued defiance of the international community, which unfortunately is not surprising in light of the Contact Group's failure to honor its commitments to stronger military action in its July 30 communique. Equally as troubling as recent developments in Bihac is the absence of any concerted high-level administration pressure on the United Nations to end, once and for all, its obstructionism and defacto "veto" of militarily effective NATO air strikes.


Enough is enough. In the name of consensus, for over two years the United States has complied with the failed policies of the U.N. and European Union while the Bosnian people and the credibility of the NATO alliance have paid a heavy price. The United Nations has simultaneously blocked the Bosnians from exercising their inherent right to self-defense and blocked NATO from taking actions it has pledged to take to confront Serbian aggression. The United States must begin to exercise the leadership necessary to reverse this trend.

Therefore, Mr. President, I urge you to act now to end this brutal Serbian assault. By acting now, the United States and NATO can prevent what the U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb warns could become a humanitarian catastrophe, while beginning to reestablish NATO's credibility.

Sincerely,



BOB DOLE

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY

TO Sandy Vershbow
OFFICE 202-456-9151

NUMBER OF
FOLLOWING PAGES 1
FROM WALTER B. SLOCOMBE

PHONE _____

PHONE (703) 695-5136

FAX 202-395-1206

FAX (703) 697-6602

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☐ Hold for delivery during normal duty hours
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COMMENTS _____

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. note	Walter B. Slocombe to Anthony Lake. Subject: Bihac. (1 page)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2608

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. paper	Bihac: Implications of the Worst Case Scenario. [CIA Act] [partial] (3 pages)	11/15/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F

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(b)(3)

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
15 November 1994

Bihac: Implications of the Worst Case Scenario

The Nightmare Scenario

Fighting in the Bihac pocket threatens to spark a worst-case scenario that could reignite the war in Croatia. In this event, Serbia probably would support both the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs. (b)(3)

In our vision of the worst case, the Bosnian Serb Army, assisted by Krajina Serb forces, presses its counterattack in the Bihac area, threatening the survival of the Bosnian Government's Fifth Corps. Zagreb has concluded that the prospect of a Serb takeover of the Muslim enclave would significantly harm Croatia's prospects for retaking the Krajina and it probably would launch its own offensive against the Krajina Serbs near the Bihac area. (b)(3)

Implications of the Worst Case

[013]

A Widened War

1. **End near term prospects for Croatian peace talks** based on the Zagreb-4 plan, or on ICFY efforts to negotiate confidence-building-measures through the reestablishment of economic links. (b)(3)

2. **Dramatically increase the likelihood of full-scale renewed warfare in Croatia.** Although Zagreb might hope to keep the fighting localized, the Krajina Serbs have threatened to retaliate against Croatian strikes with missile attacks against Zagreb. The Serbs might also choose to try to distract Zagreb by counterattacking Croatian forces in other parts of the country. If Zagreb made quick gains in the Bihac area, it might become emboldened to strike elsewhere. (b)(3)

3. **UNPROFOR would scramble to redeploy its forces or withdraw from Croatia and look to Washington for help.** If the war spread quickly in Croatia or expanded significantly in Bosnia, Allied troop contributors would expect US involvement on the ground to assist them in extricating their forces. (b)(3)

4. **Cement the Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb military partnership.** The two Serb factions have long discussed combining forces, and a major battle in the Bihac area that drew in the Croats would finally give them a common cause. The Bosnian Serbs would

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VZ 16/1/2013

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

be tempted to attack vulnerable Croat forces in Bosnia to punish Zagreb for its assaults against the Krajina Serbs. These forces probably would be particularly vulnerable since the help they have received from the Croatian Army would probably be redirected to the fighting in the Krajina. (b)(3)

5. **Increase Zagreb's demand for weapons.** Zagreb might be more willing to permit Bosnian Government forces to receive heavy weapons in order to increase its own imports.

(b)(3)

6. **Increase Zagreb's interest in a military alliance with the Bosnian Government.** If Zagreb adopts the war option in Croatia, it will need the Bosnian Government's cooperation to distract the Bosnian Serbs from lending their full support to the Krajina Serbs. Moreover, Croatia will have to trust the Bosnian Government not to renew its attacks against Bosnian Croat forces while Zagreb is preoccupied with the Krajina Serbs. Although the Bosnian Government has long pressed for an alliance with the Croats--and would be grateful for Zagreb's intervention in the Bihac area--the partnership would face early strains as the two groups struggle to define a common military strategy and tactics.

