

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

9504958 [Loose] [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

1076

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

4

Position:

1

Stack:

V

TO: ALLARD, WAYNE
ET AL

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 18 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SANCTIONS

UN
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL LTRS CALLING FOR UNILATERAL LIFT OF ARMS
EMBARGO ON BOSNIA

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 30 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DREW
NSC CHRON
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9504958

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DREW	Z 95062717 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 LAKE	Z 95070521 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
003 PRESIDENT	Z 95071816 FOR SIGNATURE
004	X 95071816 PRESIDENT SGD LTRS
004 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 95071816 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

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004	950718	BARTON, JOE L
004	950718	BILBRAY, JAMES H
004	950718	BOEHLERT, SHERWOOD L
004	950718	BONO, SONNY
004	950718	BROWNBACK, SAM
004	950718	BUNN, JIM
004	950718	BURR, RICHARD
004	950718	CALVERT, KEN
004	950718	CHRISTENSEN, JON
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004	950718	COOLEY WES
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004	950718	DAVIS, THOMAS M
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004	950718	ENSIGN, JOHN
004	950718	EWING, THOMAS W
004	950718	FLANAGAN, MICHAEL
004	950718	FORBES, MICHAEL
004	950718	FRANK, BARNEY
004	950718	FROST, MARTIN
004	950718	FUNDERBURK, DAVID
004	950718	GANSKE, GREG
004	950718	GILCHREST, WAYNE T
004	950718	GILMAN, BENJAMIN A
004	950718	GOSS, PORTER J
004	950718	GREEN, GENE
004	950718	GREENWOOD, JAMES C
004	950718	GUTKNECHT, GIL

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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9504958

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004	950718	HEINEMAN, FREDERICK K	
004	950718	HERGER, WALLY	
004	950718	HOKE, MARTIN R	
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004	950718	MYRICK, SUE	
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004	950718	HORN, STEPHEN	
004	950718	HUTCHINSON, TIM	
004	950718	HYDE, HENRY J	
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004	950718	KING, PETER T	
004	950718	KINGSTON, JACK	
004	950718	KOLBE, JIM	
004	950718	LAHOOD, RAY	
004	950718	LATOURETTE, STEVEN C	
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004	950718	MCKEON, HOWARD P	
004	950718	MCNULTY, MICHAEL R	

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UNCLASSIFIED
DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9504958

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
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004	950718	THOMAS, WILLIAM M	
004	950718	TRAFICANT, JAMES M	
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004	950718	WELDON, CURT	
004	950718	WELLER, JERRY	
004	950718	WHITFIELD, ED	
004	950718	WYNN, ALBERT R	
004	950718	ZIMMER, DICK A	
004 -	950718	HASTINGS, RICHARD	
004	950718	WH STRIPPING DESK	

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4958

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 18K A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>JA</u>	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>18K 7/18</u>	<u>2</u>
Records Mgt.			<u>D</u>

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action
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cc:

COMMENTS:

Date July 13, 1995 ?

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7/17/95

4958

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

95 JUL 13 P5:45

July 12, 1995

~~95 JUL 13 P25:345~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN *PG*

SUBJECT:

Response to Congressional Letter Calling for
Unilateral Lift of the Arms Embargo on Bosnia

Purpose

To respond to a letter signed by 112 members of the House of Representatives calling for a lift of the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Background

One hundred and twelve members of the House of Representatives signed a letter on June 27 calling upon you to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

The attached letter outlines U.S. interests in Bosnia, restates administration policy and lays out the case rejecting unilateral lift as a viable policy option.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters.

