

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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1

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. presentation	Bosnia / Former Yugoslavia Border. (6 pages)	c. 11/1994	P1/b(1)
002. presentation	Nunn-Mitchell Amendment. (27 pages)	c. 11/1994	P1/b(1)
003. report	Congressional Briefing on Bosnia: Key Points. (2 pages)	11/14/1994	P1/b(1)
004. report	Bosnia Lift Resolution Options: Pros and Cons. (2 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Bosnia Update - UNSCR, Nunn-Mitchell. Record ID: 9409101. (2 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1)
005b. report	Duplicate of 004. (2 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1)
006. report	Implication of Lifting the UN Arms Embargo Against Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. [CIA Act] [partial] (5 pages)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2603

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH _____ DRAFT _____

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6 _____ 7 _____ 8 _____

EUR:RCFRASURE/SBREMNER:SB2
11/15/94 71626 SERPMS 7565
EUR:RHOLBROOKE

EUR/RPM:DMCELHANEY
H/EUR:TROBERTSON
OSD:
S/S:

EUR/SCE:CHILL
JCS:
NSC:
S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE USNATO

PRIORITY EURPO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, BK, SR, MARR

SUBJECT: HILL BRIEFINGS ON BOSNIA AND UNILATERAL LIFT

US VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

1. _____ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AS MANDATED IN NUNN/MITCHELL, A STATE/JCS/DOD TEAM BRIEFED SENATE AND HOUSE MEMBERS AND STAFFERS NOVEMBER 15 ON UNILATERAL LIFT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA. FOUR SENATORS AND TWO HOUSE MEMBERS TOOK PART IN THE MEETINGS, WITH 30-40 SENATE STAFF AND 20-30 HOUSE STAFF PARTICIPATING. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE BRIEFINGS WILL BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND COULD BE PRESENTED AS SOME KIND OF ADMINISTRATION "PROPOSAL" FOR UNILATERAL LIFT. IN FACT THE SESSIONS WERE SOLELY INFORMATIONAL AND IN RESPONSE TO THE NUNN/MITCHELL REQUIREMENT THAT THE "PRESIDENT SHALL SUBMIT A PLAN TO, AND SHALL CONSULT WITH, CONGRESS REGARDING THE UNILATERAL TERMINATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE BOSNIA ARMS EMBARGO AND THE IMPLICATIONS THEREOF." IF NATO OR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RAISE THE ISSUE, YOU SHOULD DESCRIBE IT IN THAT MANNER.

2

POLICY ON LIFT

3. IN INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, DAS FRASURE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON LIFT:

THE ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE MULTILATERAL LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST BOSNIA.

THAT POSITION WAS REFLECTED IN OUR RECENT UNGA VOTE AND IN THE RESOLUTION THAT WE HAVE INTRODUCED INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IF THE EMBARGO WERE TO BE LIFTED MULTILATERALLY INCLUDING:

-- UNPROFOR DEPARTURE

-- A LIKELY BOSNIAN SERB OFFENSIVE, NEED FOR AIR COVER.

-- DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE MUSLIM/CROAT FEDERATION

-- THE DETERIORATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION OVER THE WINTER.

NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT THESE PROBLEMS CAN BE MANAGED, SO LONG AS IT IS ALL HANDLED IN CONJUNCTION WITH BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES, I.E. SIX MONTHS DEFERRAL.

WE CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO OPPOSE UNILATERAL LIFT OF THE EMBARGO.

WE DO SO BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MULTILATERAL LIFT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY EXACERBATED. NOTABLY, WITHOUT NATO CONSENSUS, WE WOULD NOT HAVE A PLATFORM FOR ENGAGEMENT IN THE REGION. IN THAT REGARD, WE BELIEVE A SIMPLE "LIFT AND LEAVE" STRATEGY WOULD HAVE DEEPLY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BOSNIANS.

ALSO, WE WOULD BE UNILATERALLY ABROGATING A UN EMBARGO. IN DOING SO WE WOULD LIKELY PROVIDE ENCOURAGEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION VIS-A-VIS EMBARGOES THAT WE SUPPORT, E.G. AGAINST IRAQ AND LIBYA.