(b)(3)

Milosevic's Ability to Maneuver is Reduced

1. **Dramatically increase domestic pressure on Milosevic to abandon his embargo of the Bosnian Serbs.** Initially, increasing numbers of Serbian "volunteers" and supplies would find their way into Bosnia and Croatia. If fighting in Croatia and Bosnia escalated rapidly, Milosevic would blame the Croats and Muslims for destroying prospects for the Contact Group plan and argue that he has no choice other than to aid his fellow Serbs.

(b)(3)

2. **Renew the adversarial relationship between Belgrade and Zagreb.** Milosevic would appeal to the international community to condemn Croatia's attack, and current hopes for a renewed dialogue between the Serbian leader and Croatian President Tudjman would plummet. (b)(3)

[013]

3. **At a minimum, informal ties between the Yugoslav Army (JA) and the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs would grow.** Severe losses by the Krajina or Bosnian Serbs would lead to a large-scale intervention into the conflict by the JA. (b)(3)

Refugees Face New Peril

1. **Most of Bihac city's 50,000 inhabitants and many of the 150,000 people in the surrounding enclave would try to flee Serb advances by forcing their way through Serb-controlled territory.** The vast majority probably would attempt to flee through Krajina Serb-controlled areas in order to reach free Croatia. (b)(3)

2. **Several thousand inhabitants of the Bihac area probably would die.** Many would be caught by the Serb advance, especially if Bosnian Government forces collapsed quickly. Because the likely axis for a Croatian advance on the Krajina would direct fighting along transportation routes that refugees would use to escape the region, deaths among those fleeing to Croatia could also be high. Some of the roughly 30,000 refugees already in the Krajina would face similar threats. Exposure could significantly increase the death count among refugees if their flight occurred during sub-freezing weather. (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

Fissures Grow in the Contact Group and UNPROFOR

1. Moscow probably would renew its demands for an end to sanctions against Serbia or, with likely support from France and the UK, argue that sanctions should also be imposed against Croatia because Zagreb had abandoned international efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in the Krajina. (b)(3)

2. France, the UK, and Russia would charge that Washington's efforts to lift the arms embargo were instrumental in causing the crisis to escalate. These nations may pressure Washington to retract its decision to stop enforcing the embargo and advocate new efforts to cut the arms flow into Croatia and Bosnia. (b)(3)

3. Bonn would look to Washington for help in moderating the Contact Group's position regarding Croatia. If the war in Croatia broadened beyond Bihac, Bonn's sympathy for Zagreb might increase strains within the EU. (b)(3)

[013]

4. The Bosnian Government would sharply criticize UNPROFOR for allowing another "Gorazde"-style attack on a UN safe area and would renew its campaign for the immediate lifting of the arms embargo. The international press would have a field day with new stories of the ethnic cleansing of another enclave. Depending on its own public relations strategy, Zagreb might appear as the enclave's savior and interest in lifting the arms embargo against Croatia might grow in some quarters, especially Germany. (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. paper	Bosnia and Croatia: The Next Six Months. [CIA Act] [partial] (3 pages)	10/17/1994	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2608

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(3)

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
17 October 1994

Bosnia and Croatia: The Next Six Months

Bosnia: Alternative Scenarios

I. Scenario: Achievement of a Political Settlement

- Likelihood. Very low. Neither side currently wants a political settlement. The current Contact Group map is totally unacceptable to the Serbs. The Muslims would reject any changes that would make the map more palatable to the Serbs.
- Conditions. If the current map is the basis for a settlement, it probably would require a change in the top Bosnian Serb leadership, combined with international pressure on the Muslims to settle, including carrots (international guarantees and implementation force) and sticks (cut-off of current weapons flow). The current Bosnian Serb leadership might accept a modified map and arrangement permitting confederation with Serbia, but achievement of this settlement would require the same carrots and sticks with the Muslims. [014]
- Implications. Violence is reduced to relatively low level. Implementation force including US troops would be required.

II. Scenario: Continuation of the Status Quo--Battlefield Stalemate, Periodic Offensives and Counteroffensives, UNPROFOR Remains Deployed

- Likelihood. High (60 percent).
- Conditions. No specific date is set for lifting the arms embargo. Flow of weapons to the Muslims does not increase much beyond current rate. Serbs do not launch preemptive strike. Muslims are relatively restrained in launching offensives against the Serbs.
- Implications. Large-scale humanitarian crisis averted. Islamic influence in Bosnia increases as more Middle Eastern/Islamic contingents deploy. Growing Islamic influence, perceived US abandonment of lift weakens Bosnian Government interest in the federation and strengthens Serb hardliners in Bosnia and Serbia. Bosnian Government grows increasingly vocal in its criticism of US failure to lift arms embargo. European war-

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weariness grows. Other Contact Group members increasingly will want to explore other options for a political settlement, including efforts to develop a new map, but will continue to resist lifting the arms embargo. Sanctions regime against Serbia gradually erodes.

