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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	09/02/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Council on Environmental Quality
Kathleen "Katie" McGinty
OA/Box Number: 2895

FOLDER TITLE:

Haiti [1]

2012-0769-F

rs2957

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

(202) 606-3970 // Old Executive Room 360
Jack Hogan Haiti ↑

Peace Corps

Director of Catholic Relief
Services
- Interim dir of Peace Corps.

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

report on Hag
out Prelim Report
Previous editions usable

TO: Aimee July 1993 UNDP Doc

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY- ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Re Rachel Veild NY-UNDP
(Organization) WOLA Inter-Am
202-906-5424

PLEASE PHONE ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

544-8045

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Inter-Am Foundation

Bob Maguire makes grants (703-841-3841)

Lisa McGowan - Dev mit G

898-1566

/macroeconomic perspective.

RECEIVED BY critical of struct. adj. DATE 8/20 TIME 4:30

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)

Prescribed by GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

☆ U.S.G.P.O. 1992 312-070-40024

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

Grassroots movements which
came out

Civil Society - boomed,
NGOs targeted by military

Strengthen local groups

- even circumstances don't

Short term view due to

pol. instability

Americanization

nat'l coalition for 60

"Silencing a people"

391-6552



U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

November 5, 1993

NOTE TO : Amy Christiansen, Office of Environmental Policy
Office of the President

FROM : L. M. Bernbaum, Director, LAC/CAR /s/

SUBJECT : HAITI - Environmental Documents

Per our meeting of October 1st and follow-on telephone conversations, I am pleased to forward the requested Terms of Reference (TORs) developed for the Haitian Environmental Action Plan. These TORs have now been cleared internally within USAID and with the United Nations Development Fund Office in Haiti.

In addition we are forwarding a copy of the review of the USAID/Haiti project portfolio conducted by Karen Menzcer. As was noted during the October 1st meeting, this review confirmed the progress being made to integrate environmental and natural resource activities into the existing project portfolio.

Attachments:
TOR - 5 pages
Portfolio Review -14 pages

HAITI ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLAN

TERMS OF REFERENCE

10/14/93

BACKGROUND:

At the initiative of the democratically elected government of Haiti (GOH), UNDP is interested in coordinating the preparation of a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) for Haiti with active participation of the World Bank, IDB, USAID, CIDA and the EEC. The NEAP for Haiti will identify the most pressing environmental issues affecting the sustainable economic growth of the country and recommend specific priority actions to address environmental concerns. The various international donors with programs in Haiti are collaborating with the GOH through technical support for the joint preparation of the NEAP. It will serve as the basis for coordinating the GOH led short and medium-term environmental and natural resources programs of each international donor organization working in the Haitian environmental sector. The NEAP for Haiti coincides with a similar exercise being conducted by the World Bank for the other Caribbean countries.

It is envisioned that donor assistance programs in Haiti, which have been characterized as mostly short-term humanitarian through non-government organizations (NGOs), with the return of President Aristide, will shift to a long-term developmental mode with increased public sector involvement as political stability is restored. The NEAP will identify resource requirements for carrying out the specific actions or interventions, determine current and projected donor assistance, and suggest levels of GOH responsibilities in each priority environmental problem area.

The NEAP preparation should rely on existing analyses and documentation, whenever possible, to form the basis for recommending specific policies and actions. Many of the analyses required to make specific recommendations have already been carried out and only some updating and limited analysis in specific areas is needed. The Haiti Environmental Profile of 1985, a list of references as well as the recent Institutional Analysis of Public Agencies conducted by UNDP Environmental Unit should serve as good starting points for preparing the NEAP.

OBJECTIVE:

The objective of the NEAP for Haiti is to document the country's principal environmental issues (e.g., economic incentive framework, legal/institutional framework, human health and population, waste management, and natural resources management) and identify policies and actions that the Government of Haiti, NGOs and international donors should carry out to address them. The NEAP is intended as a planning tool to establish an agenda of actions to address the most pressing environmental issues affecting the country.

LEVEL OF EFFORT:

The NEAP preparation will require a team of technical experts consisting of an environment/natural resources economist as the team leader, a legal/institutional analyst, a population/health expert, a pollution/waste management specialist and a natural resources management specialist. The draft NEAP will be completed in approximately six (6) weeks.

- b. Analyze existing environmental, land-use, agricultural and coastal zone policies, legislation, regulations, and enforcement programs to determine the adequacy of the legal authorities to address the principal issues of water and air contamination, waste management, use of pesticides and toxic chemicals, deforestation, soil conservation, biodiversity and natural resource management.
- c. Analyze existing institutional arrangements to determine the adequacy of the institutional structure and the institutional capacity to perform the required planning, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement functions and recommend specific actions to strengthen GOH agencies.
- d. This analyst in collaboration with the economist will review policies and legislation as they relate to deforestation particularly as it results from population increase, unemployment and people turning in desperation to charcoal manufacture as an income of last resort.

Population/Health Analysis

- a. Identify and analyze the environmental impact of existing population density and determine population growth and unemployment trends in the different regions of the country, and recommend policies and specific actions to mitigate existing and projected adverse environmental impacts of demography (e.g. deforestation resulting from land use conversion to intensive agriculture and charcoal manufacture.
- b. Evaluate urban and rural infrastructure for systems of potable water, drainage, solid and liquid waste disposal, and its environmental and health impacts.
- c. Evaluate environmentally-related health risks and diseases caused by pollution, poor sanitation and hygiene (including medical waste disposal) and inadequate food quality controls.
- d. Determine the effects of environmental degradation that directly or indirectly influence poverty indicators (health, personal income, etc.) and recommend specific environmental education programs to raise public awareness of the consequences of environmental degradation.

Pollution/Waste Management Analysis

- a. Perform a comprehensive review of the management of

municipal, industrial, agricultural wastes (air, water, and solid), recommending environmentally sound and cost-effective management policies.

- b. Identify any socio-cultural aspects that must be taken into account in waste management planning.
- c. Evaluate the environmental impact of existing collection, storage, treatment, and disposal facilities for solid and liquid wastes and recommend specific mitigation measures.

Natural Resources Management Analysis

- a. Identify and prioritize agricultural, livestock and other land use systems and practices causing environmental degradation, and recommend changes that would increase their environmental soundness and long-term sustainability.
- b. Review the current system of land tenure/ownership and recommend public policies and laws that would alleviate adverse environmental impacts related to the various forms of exploitation and land management in rural areas.
- c. Review the current management of coastal zones including beaches, coral reefs, estuaries, fisheries and coastal waters, and recommend policies and mitigation measures that would lessen environmental impacts of there exploitation and improve long-term sustainability.
- d. Review the current situation of forestry and natural vegetation management and recommend measures to strengthen forest resource and watershed management, improve soil conservation, control grazing on public lands, and protect wildlife habitat.
- e. Review the current situation with regard to bio-diversity and the management of parks and protected areas, and recommend measures to control the destruction of wildlife habitat and improve the management of reserves, as well as historical and cultural areas.

Environmental Actions

- a. List the most important environmental actions identified by the above analyses, recommend resource levels and timeframes required to carry them out.
- b. Determine the extent at which existing GOH, international donor and NGO-financed programs are addressing the environmental concerns identified by the above analyses and the amount of additional assistance required to adequately address these problems.

SCOPE OF WORK:

The following scope of work will require the services of an environmental/natural resources economist (team leader), a legal/institutional analyst, a population/health expert, a pollution/waste management specialist, and a natural resources management specialist.

The members of the team will complete the following specific tasks:

Economic Analysis

- a. Review existing available information and analyses, supplemented with specific analysis when required, to determine those resource management issues/factors that have significant impact on the national economy, poverty indicators, individual income and income distribution, quantify and recommend appropriate prioritization for follow up action.
- b. Estimate the relative importance of the various economic subsectors that are directly or indirectly natural resource dependent (e.g., agriculture, forestry, fisheries, tourism, industrial manufacturing/processing, energy, etc.), quantify and recommend appropriate prioritization for follow up action.
- c. Analyze existing economic policies (i.e., incentive framework) to identify those that either have an adverse impact on the environment or discourage efficient use of natural resources, and recommend necessary policy reforms.
- d. Analyze the consistency of long-term macroeconomic policies (if they exist) to determine environmental soundness and sustainability, and recommend necessary policy changes.
- e. Evaluate the relative importance of the availability of capital as a limiting factor for making investments/improvements in basic infrastructure and production systems in urban and rural areas, and identify the adverse effects (if any) on the environment and the management of natural resources when it is lacking.

Legal/Institutional Analysis

- a. Review the country's existing environmental, land-use, agricultural and coastal management legal/institutional framework, identify gaps and weaknesses, and recommend measures to strengthen the framework.



U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

October 6, 1993

FAX MEMORANDUM:

TO: USDA/ASCS, A. James Firth
THRU: FHA/DD/FFP, *Jeanne Markunas* Jeanne Markunas
FROM: FHA/FFP/CPD (A), *Sylvia R. Graves* Sylvia R. Graves
SUBJECT: Acceptance of Range of Specifications for Haiti's
FY 93 Title III Agreement Call Forward No. 521-3001,
Amendment No. 1

Attached for your information is a copy of USAID/Haiti's October 6, 1993, message advising acceptance of revised ranges for each respective specification factor for Amendment No. 1 of the subject call forward. A.I.D./W concurs with their acceptance.

We are in agreement with the revised ranges in specifications as long as they are consistently applied for the entirety of flour to be milled and shipped under Haiti's FY 93 Title III program.

Attachment: a/s

cc: USAID/Haiti, L. Downing/M. Bailey (FAX)
AID/LAC, J. Johnson (FAX)
J. Nindel
OP/TRANS, R. Goldman/K. Howard (FAX)
FHA/FFP, S. Parks
A. Harding
A. Hair

To: Sylvia Graves@FHA.FFP@AIDW, David Joslyn@FHA.FFP@AIDW
Cc: Rudy Griego@FHA.FFP@AIDW, L. Marcia Bernbaum@LAC.CAR@AIDW
James David Lehman@FHA.FFP@AIDW
SSWGATE@BASA14001@SERVERS[HOW114AE:GATEWAY1]
James Nindel@LAC.DR@AIDW, Joan Johnson@LAC.CAR@AIDW
David A. Cohen@DIR@HAITI, Gerard Bowers@DIR@HAITI
Bcc:
From: Lance Downing@PPS@HAITI
Subject: Title III Specs: Clarification
Date: Wednesday, October 6, 1993 15:26:24 EDT
Attach:
Certify: N
Forwarded by:

Based on another conversation with flour expert P.V. Reddy, which clarified technical issues regarding the significance of several specifications listed in earlier E-Mails sent today, USAID is now able to eliminate several non-critical limits from four specifications. There should be no minimum for ash, no maximum for falling numbers, no maximum for protein, and no minimum for moisture.

Restated, Haiti Title III specifications are:

Calcium: 400 - 1107

Ash: Maximum 0.51%, no minimum

Bromate: 20 - 70

Falling numbers: minimum 210, no maximum

Protein: minimum 10.5 %, no maximum

Moisture: maximum 14.1, no minimum

USAID hopes this is helpful.

MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 21, 1993

TO: Marcia Birnbaum, LAC/CAR

FROM: David Cohen, Mission Director, USAID/Haiti

SUBJECT: Portfolio review for environmental and natural resource integration

In response to interest from Vice President Gore's office, USAID/Haiti requested an outside review of its portfolio to evaluate the integration of environmental and natural resources (E/NR) concerns, and to identify opportunities for additional integration. Karen Menczer, a RSSA from LAC/DR/E, reviewed the portfolio from September 13-17. Her evaluation, which reflects USAID/Haiti's commitment to promoting sustainable natural resource management, is attached.

As the principal donor involved in E/NR initiatives in Haiti, (the only one during the last 22 months), the Mission ensures that environmental concerns are considered in all its actions. USAID/Haiti has developed expertise in designing, implementing, and monitoring projects that incorporate E/NR concerns. We are committed to ensuring that sustainable development incorporates protection of Haiti's natural resource base.

To facilitate discussions with the Vice President's office, Abdul Wahab, Chief of the Private Enterprise and Agricultural Development Office, will be available on October 1 to meet with the Vice President's staff.

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

REVIEW OF USAID/HAITI PORTFOLIO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Haiti's commitment to environmental conservation is reflected in the broad application of E/NR concerns and activities throughout its portfolio. In Haiti, A.I.D. is a leader in promoting E/NR initiatives, and is coordinating with other donors to encourage support in the E/NR field and leverage donor resources.

Recently, the Mission committed to participate in the development of a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) with assistance of other bilateral and multilateral donors, and in cooperation with the GOH. USAID/Haiti will be one of the lead players in this effort to prioritize interventions and identify potential donors.

The Mission has completed the hiring process for a new Mission Environmental Officer even before the incumbent a Haitian, departs to assume his new position overseas. USAID/Haiti has committed to a comprehensive training program for the new hire. This will ensure that, without interruption, Mission interventions will receive timely review of potential environmental impacts, and that E/NR initiatives will be incorporated into Mission activities as appropriate.

USAID/Haiti is committed to assisting Haiti protect its environment and conserve its biodiversity as it pursues the course toward sustainable development.

PORTFOLIO REVIEW

The following is an assessment of the USAID/Haiti portfolio to evaluate the Mission's response to Environmental/Natural Resources (E/NR) concerns and identify opportunities for further integration of E/NR initiatives in current and planned projects and project amendments. USAID/Haiti's integration of E/NR initiatives in the Mission portfolio is predicated on the link between a sound natural resource base and sustainable development. The Mission has a long and successful history of working to conserve biodiversity and respond to other E/NR concerns through institution building, environmental education, natural resources restoration, management and protection activities, and agricultural extension services essential for sustainable agricultural practices.

E/NR Initiatives

- 1. Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS)**
Amount-\$30 million
LOP-5 years (1989-1994)

Purpose

PLUS works to conserve Haiti's natural resource base by providing extension support to small farmers, encouraging ecologically and economically sound crop production practices which result in sustainable increases in on-farm productivity and income.

Assessment

The PLUS project links sustainable agricultural systems with conservation of the natural resource base. Soil and water resources are conserved by encouraging small producers to use farming practices that increase productivity and farm income levels, and identifying marketing opportunities for their crops. This minimizes the need to clear additional fragile land for agriculture. PLUS provides farmers with technical assistance in tree nursery establishment and maintenance and follow-up extension service for tree care and grafting. Thus, farmers are encouraged to plant economically valuable tree seedlings, and are more inclined to keep this perennial tree cover for its sustainable economic return.

Extension services teach farmers to use Integrated Pest Management (IPM) to minimize or eliminate the need for chemical pesticides. This project does not buy, use, or promote chemical pesticides.

Opportunities

PLUS activities address and fully integrate E/NR concerns. They can provide long-term solutions to Haiti's environmental degradation that is due to unsustainable agricultural practices. The interventions can be replicated with minor adjustments throughout the agricultural zones in Haiti. To maximize the impact of PLUS, the project should be assured of long-term funding, and the Mission should continue to coordinate with the donor community to encourage the rapid replication of similar interventions throughout Haiti.

2. Targeted Watershed Management (TWM)

Amount-\$16.25 million

LOP-7 years (1987-1996)

Purpose

TWM works to conserve the last remaining major rainforest in Haiti, Parc Macaya, by conserving and restoring habitat in the Park's core area, promoting soil and water conservation techniques for fragile hillside agriculture in the buffer zone, and strengthening local NGOs to assist in Park buffer zone and core area management.

Assessment

This project fully addresses and integrates E/NR concerns by rehabilitating degraded habitat and decreasing pressure on Parc Macaya's natural resources through the provision of extension services to approximately 1,500 farmers. The actual program supplements University of Florida's work initiated in the core area of the Park under the original phase of TWM. The project has successfully integrated sustainable agriculture, natural resources conservation, and environmental education. A \$27 million World Bank project, which will promote natural resources protection in Haiti, including Parc Macaya, will be able to build on the foundations

laid by this project, due to end in 1996.

3. Coffee Revitalization Project

Amount-\$4.5 million

LOP-5 years (1990-1995)

Purpose

This project is assisting coffee farmers in the south west peninsula (Jacmel and Beaumont) to upgrade the quality and productivity of their coffee stands by promoting higher-yielding, rust-tolerant varieties and sustainable production practices.

Assessment

Coffee based farming systems can provide valuable ecosystem benefits such as wildlife habitat and erosion control, while generating economic returns. Due to coffee rust problems compounded by low world prices, farmers started to replace coffee stands and associated perennial trees on fragile hillsides by annual crops such as beans. By promoting high quality rust tolerant coffee strains and encouraging sustainable production practices, this project helps to keep fragile lands under permanent vegetation, thereby protecting the natural resource base. In addition, the project uses a "systems" approach to sustainable agricultural management by promoting the planting of selected food crops in a coffee-based agricultural system.

Opportunities

This project fully integrates E/NR concerns.

4. Provincial Enterprise Development (PED)

Amount-\$12 million

LOP-5 years (1991-1996)

Purpose

PED seeks to expand access to credit into major provincial centers to stimulate private sector growth and improve the well-being of the population through employment and income generation.

Assessment

This project's focus is not on E/NR, however, the project is integrating E/NR concerns by providing technical assistance to small businesses and micro-enterprises in evaluating environmental impacts of their actions. The project promotes only environmentally-friendly activities.

Opportunities

PED should continue to promote activities such as recycling and water conservation.

5. Seed Production and Multiplication Project (SPM)

Amount-\$1.4 million

LOP-3 years (1993-1996)

Purpose

SPM encourages the sustainable production and marketing of high quality bean, corn, and sorghum seeds and sweet potato cuttings to increase agricultural production and enhance food security.

Assessment

By providing farmers with higher quality seeds and cuttings, thus, increasing agricultural production on already cleared land, the need to clear additional fragile lands for agriculture is minimized. The project promotes IPM, and had an IPM specialist from AID/Washington review interventions under SPM to ensure that IPM is fully integrated.

Opportunities

This project fully integrates E/NR concerns.

6. Promotion of Business and Exports (PROBE) (suspended)

Amount-\$12.7 million

LOP-10 years (1986-1995)

Purpose

PROBE's purpose is to improve, expand, and professionalize trade and investment services to manufacturing, tourism, and agro-industry businesses and entrepreneurs to help Haitian firms become more competitive in world markets.

Assessment

With a recent change in emphasis of the PROBE project, the Mission intends to incorporate E/NR activities when the project is reactivated.

Opportunities

Technical assistance to the tourism industry should include the promotion of nature tourism to Parc Macaya and coastal areas. If properly managed, nature tourism can provide economic

incentives to conserve the natural resource base. The importance of natural resource conservation should be emphasized to tourism operators to ensure ecotourism sustainability.

To increase Haiti's competitiveness in world markets, "eco-certification" for wood products, honey, "organically grown" products and other specialty items should be pursued.

7. Enhancing Food Security (EFS)

Amount-\$44.5 million

LOP-5 years (1992-1997)

Purpose

To increase access to food for nutritionally-vulnerable groups, strengthen NGOs for food assistance program management, and create jobs.

Assessment

E/NR concerns are incorporated into this project through the jobs creation component. EFS is supporting solid waste collection and disposal, drainage ditch clearing, soil and water conservation activities and infrastructure rehabilitation. An environmental assessment conducted for waste collection and disposal and drainage ditch clean-up will ensure safe landfilling of wastes, including implementation of a groundwater monitoring program at the landfill and development of a contingency plan with local population involvement.

Other E/NR activities in the jobs creation component include: planting vegetation along streambanks and drainage ditches to control sedimentation; construction and rehabilitation of check dams to reduce soil loss and recharge aquifers; promoting recycling activities; and rehabilitating irrigation systems.

Opportunities

EFS should continue to create jobs that involve restoration and protection of the environment.

8. Voluntary Agencies for Child Survival (VACS)

Amount-\$41 million

LOP-8 years (1987-1995)

Purpose

VACS is developing the institutional capacity of private and public organizations in Haiti to provide child survival outreach and increase child survival services.

Assessment

VACS has integrated E/NR concerns with the recent addition to the project of providing small water and sewage treatment systems to aid in child survival. It also supports the groundwater monitoring component of the "Employment Generation Program" under EFS.

Opportunities

Water and sewage treatment systems will benefit the general population and decrease water pollution resulting from improper sewage disposal. This is an important addition to the VACS project.

9. **Private Sector Family Planning (PSFP)**
Amount-\$41 million
LOP-3 years (1992-1995)

Purpose

To strengthen the capacity of PVO health service providers to increase popular access to voluntary family planning services.

Assessment

By providing family planning services, this project will help to stem population pressure on the environment, the impacts of which will begin to become evident after one generation.

Opportunities

With its concentration on family planning, E/NR concerns are fully integrated.

10. **Expanded Urban Health Services**
Amount-\$18,500,000
LOP-5 years (1989-1994)

Purpose

To support the efforts of the Centers for Development and Health, a Haitian PVO, to provide affordable and effective primary health care to residents of economically depressed areas of Haiti.

Assessment/Opportunities

E/NR concerns are outside of this project's focus.

11. **Awareness and Prevention of Drug Abuse**
Amount-\$1,150,000

LOP-6 years (1988-1994)

Purpose

To expand the activities of the Association for the Prevention of Alcoholism and other Chemical Dependencies.

Assessment/Opportunities

E/NR concerns are outside of this project's focus.

12. **AIDS Control**
Amount-\$16.7 million
LOP-9 years (1991-2000)

Purpose

To reduce the transmission of HIV in Haiti through selected interventions designed to reorient high risk populations to practice AIDS preventive behavior.

Assessment/Opportunities

E/NR concerns are outside of this project's focus.

13. **Incentives to Improve Basic Education**
Amount-\$20,489,741
LOP-2 years (1992-1994)

Purpose

To work with the private primary education sector to improve education in rural areas and disadvantaged urban centers.

Assessment

This project has not incorporated E/NR activities.

Opportunities

Issues such as recycling, water and air pollution, and wildlife should be incorporated into the primary school curriculum.

14. **Caribbean and Latin American Scholarship Program (CLASP II)**
Amount-\$2,404,000

LOP-5 years (1990-1995)

Purpose

To provide short-term technical training for approximately 120 people in priority fields; 19 scholarships for U.S. long-term technical training consisting of specialized courses in priority fields; and 14 scholarships for U.S. long-term academic training consisting of Master's degree work in health, education, and agriculture.

Assessment

CLASP II has provided training in environmental fields for 20 Haitian professionals.

Opportunities

CLASP II should continue to provide environmental training, including training in environmental education, environmental journalism, and environmental law. The Mission should seek out those with the potential to make the greatest impact in the E/NR field.

15. **Democracy Enhancement**
Amount-\$21 million
LOP-6 years (1991-1997)

Purpose

To expand and strengthen autonomous private institutions which facilitate broad-based participation in democratic decision-making, respect for the Constitution, and a return to constitutional democracy.

Assessment/Opportunities

E/NR concerns are outside of this project's focus.

16. **Administration of Justice**
Amount-\$18 million
LOP-TBD

Purpose

Contingent on political resolution, this project will seek to improve the effectiveness, accessibility, and accountability of the Haitian justice system.

Assessment

This project will begin in 1993.

Opportunities

Regulatory mechanisms, important components of environmental protection, are effective only with an effective court system which can ensure enforcement. In-service training for judges, and other justice sector personnel, alternative dispute resolution, justice advocacy, and outreach should include technical assistance in establishing environmental regulatory mechanisms. This will only be possible with effective environmental institutions in place.

17. Special Development Activities (SDA)

Amount-\$400,000/year

LOP-1968-

Purpose

To provide technical assistance, supplies, and construction materials for self-help, primarily rural-based development and economically productive infrastructure activities.

Assessment

This project has incorporated E/NR concerns in its agriculture promotion and infrastructure rehabilitation activities.

Opportunities

Technical assistance should include environmental impact assessment methodology and mitigation measure implementation.