ACTING UNILATERALLY, WE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF DEEPER

3

INVOLVEMENT IN AN INCREASINGLY AMERICAN WAR IN THE BALKANS WITH NO END IN SIGHT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS A POPULAR BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THIS APPROACH IN THE U.S. TODAY.

FINALLY, UNILATERAL LIFT WOULD SERIOUSLY DIVIDE THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND WOULD SEVERELY COMPLICATE OUR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

WE ARE PREPARED TO ACTIVELY DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE CONGRESS.

OPTIONS FOR LIFT

4. JCS ADMIRAL MOORE THEN PRESENTED THREE MODELS OF UNILATERAL LIFT:

-- LIFT, BUT NO FURTHER ACTION

-- LIFT AND LIGHT OPTION

DESIGNED TO COUNTER BOSNIAN SERB STRENGTHS, THIS WOULD BE AIMED AT CREATING A RESPECTABLE LIGHT INFANTRY FORCE. IT WOULD REQUIRE AN INITIAL MINIMUM OF 3-6 MONTHS, 1250 US TRAINERS (OUTSIDE BOSNIA), AND WOULD COST IN THE RANGE OF DOLLARS 430 MILLION. IN TERMS OF WEAPONS THE FOCUS WOULD BE ON ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, MINES, MORTARS AND COMMO.

-- LIFT AND HEAVY OPTION

DESIGNED TO MATCH SERB STRENGTHS, THIS PROGRAM WOULD REQUIRE INITIAL MINIMUM OF ONE YEAR AND EMPLOY FIVE SPECIAL FORCES BATTALIONS (3800 MEN) TO TRAIN 47 BOSNIAN BATTALIONS, HEAVY EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING ARTILLERY, TANKS AND APCS WOULD BE PROVIDED. THE COST WOULD BE IN THE RANGE OF DOLLARS 2.17 BILLION IF "SOVIET" EQUIPMENT WERE PROVIDED UP TO DOLLARS 3.7 BILLION FOR U.S. EQUIPMENT.

5. GENERAL WALSH LAID OUT A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EFFECT OF SUCH A PROGRAM E.G. UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL, SERB RESPONSES, MILOSEVIC, ETC. 44

The 33 JS stays
rep presented point
models for unilateral
lift. The JS rep
laid out the
mil impacts
of the lift
and how
studied
associated pol
issues.

Sanctions and the Bold Approach
US Position

Policy Goals	Sanctions Levers
<u>Phase 1:</u> (Same as Plan A)	
<u>Phase 2:</u> FRY: • Recognizes Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and FYROM • Continues to accept and support the Contact Group map¹ • Accepts and supports the ICFY plan for Krajina • Continues verified closure of the border with B-H and ends all military, financial, and logistic support of Bosnian Serb authorities • Institutes verified closure of the border with UNPAS Sector East and ends financial and military support for Krajina Serb authorities	Suspension ² of UN sanctions on trade and transshipment of non-strategic goods. Financial sanctions (except for limited, clearly defined exceptions necessary to conduct trade in non-strategic goods), assets freeze, and ban on strategic trade (with strategic goods as defined in UNSCR 787 ³) all remain in place. Enforcement mechanisms remain in place.
<u>Phase 3:</u> Bosnian Serbs accept Contact Group plan and withdraw to agreed territories -OR- Krajina Serb accept and implement ICFY plan	Suspension ⁴ of sanctions against trade and transshipment of strategic goods. Suspension of financial sanctions. Release of frozen assets. Enforcement mechanisms remain in place.
<u>Final Phase:</u> Full implementation of Bosnia and Krajina plans.	Lifting of all UN sanctions. Enforcement mechanisms dismantled.

¹ Balanced treatment for the Bosniac Croat and Bosnian Serb entities will be ensured, within the context of Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan.

² Suspension is for successive, limited periods (30 to 45 days), with UNSC action required to continue the suspension at end of each period. Decision to continue suspensions to be based on level of compliance with requirements for sanctions suspension as well as continued progress toward negotiated settlement of the conflicts. Sanctions will be immediately re-imposed upon report that the FRY is no longer in compliance with conditions for sanctions relief.

³ UNSCR 787 defines strategic goods as: Crude oil, petroleum products; coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

⁴ Same as note 2.