III. Scenario: Overall Increase in the Violence

- Likelihood. Moderate (40 percent).
- Conditions. Arms embargo is lifted or Serbs conclude that lifting the arms embargo is inevitable in the spring and launch a preemptive attack. The flow of weapons to the Bosnian Muslims and Croatia increases. The Muslims increase offensive actions against the Serbs. UNPROFOR begins to retrench, withdrawing from the eastern enclaves.
- Implications. Possibility of serious humanitarian crisis as Serbs attack eastern enclaves, tighten the supply and utility situation around Sarajevo, and take a very restrictive approach to aid deliveries. Serbian-Bosnian Serb border becomes more porous. Bosnian Government expects NATO military action to slow the Serbs. UNPROFOR comes under greater attack from Serbs. Pressure for UNPROFOR withdrawal goes up. US forces possibly called on to help extricate UNPROFOR. Croat enthusiasm for renewed war in the Krajina grows as Croatia's military machine absorbs the larger weapons flow.

[014]

Croatia: Alternative Scenarios

I. Scenario: Continuation of the Status Quo--Stagnation

- Likelihood. Less than 50-50 chance.
- Conditions. Negotiations continue aimed at achieving a political settlement with some progress on economic issues and confidence-building measures. The Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia remains shaky so that the Croats must worry about the situation there, or fighting resumes between Croats and Muslims. Fighting between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia remains limited. Croats have doubts about their ability to score military gains with a minimum of casualties. International community maintains pressure on Croatia not to launch a military attack.
- Implications. Serbs continue to establish control over areas they control, but the spread of the conflict is averted.

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II. Scenario: Renewal of Fighting--Limited Croatian Attack

- Likelihood. More than 50-50 chance.
- Conditions. No progress is being made in negotiations. The international community is perceived by the Croats as not actively engaged. Croats are confident of military capabilities in some areas, but remain convinced that a broad attack will fail. Milosevic continues to maintain a blockade against the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs. The Croat-Muslim federation continues to plod along or some steps are made to strengthen it. Muslim-Serb fighting in Bosnia is on an upswing, with the Krajina Serbs providing some assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.
- Implications. UNPROFOR forces in Croatia could be placed in danger. Serbs could launch missiles against population centers as a weapon of terror. Both sides could employ air power. Fighting initiated by Croats could embolden nationalists in Serbia opposed to Milosevic's cut-off of aid to the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs.

III. Scenario: Renewal of Fighting--Major Croatian Attack

[014]

- Likelihood. About 20 percent chance.
- Conditions. No progress is made in negotiations between the Croats and Krajina Serbs. Zagreb perceives that the international community is not interested in the Krajina problem. Weakened arms embargo provides steady flow of weapons for Zagreb. Croats are confident--even overconfident--of their military capabilities. Bosnian Serbs are on the defensive against the Muslims in Bosnia, thereby less able to assist the Krajina Serbs. Milosevic's embargo continues to be felt strongly in the Krajina, particularly in terms of fuel shortages.
- Implications. Sharp increase in fighting, with the possibility that UNPROFOR forces may need to be extricated. Serbs will attack Croatian population centers. The Yugoslav Army will intervene if the Krajina Serbs begin to lose significant ground. A military stalemate is likely to develop.

3
(b)(3)

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24

TO: DOLE, ROBERT J

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 21 NOV 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PC REVIEW OF BIHAC & BOSNIA POLICY

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 23 NOV 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KERRICK

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014
7013-0687-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY SP DATE 11/21 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMBN

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 94112120 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
002 PRESIDENT	Z 94112120 FOR SIGNATURE
003	X 94112120 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
003 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 94112120 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTIONDISPATCH FOR INFO

003	941121	DOLE, ROBERT J
003	941121	WH STRIPPING DESK

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9293
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>OPS 11/21</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC: _____

COMMENTS:

*Date 11-21-93 per
W. Gray*

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 21, 1994

Dear Mr. Leader:

I share your deep concern about the deteriorating situation in and around the town of Bihac in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are particularly disturbed at the large-scale involvement of Serb forces from the Krajina region of Croatia, and the air strikes launched from that area against Bihac city.