18. Economic Recovery and Reform

Amount-\$6 million

LOP-1991

Purpose

This cash transfer was designed to encourage and support economic reform and stabilization efforts, and provided a grant to be used for payment of Haiti's debt to international financial institutions.

Assessment/Opportunities

As a cash transfer, E/NR concerns were outside of this project's focus.

19. Policy and Administrative Reform (suspended)

Amount-\$9 million
LOP-5 years (1991-1996)

Purpose

To enable the GOH to formulate and implement better economic, regulatory, and administrative policies and to reform structures, procedures, and processes in public administration.

Assessment

Assistance has been given in formulating and implementing environmental regulatory policies.

Opportunities

Development and implementation of environmental regulatory policies can only be successful with the institutional capacity for enforcement in place. With the potential for reactivation of the PAR project, the formulation and implementation of environmental regulatory policy is a potential area for future collaboration.

20. **Enhancement of the Informal Sector**
Amount-\$12 million
LOP-5 years (1994-1999)

Purpose

This project will work to increase output of targeted micro-enterprises and their access to credit, electricity, and water.

Assessment

This project will begin in 1994.

Opportunities

The project should ensure that only micro-enterprises that do not involve environmental impact are promoted, and should encourage "eco-certified" and "environmentally-aware" products.

21. **Economic Recovery Assistance**
Amount-\$20 million
LOP-

Purpose

To support Haiti's transition to a functioning democracy and assist in economic restructuring

efforts.

Assessment

E/NR concerns are integrated into this project through the PL 480 local currency component. E/NR activities include implementing soil and water conservation measures, rehabilitating irrigation systems, tree planting, ravine stabilization, agricultural policy analysis, and land reform analysis.

Opportunities

Through policy dialogue, the formulation of environmentally-sound development and trade policies should be encouraged.

22. Agricultural Market Linkage Project

Amount-\$10 million

LOP-6 years (1995-2001)

Purpose

To increase farmer incomes through the identification of profitable domestic and export market opportunities, and helping producers, buyers, and processors respond to them.

Assessment

This project will begin in 1995.

Opportunities

Although not yet designed, the Mission intends to incorporate residue recycling, which will maximize the uses of primary and secondary by-products, and minimize waste. IPM will be incorporated into the project. Prior to promoting non-traditional exports, the Mission will ensure that their promotion will not result in significant environmental impact.

23. Development Training and Technical Assistance

Amount-\$15 million

LOP-6 years (1994-2000)

Purpose

To provide skilled human resources and technical assistance to Haiti's transition to a stable democracy and to encourage sustained economic growth.

Assessment

This project will begin in 1994.

Opportunities

The training component should include environmental training for decision-makers, including those in the environmental field, and those whose decisions may indirectly affect E/NR issues.

24. **Integrated Family Health**
Amount-\$80 million
LOP-5 years (1995-2000)

Purpose

To reduce the infant mortality rate and increase the use of modern contraceptive methods through an expanded family health services system.

Assessment

This project will begin in 1995.

Opportunities

E/NR concerns will be met in this project by relieving population pressure on the natural environment.

25. **Educating for Development and Democracy**
Amount-\$20 million
LOP-5 years (1995-2000)

Purpose

To strengthen the human resource base through improvements in primary education.

Assessment

This project will begin in 1995.

Opportunities

Environmental education should be included in the primary school curriculum. Such subjects as recycling/reuse, air and water pollution, and wildlife lend themselves to incorporation into the primary school curriculum.

Additional Opportunities in E/NR

Coastal/Marine Biodiversity Conservation

This area has received minimal attention due to resource constraints and the need to focus attention on top priority terrestrial resources. A project focusing on protection of the coastal/marine environment in Haiti could link economic opportunities in fisheries and ecotourism with ecosystem restoration and management.

Institutional Capacity Building

Without governmental institutions in place with the regulatory enforcement capability to protect the environment and regulate the use of the natural resource base, most E/NR initiatives will be minimally successful and unsustainable. The Mission already has a project in place to respond to this need, the Policy and Administrative Reform (PAR) project, however, it has been suspended. When reactivated, a major focus should be environmental institution building.

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
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ENVIRONMENT STRATEGY



U.S. Agency for
International Development
June 1992

D R A F T
PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ADDRESSING
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS IN HAITI
(9/2/93)

Proposed draft strategy is three-pronged:

1. DEVELOP ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLAN

USAID/Haiti, in coordination with other bilateral and multilateral donors - including the UNDP, GOH and PVOs - will contribute to the development and approval of an Environmental Action Plan (EAP) for Haiti. Such a process will ensure ownership and commitment by everyone. This EAP document will serve as the basis for internalizing environmental considerations in public policy and long-term economic development.

who work w/?

The World Bank has effectively coordinated the preparation and funding of over ten EAPs and is in the process of completing fifteen others. Currently it is coordinating the preparation of EAPs for the Caribbean countries including Haiti. Therefore, it is opportune for the Agency to engage the WB in discussions on A.I.D. level of support and involvement to this multidisciplinary effort.

Once the EAP is approved, A.I.D. will identify opportunities for its support. *- snap it around.*

2. REVIEW CURRENT USAID/HAITI PORTFOLIO TO IDENTIFY OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

USAID/Haiti is currently active in promoting environmental conservation and sustainability under its on-going Productive Land Use Systems Project (PLUS), the Coffee Revitalization Project and the Targeted Watershed Management Project. *- how integrate?*

envt resources.
LAC/DR Environmental Adviser will assist USAID/HAITI during the week of 09/13 to review its portfolio of current and planned projects to ascertain: i) the extent to which projects address environmental concerns and ii) identify additional activities for improved management of the natural resources base. *who talk w/?*

Some ideas of what might come out of this exercise:

- Karen Monczka*
- near + mid-term*
- Soil and water conservation activities and environmentally sound disposal of solid wastes under the recently launched Productive Employment Generation Program jobs creation program.
 - Assist to improve the national cadastre and titling authority which is essential to increasing investment in land management.
 - Conduct a comprehensive inventory of policies discouraging more sustainable natural resources management (DESFIL project buy-in) in order to more fully appreciate inter-sectoral constraints.

- Undertake policy dialogue with the ^{GOH}~~GOE~~ focussing on environmental conservation and sustainability.
- Enactment of legislation relating to secure land and resource tenure, and natural resources accounting.
- Greater integration of environmental education under the on-going CLASP II Project. ^{ecosystem} biologist-parks ^{partnership}

3. MAXIMIZE OPPORTUNITIES TO BENEFIT FROM LAC REGIONAL AND OTHER CENTRAL PROGRAMS

- OYB transfer made 7/93 to the Biodiversity Support Program (BSP) to provide assistance through 9/95 for Pic Macaya biodiversity protection and conservation activities; and heighten other donors and GOH awareness and interest in the strategic importance of this last remaining rainforest.
- Explore possibilities for Haiti to benefit from the Global Environmental Facility in the area of biodiversity and productive natural resources management.
- Explore possibilities under the Decentralization and Financial Management Project for establishing creative financial partnerships for sustainable resource utilization including production of non-traditional commodities.
- Harness the Development Strategies for Fragile Lands (DESFIL) project to conduct critical constraints analyses or develop local NGO capabilities to conduct Rapid Rural Appraisals to expand USAID/Haiti's PLUS project.
- Look at markets for agricultural products through several LAC regional projects in order to generate income and employment.
- Ask the GENESYS project to take a prescriptive look at land-labor-women relationships. ^{Worldwide AID \$}

also Parks in Peril

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Sept. 7 report National Performance Review

THE
DEVELOPMENT
GAP

THE DEVELOPMENT GAP FAX COVERSHEET

FAX # (202)898-1612

DATE: 1 September 1993

TO: Office on Environmental Policy

ATTN: Amy Christianson

FROM: Lisa McGowan

TO FAX #: 456-2710

OF PAGES: 5 including coversheet

Dear Amy,

Following is information on the National Labor Committee Report on Haiti, as promised. I will be in touch again as soon as we have the outline of a mechanism to get funding to Haitian grassroots and development NGOs. As I mentioned, the outline will be produced by NGOs here in Washington, then shared with our Haitian colleagues who have already endorsed the idea, and are awaiting a draft outline to provide specific comments, input, and revisions. When it is completed (by October 1st, I expect), the mechanism will have a broad range of support among civil society in Haiti as well as among development and policy NGOs in the U.S.


Please don't hesitate to contact us if we can get you any further information on development assistance in Haiti, or on MDBs more generally. I look forward to collaborating with your office to strengthen sustainable development in Haiti.

Best regards,



Lisa A. McGowan

Haiti After the Coup *Sweatshop or Real Development?*



A Special Delegation Report • of the National Labor Committee • Education Fund
in Support of Worker & Human Rights in Central America

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Research for this report was carried out by National Labor Committee staff Barbara Briggs, David Cook, Jack McKay and Charles Kernaghan. We were also ably assisted by New School graduate student Marie Duggan. Stella Grieco helped prepare the manuscript.

In Haiti, the delegation could not have met so many extraordinary people without the guidance of Kathie Klarreich. And it was-- of course-- the Haitian people who taught the delegation so much about the struggle for democracy and worker rights.

Besides union contributions, funding support from the Veatch and ARCA Foundations was instrumental in carrying out the trip, research and writing of this report.

Photographs by Ernesto Mora and Charles Kernaghan.

Cover design by Maggie Block; typesetting by Peter Hogness.

April 1993



For further information, or to order copies of this report, contact:

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(A five dollar contribution per report is requested to help cover production costs.)

*Haiti After the Coup / 17***EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- * Haitian workers assembling goods for export to the U.S. market are being paid \$.14 an hour. Companies pay no employee health and pension benefits.
- * In 1991, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) organized, managed and financed elite business opposition to the economic and social policies of the democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
- * USAID used U.S. tax dollars to actively oppose a minimum wage increase from \$.33 to \$.50 an hour proposed by the Aristide government.
- * Between 1983 and 1989, as apparel assembly and exports from Haiti to the U.S. doubled, real wages in Haiti were slashed 56 percent.
- * In February 1992, the Bush Administration lifted the OAS embargo for U.S. companies assembling goods in or sourcing production from Haiti. U.S. companies returning to Haiti used the climate of terror and military repression to destroy the unions in their factories. Despite the embargo, last year more than

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\$67 million of apparel was imported to the U.S. from Haiti.

- * In lifting the OAS embargo on the export assembly sector the Bush Administration granted U.S. import licenses to wealthy Haiti business families who are publicly known to have supported and assisted in the coup.
- * Unions and peasant organizations have been and continue to be the target of fierce military repression. All normal union activities remain suppressed. Unions are growing weaker each day.
- * Haiti is in a state of sheer chaos. The rule of law has collapsed. The government is not even collecting garbage. Roads, energy generation, water supply, telecommunications, and ports are all being ruined by neglect and military corruption.

Haiti's Premier Is Installed, but in Washington and Amid Heat

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 30 — It was a peculiar setting for a ceremony marking the installation of a new head of government: an embassy in a foreign capital. But given the turbulent politics of Haiti, it was hardly surprising for Prime Minister Robert Malval.

Rather, the occasion today at the Haitian Embassy here marked a reconciliation of bitterly divided political, military and business leaders that is intended to end violence and restore democracy to Haiti.

The Inter-American Human Rights Commission says about 1,500 Haitians have been killed and 300,000 driven into hiding in the nearly two years of rule by a military junta since 1991.

Mr. Malval, a 50-year-old businessman who was virtually unknown a month ago in Haitian political circles,

Haiti's Prime Minister takes office, sort of.

became Prime Minister on Thursday after a vote by the lower house of deputies approving his Cabinet and Government program. The upper house gave its approval the day before.

"There was no swearing-in," Lawrence E. Pezzullo, a special United States envoy for international negotiations on Haiti, said of today's event, "just a laying on of hands."

But symbolism was heavy at the ceremony, which took place on a sweltering day reminiscent of the climate of the Caribbean, in a room made more stifling by a failure of air conditioning.

Witnesses included the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the ousted President of Haiti, who has spent most of the last 23 months here in exile after being overthrown in a violent coup, and René Preval, another exile who was then Prime Minister.

Speeches were made in Creole, French and English. Mr. Malval, educated at the University of Miami and in Paris, said he wanted to "restore democracy to Haiti as of today." To those who would resist change, he declared, "You can kill us, but you will never kill the dream of the people of Haiti."

Aristide to Return on Oct. 30

Under an elaborate deal brokered last month by the United Nations with the help of the Clinton Administration, Father Aristide is to return to office in Port-au-Prince on Oct. 30.

Mr. Malval was selected by Father Aristide and also gets along with Lieut.

Gen. Raoul Cédras, who led the coup and who has agreed to retire from the scene in Port-au-Prince.

Father Aristide, 40, was a Roman Catholic priest with pronounced leftist views, which made him anathema to most of Haiti's business sector. But in July, Mr. Malval arranged a meeting between Father Aristide and 200 Haitian businessmen in Miami that was called a success by all participants.

Mr. Malval, the scion of an old Haitian family who became a prosperous publisher, has vowed to quit as Prime Minister in mid-December to pave the way for new elections.

Company News:
Tuesday through Saturday,
Business Day

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1993

Amee

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specifically told
Stockwell said. But relief workers from Nations forces in southern Mozambique, that the United Nations workers were
the French relief agency International killing more than 30 peacekeepers. treated as well as possible.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1993

**PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION**

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New Prime Minister Vows To End Haiti's 'Madness'

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Robert Malval, a U.S.-educated publishing executive of Lebanese descent, was sworn in yesterday as prime minister of Haiti in a ceremony here and pledged to open a new era in which Haitians will "put an end to our madness."

He said he would return to Haiti today and begin preparing for the Oct. 30 return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was overthrown in a military coup on Sept. 30, 1991.

The emotional ceremony at the Haitian Embassy yesterday was a key step in a United Nations-brokered process of returning Aristide to power. Malval's installation restores a legitimate, internationally accepted government to Haiti for the first time since the coup and opens the way for international economic aid.

Yesterday afternoon, Malval, 50, was welcomed with a standing ovation by delegates to the Organization of American States as he arrived for his first public address as prime minister.

Speaking in French, Malval said the international community's support for Aristide "allows us to hope that the march toward democracy in Haiti is now irreversible." His goal, he said, is the creation of a Haiti that would become synonymous with the French revolutionary motto that inspired the island nation's founders: "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité."

He said one his most difficult tasks would be to energize Haiti's government workers, whom he described as "more careless than dishonest," and he pledged to "correct with the strictest discipline" the country's fiscal disarray.

"We don't ask for much," he said. "We ask only for the means to break out of the vicious circle of abject poverty so we can hope finally to break down the fatalism of our misery." He asked that foreign creditors relieve Haiti of international debts that "its own executioners contracted in the country's name, not to the country's benefit."

President Clinton, after a White House meeting with the leaders of five English-speaking Caribbean Nations, thanked them for supporting international efforts to restore Aristide to power. They discussed "security and economic measures to assist Haitian democracy," Clinton said. The United States has agreed to provide training for a new civilian police force in Haiti.

Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, was Haiti's first democratically elected president, popular with the masses but distrusted by the military and the political oligarchy. After his ouster, the United States, the United Nations and the Organization of American States cooperated in unremitting pressure on the Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, the leader of the coup, in an effort to restore Aristide to power.

Cedras capitulated to a strangling economic embargo, and on July 3 agreed to step aside and allow Aristide to return. With the Haitian legislature's acceptance of Malval last week, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to suspend the economic sanctions. Aristide presided over yesterday's swearing-in ceremony.

Malval is a political science graduate of the University of Miami who also studied in Paris. According to his resumé, he published two of Aristide's books and developed a "combat alliance" with Aristide.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1993 THE WASHINGTON POST

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and David Owen appear set to adopt a virtual "take-it-or-leave-it" position when talks resume Tuesday, the sources said. Their partition plan, unveiled 10 days ago, would give the Muslims control of about 30 percent of Bosnian territory, the Croats 18 percent and the Serbs 52 percent, even though the international community had vowed not to reward Serb aggression in the 17-month-old war.

"It would be dangerous if any of the parties came back [to Geneva] with a long list of adjustments, or even a short list," said a U.N. source, clearly referring to Izetbegovic's hopes for getting a better deal.

The source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the plan could be fine-tuned but that any demand for major revisions might

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, right, shakes hands with a French U.N. peace keeper before leaving for the Sarajevo airport to catch a plane to Geneva for the next round of Balkan peace negotiations.

prompt the Serbs to back out after having approved the proposal at a weekend session of their self-styled Bosnian Serb parliament.

"These concessions aren't going to stay on the table indefinitely," the U.N. source said, echoing Serb warnings.

The mediators' stance appears to be part of a trend in which U.N. officials here and in Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, seeking to wrap up an accord, are siding increasingly with the Serbs and Croats, who have badly beaten back the Muslims in the war.

Critics have described the U.N. stance as appeasement. U.N. officials defend it as realism because

the United States and its allies have balked at intervening militarily to roll back Serb and Croat territorial gains. As a result, the partition of Bosnia must meet Serbo-Croat specifications, they say.

"The mediators are charged by the international community to reach an agreement," the source said. "Look at the tools they are given."

Izetbegovic, whose inability to fly out of Sarajevo forced the resumption of talks to be delayed a day, reportedly told Sarajevo radio today that there is little hope for getting any new concessions in Geneva. "I feel like a thirsty man who is be-

See GENEVA, A16, C2, 4

Changes to Bosnian Plan Discouraged

GENEVA, From A12

ing] sent to the desert to look for water," Izetbegovic said. "Our people are looking for peace, but the proposals [the mediators] are offering us are worse than war."

The Bosnian Parliament refused to explicitly back the partition plan in a meeting this weekend. The plan gives the Muslim-led government territory in four separate, land-locked parcels, and the government is holding out for two concessions: a land corridor through Serb territory to link Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia to Sarajevo; and a land corridor through Croat territory to connect Muslim land in central Bosnia to the Adriatic Sea. Many Balkan experts support Izetbegovic's contention that the new Muslim state would be unviable without those lifelines.

Sarajevo's anger at what it perceives as Western hypocrisy in condemning war crimes but not taking action to keep them from being committed surfaced at a special meeting convened today by the International Committee of the Red Cross to condemn the prevalence of such crimes in the Balkan conflict. The Bosnian government initially refused to send a delegation to what its officials termed an "alibi conference," but relented after a special plea from the Swiss government.

At the conference, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called once more for the aggressive prosecution of war criminals. His position was backed by a number of foreign dignitaries, including Warren Zimmermann, the State Department's director for refugee programs and a former ambassador to Yugoslavia.

"We expect this tribunal to be impartial and thorough," Zimmermann said, referring to a war crimes tribunal established by the United Nations in May. "It should serve as a model for other conflicts and a warning to those who believe that they can avoid punishment for despicable acts."

The conference took place just a few hundred yards from the U.N. building where Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic—both accused by the State Department as likely war criminals—have been key participants in the U.N.-sponsored peace talks.

"The U.N. is talking about defense of human rights here, but it's also talking with the real war criminals next door," said a human rights official participating in the three-day conference.

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

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MEMO FROM DAN TO KATIE**RE: Haiti's Environmental and Economic Status****DATE: 7/29/93**

Few countries in the world face a more serious threat to their own survival from environmental catastrophe than Haiti. Overpopulated, its resources are overexploited and trends towards further environmental deterioration are apparent everywhere. The following 1990 United Nations Development Program figures put Haiti in context: Haiti is 137th out of 173 countries on the human development index, the lowest ranking of any of the Latin American countries. Haiti's life expectancy at birth is 55.7 years, the adult literacy rate is 53%, mean years of schooling are 1.7, and the real GDP per capita is \$933. In 1991 Haiti received US\$197 million in official development assistance, representing 8.2% of its GNP or \$30 per capita (above average even for low HDI countries). Only 20.1% of land in Haiti is arable (2.8 million hectares), of which 8% is irrigated. Forests make up 1.5% of land area, and the annual rate of deforestation from 1981-1985 was 3.7% (5 times greater than the low HDI country average).

LAND/WATER:

Haiti is extremely mountainous, with 63% of lands having a slope greater than 20%, and most rivers short and swift flowing. Surface water is used for domestic purposes by the great majority of the people in Haiti and it also flows directly into a number of small and large irrigation systems. The evidence is mounting that the quantity of surface waters available for irrigation is decreasing due to continuous deforestation and loss of water retention capacity in the rivers' upper watersheds. The groundwater reserves could become the principle source of freshwater in the country in the future, but this source has not been mapped nor is it currently utilized to help increase agriculture production.

Haiti's arable land is being over-utilized with the total area under some form of agricultural production six times greater than the estimated area of "good agriculture land." About one third of all lands are either extremely eroded or otherwise unusable due to inappropriate land-use practices including farming, grazing and tree cutting. As the best lands are used, agriculture moves farther up the mountains and the result of indiscriminate tree cutting and intensification of cultivation is tremendous soil erosion. Each year the equivalent of 6,000 hectares of valuable arable land are lost to erosion.

FORESTS:

The forests of Haiti have long ago lost their economic significance as renewable resources, and are quickly losing their ecological function as well. At the beginning of the 19th century, Haiti was mostly covered by lush forests with ecological variation defined in terms of different forest types. Since then forested land area has been reduced drastically, and today only covers 6.7% of the total land area of the nation. The largest parcel of forest (26,400 ha) is the pine forest in the southeastern portion of the country, and while the highest percent of tree cover is found in this area, all its rivers drain into the Dominican Republic.

Reforestation programs past and present, even when successful, have proven inadequate to reverse the trend in deforestation rates. Successful small scale projects implemented by NGOs have replaced less than 20% of the tree biomass cut every year for lumber, charcoal and clearing for agriculture (despite the fact that these projects have planted nearly 14 million trees in four years with about 50% survival).

Although it appears that forest resources in Haiti will never again be a significant economic resource, USAID stated that due to the fact that more than 70% of all energy consumed comes from either firewood or charcoal, that sustained agricultural production of the plains and continuous hydroelectric output depend upon adequate forest cover in the upper watersheds, it is clear that the remaining forests in Haiti must be protected, restored and adequately managed. USAID's Agroforestry Outreach Project has demonstrated that although the peasants' need for new agricultural lands and their preference for fruit trees have prevailed in the past, people will plant non-fruit bearing trees on a large scale if there is public participation and an understanding of the goals of the project.

BIODIVERSITY:

The insular nature of Hispaniola has resulted in substantially varied flora, from dry desert conditions to the permanently moist conditions of the mountainous rainforest. Thirty-six percent of all plants are endemic to the island and many species are probably undiscovered. The fauna of Haiti consists of few mammals, but a diverse population of birds. Vertebrate fauna are well-known compared to invertebrates: a recent survey of two mountainous areas presented that 23 of 46 species of mollusks collected were new to science.

Haiti is characterized by nine life zones, including the Subtropical Thorn Woodland and the Subtropical Dry Forest, with the most common area originally being the Subtropical Moist Forest, which currently has few representatives left. The greatest threats to Haiti's biodiversity are rapid

habitat destruction, and the introduction of exotic species which have replaced native and often endemic species in their ecological niches.

COASTAL AND MARINE RESOURCES:

In contrast to the declining resource value of its lands and forests, the country's coastal and marine habitats appear to be in a relatively pristine state. The magnitude and ecological significance of its resources: mangrove wetlands, seagrass meadows, coral reefs and protected bays and estuaries are considerable. The mangrove forests alone cover more than 180 square kilometers. Well-developed and largely unexplored coral reefs directly offshore are prized by recreational users and fishermen.

Breeding and nesting sites of rare and endangered animal species in the coastal zone have not been well studied. At least 13 threatened or endangered species have been identified as utilizing the mangrove wetlands and lagoons of Haiti, and while laws exist to protect these species, pressure upon rare sea turtles and shorebirds continues. Site specific species and habitat studies as part of a coastal resources plan could result in better management of coastal areas, and enhance the fisheries. It has been estimated that the fishery yield potential could greatly increase with the introduction of appropriate technology and adequate infrastructure. Mariculture projects involving conch, shrimp and King crab have recently been proposed on a small scale basis by PVOs.

