

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

9504958 [Loose] [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

1076

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

4

Position:

1

Stack:

V

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Seastrand:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Andrea Seastrand
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0517

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Schiff:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Steven Schiff
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3007

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Salmon:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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The Honorable Matt Salmon
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4202

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Royce:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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The Honorable Edward R. Royce
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2307

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Rohrabacher:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1608

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Riggs:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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The Honorable Frank Riggs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3821

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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The Honorable Jim Ramstad
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4206

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Radanovich:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable George P. Radanovich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Pryce:

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The Honorable Deborah Pryce
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4003

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Pombo:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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The Honorable Richard W. Pombo
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0511

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Dear Frank:

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3006

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Ron Packard
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0548

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Oxley:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Michael G. Oxley
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3504

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear John:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Olver", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable John W. Olver
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0545

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Neumann:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Mark W. Neumann
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1301

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Nethercutt:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable George Nethercutt
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4703

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Myrick:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Sue Myrick
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0921

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Molinari:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Susan Molinari
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0901

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Miller:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Dan Miller
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0551

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Mica:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable John L. Mica
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3216

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Metcalf:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jack Metcalf
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-5301

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Marty:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bin", likely a stylized or partial signature of Bill Clinton.

The Honorable Martin T. Meehan
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3401

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mike:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Michael R. McNulty
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0605

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative McKeon:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0525

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative McHugh:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable John M. McHugh
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3224

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Martini:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Bill Martini
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1404

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill", written in a cursive, slightly stylized font.

The Honorable William P. 'Bill' Luther
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1405

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bin" or "Clinton", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable William O. Lipinski
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1303

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Linder:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable John Linder
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0105

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Lewis:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1318

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable James A. Leach
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1501