

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

850

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34	1	10	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Sanctions. (8 pages)	10/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: Bosnia Updates. Record ID: 9408781. (1 page)	10/29/1994	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Bosnia-Herzegovina: Six-Month Outlook. (6 pages)	10/24/1994	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Bosnia: Lifting of the Arms Embargo. (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: French Questions on Nunn/Mitchell. (3 pages)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)
006. report	Sanctions. (9 pages)	11/21/1994	P1/b(1)
007. poster	Overview of Sanctions, November 21, 1994. (1 page)	11/21/1994	P1/b(1)
008. report	Sanctions. (10 pages)	11/09/1994	P1/b(1)
009. report	Sanctions. (7 pages)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: Letter from British Prime Minister John Major to President Bill Clinton. (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2606

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ARMS EMBARGO

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS,

REAFFIRMING ALSO ITS COMMITMENT TO THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERALL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND URGING THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,

REITERATING ITS APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WHICH HAS BEEN PUT TO THE PARTIES BY THE INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP AS PART OF AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND AGAIN WELCOMING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSED TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT IN FULL BY ALL PARTIES EXCEPT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY,

REITERATING ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE REFUSAL OF THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSED TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT, AND ITS DEMAND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY ACCEPT THIS SETTLEMENT UNCONDITIONALLY AND IN FULL,

RECALLING THAT, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND STABILITY, RESOLUTION 713 AND SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS IMPOSED A COMPLETE EMBARGO ON ALL DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA UNTIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDED OTHERWISE,

CONCERNED THAT THE EMBARGO ON DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA HAS NOT BROUGHT ABOUT PEACE AND STABILITY AND HAS RESULTED IN A MILITARY IMBALANCE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,

CONVINCED THAT CONTINUATION OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AND THE REJECTION OF THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY OF THE PROPOSED TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT, CALL INTO QUESTION THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE EMBARGO ON DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,

CONVINCED ALSO THAT THE CONTINUED REFUSAL OF THE CROATIAN SERB AUTHORITIES TO IMPLEMENT KEY ELEMENTS OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING PLAN FOR CROATIA AND RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CALLS INTO QUESTION THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE EMBARGO ON DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

NOTING WITH SPECIAL INTEREST THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON JULY 30 BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF GERMANY, GREECE, AND FRANCE WHICH REITERATED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF CONTINUING REJECTION OF THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSAL BY THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY, AS A LAST RESORT A DECISION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO COULD BECOME UNAVOIDABLE,

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

[1] DECIDES TO EXEMPT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, FROM THE EMBARGO ON THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPOSED BY RESOLUTION 713, SUCH EXEMPTION TO TAKE EFFECT SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF PASSAGE OF THIS RESOLUTION UNLESS THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTS THAT THE CONTACT GROUP HAS DETERMINED THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY HAS OFFICIALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY ACCEPTED THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSED TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT IN FULL PRIOR TO THE END OF THAT SIX MONTH PERIOD.

[2] REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE PLANNING FOR THE ORDERLY AND SAFE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR PERSONNEL IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA THAT MIGHT BECOME NECESSARY IF THE MEASURE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE IS IMPLEMENTED;

[3] FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WHEN SUCH PLANS ARE COMPLETED;

[4] AFFIRMS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING ACTIONS THAT MAY BE TAKEN TO EFFECT THE EXEMPTION IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE FROM THE EMBARGO ON THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPOSED BY RESOLUTION 713, SUCH EMBARGO REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

[5] DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

October 7, 1994

F.