Attachments

Tab A Reply to 112 Representatives

Tab B Incoming Congressional Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4958

July 5, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: NELSON DREW *N*
SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Congressional Letter
Calling for Unilateral Lift of the Arms Embargo on
Bosnia

One hundred and twelve members of the House of Representatives signed a letter to the President on June 27 calling upon him to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

The attached memorandum forwards a Presidential response that outlines U.S. interests in Bosnia, restates administration policy, and lays out the case rejecting unilateral lift as a viable policy option.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers *Bill*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letters from the President to 112 Representatives
Tab B Letter from 112 Representatives to the President

4958

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

June 27, 1995

The Honorable William J. Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:



We are writing to urge you to end United States' participation in the U.N.-imposed arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The world community continues to pursue a policy in Bosnia that is morally bankrupt and an obvious failure. History will condemn the countries that continually appeased the Serbs and prolonged the arms embargo on Bosnia as accomplices to Serbian-led genocide. Considering the values and heritage of our Nation, we believe following such a policy is unacceptable. Underscoring this belief, the House of Representatives -- with broad bipartisan support -- recently voted 318 to 99 to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Bosnia, as recognized by the United States on April 7, 1992, is a sovereign and independent country. Its people have an inalienable right to defend themselves from Serbian aggression and by failing to lift the arms embargo, the United States is denying the Bosnian people one of their most fundamental rights -- the right to self-defense.

Those who argue that we cannot act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo fail to see the basic difference between the arms embargo on Bosnia, a victim of aggression, and embargoes on renegade countries such as Iraq and Libya. The Bosnian government has taken no action for which we can justify the continuation of this embargo. If our allies and the U.N. cannot recognize that the arms embargo is hurting the very people it is meant to help, then for the sake of our national conscience, we must act unilaterally.

The time has come for the United States to reclaim our role as leader of the free world. In this case, leadership must be by example. The current Bosnia policy is both a failure and immoral. You are in a position to change that policy. We urge you to stop denying the Bosnians what Americans would surely demand for themselves -- the ability to defend their country.

Sincerely,



Jon Christensen

Ken Calvert

Dick Chynoweth

John W. Markham

Barbara Cullen

Fred Vennemann

James Greenwood

Ken Cook

Stephen Horn

Tommy Long

Henry Brinker

Ben Gelman

T. H. H. H.

Phil B. Hannon

Linda A. Smith

Sammy Smith

Sam Johnson

Lee Myrick

Bill Cohen

Decker

~~Sam Johnson~~

Henry J. Hyde

Sam Johnson

Bill Thomas

Playwright

McWong

Jack Kingst

Ed Royce

Kingst

Don Lujan

Don V. Hume

George R. Kithencreutz

Jim Parstad

Matt Salmon

Pat Deutsch

Martin ? Hoke

Dick Zimmer

Pete King

Beck Legie

Beck McKean

Robert L. Shulieff

Jay Kim

Malcolm Mack Frank Pallone Jr.

Wayne Allard

David Gunderson

Jimmy Will

Frank Riggs

Nathan D. Fark

BC J Tourette

Jim B

Richards Pombo

John T. Doolittle

Ed Whitfield

Christopher Shays

GP B

Bill Barrett

Andrew Sestrand

Aleg Bencke

Mac Collins

Gene Green

Brian P. Bellway

J. Lusk

Bill Emerson

Joe Barton

Joe Deen

Colin Smith

Maci Farn

Carl Wilson

Michael P. McQuitty

Lamar Smith

CO (17-04)

Esmer Molinari

Wally Hergen

Dan Rabin

PSD

Barney Frank

St. Sch

Ernie G. Waldmaltz

Tom Latham

Mike Forbes

Jack Metzalt

Sakely

Jim Talent

Sony Jones

Ph. Rodgers

Tom Davis

Rich Katz-Brown

Al H. R. G. R.