As the Bihac crisis began to escalate last weekend, we took action on a number of fronts. In an emergency session of the UN Security Council on Sunday, Ambassador Albright won agreement to a Presidential statement condemning the Serb offensive and the cross-border actions of the so-called Krajina Serbs. Our Ambassadors in NATO capitals have pressed our concerns with our NATO allies and we have called for firm action in the North Atlantic Council. NATO Military Authorities with their UN counterparts are developing appropriate military responses to contain the fighting around Bihac. At the same time, we have been consulting with the government of Croatia on NATO's behalf and have obtained its approval for NATO to conduct close air support, if requested by the UN, against artillery and other targets in the Krajina region that have been involved in the assault on Bihac.

We are continuing to press our Allies on measures to limit the Serb offensive and are actively working on a range of options that could bring NATO air power to bear in response to continued escalation by Serb forces.

Ambassador Albright convened the Security Council Thursday and Friday afternoon, and again on Saturday, to underscore the seriousness of

the situation and to urge action by the UN in coordination with NATO.

In Saturday's meeting, at her urging, the Security Council adopted new resolutions on the protection of the safe areas that included the authorization to conduct air strikes in Croatia as well as Bosnia against targets threatening the safe areas. The North Atlantic Council convened Saturday night in Brussels to provide the corresponding authority to NATO forces. And as you know, NATO aircraft conducted such a strike today.

I hope you will stay in touch on this issue. I will always welcome your ideas as we work to resolve it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill Clinton".

The Honorable Robert Dole
Minority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015a. memo	Duplicate of 003. (3 pages)	11/19/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2608

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015b. paper	Bihac Options. (1 page)	11/18/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [6]

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9293

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 19, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(i)*
SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President on Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President regarding Principals review of Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Triggers and Menu of Options

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 5/20/2014
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CEF ca

106 2

cu 5

106 2

Source: Reuters

Subject : BRITAIN

al860

^BC-BRITAIN 4THLD

^Major wins key vote on Euro funds, avoids election
(Eds: Updates with vote, quotes, new throughout)

By Paul Mylrea

LONDON, Nov 28 (Reuter) - British Prime Minister John Major won a narrow victory on a crucial vote on European Union funding on Monday, saving him from calling a general election which he would almost certainly lose.

But the ruling Conservative party, lagging 25 points behind the Labour party, was left with deep internal wounds after Major adopted strongarm tactics to force anti-European rank and file members of parliament into line.

An opposition Labour party amendment designed to wreck the bill was defeated by 330 votes to 303, with Major having to rely on Northern Irish MPs to shore up his fragile majority of 14.

The bill covers a rise in British payments to the European Union. Around 20 government rebels originally threatened to scupper it, but Major warned he would call a general election if the bill was defeated.

In the end, seven Conservative MPs ignored strong pressure and abstained from the vote. They now risk being banned from taking part in ruling party business in the House of Commons.

The government's threat to ban the rebels would on paper wipe out its majority, although the dissidents are likely to back the government in future votes.

The damaging effects of the row over Europe will dog Major for the rest of this week, described by political commentators as the most difficult he has faced during four years in office.

On Tuesday, Major's finance minister, Kenneth Clarke, must present parliament with the government's annual budget.

But Clarke has already ruled out the tax cuts being demanded by right-wing Conservative lawmakers jittery at their dismal prospects in an election which must be held before mid-1997.

Major could even face a leadership challenge from within his own party, although most mooted candidates have ruled themselves out. The deadline for a challenge is Wednesday.

But his most serious threat will come next Tuesday, when Labour has promised a fight over the government's plans to increase Value Added Tax on fuel and hopes to win support from some of the Conservative lawmakers angered at Major's tactics.

Conservative party managers brought in every available MP to back Major in Monday's vote, including several sick lawmakers, one with his arm in a sling and another in a neck brace.

Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd sped back from Brussels by train through the Channel Tunnel.

The debate was marked by speeches by Conservative rebels angry at what they called government blackmail against them.

Conservative MP John Wilkinson told the chamber: "To me, for the Conservative Party this is as climactic a moment as when the anti-appeasers stood their ground over Munich in 1938."

"It seems to me that the Government bows down and appeases Brussels all the way along the line. And the danger is that, like (prime minister in 1938) Neville Chamberlain, Mr Major will be swept away from office," Wilkinson said.

Major's former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, said Britain should even consider pulling out of Europe.

"Europe is an issue that risks splitting the Conservative party... This country needs to redefine its relations with Europe on a permanent basis, Lamont said.

"We... have to consider all options if we cannot negotiate a special relationship between Britain and our partners, including even withdrawal," Lamont said to cheers

RB-- 11/28/94 18:22:00

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 23, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: DON KERRICK *DK*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Telephone Call with President
Mitterrand

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his telephone call with President Mitterrand.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be made

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White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Va Zolner* NARA, Date *5/20/2014*

2013-0687-f

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