POLLUTION:

The two most pressing pollution-related issues are the need for a safe water supply, and sanitary methods of disposing of human wastes. Potable water is currently only available to 60% of the Port-au-Prince area, and beyond the metropolitan area, only 10% of the population have access to a safe water supply. Water related diseases are prevalent particularly in the countryside, where in 1979 diarrhea alone caused the death of 9% of the babies under one year of age.

The vast majority of Haitians do not have access to sanitary means of waste disposal. UNICEF reported in 1984 that 40% of the population were using latrines or septic tanks, mostly in urban areas. Contamination of surface and groundwater from human waste and other solid and liquid wastes is increasing without sufficient means or a plan to control it. The air in the Port-au-Prince contains dust and emissions from poorly inspected vehicles, and smoke from burning garbage and industrial plants add to the air pollution problem.

INSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATION:

Despite early and comprehensive legislation designed to protect and manage the country's natural resources, Haiti's environment, lands, forests,

drinking water, wildlands and wildlife are in serious trouble. Environmental laws, although well constructed, have not been applied and enforced. In addition, there are many repetitive laws which have more than one agency overseeing identical issues, with very little, if any, communication, and it often leads to fighting over territory.

Numerous government agencies, PVOs, NGOs and international donors are involved with the environment and natural resources of Haiti, but problems caused by lack of coordination are due as much to the diverse responsibilities assigned each public agency as to the absence of a coherent natural resource policy.

USAID STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND CONSERVATION:

Haiti's population is projected to increase from an estimated 5,200,000 in 1985 to 6,500,000 in 2006. During that period, the migration from rural to urban areas is expected to swell the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince to 2,200,000 people. Deterioration of the countryside as evidenced by sharply declining food production, internal migration into Port-au-Prince, the high unemployment of rural emigrants, the continuing attempts at illegal international migration have all been thoroughly documented. To have any stabilizing effect, conservation strategies are urgently needed now, i.e.:

- approach land conservation on a regional watershed basis considering both environmental and socio-economic issues;
- conceptualize projects for longer periods than the normal two to five year period;
- manage the upper watershed, especially the threatened habitats of the Macaya National Park, Haiti's only significant remaining natural watershed. It serves one of Haiti's few remaining highly productive agricultural regions. The Macaya area possesses one of the highest rates of biological diversity in the Caribbean;
- Encourage large-scale conservation and reforestation projects to prevent further soil erosion, particularly in the watersheds directly above agriculturally and economically important lands.
- incorporate local participation in land use projects;
- consider the removal of certain hillslope cultivated lands from production, return of these lands to forest, and also a relocation of inhabitants where other living arrangements can be found;
- promote tree crops such as coffee, cocoa and fruit trees that protect slopes from erosion and give the country an economic advantage;
- employ vegetative cover in a strip pattern alternating with cultivated crops to reduce soil erosion.

AID GOALS AND STRATEGIES FOR HAITI

The USAID strategy focuses on three critical, interdependent elements:

- 1) the evolution of public and private democratic institutions that respond to the needs of the Haitian people;
- 2) sustainable, private sector-led, equitable economic growth and development; and
- 3) protection and development of the human resources needed to lay a sound basis for enduring democracy and sustained economic growth.

In relation to the environment, AID's agricultural strategy will focus on increasing rural incomes, food security, and agricultural productivity, while preserving the natural resource base. Aid programs will emphasize market linkages and income enhancement as a means of stimulating increased production, use of more effective production technologies and techniques as well as improved and sustainable environmental practices.

Other major donors have played important roles in the agriculture sector, but such assistance favored projects with the government of Haiti, which has attached major importance to food production. The Inter-American Development Bank is historically the principal sponsor of major irrigation projects and has planned a large water control project to protect some of the watersheds that feed the lake behind the hydroelectric facility. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has supported a small number of water management and irrigation activities. Prior to the coup, the World Bank supported the regional development authority in the North and was considering a large forestry and natural resources project. The French, Germans and Canadians have funded smaller, more diverse, rural development portfolios, while numerous PVO groups receive support through religious missions for small, localized activities.

USAID has suggested that the only viable, sustainable environmental strategy for Haiti is one that seeks to create and reinforce positive economic incentives to preserve what remains of the severely degraded natural resource base, while reducing the rewards to short-term, non-renewable exploitation and reinforcing the negative consequences for resource abuse. This environmental strategy is also basic to avoid worsening Haiti's already debilitated food security.

Recognizing this, USAID projects in agriculture are designed to have the maximum sustainable positive impact on environment and natural resource preservation, without depending on the GOH's unlikely capability to meet recurrent costs or the possibility of indefinite foreign donor subsidy. In protecting the remaining watershed and other ecologically sound areas, biodiversity will also be maintained.

The Productive Land Use Services Project (PLUS) is AID/Haiti's most significant ecological effort. The purpose is to encourage the use of ecologically sound practices on Haiti's hillsides. The project seeks to encourage ecologically and economically sustainable farming activities by improving economic incentives to plant trees and hedge-rows and avoid cultivation of erosion-inducing annual crops. Participating farmers receive training in sustainable techniques for conserving fragile soils and increasing the efficiency of water utilization, while boosting crop production and farm income levels.

Finally, reduction in the population growth of Haiti is a key project goal of AID, through assisting the GOH in addressing the associated policy dilemmas. AID programs in population and family planning will be enlarged. Together with education and small business development programs which encourage female participation in the labor force, these efforts could have a significant demographic impact over the longer term. The GOH must be convinced not only of the health and human rights aspects of access to family planning advice and services, but of the economic aspects as well.

[prepared by Aimée Christensen]

MEMO FROM AIMÉE TO EILEEN, KATIE AND DAN
RE: HAITI & USAID'S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PLAN
DATE: 8-20-93

I spoke with Jim Hester over the phone and then ran into him, Jeff Brokaw, and one other man from the Policy Office of AID outside of Katie's office while they were waiting to brief her on Ecuador. The general consensus was as follows:

- There is very little chance we can do anything about the money going out at the beginning of next week. It has been specifically earmarked for urgent short-term needs like food for 64,000 families for 90 days, a job creation project, and a presidential security detail. In essence, OEP and Eileen's office have missed the boat on this allocation--no one was pushing for environmental concerns during the interagency decision-making process.

- However, Jim and Jeff suggested we push for some of the jobs in the job creation project to be for environmental projects. Apparently it has not been specifically spelled out exactly what types of jobs are to be created, (see below), and there is the lee-way to push for an environmental focus.

- Regarding Katie and Eileen's requests for AID to come up with a sustainable development strategy for Haiti to integrate environmental concerns into all aspects of our bilateral aid, Jim Hester feels that without money (as all current AID funds have been committed) there is not much to do to get funds redirected in this next week, but an ongoing dialogue with the AID mission in Haiti would be a productive first step. We can organize a focussed plan through an interagency working process and aim for the next tranche of funds. (I am currently trying to get a time line on this). Then we can be more effective by focussing heavily and early on the next tranche of funds to be sure that it integrates environmental concerns into all aspects of the program. Jim just does not see any money in the very short-term.

- The coordination of aid (both bilateral and multilateral) is key; there is a meeting on Saturday in Port-au-Prince with bilateral donors and some of the MDBs. It will be led by Vicky Huddleston, the Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. in Haiti, and the UNDP and World Bank are both involved in organizing the meeting. It can be a first opportunity for the U.S. government to demonstrate our high-level commitment to sustainable development in Haiti, and to make it clear that issues of sustainable development are central to long-term peace and improved economic/living conditions in Haiti. As far as here in the U.S., Jim Hester suggested that Mark Schneider be the long term coordinator of interagency/bilateral/multilateral donor focus on sustainable

development for Haiti. Mark is the soon-to-be-confirmed head of the Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau, and will be part of the aid consultative group (to meet supposedly in late September) which also includes Treasury (Jim Fall).

- Richard Feinberg spoke with me briefly about the \$1-2 Billion coordinated "sustainable development assistance package" of which the U.S. has supposedly committed \$1-200 million. It is supposed to unfold over a period of five years, and our efforts to work for a strong, coordinated sustainable development action plan is key to make it successful. He would like to speak more with Katie and Eileen today to clarify the plan. I am trying to find out more about the program directly from AID, but have been given the run around--see bottom.

- It has been suggested that Eileen call Vicky Huddleston today to discuss our strong interest in a long-term coordinated sustainable development plan for Haiti. Her phone number is: 011-509-22-0354. In addition, Eileen can call Assistant Secretary Alec Watson at State; he is very receptive to working on sustainable development issues in Latin America, and Haiti in particular.

*** I attempted to communicate with Jim Hester (647-9012), Joan Johnson of the Haiti desk and Carol Tyson of the Caribbean Bureau (both 647-3452). Jim never got back to me today, and I left two or three messages today and yesterday with the Caribbean Bureau, (Joan and Carol), and no one ever got back to me. I also tried to talk directly with the USAID Mission in Haiti, (Jerry Bowers, Deputy Director of Mission) but no one answered.

Current USAID projects: there are several on-going and soon-to-be-implemented projects in Haiti, which AID describe as "addressing environmental problems through a cross-sectoral range of activities":

- The Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS) Project (\$30 million) promotes productive, sustainable land-use practices (e.g. use of hedgerows, soil retaining perennials, tree planting, retaining walls, terracing, etc.) among Haiti's hillside farmers. Jim Hester said that the project was 80% environmentally focussed and he felt that if they had had a better P.R. person it would have a better reputation than the Kenya project.

- * Since your July 30 meeting with AID, Wayne Nilsestuen, the Chief of the Rural Development Division sent us more information on their (PLUS) program. PLUS is a reorganization of the original Agroforestry Outreach Project (AOP) and the more recent Agroforestry II project (AFII) begun in 1989. AID says that the name change signaled a shift of emphasis away from subsidized tree planting and conventional land conservation to a more

sustainable program aimed at extensions of conservation practices and increased farmer income through greater production, improved operations and reduced management costs. An important element of the project is working to convince farmers that continuous and determined conservation practices are valuable not only to preserve soil and water for future use, but also as an instrument to increase crop production and farmer income.

- The Targeted Water Management (TWM) Project (\$16 million) is decreasing pressure on Pic Macaya, Haiti's largest watershed which includes a biosphere reserve and Haiti's last remaining natural rain forest. The project includes tree planting and promotes sustainable farming and land use practices among the farmers who live on the park's periphery. Protection of this region is vital to food production on the fertile Les Cayes plain. Jim said that the project was very successful, but that it fell apart when the Haitian workers who were paid by the Aristide government to watch over/protect the project left their jobs at the time of the coup. Since then many of the trees were cut by desperate Haitians who needed them to survive.

- The Coffee Revitalization Project (\$4 million) protects environmentally-threatened hillsides by promoting cultivation of perennial, erosion-controlling crops, emphasizing coffee and its essential tree cover. Jim said that this project is not focussed on coffee growing, but the soil conservation that the coffee trees provide.

- The Private Sector Family Planning Project (\$25 million) involves over 20 Haitian, U.S. and international agencies in delivering family planning information and services to Haiti's rural and urban populations.

- Jobs/Infrastructure Initiative (\$16.5 million) will create approximately 100,000 short-term jobs for the country's poorest citizens in a wide variety of environmental protection and other activities, e.g. soil and water conservation, erosion control, and tree planting.

- Municipal Garbage Removal project in Port-au-Prince is earmarked for the upcoming release of funds to Haiti; it will remove garbage from the city's streets and help eliminate the associated health hazards.

- Restoration of Democracy project to help strengthen the institutions of democratic government (legislature, courts, executive, and help GOH identify policy options on the environment). This includes a presidential security detail.



U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

**Mr. Daniel Blank
OES/NSC
The White House
Washington DC 20506**

August 9, 1993

Dear Mr. Blank:

Pursuant to our July 30 meeting with yourself and Ms. McGinty I am enclosing portions of A.I.D./Haiti's Productive Land-Use Systems Project (PLUS) Paper. I believe you will find the Executive Summary is a useful synthesis of A.I.D.'s learning experiences with regard to reforestation incentives in Haiti over the last 15 years.

As I mentioned during our meeting, Haiti's most serious environmental problem are inappropriate farming and watershed management practices which are resulting in declining crop yields and fuelwood shortages. These practices, which promote soil loss and fertility decline, further encourage the downward spiral of rural poverty. Addressing the root causes of mismanagement requires developing technologies, extension outreach, and a policy environment which will contribute immediate nutritional or financial benefits to farm families.

My staff and I look forward to keeping you informed as we begin this long process of Haitian reconstruction. Please do not hesitate to call on me if you require additional information.

Sincerely,

**Wayne R. Nilsestuen
Chief,
Rural Development Division**

encl: a/s

cc: Carol Tyson
Norma Parker

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This amendment introduces a mid-course correction to USAID/Haiti's Agroforestry II project (AFII), begun in 1989. AFII was a follow-on activity to the highly successful Agroforestry Outreach Project (AOP), which was conducted from 1981-1989 and introduced the concept of trees as a cash crop. Activities concentrated on tree planting and soil and water conservation. AFII differed from its predecessor project by developing on-farm propagation techniques and harvest schemes, promoting a broader range of perennial species of forages, grasses and non-woody vegetation and diversifying its interventions to include hedgerows, alley cropping, gully plugs, ravine control measures, and wider use of indigenous seed and germ plasm.

The AFII project was suspended, along with most of the USAID program, in October 1991 after the coup d'état. However, it remained in a status of partially-funded suspension to permit a rapid start-up, which was authorized in July 1992. The present redesign began the following week.

The nature of the redesign is characterized by the change of the project's name from Agroforestry II to Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS), reflecting a shift of emphasis away from subsidized tree-planting and conventional land conservation to a more sustainable program aimed at extension of conservation practices and increased farmer income through greater production, improved operations and reduced management costs. An important element of sustainability is the need to convince farmers that continuous and determined conservation practices are valuable not only to preserve soil and water for future use, but also as an instrument to increase crop production and hence farmer income.

The Goal and Purpose of PLUS remain the same as the AFII project:

Goal: To maximize the productive potential of Haitian hillside agriculture by reducing the ongoing degradation of the country's natural resources base through sustainable land-use interventions;

Purpose: To achieve sustainable increases in on-farm productivity and income generation by integrating into existing farming systems appropriate land use and soil and water conservation measures, involving trees, shrubs, grasses, and other plant materials which will enhance soil fertility.

The essence of the changes reflected in this amendment lies in the project's implementation strategy. Although the same three institutions, CARE, PADF and SECID, will continue to serve as implementing agents, the focus will be on land use interventions which provide sustainable income for Haitian hillside farmers.

For this initiative to be successful, interventions must be responsive to the motivations which drive farmers' decisions. To ensure the sustainability of practices introduced, subsidies provided under the AFII project will be eliminated. The incentive for the farmer to continue will therefore be based on the perceived value and utility of the practices learned under the project.

With increased emphasis of extension of land use practices, PLUS will also pay increased attention to monitoring and evaluation (M&E). This is necessary to enable project managers to improve their understanding of farmers' perceived needs and to design interventions which best meet those needs on a sustainable basis. It will be the role of SECID to organize and direct the project's M&E effort, to analyze results of interventions and to provide the operating agencies, CARE and PADF, with practical feedback.

Two years remain for PLUS to complete the original life of project of the Agroforestry II project. The project budget will be somewhat leaner and expatriate technical assistance will be about one-third less than before. Similarly, geographic coverage, especially for PADF, and the numerical targets for interventions will be reduced from the levels of the first two years of AFII (see target tables in Section V). Nevertheless, important accomplishments are anticipated in the remaining life of the project. Foremost among them will be a significant increase in the number of Haitian farmers earning sustained higher incomes. Of the estimated 125,000 farm families expected to be touched in some way during the remainder of the project, at least 45,000 of them should meet the sustainability criteria at the end of the project. Another critical project contribution will be a major reduction in the environmental degradation of farm land which has plagued Haitian agriculture in recent years.

In more specific terms, project outputs will be achieved in the following areas:

Increases in production and income through propagation of improved varieties of fruit trees and food crops, grafting, foodcrop germplasm improvement, appropriate grain storage development, bio-intensive gardening, and improved market information and access.

Sustainable production systems involving soil and water conservation practices encompassing terracing and hedgerow technologies, ravine stabilization, rock walls, etc., as well as appropriate production technologies, including composting, deep tillage, cover cropping, and improved crop management.

Multipurpose tree propagation through training of farmers in propagation techniques, direct seeding, use of plastic sack nurseries, stump planting, etc., in order to maintain adequate numbers of trees for farmers to integrate into their farming system.

I. Purpose and Objectives of the Amendment

For a full decade until the advent of Haiti's most recent political turmoil stemming from the September 30, 1991 coup d'état ousting the democratically elected Aristide government, two major USAID projects, Agroforestry Outreach Project (AOP) and Agroforestry II (AFII), have provided the continuous and vital delivery of agroforestry services to much of Haiti's rural population. In many areas, the projects offered the only basis for systematic and rational land use. These projects have also provided a formidable technical and institutional foundation upon which a new orientation of sustainable activities can now build.

Recent political events and the resulting hiatus in project activities since October 1991 now afford USAID/Haiti and participating NGOs -- CARE, PADF and SECID -- the opportunity to reassess and revise the methodology of the AFII project, in an effort to sharpen the focus of activities and to assure a more meaningful and enduring economic and ecological impact. Authority to reactivate the project was received from Washington in July 1992, after which an external two-member U.S. technical team reviewed the status of the project in light of the country's present agricultural environment. The conclusions of this review, based in part on a draft amendment prepared by USAID/Haiti before the coup and in part on current consultations with CARE and PADF representatives, constitute the basis of the present amendment. To underscore the new emphasis, and to alter the image of the project among many observers as essentially a tree-planting activity, this amendment introduces a change in the project's name to Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS)¹.

The objective of this amendment is to increase the project's emphasis on achieving both economically profitable and environmentally sustainable agricultural activities. Specifically, the amendment directs project implementors to:

1. Optimize extension capacity to introduce agricultural and conservation technologies that will gradually be adopted and sustained by:

- > geographically consolidating PADF and CARE activities;
- > concentrating attention on counterpart NGOs (PADF) or in communities (CARE and PADF) with strong support;
- > retraining extension staff to offer a demand-driven range of sustainable agricultural technologies;

¹ To minimize confusion in this paper regarding the project name, the title AFII will be retained in historical references to past activities of the Agroforestry II project, and the label AFII/PLUS will occasionally appear with respect to continuous past and future activities. AOP refers to the original Agroforestry Outreach Project (1981-89). The new name, PLUS, will be used for clearly prospective actions.

- > utilizing the capacity of local organizations to acquire improved germplasm, grafting materials, and provide training;
- > reducing the emphasis on forest tree production;
- > increasing the emphasis on fruit tree production; and
- > increasing women extension staff in order to increase coverage of women farmers and home garden technologies.

2. Improve the project's internal monitoring and evaluation system to track economic performance more effectively, to identify appropriate practices, and to improve extension training by:

- > developing a baseline of present conditions as a benchmark for new activities;
- > focusing complementary research on developing agile and effective monitoring and evaluation systems; and
- > attaching higher priority to estimating the project's economic impact.

3. Realign complementary research activities to emphasize extension of demand-driven conservation and agricultural production practices by:

- > guiding extension toward technologies with maximum sustainability and accelerated replication;
- > undertaking on-farm agronomic trials to assess the productivity and soil-enhancement potential of different crops and land use practices; and
- > placing the responsibility for determining short-term technical assistance needs in CARE and PADF, and meeting them through the SECID contract.

4. Reduce management and overhead costs by emphasizing local capacity and streamlining operations:

The following measures are proposed, subject to final negotiations with grantees organizations.

- > CARE will reduce international staff to two positions;
- > PADF will reduce international staff to three positions;
- > SECID will reduce international staff to two long-term positions, supplemented by short-term consultants;
- > SECID will locate in close proximity to PADF or CARE;
- CARE field office costs will be shared with its food distribution activities;
- > CARE and PADF will not increase other staff; and
- > CARE and PADF will target their respective activities not only to enhance impact but also to improve cost effectiveness.

These modifications in project implementation will effectively inject farm-level financial decision-making into what has been predominantly a conservation management program. The project

will integrate economic considerations into almost all its activities. By continuing to emphasize the profitability of sustainable agriculture and land resource management practices, farmers will be exposed to an increasingly wide variety of production, marketing, and conservation opportunities. By harnessing the farmer's more immediate financial interests, the project will help stimulate the widespread adoption of both conservation and economic development activities upon which ecological and economic sustainability ultimately depend.

II. Rationale for the Amendment

The activities of the AOP/AFII projects (described in the next section) have generally been very successful over the past ten years. CARE and PADF have been an important, and often the main, source for agricultural change in major parts of Haiti. Project activity targets have consistently surpassed projections and, more importantly, there are clear indications in the landscape that suggest the project is effectively changing the way farmers use trees to their economic advantage. Finally, the evolution of the project from a forestry activity to a broader agriculture support program has gradually taken place, by constantly learning from its achievements as well as its mistakes. Few projects have succeeded as well in maintaining this degree of objectivity.

This evolution of the project has been recognized for some time, and in fact, a draft amendment of AFII was prepared by the USAID Agricultural Development Office just before the September 1991 coup. This draft amendment was never acted upon because of the coup and program suspension intervened, but the general theme, as well as specific activities are reflected in the present amendment. The major objective of the 1991 redesign exercise was to increase sustainability - both the ecological sustainability of interventions introduced under the project and the financial sustainability of the technologies applied at the farm level. An important aspect of sustainability centers around a direct linkage to a wider range of market opportunities, providing farmers with an strong incentive to continue the new technologies developed under the project. This broader definition of sustainability will be understood at the local level when farmers recognize the income potential of implementing ecologically sound land management practices and improved information on and access to markets. When this occurs, farmers will develop a vested interest in continuing project activities well after the project itself has finished.

Questions regarding the lasting effect of activities result from the project's dependence on subsidies (production and distribution of free tree seedlings), the narrow range of conservation-oriented extension services provided to farmers, and the resulting limited market access for participating farmers. The driving principle behind the Mission's strong desire to reorient the path of the Agroforestry II project is **sustainability** - both to promote an enduring ecological balance, and to

ensure a solid basis for financial stability and growth at the farmer-level.

Continued profitability, over time, of any agricultural crop or product is inseparably linked to the ecological sustainability of the production system. Regardless of how potentially profitable any agricultural commodity might be, it must be incorporated into an ecologically sustainable production system. For this very fundamental reason, PLUS will continue its extension/outreach and training program in this area. The CARE and PADF outreach program will continue to train farmers and transfer appropriate farming systems technologies to producers in reduced geographic areas. Likewise, the project will continue to pursue a strategy of convincing farmers to adopt conservation farming practices without relying on subsidies.

To achieve this responsiveness to more direct farmer incentives, the project must devote considerably more human and financial resources per production or farm unit than before. It will mean developing the capacity to assess particular combinations of tree, food, and forage crops and quickly develop appropriate extension messages. Developing this assessment capability, providing the re-training of forestry-oriented staff, and developing the required level of monitoring and evaluation proficiency will require time and resources to plan and execute. Results will not be evident for a minimum of several months.

Reduction of AID-financed resources and concerns regarding long-term sustainability of activities will oblige project implementors to make choices regarding resources allocation. This means selectively consolidating efforts both geographically, institutionally and technically along several lines. The necessary "triage" can be done in a variety of ways, to be developed at an early date with the implementing NGOs. Grantees implementing organizations will play an active role in this selection process, by setting a series of objective and realistic criteria to form the basis for the culling process in the workplans of the grantee organizations.