Covert Action and "Requests"

- o On November 30, 1990, President Bush vetoed the proposed Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 91. (Tab A) The primary reason was that "requests" to third governments to engage in covert actions could have been deemed to be covert actions. (The offensive language had been added in Conference.) The President indicated that this could have a chilling effect on our diplomats. The State Department was particularly concerned about this language. (Tab B) Q/A's prepared at the time elaborated on this issue. (Tab C)
- o The veto was unpopular on the Hill (Tab D). The Bush Administration adopted a strategy to work with Congress (Tab E), and the issue was resolved in negotiations.
- o Congress passed a revised bill the following summer, and the offensive language was deleted. On August 19, 1991, President Bush signed the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1991 (Public Law 102-88). He noted with satisfaction in his signing statement that the "requests" language had been deleted. (Tab F)
- o It should be noted that in the 1990 veto statement, the President stated that "[i]t remains Administration policy that our intelligence services will not ask third parties to carry out activities that they are themselves forbidden to take . . . " under the Executive Order on intelligence activities. These words were carefully chosen.
- o The relevant current law is Section 503(a)(4) and (e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1991. The definition of covert action is at Tab G. The relevant pages of legislative history are at Tab H.
- o It thus is clear that requests at the diplomatic level or diplomatic level discussions generally on covert actions normally are not deemed to be covert action, and thus do not require a Finding. However, as the legislative history illustrates, specific support (e.g., assistance or direct participation in implementing a foreign covert program) will probably constitute covert action.
 - This is the case, for example, if a foreign government could be deemed to be acting on behalf of and under the control of the U.S. Government.
 - As the Conference Report indicates, "[t]he Committee considers third parties to be acting on behalf and under control of an element of the United States Government when they are receiving direction and assistance from U.S. personnel directly involved in carrying out the covert action in question, or when they are receiving significant financial support or other significant forms of tangible materiel support from an element of the United States Government for use in carrying out the covert action."

Clearly OK

Responding verbally to inquiries from diplomats of a foreign country on its thoughts/plans/intentions on engaging in covert action, and providing general advice at the diplomatic level.

Within the Letter of the Law

Suggesting to a foreign country through diplomatic channels that it might consider a covert action.

Within the Letter of the Law but potentially risky from a Hill standpoint depending on the issue involved

Encouraging a foreign country through diplomatic channels to engage in a covert operation or action, with the caveat that only the foreign country's resources are used and the U.S. have no other role, not even a continuing oversight or general advisory role.

Crosses the Line into Covert Action

Actually supporting the foreign action through assistance, direction, direct participation, etc.

Important to Avoid

The National Security Act provides that the President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action by any department or agency of the USG unless certain requirements are met, which include specifying in a written Finding whether any third party (which includes third countries) will be used to undertake the covert action concerned "on behalf of the United States." It is important to avoid asking a country to engage in a covert action on our behalf (as opposed to encouraging it to engage in such activities because it is in that country's interest or our mutual interests). It is also important to avoid providing assistance, direction, or asking the foreign government to do something that the USG is expressly prohibited from doing (e.g., assassinations) and making promises of financial "quids."

Special Factors

There may be additional complications if one of the countries involved is subject to special U.S. sanctions (e.g., the terrorism list) or U.N. sanctions, or if we have reason to believe that international agreements may be violated.

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 24 OCT 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC

PC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 OCT PC MTG ON BOSNIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 24 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: IFG

NSCP:

CODES: BOS

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BERGER
DARBY
KERRICK
KRECKO
LAKE
NSC CHRON
SODERBERG
VERSHBOW
WOLIN
WRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By 12 NARA, Date 5/20/2004
2013-0687-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY HH DATE 10/24 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 2 OF 2

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21228

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 24, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative of the U.S. to
the United Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President
of the United States

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
October 18, 1994 (S)

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tab A. (S)



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By JA Th NARA, Date 5/20/2014

7013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

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21228

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions

Meeting of NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 18, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 3:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

CIA

Director James Woolsey

OVP

Leon Fuerth

JCS

ADM William Owens

State

Secretary Warren Christopher

David Gergen

Charles Thomas

White House

Samuel Berger

Nancy Soderberg

DOD

Deputy Secretary John Deutch

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

UN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Summary of Conclusions

Strategy:

1. The Principals affirmed our goal to use the next six months in an intensive effort to achieve a political settlement based on the Contact Group proposal. They agreed to press forward with the "Bold Approach" and the Zagreb-Four plan to induce Milosevic to effect a total cut-off of the Krajina Serbs and recognize borders, with a view to further isolating the Bosnian Serbs. Principals requested a short paper within forty-eight hours summarizing key issues encompassing the bold approach and how we would relate those to sanctions relief. Action: State.
2. The Principals agreed that the U.S. will circulate a draft UNSC resolution on or about October 29 calling for a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo by a date certain in the spring (hard-trigger). The resolution should include a "build-down" strategy, if possible. The

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2010-0533-M
5/9/2014

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further agreed to consult closely along the way with the Bosnians and the Congress. Principals will review progress and consider next steps in early November.

Action: State/USUN.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

3. The Principals reviewed the progress of military planning and directed that the Departments of Defense and State continue their efforts, consulting with Congress on outstanding issues relating to lift with a view to resolving issues by January 1. The Principals recognized that allies expect the U.S. to provide ground forces, if necessary, to assist with UNPROFOR withdrawal, although we have made no specific commitment to do so. Action: Joint Staff and OSD.

4. The Principals agreed we will implement the Nunn-Mitchell amendment requirement to cease funding for enforcing the arms embargo and requested a briefing by November 1 on the modifications necessary and the operational implications of U.S. limitations of enforcing the arms embargo. The Principals also requested companion papers on how to deal with this issue at the United Nations and NATO. CIA will review the scope of intelligence sharing conducted in conjunction with enforcing the arms embargo. Action: Briefing - Joint Staff. Papers - State/OSD/Intel Sharing - CIA.

Sanctions:

5. The Principals stressed the importance of fulfilling commitments and for rapid deployment of the U.S. monitors participating in the ICFY sanctions monitoring mission in Serbia. DoD agreed to provide 20 to complement the 20 being provided by State. Action: OVP.

6. The Principals discussed the effectiveness of the border closure and directed the interagency working group on Bosnia to review the status of Serbian compliance prior to each 30-day review with a view to determining if action should be taken to terminate sanctions relief. The IWG should coordinate demarches to Serbia and other capitals based on available evidence. Action: OVP, NSC, and State.

Strict Enforcement

7. The Principals reviewed the progress of efforts underway to improve strict enforcement of exclusion zones and directed that efforts be taken with the British and French at the United Nations with a view to obtaining a more positive UN response on the new NATO airstrike standards. Action: State.

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
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21228

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia, October 18, 1994

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen
NOTED

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held October 18, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *✓* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van Thiel* NARA, Date *5/20/2014*
2013-0687-F

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BOSNIA

Supplemental Questions and Answers

Q: Why didn't the air strike at Udbina target aircraft? Isn't this just another weak response by NATO?

- o NATO acted in coordination with the United Nations in planning and conducting the air strike. The United Nations commanders expressed concerns about triggering further escalation and about the safety of their forces on the ground.
- o Under the circumstances, the NATO operation was a strong and appropriate response.
- o NATO is prepared to act more decisively if the Serbs continue their assault on the Bihac safe area.

Q: Why are we and NATO taking orders from the United Nations?

- o Decision that NATO would not take the lead in the former Yugoslavia was made during the previous Administration.
- o UN has been in charge from the beginning, and despite our occasional frustration with their tactics, NATO must coordinate military operations with UN Commanders who have troops on the ground and are concerned about their safety.

Q: What are we doing to prevent the fall of Bihac?

- o Have been very concerned about the serious situation in Bihac and have been pressing for action on a number of fronts with some results.
- o At our urging, UN and NATO have condemned the Bosnian and Krajina Serb violations in Bihac and authorized air strikes to address the most serious of those violations -- the use of Croatian airfields to attack a neighboring state. The NATO air strike yesterday was such a strike.
- o Continuing to press our Allies on measures to limit the Serb offensive and are actively working on a range of options that could bring NATO air power to bear in response to further Serb escalation.