Marty Meek

Wayne T. Gekker

Walt Schorn

Dave Weldon

Pat L. Soss

John W. Oltz

Jim Lunkem

Charlie Stedden

Chris Cox

Doc Hastings

Richard Baker

Michael Kinnaghan

John E. Enjo

Bill Martin

John Linder

Phil English

Sam Butler

Jerry Lewis

Jim Gettemelt

Ron Packard

Letter

Rep. George Radanovich

Rep. John Boehner

Page 1

Page 2

Rep. Jon Christensen	Rep. Stephen Horn
Rep. Ken Calvert	Rep. Tom DeLay
Rep. Dick Chrysler	Rep. Sherwood Boehlert
Rep. John McHugh	Rep. Benjamin Gilman
Rep. Barbara Cubin	Rep. Tim Hutchinson
Rep. Frederick Heineman	Rep. Mark Neumann
Rep. James Greenwood	Rep. Linda Smith
Rep. Wes Cooley	Rep. Sam Brownback

Rep. Steve Stockman	Rep. Sue Myrick
Rep. Tom Coburn	Rep. Dan Miller
Rep. John Mica	Rep. Henry Hyde
Rep. Jennifer Dunn	Rep. William Thomas
Rep. J.D. Hayworth	Rep. Jim Kolbe
Rep. Jack Kingston	Rep. Thomas Ewing
Rep. Gerald Solomon	Rep. Edward Royce
Rep. Ray LaHood	Rep. Deborah Pryce

Page 3

Page 4

Rep. James Hansen	Rep. George Nethercutt
Rep. Jim Ramstad	Rep. Matt Salmon
Rep. Peter Deutsch	Rep. Martin Hoke
Rep. Dick Zimmer	Rep. Peter King
Rep. Rick Lazio	Rep. Howard McKeon
Rep. Robert Ehrlich	Rep. Jay Kim
Rep. Mel Hancock	Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Rep. Wayne Allard	Rep. David Funderburk

Rep. Gerald Weller	Rep. Frank Riggs
Rep. William Lipinski	Rep. Steven LaTourette
Rep. Jim Bunn	Rep. Richard Pombo
Rep. John Doolittle	Rep. Edward Whitfield
Rep. Christopher Shays	Rep. Richard Burr
Rep. Bill Barrett	Rep. Andrea Seastrand
Rep. Greg Ganske	Rep. Mac Collins
Rep. Gene Green	Rep. Brian Bilbray

Page 5

Rep. James Leach	Rep. Bill Emerson
Rep. Joe Barton	Rep. Joe Skeen
Rep. Christopher Smith	Rep. Martin Frost
Rep. Curt Weldon	Rep. Michael McNulty
Rep. Lamar Smith	Rep. James Traficant
Rep. Susan Molinari	Rep. Wally Herger
Rep. Dana Rohrabacher	Rep. Michael Oxley
Rep. Barney Frank	Rep. Steven Schiff

Page 6

Rep. Enid Waldholtz	Rep. Tom Latham
Rep. Michael Forbes	Rep. Jack Metcalf
Rep. Sue Kelly	Rep. James Talent
Rep. Sonny Bono	Rep. John Shadegg
Rep. Thomas Davis	Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart
Rep. Albert Wynn	Rep. Martin Meehan
Rep. Wayne Gilchrest	Rep. Matt Salmon*
Rep. Dave Weldon	Rep. Porter Goss

* repeat signature

Page 7

Rep. John Olver	Rep. James Sensenbrenner
Rep. Charles Stenholm	Rep. Christopher Cox
Rep. Richard Hastings	Rep. Richard Baker
Rep. Michael Flanagan	Rep. John Ensign
Rep. William Martini	Rep. John Linder
Rep. Phil English	Rep. William Luther
Rep. Jerry Lewis	Rep. Gil Gutknecht
Rep. Ron Packard	

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

FAX COVER SHEET

NOTE: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FACSIMILE MESSAGE IS
CONFIDENTIAL AND INTENDED FOR THE RECIPIENT ONLY.

DATE: June 27, 1995TO: Andrew Sens @ NSCFROM: Chris WalkerLegislative Affairs EW/102RE: Congressional CorrespondencePage 1 of 11

If there are any problems with this transmission, please call
(202) 456-7500.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY 
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached is a copy of the letter sent to the White House from several members of Congress regarding the U.N.-imposed arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since this letter relates to national security issues, I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call Jocelyn Jolley at x67500.