A. Geographic Consolidation

Both PADF and CARE will need to consolidate their geographic foci in order to deliver improved extension capability with fewer resources. Fundamentally, the two most widely used criteria - productivity versus environmental risk - illustrate the dichotomous criteria which might be applied differentially:

- * **potential productivity assessment** - is a selection process where all activities would focus on achieving the greatest economic return per unit of project assistance. In both the north and south, this would suggest activities in high value crops, plasm improvement for commercial crops and perhaps even irrigation management. Activities in the north and northwest would be geared more toward bottom land improvement and conservation.

* **ecological risk assessment** - would take the opposite approach and support remedial activities on those most fragile lands that are in the greatest risk of being irreversibly destroyed through erosion or fertility mismanagement. This would tend to concentrate project activities on steep wooded slopes in the south and on drier hillsides and gullies in the central plateau and northwest.

The PLUS project is actually committed to both strategies, and the question of which takes precedence in any given situation must be determined by local factors. What the continuing reorientation stresses is that all interventions should be balanced by the economic realities of resource-scarce donor agencies and needs of agrarian societies: the most economical intervention must be stressed in order to stimulate spontaneous and enduring replication of activities. In effect, this economic rationale would likely promote agriculture intensification versus extensification across the board; productive lowlands will become the focal point for production increases, which will ultimately reduce pressure on the more fragile side slopes.

This does not imply that all hillside activities are marginal and should be neglected. Indeed, because of ecological realities of Haiti and the economic needs of its farmers, the policy environment in the northwest strongly suggests that we expend our efforts on behalf of the disadvantaged who are often hillside farmers eking out just enough to feed their families. Nonetheless, even these farmers will allocate labor and financial resources according to "best return" strategies. Thus the project must provide those who ask with the most economically viable technologies. The problem is to limit the "technology basket" (see below) so that only suitable, high-quality messages are sent and received.

B. Organizational Concentration

PADF operates differently from CARE, in that its extension outreach is largely achieved through local NGO structures with very disparate goals and staffing capabilities. CARE promotes most activities primarily through direct links with individual farmers or through small groups and "combites." These groups, too, have their strengths and weaknesses, and some are clearly more effective and hence durable for post-project longevity.

CARE and PADF will carefully review the capacity and sustaining power of individual organizations and concentrate on those with the highest potential to continue after the project ends. Some of the indicators would include alternative income, democratization, responsiveness to members, and linkages with technology-generating firms.

CARE and PADF will propose systems by which they each will continually evaluate and focus on those groups showing the highest potential to achieve self-sufficiency within the remaining life of project.

C. Technical Calibration and Reducing Subsidies

Geographical and organizational adjustments should lead to a more refined understanding of which technologies will be most apparent in each region and training altered accordingly. Disciplining extension agents to move away from exclusively tree-based solutions and objectively listening to the farmer's particular concerns strongly suggests implementors emphasize communications skill development initially. Once the agent can begin to understand the farming system as a whole s/he can identify "turn-key" technologies that can be easily and economically introduced.

CARE and PADF technical staff will, with SECID's help, seek to identify the three or four technologies which hold the most sustainable promise in any given agro-ecological situation. Training will need to be tailored to these judgments and monitoring of extension advise routinely conducted to assure compliance. Both CARE and PADF, with the help of their SECID counterparts, will describe in amended workplans how this ongoing training will be accomplished.

Project sustainability also implies that the types of technologies preferred through the outreach not depend on external resources. It was widely believed that the dependence of the AOP and AFII projects on free seedlings and plant materials undermined the sustainability of technologies introduced by the project after USAID funding ends. To ensure the perpetuation of project-sponsored technologies, subsidies must be eliminated altogether. Strategies for the removal of these subsidies, whether total and precipitous or gradual and phased, must be developed by CARE and PADF based on local conditions and assessment of financial impact.

The elimination of subsidies and careful replacement with technologies which depend on resources available to farmers will not prevent or hinder the provision of temporary inputs for demonstration purposes. CARE and PADF will explain in their workplans exactly how they intend to comply with this change.

III. Background of the Amendment

This section summarizes nearly ten years of project experience and developments that have led to the present amendment.

A. Agroforestry Outreach Project (AOP), 1981-1989

Following the resumption of USAID's development assistance to Haiti in the early 1970s, the agricultural portfolio was designed to emphasize institutional strengthening, food crop research, and irrigation potential. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector continued to decline steadily, yields degenerated, and new arable land was exhausted. By 1980, agricultural specialists concluded that the principal constraints to both commercial and subsistence agricultural production throughout Haiti were declining soil

Food Security and Development in Haiti

On a sweltering day in August 1987, 315 small farmers, members of the Oganizasyon Agrikol pou Developman (OGAD), gathered in Haiti's Artibonite Valley to celebrate the realization of a long-held dream. They were inaugurating their own *estokaj*, or food-storage enterprise. Pooling their savings with a \$10,000 grant from the IAF, they had purchased building materials and erected a four-chambered, cinder-block silo designed to hold nearly 50 tons of locally grown corn, sorghum, rice, and beans. A \$1,200 revolving credit fund was set up to buy members' crops at harvest, when supplies would be abundant and prices depressed. Crops would be stored until market values rose, or until farmers needed food for their tables or seed to plant their fields. Each of these benefits from the *estokaj* promised to loosen members' bondage to *spekilatè*, or middlemen, who had controlled local market prices through their virtual stranglehold on credit to buy staples and farm supplies.

Three months later this promising start seemed at a dead end. Near midnight on November 24, eight weeks after the corn harvest and a few days before the first national elections were scheduled under a newly ratified Constitution, a band of nearly three dozen masked men swept out of the darkness, firing weapons into the air around the silo. Rumors of impending assault had been circulating through the valley for weeks, and a small group of unarmed farmers had organized a vigil, hoping their presence would protect the building. It did not.

Forced to flee to a safe distance, the farmers heard orders barked out to haul off bags of corn, spread kerosene over the rest, and torch the building. They watched as the marauders, eerily backlit by billowing flames, swarmed



OGAD leaders stand before the burnt-out shell of their silo.

around the burning silo like an army of shadows, shouting threats and firing gunbursts into the air before finally vanishing back into the night.

Word of the attack spread quickly throughout the valley and into the surrounding foothills. By dawn, OGAD's families and their friends and supporters had gathered to survey the still-smoldering ruins. In addition to the silo, nearly 6,000 *marmites* of corn, approximately 16.5 tons, valued at \$4,800, had been lost. Also lost was the seed stock for the next planting. All prospects for recapitalizing the credit fund, which included each member's hard-earned share of one dollar, had vanished. The only good news was that no one had been killed.

Later that day, OGAD's treasurer sounded a defiant note during an interview with a radio reporter. "Since we are motivated and hopeful," he said, "we will not abandon this project. We will begin meeting as soon as possible to see how to get our grain storage program back on track. The

estokaj is crucial for our survival as peasant farmers."

Progress was slow, despite the determined words. In the valley it was impossible for the marauders to keep all their identities secret. Easiest to unmask were the ringleaders since rumors of the attack could be traced back to them. Seven were named: two local sheriffs who were members of the Haitian army; and five *gwo neg*, or big shots, who had been officials of the deposed Duvalier regime and were founding members of a newly formed paramilitary gang, the *gwoup san maman*, or motherless ones. Among the ringleaders was one of the area's largest moneylenders and *spekilatè*, who employed a network of agents, called *sekretè*, to scour the countryside and secure farmers' crops at cut-rate prices.

None of these men was ever officially charged. Indeed, the only arrests were of OGAD administrators following the radio interview. Rapid intervention by several Haitian and international human-rights and non-governmental organizations saved them from harm, but a message had been delivered. Eighteen months after the arson, active participation was down in many of the community groups of eight to fifteen members that formed the core of OGAD, and there was no movement to rebuild the silo. A supplemental IAF grant enabled OGAD to replace its seed stock and recover members' shares in the revolving fund, but marketing was still controlled by *spekilatè*.

Believing that the silo's shell could be salvaged for later use, OGAD's leaders recommended in mid-1988 that it be taken apart, block by block. Unexpectedly, the members balked, offering a haunting reason. As one of them put it, "This wreck must be left here so our children will never forget what ~~they~~ we have done to us."

A year later OGAD had decided to revitalize its estokaj. With support from the IAF, the Organizasyon began to construct four smaller, decentralized silos and resumed training members to manage the units when they opened in mid-1990. To evaluate that effort and the prospects for extending the estokaj mechanism to other interested groups of small farmers, the IAF commissioned its Haitian In-Country Service team in 1991 to study three of the fourteen active grants supporting food storage and marketing. A summary of the findings follows.

Project Objectives

A review of available literature and interviews with project participants from OGAD, the Asosyasyon Animate Kot Sid (AAKS), and the Asosyasyon Peyizan ak Atizan Bonbad (APAB) underlines the importance of estokaj programs for the small-farm families that make up nearly 70 percent of the country's population. All three projects share four broad objectives. The first goal is guaranteeing food security in a nation where hunger is widespread and UNICEF reports that 75 percent of rural children are malnourished.

Even villages that produce ample yields of food crops can develop shortfalls. Traditional methods of storing harvests—whether hung braided from trees or posts (*guan-n*), in sacks woven from latanier leaves (*djakout-sak*), or in raised sheds of wood and thatch (*kolonbye*)—rely on individual families and have limited capacities. Farm families often exhaust their supplies between harvests, and since there is usually no community backstop, they must buy food from regional middlemen at high prices. By allowing farmers to store more of their harvests safely, the estokaj creates a local "food-savings bank" members can tap as the need arises.



A member of the Cooperative Artisanal et Caisse Populaire de Surprendre-Mare Rouge fumigates an estokaj, or food-storage enterprise, before storing the sun-dried grains. Proper pesticide use was one of the challenges undertaken by area farmers.

The second objective is to ensure that farmers have access at the beginning of each growing season to low-cost seeds, resistant to the rigors of the local environment. That is, community storage programs act as community "seed-savings banks." Without the estokaj, peasants can be forced, in effect, to buy back at a premium the same grains for planting that they sold to *spekilatè* months before, when prices were at their post-harvest low.

The third objective is to boost family incomes. Community grain storage allows farmers to sell their harvests throughout the post-harvest period and wait for the right price. Since prices fluctuate as much as 400 percent between harvests, depending on the commodity and the accessibility of a given geographical zone to suppliers, the potential for higher earnings is considerable. Increased profit margins are vital not only as a source of seed capital for community development, but also for allowing families to save the cash they need to school their children and ride out medical emergencies or poor future harvests.

Presently, unorganized farmers often must either sell off part of the food set aside to tide them over until the next harvest and hope they can squeeze by, or borrow from a moneylender. Monthly interest rates usually begin at 20 percent. Since the lender is also often the grain-marketing middleman, farmers are easily ensnared in a tightening web of debt, mortgaging the next crop to pay for the shortfalls of the last one. By improving food security in the countryside and providing abundant stocks that can be released to meet demand, the estokaj dampens the psychology of scarcity. This can help stabilize prices in regional markets, providing spillover benefits to townspeople as well.

Finally, these programs generate the human and financial capital needed to spark development in rural communities. By strengthening local organizations and freeing local initiative, the estokaj paves the way for other efforts to provide potable water, conduct literacy campaigns, enrich soils, improve farming techniques, and reclaim deforested hillsides.

Learning to Operate Silos and Manage Credit

The primary start-up costs for estokaj programs involve building adequate storage facilities and providing loans so that farmers can afford to use them. Technical assistance and training in enterprise management are important if the estokaj is to become sustainable. All three projects in the study provided counterpart contributions of labor and some cash; but construction materials, rotating credit funds, training programs, and initial operating capital to operate the silos largely came from outside these very poor communities. The IAF provided grants of \$16,931 to OGAD, \$12,138 to APAB, and \$15,810 to AAKS.

Each project chose its own storage technology. OGAD built four double-chambered, cinder-block silos in the hamlets of Martineau, Morisseau, Charrier, and Drice, and focused on two crops—corn and sorghum. In a pilot program that was designed to generate the baseline data for expanding service to all 1,250 of its members, AAKS built two double-chambered silos and one single-chambered silo out of cinder block in the hamlets of Fiereville and Saint Alba and the village of Tiburon, and handled a variety of crops. APAB chose not to invest significant resources in centrally located physical infrastructure to support its 255 small farmers living in and around the town of Bombardopolis. Instead, several latanier-woven djakout-sak, capable of holding 40–50 marmites (220–275 pounds) of grain apiece, were distributed to each of 16 affiliated subgroups. At the time of evaluation, the OGAD estokaj had been operating for nine months, AAKS for eighteen months, and APAB for six months.

While each estokaj focuses exclusively on locally grown food crops, there are differences in crop selection, suppliers, ratio of storage for con-

sumption and marketing, and methods of implementation. OGAD's silos have only been used to store corn and sorghum produced by members. Nearly 60 percent of the sorghum is held for members' subsistence needs, while the remainder and all of the corn is marketed by the organization. AAKS stores members' peanuts and beans as well as corn and sorghum, but it does not engage in marketing. Members decide which portion of their individually stored harvests to reserve for food and seed, and they market the rest themselves. APAB purchases sorghum, peanuts, beans, and rice from local suppliers, including nonmembers when yields have been low, and then stores the crops for eventual resale as food or seed to members, or for eventual sale in local markets, dividing the earnings among members.

Each of the three organizations has also chosen its own storage system. OGAD fills its silos in bulk, without separating the crops from the cement floors. AAKS fills its silos by storing crops in sacks, which are then stacked on wooden planking above the concrete floors. APAB's 16 groups store their grain in djakout-sak in the houses of designated members. The woven sacks rest on boards above the earthen floors of these rustic structures.

Examination of storage methods and management at various sites in the three programs revealed lessons for other groups wanting to establish an estokaj. All three organizations have experienced rodent damage to their stored grain. It is not enough to simply build a solid structure; the building must be vigilantly maintained and managed. The AAKS silos at Tiburon and Rendel, for example, reveal the importance of properly fitting doors to their frames and filling cracks that form between door jambs and walls as new buildings settle. In all three projects, it was demonstrated that ventilation apertures in silos or the gaps left between roofs

and the walls of houses have to be secured by screening devices. Rodent traps should be set out near these openings as a back-up measure, or to minimize damage if the community cannot afford screening. Finally, the use of natural predators, that is, cats, should be considered.

Varied experiences with damage from humidity also offer insights. The preliminary evidence from AAKS in Tiburon and OGAD in Desarmes suggests the need to modify bulk-storage techniques, since dampness rising from the floors at these sites has caused grains at the bottom to harden. Damage from mildew has also been reported. At AAKS and APAB facilities where grains are bagged and stored on wooden planking this problem has been avoided, suggesting a low-cost remedy without the expense of installing concrete flooring.

Problems with insect control were also observed. Some structures were not thoroughly fumigated before crops were stored in them. In the OGAD silos at Desarmes and the APAB sites in Bombardopolis, grains received insecticide doses that were either too high, posing dangerous health hazards, or too low to be effective. Overall, insufficient attention was paid to the need for precise treatments. Program evaluators observed that silo staff either do not understand, or do not systematically use, proper application techniques.

This is symptomatic of a broader failing among group leaders, silo managers, and farmers to master how actions and plans intended to ensure optimum program efficiency, safety, and success are interrelated. To some extent, this can be attributed to the relative newness of the programs. Each silo has had only a few harvests to provide the baseline for comparison the groups need to pinpoint problems and identify solutions. Political turmoil at the national level, and throughout the countryside, has also made it difficult for groups to reflect



Robert Maguire

An In-Country Service staff member advises small farmers about their grain-storage techniques.

on past experiences when the immediate challenge is survival itself. Nevertheless, the lack of comprehension about basic measures that are vital to long-term success underlines the need to provide for training and technical assistance in future grants, and suggests that projects must devise some mechanism for silo managers and organization leaders and members to exchange experiences, identify problems, and test solutions.

Despite these difficulties, overall grain losses during the evaluation period were minimal, and all three enterprises have generated much-needed revenues. OGAD's losses have been zero for sorghum, which accounts for 85 percent of its storage, and 10 percent for corn. Three reasons for the loss can be listed: the previously cited problems with pest control and humidity, and spillage from defective grain-chute enclosures at one of the silos. AAKS's losses have been less than 1 percent for sorghum and peanuts, which account for 15 percent of crop storage, and 3 percent for corn and beans, which make up the rest. APAB reports losses for all crops of nearly 8.5 percent, which were caused by previously cited problems with mildew and rodents and a theft at one of its dispersed and relatively unsecured household storage sites.

The three programs had total net earnings of 20,643 gourdes, or approx-

imately \$3,000, at the time of the evaluation. AAKS accounted for over 80 percent of that total, OGAD 13 percent, and APAB the rest. Prorated annual percentages of earnings to start-up rotating funds and membership shares were 35.2 for AAKS, 42.9 for OGAD, and 9.2 for

APAB. AAKS distributed 66 percent of its profits to members, OGAD 60 percent, and APAB 5 percent. Remaining earnings were channeled into rotating and reserve funds, to various committee treasuries, and to cover overhead and administrative costs.

The relative weakness of APAB's program, which was at an earlier stage of implementation than the other two, was primarily due to the decision by managers to focus not on short-term economic maximization, but on the long-term benefits from allowing all 16 groups to make their own management decisions and learn administrative skills through the trial and error of firsthand experience. Periodic workshops to bring group representatives together with project promoters and leaders were planned to identify common problems and possible solutions. (Unfortunately, as will be seen later, this process has been short-circuited.)

The key to whether these three programs can maintain themselves and expand over the long term is the size and solvency of their rotating funds. Although OGAD has been able to expand its fund by 15.6 percent, start-up capital was only \$250 per silo. The decision to begin the program far short of the level of local demand was based on several factors. Given the prior ransacking by night raiders, the organization wished to avoid a show

of wealth that might precipitate another attack. Project leaders also thought that the small scale would allow silo managers to obtain needed experience, laying the foundation for them to run operations whose resource base was expected to grow at least four times in size. Members had chosen silo managers who were highly respected and trustworthy, but several were also illiterate, and this underscored the need to start slowly so that training and technical assistance could be attuned to the growth process. The short-term result of this strategy, however, was that OGAD's silos stood only half full during the first storage cycle.

The Asosyasyon Animatè Kot Sid expanded its fund by 6.6 percent, despite losing \$1,010 of its \$6,000 revolving fund when thieves broke into the organization's office and cracked its safe. Persistent entreaties to local officials authorized to investigate the loss resulted in a recuperation of only \$100.

With its credit program based on simple repayment of loans, APAB did not channel any additional revenue back into its revolving fund. This arouses concern that its program, while technically innovative and strongly decentralized in terms of management and participation, is in danger of decapitalizing its loan fund because of inflation or tardy repayment by even a few borrowers. Moreover, APAB, unlike OGAD and AAKS, does not charge members a management or handling fee that can be used to offset decapitalization.

Piracy or Development?

A well-known axiom says that everyone's boat, whether rich or poor, large or small, is lifted by a rising tide of development. Associations of peasant farmers in Haiti face the same kinds of challenges as rural cooperatives throughout the hemisphere in learning to thrive in a market economy.

Developing such organizational capacity in Haiti, however, is particularly difficult since the rural economy has been so systematically strangled by the predation of the gwo neg and their allies. For generations, ruling elites have been more concerned with managing an economy of scarcity than reinvesting local resources to spur productivity and growth.

Haitians equate this systematic extraction with a locally sold Popsicle called *pese-souse*, which means "squeeze and suck." The plastic wrap holding the "ice" is opened at the top and squeezed at the bottom until it is sucked dry.

One difficulty with the *estokaj*, as the story of OGAD's first silo demonstrates, is that it can offer an inviting target to organized predators in a society in which law enforcers are above the law. While OGAD's decision to decentralize storage facilities is designed to reduce the risk of pillaging and infrastructure loss, recent experience suggests that serendipitous timing may be all that protects the silos.

Immediately following the September 30, 1991, coup d'état that deposed the democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the gwo pou san manan returned to raid OGAD's silos. Fortunately, the association's grain coffers were empty since the coup occurred just before the harvests began. Moreover, silo managers were able to strip the buildings of useful equipment and hide it before the raiders arrived. They then opened the silo chambers for "inspection," and went into hiding themselves. The armed band left the empty chambers alone, but they remain idle today, and OGAD itself has been unable to function.

APAB's strategy of using rustic storage facilities that are widely dispersed in members' homes now seems oddly anticipatory. Thus far there has not been significant infrastructure loss, and Bombardopolis's version of the "motherless ones" has

not yet raided individual homes for their grain supplies. The generalized reign of terror, however, has made it impossible for democratically organized farmers' groups to function, and APAB is also in hiding. In retrospect, then, some of the more puzzling evaluation findings about APAB and its methodology seem clarified.

In better times, its radically decentralized *estokaj* appeared inefficient, posing special challenges to administration and management that helped explain why crop losses were higher than in the other two programs. Increasing the number of sites multiplies the cost and complicates the task of training and technical assistance. And over the long term, the complexity of coordinating transportation and marketing for so many sites may well have operated as an invisible ceiling to future growth. Indeed, a system such as APAB's seems better suited to addressing the widespread need for food security than for increasing the return for cash crops.

Even the decision by APAB's members not to reinvest early profits in the rotating credit fund now seems

With the capital generated from estokaj projects, rural communities have access to basic necessities, such as potable water.



Mitchell Denburg

less a symptom of inexperience with managing a sustainable business than wariness of the lingering power of the *pese-souse* system. The daily struggle for life at the margins makes it difficult enough to save for tomorrow. But when the threat of systematic predation is a daily fact of life, it makes sense for small farmers to conclude that the only secure investment is in consumption.

The small farmers of OGAD, APAB, and AAKS, their families, and their cohorts in hundreds of villages throughout the rugged Haitian countryside have tasted the sweet fruit of organizing themselves to exert greater control over their lives. Today, that taste is a memory.

Yet there is also a sliver of hope. Before the coup, plans were underway for the *estokaj* projects to convene a forum where they could evaluate their progress, share their lessons, and refine their methodologies. Those plans still exist in the minds and hearts of the conference organizers. And one must presume that the idea of the *estokaj*, which emerged from the need of Haiti's small farmers and is firmly rooted in their reality, also exists, like a dormant seed, among them. These are people, after all, who have survived some of the bleakest conditions the hemisphere has to offer. And among them are those who, like the members of OGAD who refused to raze the ruins of their first *estokaj*, are determined not to forget. Today the silos of OGAD's second *estokaj* may stand empty, but they are standing, waiting to be filled tomorrow. ♦

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STANDING TALL:

Balanced Development in Haiti

Robert Maguire

The IAF field representative for Haiti reports on the mood, opinions, and needs of rural Haitians as they set about building a new democracy.

For the past seven years I have worked as the representative of the Inter-American Foundation for Haiti. During these years I have often been told that the country is a basket case with little hope for the future. One representative of an international development agency even suggested, in despair, that Haiti should be evacuated—that its population be packed up and moved to another country!

Even though Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, I have become increasingly angry at the “basket case” analogy. If anything Haitian were a basket case, it was never the country nor its people, but the government, hopelessly corrupt, greedy, and self-centered. I have argued that, given a chance, the Haitian poor could demonstrate that neither they nor their country are beyond hope.

In the aftermath of the demise of the Duvalier dictatorship on February 7, 1986, the people have that chance, and already things are changing. The Haitian poor, after 29 years of repression, are literally standing taller, as though an actual weight has been lifted from their shoulders. They are breathing more freely, as if a foul air has blown away. On the morning of Jean-Claude and Michele Duvalier's departure, many Haitians carried tree branches in their hands, using them as brooms to symbolically sweep out the evil spirits that had haunted their country for so many years.


