

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

9504958 [Loose] [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

1076

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

4

Position:

1

Stack:

V

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Lazio:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Rick Lazio
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3202

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative LaTourette:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Steven C. LaTourette
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2302

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Latham:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Tom Latham
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3311

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative LaHood:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Ray LaHood
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1005

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Kolbe:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jim Kolbe
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4305

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Kingston:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jack Kingston
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3507

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative King:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Peter T. King
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2901

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Kim:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jay Kim
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2104

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Kelly:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Sue W. Kelly
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0903

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1306

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hutchinson:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Tim Hutchinson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3001

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Horn:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Stephen Horn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2507

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hoke:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bin Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Martin R. Hoke
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Herger:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Wally Herger
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0502

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Heineman:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Frederick K. Heineman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1101

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hayworth:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable J. D. Hayworth
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0538

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hastings:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Richard 'Doc' Hastings
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hansen:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable James V. Hansen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4401

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Hancock:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Mel Hancock
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3003

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Gutknecht:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Gil Gutknecht
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0920

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Greenwood:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable James C. Greenwood
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4608

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Gene:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bin", likely a stylized or partial signature of Bill Clinton.

The Honorable Gene Green
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0306

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Goss:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Porter J. Goss
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ben Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4309

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Gilchrest:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Wayne T. Gilchrest
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0906

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Ganske:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Greg Ganske
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2215

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Funderburk:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable David Funderburk
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0907

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Martin:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bin", likely a stylized or partial signature of Bill Clinton.

The Honorable Martin Frost
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4324

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Barney:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Barney Frank" in a stylized, cursive script.

The Honorable Barney Frank
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3820

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Forbes:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Michael P. Forbes
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0541

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Flanagan:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Michael Patrick Flanagan
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3513