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Sanctions and the Bold Approach
Proposed US Position

AS DISCUSSED ON 11/3

SV
Pls call
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mark-up
changes to
member to him
1/2
(K)

Policy Goals	Sanctions Levers
Milosevic agrees to: --Mutual recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and FYROM. --End to all military, financial, and logistic support of Bosnian Serb forces. -- Cessation of trade with Krajina Serbs, including an end to oil extraction from Sector East. --Increase protection of minority rights, including return of CSCE monitors	Suspension of UN sanctions on trade and transshipment of non-strategic goods (with strategic goods as defined in UNSCR 787¹).²
Bosnian Serb acceptance of Contact Group plan and withdrawal to agreed territories -OR- Knin acceptance and initial implementation of Krajina plan	Suspension of sanctions against trade and transshipment of strategic goods. Suspension of financial sanctions. Release of frozen assets.
Full implementation of Bosnia and Krajina plans. Resolution of other regional issues (inter alia, minority rights, regional arms reductions, War Crimes Tribunal).	Lifting of all UN sanctions. Serbia becomes eligible for participation in international financial institutions and regional recovery programs.

¹ UNSCR 787 defines strategic goods as: Crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.
² Financial sanctions (except for limited, clearly defined exceptions necessary to conduct trade in non-strategic goods), assets freeze, and ban on strategic trade all remain in place.

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003. report	Congressional Briefing on Bosnia: Key Points. (2 pages)	11/14/1994	P1/b(1)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1994

Presidential Determination
No. 95-4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Determination to Waive the Funding Prohibition in Section 1404(f)(3)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 in the Case of U.S. Military Personnel Serving in NATO Headquarters Positions

Pursuant to the authority provided in section 1404(f)(3)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that the limitation in section 1404(f)(2) of the Act is waived in the case of U.S. military personnel serving in NATO headquarters positions, including the following:

- (1) All U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing duties at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.
- (2) The Commanders and all U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing duties at the staffs of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe or the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.
- (3) The Commanders and all U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing duties at the staff of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe.
- (4) Those U.S. Commanders and U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing duties at subordinate NATO headquarters staffs of the above listed staffs.
- (5) Those U.S. Commanders and other U.S. military personnel assigned to or performing duties at other Allied Forces Europe staffs, such as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe.

You are authorized and directed to report this determination to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

William S. Clinton

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1994

94 NOV 11 P3:07

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
PATRICK GRIFFIN 

SUBJECT: Presidential Waiver of Funding Prohibition in the
Case of U.S. Military Personnel Serving in NATO
Headquarters Positions

Purpose

To waive the Nunn-Mitchell funding prohibition for U.S. personnel serving in NATO headquarters positions.

Background

Nunn-Mitchell language in the 1995 Defense Authorization Act terminates funding for U.S. enforcement of the arms embargo on the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina at midnight on November 12 (two weeks after introduction of our UNSCR to lift the arms embargo).

You can waive the funding prohibition for U.S. personnel serving in NATO Headquarters. The Secretary of Defense and CJCS have requested that you exercise your waiver authority on or before November 12 to prevent disruption of NATO commitments; the State Department concurs.

Nunn-Mitchell also requires you to submit plans and consult with Congress on training Bosnian forces and on unilateral lift. The Secretaries of State and Defense are submitting those plans on your behalf.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the determination at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Determination

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 9, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*SUBJECT: Presidential Waiver of Funding Prohibition in the
Case of U.S. Military Personnel Serving in NATO
Headquarters Positions

Nunn-Mitchell language terminates funding for U.S. enforcement of the Arms Embargo on Bosnia as of midnight November 12. Section 1404 of the FY 1995 DoD Authorization Act provides the President waiver authority for U.S. military personnel serving in NATO headquarters. The Secretary of Defense and the CJCS have requested the President to waive the funding prohibition; State concurs and DOJ has cleared the proposed determination.

The memo also informs the President that reporting to Congress under Nunn-Mitchell is being done by the Departments of State and Defense.