Enclosure

Please stay

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY *SB*
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached is a copy of the letter sent to the White House from several members of Congress. Since this letter relates to national security issues, I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call Jocelyn Jolley at x67500.

Enclosure

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: RADANOVICH, GEORGE
ET AL

DOC DATE: 27 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SANCTIONS

UN
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM REP RADANOVICH ET AL RE UN IMPOSED ARMS EMBARGO ON
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 30 JUN 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

DREW

FOR CONCURRENCE

AOKI
BEERS
CLARKE
DANVERS
HALPERIN
SHEEHAN

FOR INFO

PONEMAN
SCHWARTZ
SEATON
SENS
SESTAK
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Zimmer:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Dick A. Zimmer
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3012

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Al:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

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In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bin" or "Binn", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Albert Russell Wynn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1505

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Whitfield:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Ed Whitfield
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0403

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Weller:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jerry Weller
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0530

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Weldon:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Dave Weldon
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Weldon:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Curt Weldon
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3807

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Waldholtz:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Enid G. Waldholtz
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3808

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim", written in a cursive, stylized script.

The Honorable James A. Traficant, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3517

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable William M. Thomas
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0601

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Talent:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable James M. Talent
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2502

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Stockman:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Steve Stockman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3010

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Charlie:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "C. Stenholm", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Charles W. Stenholm
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4317

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Gerald B. H. Solomon
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1703

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable Linda Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2506

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable Lamar S. Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4321

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

If the United States were to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, it would make a difficult situation even worse.

First, it would trigger a decision by our Allies to pull out UNPROFOR immediately, causing the humanitarian crisis to worsen; this withdrawal would take place in an especially hostile environment, likely requiring the deployment of significant NATO ground forces, including U.S. troops.

Second, a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt the Bosnian Serbs to launch preemptive attacks against Bosnian Government forces before government forces had a chance to acquire additional arms; the United States, by having lifted the embargo unilaterally, would bear primary responsibility for the consequences, and we would be under tremendous pressure to provide arms, air support and, ultimately, even ground forces to ensure the survival of Bosnian Government forces.

Third, the escalation of the fighting following a lifting of the arms embargo could prompt increased involvement by Serbia-Montenegro in support of the Bosnian Serbs, exacerbating further the Bosnian Government's difficulties on the battlefield.

Fourth, unilateral U.S. action could encourage other states to ignore other mandatory UN sanctions regimes such as those on Iraq and Libya, and to violate the economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.

In view of these dangers, I believe strongly that the best course is to continue efforts to contain the conflict, to preserve UNPROFOR's presence, and to seek a political settlement based on the Contact Group plan. Despite its limitations, UNPROFOR has played an important role in reducing the level of civilian casualties, delivering humanitarian assistance, and implementing last year's Washington Accords that established a Federation between Bosnia's Muslim and Croat communities. I support the efforts of our Allies to establish the new Rapid Reaction Force as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it is better able to defend itself and deal with Serb provocations.

If these efforts fail and the decision is taken that UNPROFOR must withdraw, I will support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. But I cannot in good conscience lift the arms embargo unilaterally when this would force the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission, Americanize the war, and undermine other UN sanctions regimes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3810

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Skeen:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Joe Skeen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3102

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Shays:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable Christopher Shays
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Shadegg:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

I believe that we have important interests in resolving the Bosnian conflict: to prevent the spread of the conflict; to help limit the loss of life; to preserve conditions conducive to a fair political settlement; and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable John Shadegg
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3501

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Representative Sensenbrenner:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your strong views on the need to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. While I know that we share a common desire to see peace restored to the Balkans, I cannot endorse the course of action you propose.

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Sincerely,

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The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4909