Q: What about a cease-fire in Bihac?

- o Support ongoing efforts to obtain a cease-fire in the Bihac region as an important measure to defuse the situation.
- o A cease-fire in Bihac now would be a positive step that the Bosnian Government could support.
- o Must reiterate, fighting must be stopped so progress can be made on achieving a negotiated settlement.

Q: What if Bihac falls?

- o Very concerned about the serious situation in Bihac. Continue to urge Allies to take stronger action to prevent the collapse of the Bihac pocket.
- o Would be a serious set-back for the Bosnians and for the peace process.
- o Continue to believe that neither side will resolve the conflict on the battlefield and that the only solution remains a negotiated, political settlement.
- o Will do all we can to stop the fighting in Bosnia and restore the focus to achieving a negotiated settlement.

Q: What do you think about the Bosnian Government's withdrawal of support for the Contact Group proposal because of the failure of the international community to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the plan?

- o Very concerned about those reports and will be discussing it with them.
- o Believe the plan is still a viable basis for a solution. Continue to support it. Urge the Bosnians to do so and renew my call for the Bosnian Serbs to accept it as best avenue to peace.
- o Understand the Bosnian frustrations that the international community has been unable to bring enough pressure to bear to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept.
- o However, no one ever said this was an easy process. The struggle for peace continues, and in the long run, there is no better alternative than to press vigorously for acceptance of the Contact Group's territorial proposal as the best hope for achieving a negotiated settlement.
- o Have not given up and neither should anyone else.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	Sanctions. (9 pages)	11/21/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2606

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. poster	Overview of Sanctions, November 21, 1994. (1 page)	11/21/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Sanctions. (10 pages)	11/09/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2606

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. report	Sanctions. (7 pages)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2606

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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010. cable	re: Letter from British Prime Minister John Major to President Bill Clinton. (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

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FINN

The Council:

- (1) condemns the recent attacks on the UN safe area of Bihac by Bosnian Serb and Krajinan Serb forces; calls for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of these forces; and supports the ongoing UN negotiating efforts to this end;
- (2) supports ongoing diplomatic efforts to create an effective stabilization in and around Bihac, and would be ready to consider how to assist the United Nations in implementing these objectives once they have been agreed;
- (3) strongly supports diplomatic approaches to the parties by the Contact Group, which reflect the Alliance's firm commitment to a negotiated settlement;
- (4) recalls its decision of 22nd April 1994 that if any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy weapons were carried out on UN designated safe areas, including Bihac, these weapons and other Bosnian Serb military assets, as well as their direct and essential support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munition sites, would be subject to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council decisions of 2nd and 9th August 1993;
- (5) recalls also its decision of 19th November 1994 authorising air strikes in response to attacks against or which threaten the UN safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina launched from the UN protected areas in Croatia;
- (6) decides that, in addition, attacks on the safe areas from within Bosnia involving heavy weapons of forces other than Bosnian Serbs will also be subject to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the existing arrangements for coordination with UNPROFOR;
- (7) recalls its decision of 22nd April 1994 concerning the designation of military exclusion zones around UN safe areas, including Bihac; and declares its readiness to use NATO air power in support of that decision should the NATO and UNPROFOR commanders on the ground designate any further exclusion zones pursuant to it;
- (8) declares its readiness to carry out air strikes in pursuit of these decisions, subject to agreement with UNPROFOR;
- (9) decides that NATO air power may be used, under the provisions of SCR 958, against aircraft flying in Croatian

air space which have been engaged in attacks on or which threaten UN safe areas, subject to making arrangements with the Croatian authorities;

- (10) tasks the NMAs to advise on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a no-fly zone in the UN protected areas of Croatia;
- (11) tasks the NMAs to report as soon as possible on the means by which the Alliance with its member states can contribute to UNPROFOR in the performance of its mission.