Soon after, I arrived for a three-week visit that would include extensive travel in the countryside. I found that even the name of the airport had changed. François Duvalier International Airport was now simply Port-au-Prince International Airport. As in V.S. Naipaul's novel *A Bend in the River*, all the external trappings of a family

dictatorship—photographs, statues, engraved passages from speeches, street signs—had been swept away. And with them went a cloud of fear. When I entered a cab to go into the city, the driver enthusiastically said, “Welcome to liberated Haiti!” He proudly displayed a large, round button with *Haiti Libéré* inscribed on a blue-and-red background. He explained that the button came from Miami and cost a dollar, but that did not matter. “It was worth it.”

In the days that followed, everywhere I went I heard people talking. They were expressing themselves in public for the first time in decades—and I learned more on this trip than in the past 10 combined. I watched ordinary people marching and demonstrating, as though their feet had been unfettered. Undeniably, tremendous change had begun to sweep over Haiti, and nowhere was it more visible than at the grassroots—among the youth and the rural and urban poor—inspired, in large part, by the leadership of the Haitian Catholic Church.

These outward signs of liberation are just the beginning of what is needed, however. Given the breadth and depth of Haiti's poverty, walking tall, speaking out, and cleansing communities of the evil of the *ton-ton macoutes*—the henchmen of the dictatorship—though necessary prerequisites of broader change, will not in themselves solve the country's hard-and-fast economic problems.

Leaders of indigenous organizations involved in grassroots development programs throughout rural Haiti have identified steps they can take to begin to satisfy those needs. They have also begun to work out how international donors can best help them. To understand the gist of their ideas and plans, it is important to highlight two statistics. First, roughly 75 percent of Haiti's close to six million



Haitian craftsman proudly displays a woven soleil. The vibrant sunburst is representative of a brighter future for the people of rural Haiti.

people live in the countryside. Second, during the Duvalier years, 80 to 85 percent of all public expenditures were made in the capital of Port-au-Prince. Juxtaposed, these two statistics demonstrate the imbalance underlying the national economy, in which an extraction system had been imposed upon the rural population and had siphoned off resources while providing almost no parallel reinvestment. It is no coincidence that the most prominent buildings in Haitian communities have been tax collection offices, army barracks, and militia posts.

Haitians equate this extraction structure with a popsicle called, in Creole, *pesé sousé*, or "squeeze and suck." It comes in a plastic tube and is eaten by opening the container at the top and then squeezing at the bottom while sucking from the top. In making the analogy, rural Haitians specify that the *pesé sousé* represents not only their material resources, squeezed and sucked away by corrupt public officials and armed extortionists, but their rights as citizens. Years of this systematic extraction have polarized the country, concentrating resources in the hands of a few people, mostly city dwellers, while rural communities and the countryside itself were progressively impoverished.

One vignette illustrates how thoroughly the *pesé sousé* system devoured scarce resources and discouraged the rural population from working toward development. The story involves something very important to Haiti—trees.

The legal code governing rural Haiti specifies that whoever owns a tree must pay a five-cent tax to the state before the tree can be cut down. This tax is earmarked to support a

state forestry service and build nurseries throughout the country. In return, the small farmer is entitled to four or five seedlings from a state nursery to replace each tree that has been harvested.

That is not how the law worked in practice. Small farmers indeed paid taxes to forestry officers. However, the actual fees ranged from one to five dollars per tree, and the money did not help support tree nurseries. There are very few government nurseries in rural Haiti. Instead, the money lined the pockets of forestry officers, who were often *ton-ton macoutes*. Since local officers were required to forward certain sums of money along a chain of command to other *macoutes*, the level of extortion tended to become more and more exorbitant.

The average annual income of rural Haitians is less than \$100. The actual tax paid, then, might be as much as 5 percent of a farmer's annual income. And keep in mind that this was not the only tax squeezing the poor. There were taxes in the marketplace, taxes for rental of state lands, taxes for all official papers—all calculated to keep the poor ever poor. No wonder small farmers felt no incentive to support reforestation programs, even when they were sponsored by private groups. The trees, after all, were not really a renewable resource but a source of deepening servitude and debt.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the clarion call now coming from rural communities is for a reversal in the geographic imbalance of public resource expenditures and for an end to the corrupt *pesé sousé* system.



Foreign assistance can best help Haitians such as the small farmer working in his garden outside Gros Morne, above, and the school children at play, opposite, by improving the nation's physical infrastructure. Grassroots leaders feel that the development of the person is something Haitians must do themselves.

Haitian rural development leaders argue that taking these two steps will allow the country to begin to satisfy some of its chronic economic needs. If the rural poor can keep more of their resources to reinvest in their communities and their work, rural development (even without massive injection of outside capital) can take off and begin to be self-sustaining. Of course, improving the rate of reinvestment in the countryside of legitimately raised public funds will further accelerate this process. Given the ton-ton macoutes' almost instantaneous fall from power within their communities after Duvalier's departure, the first part of this process has already begun. With no one squeezing at the bottom for the moment, the pesé sousé system has begun to break down.

However, I was told repeatedly that "demacoutization" is a complex process with two phases. The first, the literal *dechoukaj*, or uprooting, of functionaries has been done. There are no longer men and women walking around in the blue denim uniforms of the macoutes, wielding authority. Yet scores of people—former macoutes and those who learned to survive through quiet submission—still carry the old system's values and expectations within them. Hence, a second *dechoukaj* to cast out that internalized mentality is underway. It will require a long, tedious process of education and reorientation, but this second casting out must be as definitive as the first if democracy is to become a reality. Otherwise, the ton-ton macoutes will

only re-emerge, wearing a different uniform. This, perhaps, is the key challenge facing Haiti.

Church leaders and the participants in grassroots development efforts with whom I spoke have begun to formulate how these changes can take place and to identify how international donors can contribute to the process. First, demacoutization requires the development of the person through education, information, and knowledge. Then, to help depolarize the economy, the physical infrastructure of the countryside must be improved through massive capital investment. Grassroots leaders feel more comfortable in having direct outside involvement in the latter—the infrastructural programs. The former, the education process and the development of the person, is widely felt to be something that Haitians must do themselves.

Donors and foreign governments can best help, then, by listening to Haitians and understanding what they want so that the assistance offered is appropriate and effective. An informed and sophisticated response is needed. The importance of Haitians' national pride, won through a revolutionary war fought almost 200 years ago, cannot be overlooked. Since then, Haitian nationalism, dignity, and pride may have been abused, but these qualities must be respected as the necessary foundation upon which to build any lasting development. Haitian leaders ask interested outsiders to support them as partners, not to dictate solutions.

They also ask donors to keep in mind that Haiti is more

than Port-au-Prince. Fundamental structural change is needed, and is occurring in rural Haiti, where the vast majority of the people reside. We should not be distracted by the inevitable headlines from Port-au-Prince and the attempts of some urban leaders to protect the old status quo. "Port-au-Prince," it is said, "a toujours mangé les révolutions (Port-au-Prince has always eaten the revolutions)." Outside investment, therefore, should focus on building rural infrastructure, particularly transportation, potable water, small-scale irrigation, and energy systems. In turn, this shift in priorities will further accelerate the dismantling of the public, para-statal, and private monopolies that extracted nearly every penny from the Haitian people—especially if the infrastructure of regional port towns destroyed by the Duvaliers is rebuilt.

Outsiders can also contribute to the literal demacoutization of the country in several ways. They can urge that macoutes and criminals of the old regime be brought to trial swiftly, under due process of law. They can support and facilitate the repatriation of resources stolen by the dictatorship. Governments can cooperate to ensure that members of the former regime do not have an outside base to threaten Haiti's future stability.

Donors can support the development of a different kind of infrastructure as well: the institution-building that underlies any democracy. They can provide financial assistance to support indigenous democratic processes, particularly by helping to ensure that honest, clear, and complete information is available to all Haitians. One way this can be done is by strengthening the broadcast power of Radio Soleil, the Catholic radio station that has come to symbolize national resistance to dictatorship. Closed during the last days of the old regime, the station reopened on February 7, broadcasting Handel's "Hallelujah Chorus." Thousands of Haitians gathered outside the studios in downtown Port-au-Prince to sing the station's theme song, "Le-m pa ou Soley-la," which had become the anthem of the street demonstrations that preceded Duvalier's flight. Soleil's work promoting the social, economic, and spiritual development of its audience has resumed, but because of weak transmitters the programming cannot be heard throughout much of the country, particularly after sunset when most people have time to listen.


Development and democratization can also be supported by providing resources to:

- the national literacy program launched last year by the Haitian Catholic Bishops. Assisted by a grant from the Inter-American Foundation, this program intends to help as many as three million Haitian adults learn to read and write in Creole, and is widely viewed as the launching pad for expanded grassroots development and for popular participation in the democratic process;

- local programs to provide legal aid and protect citizen rights, thus ensuring that demacoutization of the country becomes and remains a full reality;

- the expansion of indigenous development education programs that work with the rural poor, particularly under the aegis of existing leadership training and regional group formation centers, most of which are linked to Church agencies;

- and finally, the community programs that enable producer groups to improve their incomes by opening access to credit at fair rates in order to store, transform, and market crops, and that encourage agricultural technologies



Mitchell Denburg

which improve production while helping to protect a dangerously depleted environment.

Many of those steps are already underway. To ensure that grassroots development proceeds on course, donors can encourage the interim government to reform and reorganize state institutions so that those institutions render real services and so local initiative is encouraged rather than discouraged. In the past, grassroots projects have often been paralyzed because it was impossible to determine what was permissible as well as possible. The Duvalier regime's extra-legal boundaries often changed impulsively and were, in fact, generally invisible. Of course, there are practical as well as ethical limits to the role any foreign agency can play. And it is worth remembering a Haitian proverb that simply states, "You can't carry eggs in a rooster's stomach." In promoting lasting rural development, Haitians, not foreigners, must take the lead.

With responsive and responsible support for their efforts at bottom-up development during what is being called Haiti's "second liberation," the Haitian poor and the Haitian nation can become healthier neighbors and demonstrate that a brighter future is at hand. ♦

ROBERT MAGUIRE has been the IAF representative for Haiti since 1979. He is the author of *Bottom-Up Development in Haiti*, published by the Foundation in 1981.

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Haiti

INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION FAX COVERSHEET

Telephone: (703) 841-3800

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DATE : Aug. 27, 1993
TO : Amy Christianson
ATTENTION :
FROM : Bob MAGuire
TO FAX NO. : 202-456-2710
NO. PAGES : 8 (INCLUDING COVERSHEET)

_____ Please call immediately to discuss.

_____ It is not necessary to call us.

_____ IF YOU HAVE NOT RECEIVED THE NUMBER OF
PAGES INDICATED ABOVE, OR IF THEY ARE
ILLEGIBLE, PLEASE LET US KNOW AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE.

Remarks:

36331 Here are documents promised from
our conversation yesterday. The
list of organizations will come
later - let's talk again on
Sept. 8 or after to reconfirm
what seems most appropriate

Environment/Sustainable Development Policies: Some Considerations for Haiti

1. End to impunity is needed:
 - thuggery
 - extortion
 - abuse of power by local officials
2. Attack key problems (linked to above):
 - zero-sum gain for rural poor when they invest in land
 - abusive state management of state lands
 - competing land title claims issued by judicial officials
3. Confront key resource needs (not always money or foreign expertise):
 - Acquisition and dissemination of information and education
 - Tools and other inputs
 - Appropriate technical assistance - in areas that relate to administration and management as well as more programmatically-linked areas
4. Strengthen organizations (Haitian):
 - Validate and plug into existing Haitian grassroots networks. (I.D. the what, who, how)
 - Validate and plug into existing Haitian Grassroots Support Organization networks (i.e. urban based NGOs)
 - Underline the importance of relying on and helping to develop and autnomoize Haitian human and organizational resources -- not foreign or international organizations
5. Confront key problem areas:
 - Charcoal production and use
 - Deforestation
 - Inadequate/corrupt State mechanisms in forestry and environmental protection
 - Insecurity of land tenure and occupation by small farmers
 - Inaccessibility of certain non-marginal lands to small scale producers (resultant use of marginal land)
6. Consider incentive programs to achieve policies, and enforcement mechanisms to ensure benefits accrue with intended beneficiaries
 - eg. incentives not to produce/use charcoal?
 - incentives for environmentally sound investments for conservation, recuperation, production

Haiti: Problem areas linked to sustainable development initiatives, particularly as instigated from non-Haitian entities

1. Tendency to rely on Port-au-Prince based, professional consultancy groups - top-down intervention. Does not necessarily validate or strengthen local capacities, which is a key to sustainability.
2. Tendency to rely on foreign FVOs that:
 - have high overheads
 - do not develop and transfer program autonomy to local institutions, or necessarily reinforce or build upon local skills and knowledge
 - reinforce perceptions that foreign aid money is 'easy come - easy go.'
3. Tendency that potential 'partnership pool' is restricted because certain Haitian NGOs are not keen on affiliating with development assistance initiatives that are initiated by and/or financed through high profile USG or international agencies.
4. Need to confront dilemma that nothing will be sustained unless there is a top priority placed on rule of law and application of justice, yet there are other problems that must be confronted concurrently. Organizational strengthening is key among.
5. Recognize that solutions are not imposed. Dialogue, collaboration, listening, and being humble are important. We have the funds, not all the answers or expertise.
6. Programs should sustain human and organizational infrastructures.
7. The Haitian state needs to play a key role, exerting moral leadership to mobilize citizens.
8. Initiatives of exchange and networking (both within and beyond Haiti, among peer groups) are important program components.
9. Do not expect overnight and miraculous solutions. Keep problems in proper perspective.
10. Transparency should include management of funds. Audits (done by individuals and/or organizations that are sensitive to local conditions and that offer technical strengthening that becomes part of the sustaining process) are important. High profile, international audit firms are not necessarily the most appropriate choices.

FBIS-LAT-91-144
26 July 1991

CARIBBEAN

9

Dominican national sense, the return of beautiful traditions about to be lost under foreign empires. The decision should be maintained. Repatriations should continue. May the decision bring again the complete distinction of neighborhoods and towns where a foreign and dangerous hegemony had been established.

An applause to a patriotic decision. Let us save our nationalistic essence. The cleaning up is needed and should continue.

Haiti

Jean-Rabel Massacre Fourth Anniversary

Aristide Delivers Speech

*FL2407120991 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale
 in Creole 1715 GMT 23 Jul 91*

[Speech by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Jean-Rabel Massacre on 23 July at the National Palace in Port-au-Prince—live]

[Text] Brothers and sisters of mine in the 10 departments: As usual, I greet you wholeheartedly as an avalanche. Four years ago today, on 23 July, 139 little peasants died in Jean-Rabel. We Haitians, in and out of the country, cannot forget these peasants and all the other peasants who have died in massacres so the country could be free. Today, when we remember them, we come to think about a peasant's life. We come together to bring consolation to the parents of the victims. We come in force so that we who have created this second independence can join together with all peasants so we can solve the problem of the country's high cost of living, to put an end to injustice, and to make the country more equitable.

On that score, in 1950, 87.75 percent of all Haitians lived in the countryside. In 1971, 79.61 percent of Haitians lived in the countryside. In 1990, 70.38 percent lived in the countryside. The first thing we note is that between 1950 and 1991, more and more people moved to the cities. If we investigate further, we note that the countryside is stricken by poverty; stricken by misfortune. They [not further identified] plotted to destroy the peasants' pigs [pigs represented the peasants' entire wealth].

The more poverty grows in the countryside, the more peasants move to towns. Then they leave the towns and move to the cities. They leave the cities and move to the capital. People continue to leave the countryside. Those who stay in the countryside, the little peasants, are always the majority. But they have no land, they have no money. Approximately how much money does a peasant earn each year? Almost nothing. Ninety-two percent of peasants living in the countryside earn barely \$150 to \$240 a year. There are others who have only heard of

money. They have never seen it at all. In reality, most of the population lives in the countryside without money.

It follows that they do not have money because they do not have land, even though it is they who work the land. They work, while the fruit of their labor is enjoyed by others. Fifty percent of these peasants who are selling their labor have only half a carreau [1.6 acre] of land, to scrape with their nails, and to water with the sweat running down their bodies, while the saddle of injustice sits on their backs and flays them. The person sitting in the saddle does not even realize that life is so rich for him because of the sweet taste of peasants' blood in his mouth.

Twenty percent of these peasants who are also unfortunate, and even poorer than the 50 percent, can scrape just half a carreau of land. Nevertheless, Dessalines died so peasants could have land. Many battles were fought so peasants could have land. Until now, those who worked the land for wealthy people.... [break in transmission]. In Jean-Rabel, four families own.... [break in transmission] the lands. Listen well to what I am saying. You, my brothers and sisters in the country, you, my brothers and sisters in the 10th Department [Haitians living abroad], all of you Haitians, listen well to what I am saying. In Jean-Rabel, four families own about 80 percent of the land. It is 1991. We have created our first independence since 1804. Do you understand this situation? Can you imagine what this means in terms of social justice?

Four years ago today, 139 peasants were hacked to death with machetes. They were murdered because they were organizing to find land to cultivate; because they were making the slogan on our flag, Unity is strength, a reality; because they were creating an avalanche, heads together.

The state's lands. What does the state say on this matter? Does the state own lands? How does the state organize its lands? If we read the Constitution, before we suggest what the state can do with its lands, Article 248.1 says that the law fixes the amount of land that a person or a group of people cultivating land is allowed to possess. Is it the law that allows four families to own 80 percent of the land in Jean-Rabel for? The law also fixes the minimum amount of land that a person or a group of people cultivating land must have. Is it the law which says that your mother, living in misery and suffering, can have no land to work? Is it the law that says your father, who has been slaving away since the mists of time for rich people, can have no land? Is it this same law that gives the right to slaughter 139 peasants because they were asking for what belonged to them.

Does the state own so much land without doing anything with it? According to some statistics, although they are not quite updated, in Haiti, the state owns 200,000 square-lands [as heard]. What does the state do with all this land?

If we look at Artibonite, I would say this is the region where the state holds the most land to cultivate. What does the state do with it? The Agricultural Department.

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through Damien, supposedly has about 20,000 square-lands where farming is allegedly undertaken, meaning large plantations or breeding farms. Who benefits? What is done with it? Is this state a cow, with its udders always full of milk for rich people to draw from, while poor people watch with their mouths watering? Is this state like a mother with two breasts, one giving sweet milk, the other giving sour: sweet milk for the rich, and sour milk for the poor. What kind of state is this, to have so much land, and so many people living without land?

The Constitution mandates the state, in Article 248, to set up an office for executing land reforms. Peasants died in Jean-Rabel because the land reform had not been accomplished. On 7 February, we said we created a lavalas [avalanche], heads together, to achieve a second independence. We said we had a political revolution to create a social revolution. We said we performed a marriage between the Army and the Haitian people. We said we raised our proud flag to keep the boiler from boiling on only one side; so poor people could stop slaving for rich people to enjoy. We said democracy equals justice; democracy equals freedom; democracy equals love. We said so many things. We said justice; we said participation; we said clarity. We said so many things. We said respect. So many things were said. How much have we done? What have we done? We have done a great deal comparing our current state with the state of corruption we inherited.

What have we done about land reforms? If we have been in power for five months, since 7 February, it is humiliating, it is outrageous, it is staggering that only one of the assassins responsible for slaughtering 139 poor peasants in Jean-Rabel is in jail. Why is there only one person? Why are the other slaughterers free? It is outrageous, it is staggering, it is humiliating when, despite the fact that only one is in jail, you hear people praying. I do not know to what god they are praying. Is it the god of injustice for this person to be freed, to celebrate with other assassins? He should be praying so the grace of lavalas justice overflows to clean up the justice machine which is corrupt.

Too many judges are still swimming in corruption. Too many government prosecutors are still swimming in corruption. Too many lawyers are still swimming in corruption. They are swimming in so much corruption that they almost drown in corruption. This is exactly the reason why four years after, five months after, four months after the first massacre, five months after the second independence, only one of these people is in jail. Is it the state of the law that assassins continue to freely move around? Is it the state of the law that issues licenses to people who have committed crimes to escape justice?

I wanted to wait until today to say what I am saying here today so that each democrat who is conscious can understand how important it is to look after our democracy so that a state of law can become a reality that brings justice to everybody, to each Haitian, so assassins who have committed crimes will not be able to keep hatching

small plots, new plots, large plots, coups, or molotov cocktails. You hear that in Arcade they are holding meetings every night. In Petit-Goave you see them grouped together preparing plots to hinder the 29 July trial of Roger Lafontant. When a round-up of police catches two of them, the so-called civil authorities, assigned to administer justice under the law, order them to be released. And you ask: How can you say the arrest is illegal, that it occurred after 0600, when you know it occurred before 0600? And you get this answer: Excellency, it was under pressure that I wrote this order. What pressure? The macoutes said they would cut off my head.

Can macoutes still intimidate you so much that they can make you write an illegal order that you call legal? Even after 7 February while they were organizing their own plot to destroy what you have created? It is not a state of law that requires this. It is a state of cowardice. It is an act of cowardice to let yourself be intimidated by macoutes instead of doing your duty in demanding a legal arrest when it is legal, in demanding the arrest of people who have committed crimes. Only then will you look after your state of law, only then will you protect it, water it with the sweat of justice so it can grow up.

Today, on the occasion of the anniversary of this massacre, in that you have mandated me to establish a state of law, a country where each person respects other's rights, I am here to tell you: Do not allow macoutes to intimidate you; demand your rights.

Peasants, organize to demand justice because if people who are in charge of arresting criminals do not do so, we will have them arrested by law. We always say so. Today, we say so because those who are in public administration and are mandated to make reforms under the Constitution, but are acting cowardly or as accomplices, know very well what I am talking about. They careen the cases of thieves. They pamper thieves. They say they do not have sufficient proof, while the file is heavy in their hands. Meanwhile, you ask yourself: Are they cowards, or are they accomplices? From now on, that is over. On behalf of the Haitian people, who are tired of letting thieves devour what belongs to them, there are taxes to be paid. I will give you until the end of July to have those thieves arrested by law. If you do not do so, I, on behalf of the Haitian people, will denounce you so the rope falls around your necks. That is the reason why the people have chosen me as president. It is my duty that I will fulfill when I do it. I gave you enough time to do your work.

Today, I stand on behalf of the Haitian people so that all accomplices of thieves are found in prison when I find out about them in public administration, especially the directors. We will dismiss some; but we will arrest some for their cowardice and for being accomplices.

If the DGI [tax office] hands over its approximate \$21.5 million a month, multiplied by 12, this will be exactly \$258 million. If Customs gives its estimated \$6.9 million

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per month, multiplied by 12, this would be \$82.8 million. DGI and Customs together would provide \$340.8 million in revenue. When this money goes to the state, it will almost be equal to the money that we collect in aid from the friendly countries, or those which pretend to be our friends by saying they will provide support. This means that at the same time we are opening the door to international cooperation, we must also stand up on behalf of the law so that thieves who aid other thieves can no longer do so. From now on, DGI will provide the money it is supposed to collect. Customs will contribute the money it is meant to give, so there will be money to create jobs so the unemployed can stop living in the streets. The peasants can stop leaving the countryside and put an end to their unfortunate circumstances. They need tools and fertilizers to work. It is indeed this money that could buy fertilizers and tools for the peasants.

Each state employee, beginning with me, must be a servant to his work so we can guarantee that state money is invested in the peasant, who is the engine for change. I said it on 7 February, and I am saying it again today, [pounds his desk, showing anger]: Potatoes do not grow in state offices. Bananas do not grow in the president's office. Corn and rice do not grow in the National Palace. It is in the peasants' yards, when they have no land, where their sweat waters the plants. It is the water from the source that must water the land.