Concurrence by: *FR (K)* Alan Kreczko, *FR (K)* Bill Danvers, Bob BellRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Presidential Determination
Tab B Incoming correspondence



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

100-100-100
8988

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0400

8 November 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM H. ITOH, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Waiver of Funding Prohibition in Section
1404(f)(3)(A) of the Department of Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 in the Case
of U^S Military Personnel Serving in NATO
Headquarters Positions

1. Request the enclosed draft memorandum, subject as above, be forwarded to the NSC point of contact listed below. Coordination and concurrence were obtained from the Joint Staff, OSD, and DOS.
2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Colonel Terry, (703)697-1137. The NSC point of contact is Mr. Alan Kreczko, (202)456-9111, fax (202)456-9110.

T. R. PATRICK
Colonel, USA
Secretary, Joint Staff

Enclosure

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NOVEMBER XX, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY
Secretary of Defense

Subject: Waiver of Funding Prohibition in Section 1404(f)(3)(A) of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 in the Case of US Military Personnel Serving in NATO Headquarters Positions

Pursuant to the authority provided in section 1404(f)(3)(A) of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, (Public Law 103-337) (the "Act"), I hereby waive the limitation in section 1404(f)(2) of the Act in the case of United States military personnel assigned to the NATO headquarters positions, including the following:

- All US military personnel assigned to or performing duties at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.
- The Commanders and all US military personnel assigned to or performing duties at the staffs of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe or the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.
- The Commander and all US military personnel assigned to or performing duties at the staff of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe.
- Those US Commanders and US military personnel assigned to or performing duties at subordinate NATO headquarters staffs of the above listed staffs.
- Those US Commanders and other US military personnel assigned to or performing duties at any other Allied Forces Europe staffs, such as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe.

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005b. report	Duplicate of 004. (2 pages)	11/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia and Bihac, November 1994 [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2603

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. report	Implication of Lifting the UN Arms Embargo Against Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. [CIA Act] [partial] (5 pages)	11/03/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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Secret

(b)(3)



Intelligence Report

Office of European Analysis

3 November 1994

Implication of Lifting the UN Arms Embargo Against Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia

(b)(3)

Lifting the UN arms embargo against Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia--in addition to Bosnia--would increase the chances for a broader conflict in the region. Zagreb--whose cooperation is vital in shipping arms to Bosnia--will insist on inclusion or, as is now occurring, on receiving a sizeable cut of arms flows to Bosnia. Lifting the arms embargo against Croatia, however, probably would hasten a decision by Zagreb to retake portions of the Krajina by force and possibly increase the scale of an offensive. Macedonia probably would not insist on inclusion in lift if it would threaten UNPROFOR's continued presence in Macedonia. An inflow of arms to Macedonia would damage its already difficult relations with Greece and Serbia and could add to Greek-Turkish tensions. Slovenia may hedge its support for lift at this time to avoid a resolution that includes Croatia and that could re-ignite Croatian-Serbian conflict over the Krajina.

(b)(3)

[006]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

✓ 10/1/2013

EUR 94-40073

(b)(3)

Secret

Discussion

Lifting the UN arms embargo against Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia--in addition to Bosnia--would have the clear benefit of allowing the US and other Western governments to counter the political and economic influence of Islamic nations such as Iran who are currently providing covert military assistance to Bosnia and Croatia. On balance, however, we assess that including these three former Yugoslav republics in a lift resolution would increase the chances for a broader regional conflict. (b)(3)

Croatia

Zagreb is ambivalent about whether arming the Bosnian federation will help end the Bosnian conflict. For this reason, it probably could live with an international decision to back off from overt, legal lift for Bosnia and Croatia, as long as covert flows of arms to Croatia and Bosnia continue.

[006]

- Both Defense Minister Susak and Foreign Minister Granic have expressed concern that lifting the embargo would lead UNPROFOR to withdraw from Bosnia, increase the level of fighting in Bosnia, and spread the conflict to Croatia.

- President Tudjman in September expressed concern (b)(1) that the Bosnian Muslims could use their strengthened position to dominate the Bosnian Croats and try to create an Islamic state following the war.

