

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

9504958 [Loose] [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

1076

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

4

Position:

1

Stack:

V

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Ewing:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned centrally below the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable Thomas W. Ewing
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1315

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Ensign:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable John Ensign
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4402

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative English:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Phil English
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4330

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Emerson:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Emerson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Bill Emerson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1902

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Ehrlich:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0549

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Dunn:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable Jennifer Dunn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0915

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Doolittle:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable John T. Doolittle
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2203

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Diaz-Balart:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3519

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Peter:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "P. Deutsch". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping "P" and a cursive "Deutsch".

The Honorable Peter Deutsch
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0919

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative DeLay:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Tom DeLay
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3207

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Davis:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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The Honorable Thomas M. Davis, III
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1403

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Cubin:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Barbara Cubin
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0404

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Cox:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Christopher Cox
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0546

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Cooley:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Wes Cooley
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4611

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Collins:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Michael A. 'Mac' Collins
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3804

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Coburn:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Tom Coburn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3815

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Chrysler:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Dick Chrysler
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0703

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Christensen:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jon Christensen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3508

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Calvert:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Ken Calvert
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0704

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Burr:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable Richard Burr
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4704

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Bunn:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jim Bunn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-5401

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Brownback:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Sam Brownback
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3226

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Bono:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Sonny Bono
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0603

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Boehner:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable John A. Boehner
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Sherry:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1703

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Bilbray:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Brian P. Bilbray
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4329

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Barton:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal line extending from the end.

The Honorable Joe Barton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3503

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Barrett:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Bill Barrett
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2703

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Baker:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal line extending from the end.

The Honorable Richard H. Baker
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 18, 1995

Dear Representative Allard:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "B".

The Honorable Wayne Allard
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2102