Today, I speak to the conscience of all agronomists, all engineers, all the country's sons who have a responsibility so they can remember how hard poverty is but that we can fight it. We will best fight it when everybody takes his responsibility. May the government that is anticipating 29 July while knowing how corrupt the justice system is be up to it and take all necessary measures so that the Lafontant trial scheduled for 29 July [anniversary of the creation of the Corps of Tontons Macoutes in 1959 by then President Francois Duvalier] can take place despite crooked wheeling and dealing and plots being formed to prevent this trial from taking place. [pounds desk, appears angry]

If the Lafontant trial does not take place on 29 July in the name of the law because Roger Lafontant and his accomplices were clearly found guilty of the failed coup of 6-7 January; if this trial does not take place on 29 July, the law will do what has to be done. A word to the wise is enough! I call God to witness, he knows. [preceding two sentences in French] He knows my efforts. He knows how much the government has attempted to respect and remains respecting the justice system while refusing to allow the crooked wheeling and dealing of the past to continue to occur. [preceding sentence in French] This is what has given us the 29 July calendar for the trial of Roger Lafontant. [sentence as heard] This is one of the reasons for my presence here today, on the people's chair so that I could say in the name of the people that on 29 July I will watch with the people to see if the trial will occur or not. It must, in the name of the law. [pounds desk] A word to the wise is enough! [preceding sentence in French] Within the scope of this justice which does

not allow clemency, we will show all our friendly countries that were pleased on 7 February that we know what our national prestige means. We stood up with all our dignity, we created an avalanche throughout the whole country, we cleaned up the country. On 29 July, we will clean it up again with the broom of justice in our hands. This means that it is not only the macoute trial that will take place on 29 July. Everywhere in the country civil authorities must take their responsibilities together with the people so that no one's son will be a victim of macoutes again. I speak to all macoutes who are showing arrogance by forming little cliques, by hatching plots here and there in order to attempt a coup even though they know they will not be able to assume the presidency. They are only hoping to spoil the food as they cannot eat it. Well, we tell them, rather, I tell them: The power which guides me and which opens the eyes of the sighted still continues to enlighten me. May those who want to understand, understand! I am sorry for those who do not want to understand. You may shoot at me, but if you are caught, that is your business. You may hatch plots, you may set traps, but if you are caught, it is still your business. You have already been caught and you will still be caught because you are prompted by some evil. This means you may continue because I am pleased with that. It is exactly this evil that comes from the power to make us track down all macoutes who hide and who now think they can reappear. Well, go ahead, reappear so we can catch you. [audience laughs and applauds]

If you remain quiet as required by the Constitution in Article 291 [prohibiting macoutes from holding state service or being elected for 10 years] you are then lucky. I am your president, too. This means I need you, provided that you are in compliance with the law because it is the law that allows us to go forward. But if you do not comply, I am sorry for you. You will then get what you deserve. That will not be my fault. Look at the marriage between the Army and the civilians and if you want to understand you will understand. The power has just begun working. Remember how recently this very power showed itself through a dove. You saw with your own eyes that it flew and came down on the Army's head. [during the 5 July 1991 Venezuela Independence Day parade Aristide released three doves and one came down on the head of a soldier]. If you wish to understand, understand. If you do not wish to understand, I am sorry for you. Evil will make you continue to move until you throw yourselves at our feet.

Starting on 29 July there will be a trial in the name of the law, there will be a cleanup in the country in accordance with the law so that henceforth I hear no Haitian complaining that macoutes are frightening them, etc. If you are cowardly, go hide under your bed. But if you are brave, stand in front of the macoute to see if he will do to you what he can not do to you. When you get together, you are powerful. When make you make a solid avalanche, you are powerful. Do not wait for the corrupt justice machine to arrest more people in Jean-Rabel. It is up to you to talk to the civil authority so he can hear you.

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Organize yourselves to talk to him until you lodge complaints and he does his duty in accordance with the law and military men help. There are works being done on that score in Artibonite. I encourage you to fulfill your responsibilities in order to move forward so there will be no bloodshed related to land conflicts.

Finally, there are some measures that we will announce today in memory of these 139 poor peasants who fell four years ago. They did not know how to speak French. They spoke in Creole, just like any good Haitian, like any Creole son. Thus, the first measure that we will announce in their name and in the name of all other peasants who did not know how to speak French and who have fallen—as the Constitution acknowledges that the country has two languages, French and Creole—the government has decided to announce that from now on in all state offices, in all public administration offices, all papers must be officially written in both languages, French and Creole. All ministers, all state employees, all people working in the government must be able to know how to write and to read Creole correctly.

It shows a lack of respect when you are administering the affairs of people who speak Creole while you do not make efforts to learn how to write and to read Creole. This way, we look like brothers and sisters who respect one another, who respect one another's language. I respect all languages. We like to learn many languages. This [referring to an unidentified document] is written in English. It was published last December. It is not even in Creole yet. It is not even in French yet. It is in English because the first work came up partially in English, in French and Creole. Someone has picked it all up and translated it into English. What can I say about that? Well, it is an expression of the respect that I have for the English language just like I have respect for all other languages. It was published last December in English. It is a best-seller. It has already been edited three times.

That means that the first and second editions were sold out completely and the third edition is almost completely sold out. All of that is to say, at the Port-au-Prince airport, why does the sign read gate? What does gate mean? It must be written in Creole. If it is written in English, it is just a courtesy. It is, first, respectful that it be written in Creole and in French. Further, if it is written in English and Spanish or as many other languages as desired, it is fine.

Are the ministers responsible for such a job? Yes they are. Are the children of the masses to watch for the job to be done? Yes. From now on, every Haitian should verify if what is written on the street is written in French and in Creole, to see if the papers in the minister's hands are in Creole and in French. If it is not so, to find the minister in charge of the administration and go to a radio and ask him questions, or remind him or tell him, because each minister is responsible for his own region.

In the same way, I am inviting all the young people, who just held a great congress, to continue to organize themselves. For each delegate in the nine departments, along with the organizations of youth, to set up a congress like the one that just took place before 7 August. Since the tenth department, through VOAM [organization of Haitians abroad], since you, the TKLs [expansion unknown], you the poor people, and all the vendors on the streets, gave money in collections, we will give to each delegate \$3000 [15,000 gourdes] so that you youth and your delegate organize a congress on learning how to read and write Creole very quickly so that you can soon make your contribution.

I am talking to you young people who participated in the congress in Port-au-Prince, if you go on vacation, you will go offer your contribution in your region and if you were not in Port-au-Prince, it is not a problem. Wherever you are, in your department, you are interested in the Creole language, speak with your delegate, and along with him, organize a one or two day congress. The \$3000 is to pay the expenses, so that not only the people from the town come, so that people will come from some other communes and rural sections, so that they find transportation. Then we will decide on when, where and how you will learn how to read and write Creole quickly in order to help writing everything in French and Creole. This is before the sixth month of our second independence. It is not something complicated.

It is possible. What young people want to do, they do. It is a challenge. We can follow their example, get on with it. Even though you will not have become a strong force by 7 August [deadline for public administration reforms allowed the government by the Constitution], at least you will have had time to begin. I know you can make a start before 7 August. I encourage you to begin. Congresses should begin in each geographical department by 7 February, since you have come to terms with the delegates of each department. There are funds available to cover the cost of transportation and meeting expenses.

It is for this same reason that you young people who are undergoing philosophy exams, marking the end of your secondary studies, have scheduled a national meeting at the Ranch [former Jean-Claude Duvalier's property] on August 4. The meeting will be held on the property used as a university building and will be for the purpose of proposing ideas for the literacy campaign. Funds are available for this purpose. The money is for you to use to organize and to learn how to read Creole so that you may participate in the literacy campaign. The National Literacy Office will help us coordinate our efforts, but we must not wait for the office to do that. In each department, we must begin to show that we have funds available, even though they are not much, and that we will use them to do the work. The program has already begun with the Damien congress. It will continue with the departmental congresses. On 4 August we will hold a large national gathering. Programs on 5 and 6 August will lead up to our six-month anniversary on 7 August. All

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this will be your responsibility. You who are now undergoing your baccalaureate exams; you are the sons of peasants. When your exams are over—I take this opportunity to wish you good luck—use your experience, your competency. Participate with young people like yourselves so that the mobilization that existed before 16 December can occur again, so that the organization which is essential for our social revolution can continue in such a way that the entire world, which is glad to help us establish democracy and have it go smoothly, can rejoice to see how we, the young people, sons of peasants, remember those who fell and empathize with those who live in honor and respect for our country, in honor and respect for the young people who are sons of peasants.

May all Haitians, together without distinction, may all Haitians, without distinction, help one another, hold one another's hands and move together so that we may help our country better itself, walk hand in hand, in memory of the peasants who have fallen. The blood of poor peasants has flowed on the floor so poor peasants do not remain on the floor. This is what we have to say on the fourth anniversary of the Jean-Rabel massacre when we erect the Marchaterre in Les Cayes.

On this fourth anniversary we repeat so it can become a reality: The blood of poor peasants has flowed on the floor so poor peasants do not remain on the floor. Let us prove it, let us demonstrate it. Alone we are weak; together we are strong; tightly united we are an avalanche. Thank you.

OVAT Supports Aristide Position

FL2507223491 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network
in Creole 1100 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Excerpts] Operation Storm Wind [OVAT] officials support the president's position as outlined in his speech of 23 July commemorating the fourth anniversary of the peasant massacre in Jean-Rabel. In his speech, the president spoke of social justice, reforms in public administration, and the trial of Roger Lafontant, which must take place on 29 July.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified OVAT official] We heard the statements President Aristide made about demacoutization. We received this statement with a thunder of applause because we see he has agreed with us in all we were demanding. We have therefore come to Radio Soleil today to express our support of the president's statements, and to ask all citizens to gather in front of the law courts very early Monday morning to determine how we shall put an end to macoute power. After we have finished trying the macoute leader, we will know that we have forced the macoutes out [preceding word in English]. This is the reason why we have come to Radio Soleil today.

[Jean-Auguste Mesyeux] Contrary to what a number of sectors say, there is a blatant contradiction between the spectacular speech, statements, and protests made, and

what the people are saying. This is the same contradiction that exists between the executive head and the prime minister. Let us remember that the prime minister has said that there are no longer any macoutes, there are no zenglendos, there are no blackouts, so what are we seeing today? Let us not waste anymore time on that. [passage omitted]

He [President Aristide] has agreed with everything we are saying. Do not forget that last week counterdemonstrations were held against us. They said that we are working for Balaguer, that we are with the CIA [preceding acronym in English], that we are working for Bazin, that we are working for De Ronceray. Today we realize that lies do not last long, that only truth lasts long. This is why we have come to Radio Soleil today—to say that we are in solidarity with Father Jean-Bertrand's demacoutization of public administration.

We had asked that macoutes be apprehended. He said if a director of administration does not want to apprehend macoutes, either because of complicity or because of cowardice, he himself will then be tied with the same rope. [passage omitted] It is because of these statements by Jean-Bertrand Aristide that can say that the political, economic, and social revolution began yesterday, 23 July.

[Unidentified OVAT official] I would like to add that Preval must be removed. He must be removed from government so this social revolution can become a reality. We still hold the same opinion: Preval must go, so the country can progress. [end recording]

Ministers Pledge Justice

FL2507212891 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network
in Creole 1100 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Excerpt] Prime Minister Rene Preval stated, on the fourth anniversary of the Jean-Rabel massacre, that if justice has not yet been achieved, it is because it takes time for the government to unravel the plots that are being hatched by the reactionary forces. But the current government is committed, he said, to dispensing justice to all those who deserve justice, especially in Jean-Rabel where more than 100 peasants were killed by wealthy landowners and reactionary sectors of the Army.

Justice Minister Karl Auguste asserted on the same occasion that everyone, rich or poor, who participated in the massacre will be arrested and sentenced in accordance with the law.

The minister of agriculture announced that 3.5 million gourdes will be released for the creation of jobs. Our ancestors died and bequeathed the land to us, said Minister Sevrin. We will not allow a small group of people to take all of it for themselves. We have rights, too. [passage omitted]

Western Hemisphere

389 employees
Board (9 all together)

approp Committees
Bill Perrin Board President

Haiti
Bob Maguire

totalled autonomous.
8/26/93
managed by Dir
Board named by Pres, confirmed
by senate. 5
vacancies.

Inter-American Foundation

US Gov't - small grants to local orgs for
grass roots devmt.

- econ - educ - strengthen orgs: farmers,
artisans, legal services, etc. Haiti 70 times, 4-5 x/yr.
goes all over countryside
• democracy building at the grassroots, improve
economics.

- no impunity

Outside

- 1) end to impunity, extortion, violence

Reef

- trees: technical aspects, not human relationships,
these are people problems, not technical ones.
- tend not to strengthen local orgs. part of OAS
• Pan American ^{Dev} Foundation long w/ AID (40% overhead
for non-Haitian specialists) dependent on foreigners.
Nothing in Haiti

• "set up 'tree project'" run by foreigners who
hire Haitians, project over it'll die.

Jan/Feb 1993 article

Helping small farmers gain control of their
harvests beyond the farm gates - also move certain
supplies of seed, etc.

Linkage of violence to sust of local programs.

(1) end of impunity + violence

IAF

* Only 75 in org, no
field staff, only contracted
Haitians - (help w/ monitoring)
etc.

(2) largest landowner - Haitian Gov't - State Land.
- many are marginal for ag. - hills

(4) Clear ownership

(5) Access to resources info + educ "legal services"

Technical assistance accessible

Money managing; we don't have to depend on outsiders.

Strengthening Orgs: validate + plug into existing networks.

also validate + plug into GSO networks (Grassroots)

Support Org. ~~3~~ could be based in the city, but give Svc to grassroots. Indigenous ones too.

Problem: a lot of these groups don't want to work w/ AID.

IAF has won the trust of these ORGs - hard to change that.

Rely

Confront problem areas: ① charcoal use + deforestation

② Insecurity of tenure, land title;

③ Good land inaccessible to small farmers.

④ 20,000 acres erode/yr.

→ 85,000 paramilitaries abusing power
^ root of problem.

Incentive prog start: types of production +

non-types of production, (incentives not produce charcoal)

Enlist Aristide Leadership - moral leadership +
peace is a priority.

IF grantees (Foreign Affairs + Finance)

- Devmt Prog.

Our reliance on AID restricts our pool of alliances.
Cultural diff.

Focus needs to go on lot. a post democratic
or all prog will fail. Also need put in

Orgs, NGOs.

- 1976 Haiti/AID report on working w/orgs. - key

- Very effective mech.
- exchange + networking key - w/in Haiti, peers.

Technical solutions aren't going to do it alone. Not overnight.

AID Dir Haiti -

Do Series of town meetings w/people to listen to them. no \$ money - Be Humble - as we have is #.

How Collective group of NGOs feel AID should be used in Haiti.

Haitians understand the problems

- deforestation, erosion, etc.

Use Haitian consultants

Validate Haitian expertise + use language to validate + tap into it.

Very very low overhead - only \$25 mill annual appropriations

David Cohen: sincere. AID. He's trapped in an org that needs to change. "morally repugnant elites in Haiti"

\$800,000, touches 50-60000 people directly, millions indirectly. → 15-16 active grants (some G80s, others community-based, peasant prog.). Has 15 proposals. "Nat'l Asso of Haitian Agro-Professionals" proposed: - pig repopulation - seed banks too big, so look for co-funding thru other bilaterals.

in policy office AID

Diane Lavoy (IAF experience)

Co-sponsored project

MEMO ON HAITI TO ME

DATE: 8-18-93

- Haiti working group meeting tomorrow, 11:00am at the State Department. Get the car with Jim Carman at 10:45am. His # is x.6033. Alec Watson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America is chairing the meeting.

- The economic embargo is to come off after ratification of Aristide's prime minister and the cabinet--about a month. We need to coordinate our efforts for what sort of aid will follow (both bilaterally and multilaterally). The impetus for our endeavors in Haiti is from the President, via the Vice-President, and in theory the State Department would be the lead agency on this.

- Leon Fuerth and Richard Feinberg are meeting tomorrow to discuss Haiti.

2.2 AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONNEMENT, INFRASTRUCTURES RURALES

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Les oppositions Etat - Paysannat qui remontent aux lendemains de l'indépendance ont conduit l'agriculture haïtienne à une situation de crise qui trouve ses origines dans le premier quart du 20ème siècle. L'agriculture haïtienne n'a jamais pu se ressaisir et la crise a entraîné son déclin progressif. Malgré les tentatives de relance de la fin des années 70, l'agriculture n'a pas suivi.

La crise agricole est particulièrement marquée par un taux d'accroissement de la production agricole (1%) inférieur à celui de la population et par une crise écologique où l'érosion consécutive à la déforestation fait perdre environ vingt mille tonnes métriques de terres arables (environ 10'000 ha) par an.

Cependant, malgré les conditions de production précaires et aléatoires, la production nationale couvre environ 70% de la demande actuelle en céréales et plus de 90% des besoins en légumineuses. Le secteur agricole fournit également 25 à 30% des recettes d'exportation et emploie 80% de la population active.

2.2.2 SITUATION DE LA PRODUCTION AGRICOLE POUR L'ANNEE 1991

La situation de l'agriculture en Haïti peut se résumer comme suit :

2.2.2.1 Production de céréales et de légumineuses

En 1991, on a enregistré une sécheresse qui se caractérise par une baisse significative des précipitations et par une réduction de près de 50% du volume d'eau disponible dans les principaux systèmes d'irrigation du pays. Ceci a eu pour conséquence une réduction importante de la production des cultures vivrières de base : diminution des superficies cultivées et/ou baisse des rendements à l'unité de surface (voir tableau page suivante).

Pour le **sorgho**, la réduction de rendement peut s'expliquer principalement par la sécheresse, tout particulièrement pendant la période de croissance et dans certaines régions pendant la formation des grains. Il est certain que beaucoup de zones de production ont été durement frappées et qu'on y a enregistré des rendements faibles, voire nuls : Plateau Central, plaines des Gonaïves et de Labre, plaines sèches du département de l'Ouest, plaine d'Aquin, Fonds-des-Blancs.

Dans le cas du **riz**, les réductions s'expliquent principalement par la sécheresse et la mauvaise gestion de l'eau dans les périmètres d'irrigation.

En ce qui à trait au **maïs**, c'est surtout la production des régions du Nord, du Nord-Est et du Nord-Ouest qui ont été touchées par la sécheresse.

Pour le **haricot**, culture fortement affectée par les variations du régime hydrique (manque ou excès d'eau), la réduction s'explique aussi par la sécheresse et le mauvais fonctionnement des principaux systèmes d'irrigation du pays.

Tableau 1
PRODUCTION DE CEREALES ET DE LEGUMINEUSES
 (estimations pour l'année 1991)

CULTURES	PRODUCTION ANNEE NORMALE en TM (1)	POURCENTAGE DE REDUCTION en % (2)	PRODUCTION 1991 (en TM)
Sorgho	125'000	30	87'500
Mais	185'000	20	148'000
Riz	81'000	10	72'900
Haricot	52'000	25	39'000
Banane	500'000	10	50'000

Source : "Rapport sur la situation de l'Agriculture et de l'Environnement (1er octobre 1991 - 31 Janvier 1992)", Jean-André VICTOR, PNUD, Février 1992.

(1) Chiffres compilés par la FAO. On remarquera que les données avancées par la Banque Mondiale sont plus élevées (maïs : 370'000 TM, sorgho : 174'000 TM, riz : 195'000 TM, haricot : 63'000 TM) que celles fournies par la FAO.

(2) Estimations réalisées après enquêtes auprès d'agriculteurs du Sud, de l'Artibonite, du Nord et du Plateau Central.

Dans l'ensemble, par rapport à une année normale, la baisse totale de production pour l'année 1991 est estimée à 83'000 TM pour les céréales, 13'000 TM pour le haricot et 50'000 TM pour la banane.

2.2.2.2 Production animale

Les seules données disponibles sont celles du Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural (MARNDR). Celles-ci, bien que peu fiables, laissaient présager une légère baisse de production ne dépassant pas les 20% pour l'ensemble du bétail.

Tableau 2
PRODUCTION ANIMALE
 (estimations pour l'année 1991)

ESPECES	POPULATION (Nombre de têtes)	PRODUCTION ANNUELLE DE VIANDE (en TM)	POURCENTAGE DE REDUCTION (en %)	PRODUCTION DE VIANDE 1991 (en TM)
Bovins	800'000	19'000	10	17'100
Porcins	300'000	11'000	20	8'800
Poulets industriels	6'000'000	6'000	30	4'200
Poulets indigènes	5'500'000	3'300	5	3'135

Source : MARNDR in "Rapport sur la situation de l'Agriculture et de l'Environnement (1er Octobre 1991 - 31 Janvier 1992)", Jean-André VICTOR, PNUD, Février 1992.

A part le déficit de production de viande de poulets industriels (1'800 TM) imputable essentiellement à la crise, durant l'année 1991, la baisse de la production de viande a été de près de 4'300 TM par rapport à une année normale.

2.2.2.3 Agro-Industrie

L'entrée d'Haïti à LOME laissait présager une possible augmentation des exportations de café et de cacao pour la fin de l'année 1991, ceci particulièrement grâce à l'ouverture des marchés européens. La position d'Haïti sur le marché de la mangue s'était consolidée, Haïti devenant le quatrième pays exportateur et tout laissait prévoir une stabilisation, voire une augmentation des exportations dès la fin de l'année 1991.

La production de sucre artisanal quant à elle a connu une baisse de production assez importante durant l'année 1991, à cause principalement de l'attaque par le charbon de la canne dans les principales zones de production.

2.2.2.4 Ecologie et énergie

En 1978, la couverture forestière aurait représenté seulement 6,7% de la superficie du territoire national. Avec un taux annuel de décroissance estimé à 0,67% et sauf application de mesures drastiques pour stopper le déboisement et la dégradation des sols, d'ici cinquante ans, il ne devrait plus rester de forêts dans le pays (voir Haïti Environmental Profile, 1986, USAID).

Pour 1988, le Bureau des Mines estime la couverture forestière à 3-4% de la superficie nationale.

L'érosion provoquerait une perte annuelle de sols arables de 20'000 tonnes métriques soit l'équivalent de 10'000 has.

Quant à la consommation de bois d'origine nationale, elle était estimée à 7 Mio de mètres cube en 1985. Si l'on considère que le capital forestier fournit annuellement une production de 2 Mio de mètres cube et que les nouvelles plantations réalisées annuellement correspondent à 0,5 Mio de mètres cube, le prélèvement annuel sur nos forêts serait de 4.5 Mio de mètres cube, avec une tendance à la hausse (voir Haïti 2000: Bois et Reboisement, Claude PIERRE-LOUIS).

La principale source d'énergie disponible en Haïti actuellement, et ceci depuis des siècles, est le bois (70 à 80% de la consommation nationale). La production de bois en Haïti est déficitaire comme nous l'avons déjà fait remarquer plus haut. Aujourd'hui, la consommation de bois se fait donc au détriment des réserves nationales. Surtout que la situation économique difficile conduit de nombreux agriculteurs à couper du bois (bois de feu, charbon de bois et bois d'oeuvre) et/ou à mettre en culture des terres très sensibles à l'érosion.

2.2.2.5 Prise en charge de la gestion de certains circuits par les organisations paysannes

Depuis le milieu des années 80, on a assisté à la naissance et au renforcement de nombreuses organisations paysannes qui se sont impliquées dans le contrôle des circuits de commercialisation et d'échanges (stockage de céréales, boutiques d'intrants, coopératives de commercialisation et/ou d'approvisionnement, etc...). A la suite des événements de 1986, les organisations les plus importantes allaient jouer un rôle actif dans l'organisation de l'économie du secteur paysan et permettre à celui-ci de se renforcer. En 1991, le rôle de ces organisations commençait à se faire sentir à des niveaux tels que : prix des intrants (nettement inférieurs à ceux enregistrés en 1990) grâce à des actions de distribution à leurs membres en partenariat bien souvent avec l'Etat et gestion de certains facteurs de production telle l'eau, sur certains périmètres irrigués.