EO 13526

(1.4) (c)

- (b)(1) Zagreb might prefer continued covert flows of arms to a formal lifting of the embargo against Bosnia and Croatia in an effort to avoid a preemptive Serb attack in Bosnia,

(1.4) (d)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

If the Croatian Government is not included in the UN resolution to lift the arms embargo, it will insist at least on continuing to receive a cut of the weapons flowing across Croatian-controlled territory to the Bosnian Muslims. Zagreb could also tie its continued political support for the Bosnian federation to this issue as well.

This report was prepared by analysts from the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force as requested by Ambassador Charles Thomas. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, at (b)(3)

- Exclusion would increase opposition party criticism of President Tudjman for failing to gain US and international support for key Croatian interests, including resolving the Krajina issue and strengthening the country's defense posture. Tudjman probably would survive the challenge; however.. (b)(3)

It would be extremely difficult to implement a lift resolution for Bosnia without Croatian cooperation. The most practical way to send heavy weapons to Bosnia would be by way of Croatian ports. Airdrops could not supply the federation forces with sufficient numbers of tanks and heavy artillery to make a difference on the battlefield and, in any event, would have to transit Croatian airspace. (b)(3)

Zagreb would see lifting the arms embargo on Croatia as tacit international approval to retake by force the Krajina if the negotiating process does not bear results.

- President Tudjman and other senior leaders have forewarned US and German officials in recent months that they are considering force if lift for Croatia occurs.
- With lift, Zagreb probably would be less patient with the negotiating process before taking military action. Depending on Zagreb's success in acquiring and integrating tanks, heavy artillery, and air defense assets, it might feel emboldened to undertake more ambitious offensives in the Krajina.
- If the UN withdrew from Croatia as well as Bosnia, this would remove the buffer between Croatian and Krajina Serb forces and further increase the risk of a Croatian attack and incidental confrontations that could escalate into serious fighting. (b)(3)

[006]

Macedonia

Macedonia will join Croatia and Slovenia in seeking inclusion in a UN resolution to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian federation. Skopje, which has little to spend on arms--probably would try to acquire aircraft, air defense systems, heavy artillery, and anti-tank weapons. If Macedonia were the only country excluded from a lift resolution, Skopje would view this as a lack of US commitment to its sovereignty.

- Skopje probably would increase its black-market efforts to purchase arms. It is negotiating with various Russian firms and has received three Russian Mi-8 transport helicopters since July, according to defense attache information. (b)(3)

Skopje sees the UN presence as integral to its legitimacy and essential to its security. It would be concerned if a lift scenario could threaten UNPROFOR's continued presence in Macedonia.

- In the event UNPROFOR withdrew, Skopje almost certainly would call on the US--among others--to provide an increased buffer force out of concern that heavier fighting in Bosnia would spark a wider conflict. (b)(3)

An inflow of arms to Macedonia would further undermine regional stability.

- Macedonian efforts to equip its army better would re-ignite Greek sensitivities about perceived Macedonian territorial ambitions and thwart progress on a comprehensive bilateral settlement.
- While Macedonia's large ethnic Albanian community would support efforts to better arm the country against Serbia, it could be concerned that Skopje also might use any new weapons to maintain internal control.
- Ankara, which already has a limited military exchange with Skopje, would immediately send arms to Macedonia, further exacerbating tensions with Greece.
- Belgrade would view influx of arms into Macedonia with great suspicion, fearing that the international community's intent was to sandwich Serbia between the modernized armies of its neighbors. It almost certainly would try to intimidate Skopje into sponsoring arms smuggling through the leaky Macedonian-Serbian border. Skopje would find it hard to ignore such pressure from its most powerful neighbor. (b)(3)

[006]

Slovenia

Slovenia repeatedly has sought exemption from the UN arms embargo, citing its distance from the Bosnian conflict as well as its desire and financial ability to buy US and Western equipment.

- Ljubljana's primary foreign policy goal is to join Western security and economic institutions, including NATO, according to its senior leadership. It views inclusion in the arms embargo as an unfair hindrance to Slovenia's efforts to escape imprisonment in the Yugoslav "problem."
- Slovenia's most pressing needs are for aircraft, air defense systems, and artillery. (b)(3)

Ljubljana nonetheless may hedge its support for lift at this time to avoid a resolution including Croatia.