- Modification dans la structure de la demande paysanne sur le marché :

Les tendances observées avant janvier 1992 se sont confirmées. Bien que les produits manufacturés soient devenus plus accessibles et à de meilleurs prix, les paysans les plus défavorisés ont éliminé de leur consommation les produits jugés superflus et trop chers. La consommation de nombreux produits industriels, même ceux fabriqués en Haïti (Cola, Juna, savon, etc...), a chuté de façon significative depuis la crise.

C. Conséquences et impacts de la crise à moyen terme

La crise aura certainement des effets à moyen terme sur la production et la sécurité alimentaire, sur l'environnement et enfin sur les infrastructures. On peut notamment prévoir :

Une baisse de production et problèmes de sécurité alimentaire :

En avril déjà, dans la plupart des petites et moyennes exploitations, les stocks étaient épuisés souvent depuis plusieurs semaines, alors que les paysans aisés disposaient de stocks relativement importants dans la plupart des départements. Dans certaines régions spécifiques (Plaine de Labre et des Gonaïves), il n'y a plus de réserves. Plus de 80% de paysans sont donc contraints de s'approvisionner sur le marché pour leur consommation alimentaire courante. Pour une famille de 5 personnes, le total des dépenses alimentaires mensuelles est estimé à environ 200 gourdes avec des écarts allant de 150 à 700 gourdes par famille selon le niveau économique de l'exploitation.

Des situations de disette existent dans la partie ouest de la Péninsule du Nord-Ouest et à la Gonave. Dans d'autres zones sèches telles que les plaines côtières de Côtes de Fer et d'Aquin, la situation alimentaire reste précaire cependant les paysans ont plus de possibilités de se tirer d'affaire compte tenu du prix de vente élevé du charbon de bois. Dans la Plaine de Labre et dans celle des Gonaïves, l'achat d'aliments est financé par la vente de bétail, de main-d'oeuvre et des emprunts usuraires.

Les prévisions de production pour l'année 1992 se présentent comme suit :

- **pour le maïs** : la production de la première saison sera presque normale : pas de réduction de superficie (peut-être même augmentation), rendement prévus avoisinant la normale (pluie importantes en mai), même pour les régions non irriguées;
- **pour le sorgho** : quant à présent rien ne laisse prévoir une diminution de la surface en sorgho pour l'année vu que les semis dans la plupart des régions auront lieu en mai et juin, lors du sarclage du maïs;
- **pour le riz** : sur les 8'000 ha normalement emblavés en riz au début de l'année, seuls 3'000 auraient été repiqués (manque d'eau et rareté des engrais). Sur près d'un millier d'hectares, le riz ne serait pas parvenu à épiaison et sur les 2'000 restants les agriculteurs estiment que les rendements seront moyens. On peut donc s'attendre à un déficit de près de 15'000 TM. Les sources officielles du Ministère de l'Agriculture estiment que les pertes pour la Vallée de l'Artibonite s'élèveront à plus de 55%. Pour les autres régions productrices de riz, on peut prévoir une baisse de production d'environ 20%. Ainsi, pour l'ensemble du pays, la perte totale au niveau de la production de riz est évaluée à approximativement 39%. Pour la deuxième saison, compte tenu des problèmes de financement auxquels sont confrontés les paysans, il faudra s'attendre à une diminution des doses d'engrais apportées (jusqu'à 50% selon certains agriculteurs) et à une réduction des surfaces plantées (15 à 20 %). Un déficit supplémentaire est donc à prévoir durant la grande saison (15'000 TM supplémentaires selon l'ANDAH);
- **pour le haricot** : les rendements pour la prochaine récolte varient d'une région à l'autre. Ils sont faibles dans l'Ouest, le Sud et la Grande-Anse et bons dans le bas Plateau Central. A cause des ressources limitées dont disposaient les agriculteurs au moment de la mise en culture pour l'achat des semences (principal poste de dépenses pour cette culture), on a enregistré une baisse de près de 20 à 30% des surfaces cultivées. La production de haricot d'avril-mai a été inférieure

de 5 à 6'000 FM par rapport à son niveau en année moyenne. On peut s'attendre à une réduction supplémentaire des surfaces plantées en haricot pour la prochaine saison de culture de juillet-août.

- **pour la banane** : la production a été affectée par le manque d'eau (Arcahaie, Trois-Rivières, et dans les régions de montagne du Sud et de la Grande-Anse), par les forts vents du début de l'année (Arcahaie) et par les prix élevés des engrais (Marigot). Pour cette saison, on peut s'attendre à une baisse de production de près de 25%;

Si des mesures de redressement ne sont pas prises dans l'immédiat, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la production de riz, il faut craindre une accentuation sérieuse du déficit alimentaire au niveau national.

- Une décapitalisation encore plus marquée au niveau des exploitations paysannes

Pour les petites et moyennes exploitations, la période de soudure de mars à mai, constitue chaque année un moment où l'épargne et souvent le capital d'exploitation doivent être entamés pour financer des dépenses alimentaires accrues ainsi que les frais de mise en culture. Cette année, ces difficultés ont été aggravées par la conjoncture de crise politique et ses conséquences économiques :

- la baisse des revenus agricoles comme conséquence des difficultés d'écoulement des marchandises sur le marché intérieur durant les quatre premiers mois de la crise et de la perte des débouchés à l'exportation;
- l'augmentation générale des coûts de production due à la hausse des prix des intrants importés et de la main d'oeuvre locale;
- l'accroissement des dépenses pour l'alimentation résultant de l'augmentation du prix des produits alimentaires;
- la dégradation des infrastructures d'irrigation due à l'effondrement des structures de gestion et d'entretien et à l'interruption du financement externe.

Les paysans sont donc pris dans un "effet ciseau" : baisse de revenu et augmentation des coûts de production et sont par conséquent forcés d'adapter leurs systèmes de production, comme nous l'avons décrit plus haut.

- Une plus grande dégradation de l'environnement

Il faut s'attendre dans le moyen terme à une dégradation de l'environnement qui se caractérisera par :

- une **augmentation de la déforestation et la destruction des "rak bwa"**. Les pressions économiques accrues sur les systèmes paysans vont conduire les agriculteurs à la recherche de nouveaux espaces et en quête de matières premières pour la fabrication de charbon de bois (revenus rapides) à s'attaquer d'avantage aux rares réserves forestières du pays (parcs naturels et "rak bwa"). De plus, les paysans ont déjà abattu (et continueront certainement à abattre) des arbres fruitiers et/ou forestiers sur leurs exploitations et dans les "lakou", réduisant encore plus la couverture boisée nationale;
- **l'épuisement et l'érosion encore plus importante des sols**, comme conséquence de :
 - l'expansion des cultures sarclées et plus érosives qui remplacent respectivement les cultures pérennes et les cultures moins érosives. Les prix très bas enregistrés sur le marché pour les denrées d'exportation ainsi que le fait qu'il n'y a pas eu d'exportation durant la période de crise peut conduire les agriculteurs à accélérer davantage le processus de remplacement des cultures d'exportation qui avait déjà été entamé;
 - la mise en culture de terres sensibles à l'érosion qui jusqu'à date n'avaient pas été défrichées. Le dos au mur, les agriculteurs prendront plus de risques en mettant en culture des espaces même défavorables où les rendements ne sont pas pour autant assurés;

. la réduction de la durée de la jachère. Il faut s'attendre à une intensification à l'unité de surface (rotations plus rapide principalement), les espaces non encore cultivés en Haïti étant très limités;

Toutes ces pratiques vont contribuer à accentuer l'érosion des terres et leur épuisement;

- **L'accélération des mouvements de population.** On peut prévoir des mouvements de population tant internes qu'externes. Sur le plan interne, de nombreux paysans des couches les plus défavorisées risquent de migrer soit vers de nouveaux espaces non encore pleinement exploités (bien que plutôt rares actuellement en Haïti), vers des régions à potentiel agricole plus élevés (plaines irriguées, hauts plateaux, zones maraîchères, etc...) et vers les grandes villes (Port-au-Prince et métropoles régionales). Ceci entraînera au niveau des villes particulièrement, une accentuation des problèmes d'environnement urbain (bidonvillisation, insalubrité, etc....). Sur le plan externe, une augmentation du nombre de "Boat People" (impressionnant depuis le début de la crise) et de travailleurs immigrés (légal ou non) haïtiens (coupeurs de canne ...).

On enregistre déjà dans les régions les plus frappées par la famine, un mouvement relativement important de ventes de terres par plusieurs agriculteurs qui deviendront soit des paysans sans terre ou dans la plupart des cas des chômeurs en ville. Bien que le phénomène ne soit pas encore mesurable, beaucoup de données risquent de changer dans le milieu rural haïtien dans les années à venir.

- **Une détérioration grave des infrastructures agricoles :**

L'absence d'entretien et le laxisme caractérisé des structures étatiques s'ajoutera aux variations saisonnières du climat pour entraîner une détérioration des infrastructures agricoles (réseau routier et systèmes d'irrigation). Si certaines mesures ne sont pas prises dans l'immédiat, ces dégradations deviendront d'importance et nécessiteront de lourds investissements pour leur remise en état.

HAITI

A Statistical Digest

I. BASIC DATA

Area (Sq. Miles)	10,714 (roughly the size of Maryland)
Population	6.5 million
Urban	30 percent
Rural	70 percent
Percent under 15	45 percent (2.9 million)
Demography	230 per sq. mile
Capital	Port-au-Prince (1.5 million)
Language	French (10-15%); Creole (100%)

II. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF UNDER OR UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT:

Economy

GNP per capita	US\$ 320 (US\$ 125 in rural areas and among urban poor)
Income Distribution	1% of the population receives 50-60% of GNP. 70% of households live in absolute poverty
Agriculture	Economic base for 65-70% of the population; produces 30% of GNP
Land Use	28% of surface cultivable; 46% in cultivation
Average farm size	2.9 acres
Environment	10,000 ha topsoil erodes annually
Industry	Employed 8% of population; produced 23% of GNP (1987). 130 export assembly factories employed 25,000 (1991)

Social Indicators

Life expectancy	55 years
Infant mortality	117 per 1,000 births
Emigration rate	5 per 1,000
Adult literacy	35%
School enrollment	
Primary	78% nationwide (34% in rural areas)
Secondary	18% nationwide
University	6,000 students (1989)
Nutrition	33% of children seriously malnourished; 70% partly malnourished
HIV positive	7% of pop. (6% in Washington, D.C.)
Access to safe water	38% of total pop. (16% in rural areas)
Access to sewerage	23% of total population
Access to electricity	10% of total pop. (45% in PAP; 3% elsewhere)

III. MISCELLANEOUS

Doctors per capita	1 per 8,200 citizens
Soldiers per capita	1 per 928 (estimated size of army is 7,000)
Number of Rural Sheriffs (Section Chiefs)	565
Number of Unpaid Deputies (Attaches)	
official	2 per section chief (1,130)
unofficial	100-200 per section chief (c.85,000)
Attaches per capita	1 per 76 citizens
Civil Service Employment	From 32,000 in 1985 to 41,000 in 1989
Civil Service Output	No increase from 1985 to 1989
Annual public health expenditure on salaries	c. 90% of total budget
Annual public expenditure on education,, nutrition, and health	US\$ 8 per capita (1990)
Credit rates	
Formal (Banks)	22% per annum ceiling
Informal	up to 20% per month
Population with access to formal credit	less than 100,000 (estimate)
Registered voters (1990)	3.2 million
Votes in 12/90 elections	2.4 million
Voter turnout	75 percent
"Development" NGOs with programs in Haiti	800 - 1,000
Indigenous community development groups	Actual number unknown - is certainly in the thousands

A G E N D A

HAITI - IWG

August 19, 1993 11:30 a.m. 6909

1. Political Situation - Briefing by Amb. Pezzullo
2. Review of Economic Assistance Package - AID, Treasury, State
 - Arrears clearing
 - Status of AID programs
 - Status of IFI programs
3. Sanctions Wrap-Up - IO, USOAS, Treasury, ARA/LP
4. Status of Deployment of International Presence - IO, DOD, ICITAP, ARA/LP
 - UN resolution, military survey team,
 - ICITAP rep to Haiti,

(Note to Invitees: Attendance should be limited to principal or substitute only)

160 mill/yr. - Carry over —

94 Budget 37 mill in

Dev Asst. Reg. Budget
15 mill ESF - jobs creation,
humanitarian + justice

Food aid

PL480

Title 2

20 mill.

+ democracy/

by Nov. 1 1993

future years
project what
will need + types
of activities

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

AID/LAC/CAR
FACSIMILE MESSAGE
COVER SHEET

DATE: August 24, 1993

SUBJECT: HAITI - AID PROGRAM - PART I -DESCRIPTION OF OUR
PROGRAM PORTFOLIO, DONORS ASSISTANCE, AND SPECIAL HAITI RECONSTRUCTION
AND RECONCILIATION FUNDS

NUMBER OF PAGES
INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET 27 24

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PAGES TO:

(NAME) Ms Amy Christensen (TITLE) _____
(OFFICE) ENVIR POLICY OFFICE/EOB (FAX NUMBER) 9-456-2710

THIS MESSAGE IS FROM:

(NAME) JOAN JOHNSON (TITLE) OFCR IN CHARGE HAITI AND DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
(OFFICE) AID/LAC/CARIBBEAN (TELEPHONE) 647-3448

(FAX NUMBER) 202-647-4791

NOTES: PART I IS BEING SENT FOR BACKGROUND INFO INCLUDING A DESCRIPTION
ON IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE AFTER POL RESOLUTION, LONGER TERM PLANNING PROJECTIONS
AND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER DONORS ON THE NEEDS FOR HAITI IN PREPARATION FOR CG MTG

PART II WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY AND WILL FOCUS ON PROJECTS AND THEIR
DESCRIPTIONS

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM: A-DA/AID, James H. Michel

SUBJECT: HAITI Present and Future Program

The attached two page briefing paper on Haiti is in response to your request for the status of our program in that country. The two page narrative outlines the current humanitarian assistance program, the post-resolution activities following a political settlement and our planned FY 94 program. It also provides budgets for FY 93 and FY 94.

Attachment: a/s

HAITI FACT SHEET

Current Humanitarian Assistance Program:

- In FY 1993, A.I.D. is providing approximately \$51 million in humanitarian assistance activities in Haiti through private voluntary organizations (PVOs). This includes:
 - Direct feeding of more than one-half million people daily through PVOs sponsored PL480 Title II programs;
 - Health care, child survival, family planning and AIDS prevention services, reaching approximately two million people; and
 - Selected development activities to mitigate environmental and economic deterioration and provide support for the restoration of democracy.
- Since January 1992, A.I.D. has provided \$7 million in ESF to support the OAS/UN international civilian mission to Haiti, i.e., up to 100 human rights observers. An additional \$10 million to support the OAS portion of the joint International Civilian Mission (ICM) is earmarked from the special Haiti Reconstruction and Reconciliation Fund. In FY 1994, a special peace-keeping (PKO) appropriation of \$28 million to expand the ICM has been requested.

Post-Resolution Economic Recovery Strategy to be implemented upon the restoration of a constitutional democracy:

- Using reprogrammed FY 1993 funds authorized under the Haiti Reconstruction and Reconciliation Fund, A.I.D. will finance the following transition support for a new government:
 - initiate a labor intensive infrastructure rehabilitation program through the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) and other entities to provide short-term (30 to 90 days) employment for up to 163,000 workers (cumulative) over a one year period on various micro and community-based projects (\$4 million plus local currency when available);
 - assist the GOM in clearing arrears owed to international financial institutions (IFIs) to allow the reactivation of suspended loans from the multilateral development banks and access to IMF stabilization assistance (\$8 million);
 - begin a new activity to strengthen the justice sector through administration of justice project (\$3 million) and a parallel ICITAP police professionalisation and training project (\$4 million); and
 - Reactivate suspended projects totalling \$5.4 million to provide (a) technical assistance to development ministries in developing their short- and medium-term policies and administrative capacity, and (b) support Haitian public and private democratic institutions, and (c) reactivate other project activities with direct GOM implementation.

USAID's FY 1994 Planned Activities:

- A.I.D. is working with the IFIs and other major bilateral donors to design a coordinated long-term development effort providing \$1 billion in resources over a five-year period to a democratic civilian government in Haiti.*
- USAID's FY 1994 program will continue the current humanitarian feeding and health care activities; fund the balance of the transitional activities in employment generation, BOP support and judicial reform; and reactivate USAID's longer-term development activities on hold since the September 1991 coup.

Budget Levels:	FY 1993 Actual	FY 1994 Proposed
<u>Humanitarian Assistance:</u>		
DA	\$27.5 million	37.0 million
ESF	8.7 million(a)	15.0 million
PL480 T-II	15.0 million	13.3 million
PL480 T-III	20.0 million	TBD (c)
<u>Other:</u>		
OAS/UN Observers	7.0 million	-----
R&R Fund	31.0 million(b)	-----
PKO	-	28.0 million
Total	\$109.2 million	93.3 million

*Per the July 3rd agreement signed by President Aristide and the de facto government, constitutional democracy will return when a new Prime Minister, appointed by President Aristide and confirmed by the Haitian Parliament, assumes office.

- (a) Excludes \$7.0 million provided to the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission; and \$31.0 million in prior year ESF reprogrammed for the Haiti Reconstruction and Reconciliation (R&R) Fund approved June 25, 1993 under Section 614 authority of the FAA.
- (b) Total includes \$10 million to OAS/UN but excludes \$5.4 million in prior year DA obligations, previously suspended.
- (c) FY 1994 PL 480 Title III budget figures not yet available.

Draft

Post-Crisis Resolution Program For Haiti

Following a successful resolution of the political crisis, the immediate aim of the USAID program will be to help ensure continuation of democratic systems through employment generation, strengthening democratic and judicial institutions, and stabilization of the economy, while continuing the large ongoing feeding and health care programs. The restored government's capacity will be developed to work in partnership with PVOs, and to complement or fill in the areas not covered by current PVO programs.

A. Short-term Job Creation: USAID is preparing a one-year, labor-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation program estimated at \$32.5 million in dollars and local currency. It will employ approximately 161,000 people for an average of two months each. By the end of the first six months of operation, over 32,000 persons will be working and approximately 44,000 persons will have worked between 30-90 days each.

The World Bank and IDB have an approved, but frozen, \$23.9 million Economic and Social Fund project (FAES) with the Government of Haiti to generate short-term employment, while improving the country's economic infrastructure. USG employment generation activities would serve as a one-year bridge until the IDB/IBRD project could be fully activated.

The labor-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation program will have three components:

1. **NGO Program:** Administered by the Pan American Development Foundation (PAHO) and implemented by a broad local NGO network, the project will focus on rehabilitation of productive infrastructure, environmental protection, solid waste disposal and drainage canal cleaning in rural and urban areas throughout the country. The total cost is estimated to be \$16.5 million in dollars (under the Enhancing Food Security Project) and local currency (pending availability). The NGO program will peak in the tenth month with 40,000 people working each day. Approximately 100,000 people throughout the country will have worked an average of two months each by the end of one year of operation of the program.

2. **Municipal Government Program:** Both the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), a U.S. PVO, and possibly other NGOs will work with municipal government officials to upgrade vector control through solid waste disposal and drainage canal cleaning, while other NGOs will concentrate on the repair of urban infrastructure. CHF had begun an urban garbage removal program with the office of the elected mayor of Port-au-Prince prior to the coup, and is prepared to continue and expand this program. The Port-au-Prince garbage removal program will employ

approximately 1,500 people for about 1.5 months each by the end of one year of operation. At the peak of the program, approximately 400 people from the PAP slums will be working each day. A much smaller, pilot public works program, administered by another U.S. PVO in conjunction with the mayors of provincial capitals, will develop the managerial capacity of municipal governments while improving local infrastructure and providing short-term employment.

3. (GOH Public Works Program: This program will be administered by GOH ministries, especially the Ministry of Public Works. This activity will be funded with local currency when it becomes available. Host country-owned local currency generated by pre-coup PL 480 and ESF Programs, frozen following the coup, could be used to support this program contingent upon GOH concurrence. Available resources amount to the equivalent of about \$4.5 million, but their value is eroding due to the falling value of the Haitian gourde. At current value, the frozen local currency would cover the first six months of the program. Beyond the sixth month, new local currency generations of \$10 million would be needed to reach the target of 60,000 people throughout the country who will have worked an average of two months each by the end of one year of operation of the program.

B. Democracy and Administration of Justice:

1. (Democracy: With political resolution, assistance to democratic NGOs and the labor movement will continue and be expanded. Programs to foster democratic development and the rule of law will be fully reactivated. Project reactivation of USAID democracy activities could include support in the following areas:

- **The National Assembly:** A needs assessment was started in mid-1991 and interrupted with the coup. Reactivation in this area could include the following assistance to the National Assembly: a) in-country orientation seminars for both chambers, b) orientation tours to visit U.S. legislative bodies; and c) an assessment of training and equipment needs.
- **Political Parties:** Grants were negotiated with the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute in 1991 to support political party building programs. No work had begun before the coup.
- **Permanent Electoral Council (CEP):** Funds are available for technical assistance to the CEP to establish a permanent electoral registry and to revise electoral logistical processes. As the CEP had not been constituted before the coup, this component never began.

- **Local Government:** Funds are available to support and strengthen the management and administrative capacity of local, elected government bodies and assist them with decentralized economic development efforts. The coup interrupted final planning for this component.

2. Administration of Justice: With political resolution, a new Administration of Justice (AOJ) project will help to improve the justice sector's operations and capacity to ensure due process and access to legal representation for the Haitian people. Assistance to the justice system must be carefully coordinated with that provided to other critical sectors, such as the military and the police. The project will include measures to increase judicial independence, efficiency, and accountability and increase public access to the legal system. Specific project activities will be subject to negotiations with the restored democratic government, but could include: 1) assistance to improve administrative systems in the courts and the Ministry of Justice; 2) in-service training for justice sector personnel; 3) alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms; and 4) justice advocacy and public outreach.

C. Balance of Payments Support: A third major element of the immediate post-resolution USAID program will be balance of payments support to the GOH to help clear an estimated \$40 million in debt arrears to the international financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank) which bar assistance from those organizations. While the unfreezing of GOH dollar accounts in the U.S. and elsewhere will make a significant amount of foreign exchange available to the GOH to help clear the arrears, the U.S. and other bilateral donors must also assist. Specific amounts of U.S. and other country assistance will be subject to negotiations with the GOH. A new P.L. 480 Title III program can provide additional balance of payments support and help stabilize the prices of food staples. Local currency generations from both sources will be used for economic development activities that complement and strengthen implementation of the USAID strategy, including logistical support for the P.L. 480 Title II feeding program and development of indigenous NGOs, and support food security, health and environmentally-related programs of voluntary agencies, USAID and other donors.

D. Policy and Administrative Reform: The reactivated Policy and Administrative Reform Project (PAR) will address needs across the the entire program during the post-crisis resolution period. Resources will be made available to the GOH for the reform of its administrative structures, particularly in the Ministry of Finance, and the analyses and development of its macroeconomic and sectoral policy options.

E. Promotion of Business: The reactivation of the Promotion of Business and Exports Project (PROBE) will support the identification of sector targets, the development of proper

policy incentives to investment, and the reestablishment of an institutional framework for public sector-private sector dialogue and cooperation. The project design will be revised to accommodate changes in the policy setting after two years of project suspension, as well as Section 599 of the Foreign Appropriations Act.

The First 120 Days

Implementation of the post-crisis resolution program assumes a USG determination to demonstrate rapid, substantive support for the new, albeit fragile, democratic government of Haiti. This strategy incorporates new initiatives and the resumption of suspended assistance activities. Implementation will require speedy action at the policy level to amend or remove existing U.S. executive and legislative sanctions, and international sanctions which would otherwise constrain activities.

While such sanctions do not apply to a portion of the funds cited below (Haiti Reconstruction and Reconciliation Fund), they either remain in effect for all others or the existing USG policy of providing only humanitarian assistance precludes the use of funds for certain activities until political resolution is achieved.

Immediate legal measures to permit the resumption of bilateral assistance include:

- Reversal of OAS and UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting assistance to the Government of Haiti and imposing an embargo and freeze of government assets;

- A presidential determination (delegated to the Secretary of State) under Section 614 authority to lift the Section 513 prohibition on assistance to countries that have had a military coup;

- Revocation of U.S. executive orders and Part 580 of the Code of Federal Regulations freezing the assets of the Haitian Government and specially designated nationals of the *de facto* regime, and imposing the embargo;

- Expeditionary lifting of 620 (q) and Brooke-Alexander amendment restrictions to permit unrestricted resumption of bilateral assistance;

- Encouragement of the use of frozen GOH assets to clear arrears in debt repayment to the USC and international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank). The U.S. and other donors would contribute towards payment of the balance. Only after these arrears are paid will the IFIs be able to unblock funds frozen under prior development projects or advance additional credit to the GOH.

Immediately Available Post Resolution Resources

<u>Ongoing Humanitarian (A)</u>	<u>FY 93 OYB</u>	<u>Conting. Fund</u>	<u>Total</u>
Child Survival (a)	10,517,290	0	10,517,290
Feeding (b)	4,151,772	0	4,151,772
Population & Family Planning	5,200,210	0	5,200,210
AIDS	2,200,000	0	2,200,000
Agriculture (c)	5,371,231	0	5,371,231
Education & Training (d)	846,111	0	846,111
Micro-Enterprise	491,065	0	491,065
Democracy	2,936,260	0	2,936,260
Sub-total	31,713,939	0	31,713,939
<u>New Activities (B)</u>			
Administration of Justice	100,000	3,000,000	3,100,000
Arrears Clearing	0	8,500,000	8,500,000
Title III	0	0	0
Jobs	450,000	4,250,000	4,700,000
Sub-total	550,000	15,750,000	16,300,000
Current OYB (A + B)	32,263,939	15,750,000	48,013,939
<u>Reactivation</u>			
	<u>Pipeline</u>		
Policy and Administrative Reform	2,700,000		2,700,000
Priv. Sector Development (PROBE)	1,106,934		1,106,934
Democracy	697,642		697,642
Sub-total	4,504,576	0	4,504,576

a/ Child Survival includes:
 Voluntary Agencies for Child Survival
 Expanded Urban Health
 Awareness & Prevention of Drug Abuse
 Program Development & Support (PD&S)

b/ Feeding includes:
 Enhancing Food Security
 Program Development & Support (PD&S)

c/ Agriculture includes:
 Targeted Watershed Management
 Coffee Revitalization
 Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS)
 Seed Multiplication & Distribution
 Program Development & Support (PD&S) - *capacity building*

d/ Education and Training includes:
 Incentives to Improve Basic Education
 Leadership Training (CLASP II)

PO:SGREGOIRE - 7/16/93

Impact of Current and Post-Crisis Resolution Programs

- **Child Survival:** Under various projects and in cooperation with international institutions and NCOs, the program currently provides vaccinations, nutritional surveillance, oral rehydration therapy and treatment of acute respiratory infections to about half of Haiti's children.
- **Feeding Program:** As of July 1, 1993, the PL 480 Title II program was feeding over 500,000 Haitians per day.
- **Family Planning:** Over 750,000 people are provided access to family planning services in both urban and isolated rural areas. Services include condoms, oral contraceptives, NORPLANT and voluntary surgical contraception.
- **AIDS Prevention and Control:** Almost one million people benefit from USAID-supported AIDS control activities, which focus on condom distribution to high-HIV-risk groups.
- **Agriculture:** Since October 1992, more than 4,000 small farmers have received training and technical assistance in appropriate, environmentally-sustainable agricultural technologies which seek to increase and improve food production and rural incomes. *Repigification?*
- **Education and Training:** Curricula and teacher training programs are provided for 236 private schools, which serve as models for some 4000 other primary schools in Haiti's private-sector dominated basic education system. Seventy-eight Haitians are receiving short and long-term training in the U.S. in FY 93. Next year an estimated 150 participants will receive training in the U.S.
- **Microenterprise:** About 250 loans are being provided to microentrepreneurs in FY 1993. These figures are expected to at least double within the first 120 days after political settlement.
- **Democracy:** Over 2,000 indigent Haitians have received legal aid under this program in FY 1993. Four labor confederations have been kept in operation. Following political settlement, activities with the National Assembly, political parties, local government bodies, and expanded civic education activities are expected to benefit, directly or indirectly, large segments of the Haitian people.
- **Administration of Justice:** Following political settlement, this new initiative will support the separation of the police from the military, support the Ministry of Justice's new role and functions and provide technical assistance and training to the courts and MOJ, thereby benefitting the entire Haitian nation.

- **Balance of Payments (Arrears-Clearing):** The U.S. will contribute funds to help the GOH clear its arrears on loan repayments to the World Bank, IMF and Inter-American Development Bank. The GOH will pay a substantial portion of those arrears; the U.S. and other donors will supply the remainder. Payment of the arrears is required to enable the international financial institutions to unblock funds under suspended development projects with the GOH and make Haiti eligible for new loans.

- **PL 480 Title III Program:** The program will provide up to \$20 million worth of wheat flour to the GOH for sale through private channels. This will ease foreign currency needs, help stabilize the price of an essential commodity and provide local currency generations to fund public sector participation in the job creation initiative (up to 60,000 short-term jobs), support for the feeding program and development efforts in health, agriculture and other sectors.

- **Jobs:** Approximately 102,000 jobs will be created under the NGO and municipal government components of the job creation initiative.

- **Policy and Administrative Reform:** Reactivation of this effort will permit economic policy and public administration assistance to the GOH.

- **Promotion of Business and Exports:** This project will improve, expand and professionalize trade and investment promotion services to a wide spectrum of businesses in Haiti. The anticipated long-term outcomes will be more local and other investment, thereby leading to economic growth and jobs.

- *Targeted Watershed Mgmt.*

Draft- Projected Plans

USAID/Haiti

Long-Term Development Program⁸

A definitive articulation of USAID/Haiti's long term development strategy must await consultation with the eventual Haitian Government and be harmonized with the programs of other donors, most importantly the World Bank and the IMF.⁹ The broad outlines of the existing USAID strategy continue to represent the most valid, workable response to the main constraints to Haitian development and presents the broad outlines of the long-term program. It addresses three major development objectives:

- strengthening of public and private democratic institutions which reinforce the rule of law, foster respect for human rights and respond to the needs of the Haitian people,
- promotion of sustainable, private sector-led, equitable economic growth, and
- as a special concern, protection and development of human resources to lay a sound basis for enduring democracy and sustained economic growth.

It is essential to recognize the interrelationship and interdependence of these objectives: democracy cannot survive without notable improvement in the economy, in living conditions, and in education; the economy cannot grow in the absence of an environment of political stability, fairly applied rule of law, respect and protection of human rights and a healthy and educated workforce; and there can be little improvement in the quality of Haitians' lives without democracy and economic growth.

Objective 1: Strengthen governance and responsiveness in key public sector institutions

This objective will be achieved by means of:

- Increased effectiveness of administrative systems in both chambers of the National Assembly
- Improved effectiveness and accountability of the Executive Branch
- Effective Judicial System reinforcing the equitable rule of law. (Provisional pending precise focus of the Administration of Justice Program)
- Strengthened electoral systems
- Strengthened local and municipal governments

Objective 2: Strengthen private organizations participating in an emerging civic society

This objective will be achieved by means of:

- Stronger political parties at the national, regional, and local levels
- Strengthened, sustainable indigenous NGO capabilities
- Strengthened independent and democratically-oriented trade unions throughout the country
- Strengthened independent print and electronic media throughout the country
- Broadened access to public and private legal representation
- Human rights organizations with enhanced capacity
- Improved capability of civic, professional, and community organizations to increase citizen participation
- Effective, functioning interest groups monitoring the judiciary.

✓ *enviro/agric NGOs*
Objective 3: Broaden private sector-led economic growth

This objective has two subobjectives:

Subobjective: Increased trade, investment, and off-farm employment. This will be achieved through:

- Trade, licensing, import policies and regulations modified to stimulate economic growth
- Increased credit used by women and men in small businesses, microenterprises, and the informal sector, particularly in provincial areas to expand production
- Increase in value-added industry for competitive Haitian products
- New private-sector jobs created
- Increased provincial business and microenterprise activity
- Increased competition and investment resulting from elimination of monopolies and protectionism

Subobjective: Protect the environment for diversified agriculture to reach new markets. This will be achieved through:

- Preservation of the remaining forested watersheds
- Increased small farmer response to expanded range of domestic and export markets
- Increased production on locally managed and maintained irrigation systems
- Environmentally sustainable increases in production of higher value crops for domestic and export markets by farmers who practice improved soil and water management

Objective 4: Strengthen the human resource base in support of economic growth and democracy

✓ *no enviro/sust. dev. capacity building*

This objective has four subobjectives:

Subobjective: Improved health and nutritional status of Haitian families. This will be achieved by means of:

- Increased use of modern family planning methods

- Improved health and nutrition status of infants and young children
- Improved nutrition of school-age children
- Improved health status of women of child-bearing age
- Reduced spread of HIV infection
- Increased access to potable water and sanitation for targeted rural families
- As a special concern, increased access to drug prevention and rehabilitation services

Subobjective: Enhanced capacity of individuals to participate and contribute to personal and national development through formal education. This will be achieved through:

- Increased numbers of girls and boys attain acceptable levels in primary schools and complete education through grade 4
- Adult women and men trained to professional levels required to manage private and public sector service programs

Subobjective: More effective and efficient Haitian health service delivery and primary education institutions at the local level. This will be achieved through the following:

- Increased local participation in decisions affecting family health and education
- Increased access to health services in depressed rural and urban areas
- Improved efficiency of primary education institutions
- Improved policies in the social sectors that take advantage of private sector delivery capabilities

Subobjective: Safety net provided for socially marginalized groups. This will be done through the following means:

- Emergency food relief provided to families as required
- Increased temporary employment in target areas
- Improved access to food for pre-school and primary-school age children

Illustrative Program Funding (In millions of dollars)

Annual Requirements	
Development Assistance	40.0
Economic Support Funds	50.0
PL 480 Title II*	0.0
PL 480 Title III	10.0
Totals	100.0

* Does not include \$10 million monetized Title II carried over from FY 1992.

p:\haiti\pub\houselongterm.prq March 26, 1993
USAID/Haiti

Projected

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1993

Presidential Determination
No. 93-28

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Haiti
Reconstruction and Reconciliation Fund

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), I hereby:

- (1) determine that it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish to Haiti up to \$36.4 million in assistance from Development Assistance obligated for Haiti, and under Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of Part II of the Act from Economic Support Funds (ESF) previously allocated for Peru and ESF deobligated from Bolivia, without regard to sections 513 and 518 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-391), and sections 620(q) and 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), or any other provision of law within the scope of section 614;
- (2) determine that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to furnish up to \$918,000 in assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act from Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds previously obligated for Haiti and \$350,000 in FMF previously obligated for Peru, without regard to section 513, the proviso in section 515(b), and section 518 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-391), and sections 620(q) and 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), or any other provision of law within the scope of section 614; and
- (3) authorize the furnishing of such assistance and the making and financing of such sales.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and section 621 of the Act, I hereby:

- (1) delegate to the Secretary of State the authority conferred upon the President to make determinations under section 610 of the Act for the purpose of transferring ESF funds available for assistance described in paragraph (1) of this determination to, and consolidating such funds with, funds available under Chapters 5 and 6 of Part II of the Act for Haiti; and
- (2) authorize the Secretary of State to take any other actions appropriate with respect to such a transfer.

The Secretary of State is hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.

William J. Clinton

Reconstruction + Reconciliation
FY 1993 Haiti Contingency Fund
Notional Allocation of Resources

<i>obligated 8/14/93</i>					
1.	UN/OAS Observer Mission	\$10.0 million	ESF	7.2 ✓	
2.	Military Professionalization	\$ 1.25 million 1.168 million	IMET FMF	6.250 ✓	
3.	Police Professionalization (ICITAP)	4.0 million	ESF	0.500 8.000	
4.	Administration of Justice (USAID)	3.0 million	ESF	3.000	
5.	Economic Stabilization*	12.75 million	ESF	8.000 9.000	
6.	Reactivate Ongoing DA Programs**	5.4 million	DA	0.500	
TOTAL		\$37.568 million			

* Includes clearing of arrears, critical BOP support and jobs creation

** Includes already obligated activities in democracy initiatives, macroeconomic policy and financial management

Note: Section 610 of the FAA is expected to be applied only to the conversion of a very small amount of ESF to IMET or, as needed, to PKO.

+ 250
500 - 350
unprogrammed 2.9 million

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Pursuant to Section 632a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended ("FAA"), the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993, (Public Law 102-391), and Presidential Determination No. 93-28, dated June 25, 1993, Reconstruction and Reconciliation Fund, the Agency for International Development hereby agrees to allocate to the Department of State the amount of Ten Million United States Dollars (\$10,000,000) from the Economic Support Fund ("ESF") to the Organization of American States ("OAS") for its participation with the United Nations (the "UN"), in the joint International Civilian Mission (ICM "observers") to monitor human rights violations in Haiti.

The above amount is in addition to the five million dollars in ESF funds furnished to the joint OAS/UN ICM observers in Haiti pursuant to Section 451 of the FAA approved by the Secretary of State on February 9, 1993 under Memorandum of Agreement dated February 10, 1993 and the two million dollars in ESF furnished to the OAS for similar activities in Haiti pursuant to Presidential Determination No. 92-13 and Memoranda of Agreements dated February 5, 1992 and January 26, 1993.

This allocation is made under the following terms and conditions:

1. The funds allocated under this agreement must be obligated by the Department of State by September 30, 1993.
2. The Department of State shall receive the allocation as a Treasury Department Non-Expenditure Transfer Authorization (SF-1151) and assure that these funds are not commingled with funds received from other sources. The Department of State will keep full and complete accounts with respect to obligated funds in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
3. The Department of State will enter into a written agreement with the OAS describing the program to be undertaken with the funds provided under this Agreement and based on the attached projected budget requirements (see illustrative budget

July 1993 to December 1993). The aforementioned agreement will contain a provision pursuant to which the OAS will undertake not to expend more than seventy percent (70%) of these funds prior to December 31, 1993 without prior consultation with A.I.D. Any expenditures for contingency purposes within the attached budget will be the subject of prior consultations with A.I.D.

U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States (the "USOAS") will manage and monitor the program on behalf of the Department of State. The program will continue deployment of civilian observers to monitor human rights and related conditions in Haiti under the present joint OAS/UN international civilian mission for a period up to one year. The activities of these ICM observers will include, but not be limited to, contributing to the reduction of political violence and promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law in Haiti.

4. The USOAS will provide the following reports:

- (a) monthly financial reports showing obligations/commitments and expenditures by budget line item; and
- (b) quarterly progress reports on ICM activities funded by those resources.


5. The Department of State shall provide a monthly report on Budget Execution (SF-133), in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-34, and a fiscal year-end certification (TFS-2108) to the A.I.D. Office of Finance and Administration (FA). The USOAS shall also certify at the conclusion of the program, based on reports and documents reviewed and accepted by and received from the OAS, that the allocated funds were expended for the purposes authorized herein.

6. The Department of State will require the grantees, OAS, to return to the Department of State any funds allocated under this Agreement (i) that have not been expended by the OAS by December 31, 1994 or (ii) that were not expended for the purposes authorized herein, and, upon receipt, will deobligate such funds and return them to A.I.D. through a Treasury Department Non-Expenditure Transfer Authorization (SF-1151).

7. The normal audit policies and procedures of the OAS shall apply to the use of these funds.

8. This agreement may be modified or canceled upon mutual agreement of the parties in writing.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Kevin E. Carroll
Executive Director
Bureau for International
Organization Affairs

Date: August 19, 1993

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT



Norma J. Parker
Acting Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean

Date: August 19, 1993

Fiscal Data:

Project No.: 521-0240

Appropriation No: 19-112/31037

Amount: \$10 million

Attachment -

OAS Illustrative Budget

P. 02

FAX NO. 2024506250

OAS SEC FOR MANAGEMENT

AUG-19-93 THU 13:03

INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION IN HAITI OAS/UN
ESTIMATED COSTS JULY TO DECEMBER, 1993

Description	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	TOTAL
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS:	688.8	688.8	688.8	688.8	688.8	688.8	4,132.8
133 Observer 6 month contract extensions				2,394.0 **			2,394.0
HARDSHIP/DANGER PAY:	231.7	225.0	225.0	231.7	225.0	231.7	1,370.0
133 Observer 6 months hardship allowance				798.0 **			798.0
LOCAL CONTRACTS:	54.2	54.2	54.2	54.2	54.2	54.2	325.2
Additional Security for HQ and sub offices		3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	17.5
TRAVEL AND TRAINING RELATED EXPENSES	19.8	20.2	19.8	20.2	19.8	20.2	119.8
Additional travel during negotiations	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	36.0
INSURANCE:	31.2	31.2	31.2	31.2	31.2	31.2	187.2
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES:	55.1	55.1	55.1	55.1	55.1	55.1	330.6
Generators, telephone system			83.0				83.0
OFFICE SPACE, MAINTENANCE AND UTILITIES:	33.0	33.1	33.0	33.1	33.0	33.1	198.8
2 additional regional offices		3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	18.5
Public Information/Civic Education		20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	120.0
5% Contingency Fund							500.0
TOTALS	\$1,119.7	\$1,117.1	\$1,199.6	\$4,315.7	\$1,116.6	\$1,123.7	\$10,610.9

NOTE: Costs not included in 7/16/93 draft budget are indicated by lower case letters

** All 133 observer contracts expire on October 31, 1993 and need to be extended for 6 months (until 4/30/94) prior to that date to ensure continuity of the Mission observer complement. The CAS must assume full cost of the 6 month contract extensions, including hardship allowance, on the date of these extensions in order to adhere to proper contracting procedures and to gain firm commitments from observers. The figures included in the month of October represent the cost of these contract extensions from 1/1/94 to 4/30/94. The figures in November and December represent the first two months of the extensions.

LAC/CAR

TEL: 2002-647-4791

Aug 24, 93

14:50 No. 002 P. 21

United Nations
Development Programme



World Development

EMERGENCY ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM

HAITI

Preliminary Report of the Joint Mission

July 1993



HAITI - REVIEW MEETING FOR THE MULTIAGENCY MISSION

1. As agreed in April 1993, a UNDP organized multi-agency mission comprising representatives of IDB, IMF, FAO, OAS, USAID and several technical consultants visited Haiti during May 16 to June 4, 1993. A one-day workshop to debrief the agencies participating in the mission was held in the World Bank on June 18, 1993. The workshop was attended by the mission chief, Mr. Favilla and several mission members and representatives from the World Bank (headed by Mr. Delvoie, LA3C2), IDB (Mr. Bobb), IMF (Mr. Williams), OAS (Messrs. Sakamoto and Humud), UNDP (Mr. Larrabure) and USAID (Ms. Tyson).

Mission Background

2. The mission was not allowed to contact officials from the de facto Government and worked with the assistance of a team of Haitian counterparts which were selected by the Presidential Commission working on behalf of President Aristide. The Haitian team was led by Madame Rey, Minister of Finance of the Aristide Government, who also worked closely with the private sector development experts.

3. Despite good collaboration with the counterpart team, the lack of access to the de facto administration made it difficult to obtain or validate information, and significantly impeded the progress of the mission. Hence, the following description of the economic situation is highly tentative.

Preliminary Mission Findings

4. The economic situation has deteriorated considerably following the coup. Real GDP dropped by an estimated 10% in fiscal year^{1/} (FY) 91/92, and is expected to fall by 4% in FY92/93. At the same time, the exchange rate has depreciated by 43% from end-September 1992 to end-May 1993 and inflation is estimated to have increased from 32% in FY91/92 to 60% in FY92/93. Arrears have been increasing to an estimated US\$105 million by end-May 1993, of which US\$34 million are owed to multilateral financial institutions, about US\$15 million to bilateral creditors, and the remaining to commercial creditors. Public finances have deteriorated rapidly. The overall public sector deficit is projected to increase from 3% of GDP in FY90/91 to 10% of GDP in FY91/92, and to 13.5% of GDP in FY92/93. To a large extent, the deficit has been monetized. Economic mismanagement, including large increases in unaccounted-for expenditures and a 50% decline in revenue collection, rather than the embargo is to be blamed for the current gross fiscal and monetary imbalances. Any sustainable recovery program would have to address these imbalances immediately.

1/ The fiscal year covers October 1 to September 30.

5. The sector experts analyzed the developments in the areas of private sector development, agriculture, energy, interurban transport, ports, urban infrastructure, water and sanitation, education, health, food and nutrition. In all sectors, the need for assistance is overwhelming. Most of the problems facing the sectors are structural in nature, and have only been aggravated, not caused, by the post-coup developments. On the whole, the mission identified investments for a tentative 6-12 month emergency program amounting to about US\$170 million excluding contingencies. (private sector development: US\$30 million; agriculture: US\$43 million; energy: US\$24 million; interurban transport: US\$15 million; ports: US\$3 million; urban infrastructure: US\$8 million, water and sanitation: US\$15 million; education: US\$9 million; and health, food and nutrition: US\$23 million).

Follow-up

6. The meeting agreed that the macroeconomic findings and projections for 1993 had to be regarded as rather tentative, as they are based on third-hand information. Also, the estimates will have to be reviewed in light of the recent UN sanctions, including the oil embargo. Further, the financing plan needs to be reworked to adequately reflect expected assistance needs on a monthly basis for the first 12 months of the emergency economic recovery program. On these and other macroeconomic issues, the IMF will take the lead and be responsible for the drafting of the macroeconomic chapter of the mission report. USAID will support the IMF in obtaining data on arrears and blocked funds in escrow accounts. Finally, it was agreed that the implementation mechanisms proposed for the Economic Emergency Recovery Program needed to be analyzed further. To this end, World Bank, IDB and UNDP will have further consultations.

7. To follow up the mission, it was agreed that further debriefing meetings will take place and an aide memoire will be presented to bilateral donors and the Constitutional Government by end-July. This will be followed by a final mission report by mid-August which could provide the base for a CGCED meeting pending the resolution of the constitutional crisis. The mission report will be a UNDP document, but the participating agencies should be "in agreement" with the contents of the report.

Action

11

VND/UB Report - Emergency Recovery
C/C Basis

HAITI
Tentative Financing Plan
August 93 - December 94
(In US\$ millions)

	1993 Aug Nov	1993-94 Dec-Dec	SUM
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE	-125	-195	-320
EXTERNAL ARREARS (1)	-45	-30	-75
<i>Multilateral</i>	-45	0	-45
<i>Other</i>	0	-30	-30
BUDGETARY SUPPORT (2)	-50	n/a	-50
EERP	-30	-165	-195
<i>Multilateral</i>	0	-100	-100
<i>Other</i>	-30	-65	-95
GENERAL BOP SUPPORT	n/a	n/a	n/a
PROJECT DISBURSEMENTS	n/a	n/a	n/a
HUMANITARIAN AID (3)	-30	-100	-130
GOVERNANCE	-20	-45	-65
POLICE AND ARMY	-5	-20	-25
CIVILIAN OBSERVER FORCE	-10	-20	-30
JUDICIARY REFORM	-5	-5	-10
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM (4)	0	-20	-20
SUM FINANCIAL NEEDS	-175	-360	-535
MEMORANDUM ITEM			
IMF DISBURSEMENTS	0	35	35

- (1) Information on commercial arrears to be updated
(2) US\$ 10-15 million per month during 3-4 months (IMF will determine) (needs quick)
(3) Expected to decline as project disbursements and EERP are implemented
(4) Rough estimate; technical work not yet initiated