- Ljubljana almost certainly is concerned that Zagreb would use lift to attack the Krajina Serbs—a conflict that could widen to involve Serbia and prompt large refugee flows to Slovenia. (b)(3)

Lifting the arms embargo against Slovenia would have the fewest consequences for regional stability.

- It could, however, increase the role of Slovenia as a route for arms going to former Yugoslav republics still under the embargo.
- Zagreb would be concerned if the embargo was lifted against Slovenia and not Croatia. It could temper its support for the Bosnian Croat-Muslim federation and turn up the heat on Ljubljana related to a border dispute in the Gulf of Piran and other bilateral issues. (b)(3)

Russian and Allied Views

Russia will remain strongly opposed to lifting the arms embargo, regardless of whether lift applies solely to Bosnia or includes Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia.

- Russian officials have repeatedly argued that any lift will only inflame the conflict and increase legislative pressures in Russia to assist the Serbs.
- Foreign Minister Kozyrev has publicly said that lifting the embargo should only be undertaken if the international community is willing to completely write off the peace process. (b)(3)

[006]

The West Europeans almost certainly will argue against ending the arms embargoes against Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, employing the same arguments they have used to oppose lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian federation.

- The Europeans probably would argue that dropping sanctions against the republics bordering Bosnia, by improving the logistics for transporting arms to federation forces, would accelerate the flow of arms into Bosnia to all sides and fuel the conflict even more.
- French and British officials have told US diplomats that they want to avoid placing themselves in open opposition to the United States and that they would abstain on a vote in the UN Security Council on any resolution lifting the embargo against Bosnia, probably hoping Russia will veto it. They probably will stick with this course even if other former Yugoslav republics are included in the resolution. (b)(3)

IMPLEMENTING NUNN-MITCHELL AMENDMENT
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: How does the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment fit into overall U.S. Bosnia policy?

A: Implementation of the Amendment is part of our overall strategy for bringing peace to former Yugoslavia.

The best hope for peace in Bosnia -- and in former Yugoslavia -- remains the Contact Group's comprehensive approach.

We must continue to isolate and put pressure on the Pale Serbs until they accept the Contact Group's map.

Implementation of Nunn-Mitchell is another step -- and an important step -- in this process. It shows American resolve and again makes clear that we will not reward the aggressor in this conflict.

Q: Won't implementing Nunn-Mitchell on our distance us from our European allies?

A: We have consulted extensively with our European allies on how and why the Amendment will be implemented.

On November 11, our Mission to NATO in Brussels delivered a full explanation of our plans to NATO headquarters.

U.S. forces will continue to work closely with NATO forces regarding areas of military cooperation not affected by Nunn-Mitchell.

Q: Will implementation of N-M lead to more fighting?

A: Implementation of N-M may increase the flow of arms to Bosnian government troops, thereby enhancing their ability to exercise the Bosnian nation's inherent right of self-defense. We hope, however, that the Bosnian Serbs will realize from this act that time is not on their side and their best option is to accept the peace proposal put forward by the Contact Group.

Q: What is the practical effect of N-M, i.e., will the Bosnian Government receive significantly more and better weapons?

A: We do not expect a dramatic increase in the flow of arms due to this action. The embargo is still in place. To date, of

the thousands of ships challenged or boarded by SHARP GUARD vessels, only three have been found to have had arms bound for Bosnia. We should also note that the U.S. provides only a small fraction of the total number of ships operating under SHARP GUARD. Other nations' ships will continue to interdict and divert vessels, including those with arms bound for Bosnia. We have no way of knowing whether there will be an upsurge in the number of ships endeavoring to deliver arms for Bosnia because the USN contingent has modified its operations in the Adriatic while other nations continue to enforce the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Q: Does the U.S. intend to arm Bosnian government forces?

A: The main thrust of N-M is its mandate that, after midnight November 12, funds may not be used to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia; the legislation does not require the USG to begin arming Bosnian government forces. At present the arms embargo remains legally in force and we have no plans to provide arms to Bosnia. We continue to have reservations about unilateral lift. We will consult with the Congress on that issue.

Q: How can the U.S. participate in a combined NATO/WEU naval operation in the Adriatic (SHARP GUARD) and yet operate under procedures and ROE which differ from those of our Allies?

A: Our ships in the Adriatic will continue to participate in operation SHARP GUARD to enforce sanctions against Serbia and the arms embargo as it pertains to nations of the former Yugoslavia other than Bosnia. We are advising NATO to issue instructions modifying the mission of U.S. forces only with regard to ships with arms bound for Bosnia. We are confident practical arrangements can be made with other nations participating in SHARP GUARD despite these modifications of our mission.

Q: How do we distinguish between arms bound for B-H from those actually intended for countries still under the embargo?

A: U.S. forces must make that decision based on a range of information available to them at the time. That information could include intelligence, history of the ship, ship papers, ports and other indicators.

Q: What about mixed cargo?

A: U.S. forces in operation SHARP GUARD will be authorized to divert ships carrying mixed cargo, i.e., if a ship contains

arms bound for Bosnia but also has prohibited arms and commodities destined for other nations of the former Yugoslavia, it will not be allowed to pass.

Q: How do you keep arms for Bosnia from going to Croatia since cargo for Bosnia must transit Croatian ports?

A: As a practical matter, N-M would not affect any subsequent decisions by the government of Bosnia to provide a portion of the arms manifested solely for themselves to Croatia as a "tax" or "fee" for use of Croatian territory (ports, roads) for transshipment. However, to the extent arms shipments can be identified as being destined solely for Croatia, N-M does not require us to cease enforcement in such cases.

Q: Will the U.S. change the deployment of its SHARP GUARD ships (e.g., confine operations to the Montenegro coast)? Will we inform potential arms suppliers for Bosnia of the location of our ships so that they can avoid confrontations with SHARP GUARD ships from other nations?

A: The NATO Command system determines the operational deployment of U.S. ships. We have no plans to recommend changes to our current operational procedures for deployment of our ships because of N-M, and we will continue to maintain the confidentiality of our SHARP GUARD dispositions.

Q: How can the U.S. ensure that, once the USN stops and releases ships with arms bound for Bosnia, other NATO/WEU ships will not then move to interdict?

A: We will continue to inspect vessels to verify cargo and destination. We will report interdictions to our Allies, but not the nature of the cargo. We cannot guarantee that other nations' ships in SHARP GUARD will not interdict ships after they have been stopped and released by the USN. We will be careful, however, to ensure we do not provide any tip-off that there are arms on board bound for Bosnia.

Q: Beyond SHARP GUARD, what other U.S. activities will be modified because implementation of N-M?

A: The U.S. intelligence community will alter its procedures. We will continue to gather information, but information on arms bound for Bosnia will no longer be shared with other nations.

Q: Are there any exceptions to Nunn-Mitchell? Are any weapons to be withheld from the government of B-H?

A: Yes. We will continue to restrict the flow of specific weapons which could pose a serious risk to U.S. forces in the region.

Q: Can you give examples (of such weapons)?

A: Yes.

-- Air defense missiles (Bosnia does not need them since we enforce the NFZ);

-- Anti-ship missiles (Bosnia has no naval threat);

-- Air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons (Bosnia has no air force); and

-- Weapons of mass destruction (a general proliferation issue).

Q: How will N-M apply to U.S. personnel assigned to NATO headquarters positions?

A: N-M states that, "the President may waive the limitation [on use of USG funds]...in the case of U.S. military personnel serving in NATO headquarters positions." Accordingly, the President signed the waiver covering, inter alia, U.S. military personnel serving on the staffs supporting sanctions activities and missions involving the former Yugoslavia when acting in a NATO capacity.

KRAJINA SERB AIR ATTACK ON BIHAC

Q: Was yesterday's Krajina Serb attack on the Bihac enclave a violation of exclusion zones? Of the no-fly zone? Why didn't NATO retaliate?

A: The Krajina Serb attack on Bihac was possibly a violation of the no-fly zone over Bosnian air space. But some reports suggest the plane attacked from Croatian air space, in which case there would have been no violation of the no-fly zone.

As flight time between the base in Krajina Serb-held Croatia and Bihac is approximately one minute, and because determining whether the plane was in Bosnian or Croatian air space was not possible, no NATO response took place.

Bihac is not an exclusion zone. As a safe area, it can be protected through NATO air strikes if it is subject to strangulation.